July 2017 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[translation/tails-persistence-setup] Update translations for tails-persistence-setup
by translation＠torproject.org 24 Jul '17

24 Jul '17

commit 54bc8f611943c91fb98592d9c01a1f8dfb933615 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 24 23:15:50 2017 +0000 Update translations for tails-persistence-setup --- id/id.po | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/id/id.po b/id/id.po index 55399a419..3125da78e 100644 --- a/id/id.po +++ b/id/id.po @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ # adhisuryo i <adhisuryo(a)gmail.com>, 2015 # cholif yulian <cholifyulian123(a)gmail.com>, 2015 # Dwi Cahyono <dwexz_cie(a)yahoo.com>, 2015 +# Eljuno Kasih <eljunotrie_anggoro(a)yahoo.co.id>, 2017 # hermawan <hermawanadhis(a)gmail.com>, 2014 # Lucas Susanto <susantolucas(a)yahoo.com>, 2015 # km242saya <pencurimangga(a)gmail.com>, 2014 @@ -17,8 +18,8 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: Tails developers <tails(a)boum.org>\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2017-05-15 13:51+0200\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2017-07-14 15:30+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: carolyn <carolyn(a)anhalt.org>\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2017-07-24 22:56+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: Eljuno Kasih <eljunotrie_anggoro(a)yahoo.co.id>\n" "Language-Team: Indonesian (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/id/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -60,11 +61,11 @@ msgstr "Profil Pidgin dan keyring OTR" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:88 msgid "Thunderbird" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Thunderbird" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:90 msgid "Thunderbird profiles and locally stored email" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Profil Thunderbird dan surel yang disimpan secara lokal" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:98 msgid "GNOME Keyring"

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[tor/master] Fix remaining cases of hs_config failures without af_unix
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Jul '17

24 Jul '17

commit a4217cc52f0369efc01d0670ba789f6900e15244 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 24 15:58:11 2017 -0400 Fix remaining cases of hs_config failures without af_unix --- src/test/test_hs_config.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_config.c b/src/test/test_hs_config.c index 16f51f808..4d4bbb889 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_config.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_config.c @@ -286,7 +286,9 @@ test_valid_service_v2(void *arg) "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" "HiddenServicePort 65535\n" "HiddenServicePort 22 1.1.1.1:22\n" +#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H "HiddenServicePort 9000 unix:/path/to/socket\n" +#endif "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient stealth charlie,romeo\n" "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts 0\n" "HiddenServiceMaxStreams 42\n" @@ -368,7 +370,9 @@ test_valid_service_v3(void *arg) "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" "HiddenServicePort 80\n" "HiddenServicePort 22 localhost:22\n" +#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H "HiddenServicePort 42 unix:/path/to/socket\n" +#endif "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts 1\n" "HiddenServiceMaxStreams 42\n" "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit 0\n" @@ -385,7 +389,9 @@ test_valid_service_v3(void *arg) "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" "HiddenServicePort 65535\n" "HiddenServicePort 22 1.1.1.1:22\n" +#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H "HiddenServicePort 9000 unix:/path/to/socket\n" +#endif "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts 0\n" "HiddenServiceMaxStreams 42\n" "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit 0\n" @@ -434,7 +440,9 @@ test_staging_service_v3(void *arg) "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" "HiddenServicePort 65535\n" "HiddenServicePort 22 1.1.1.1:22\n" +#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H "HiddenServicePort 9000 unix:/path/to/socket\n" +#endif "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts 0\n" "HiddenServiceMaxStreams 42\n" "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit 0\n"

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[tor/master] Fix hs_config unit test on systems without unix sockets
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Jul '17

24 Jul '17

commit 661e31769795949acec36cbc24f0a1eb1db8b653 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 24 15:13:23 2017 -0400 Fix hs_config unit test on systems without unix sockets Bugfix on 418059dd96f5f427eceffff1daeb2a2f6c4adbeb; jenkins found this. --- src/test/test_hs_config.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_config.c b/src/test/test_hs_config.c index 343ce9f2f..16f51f808 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_config.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_config.c @@ -266,7 +266,9 @@ test_valid_service_v2(void *arg) "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" "HiddenServicePort 80\n" "HiddenServicePort 22 localhost:22\n" +#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H "HiddenServicePort 42 unix:/path/to/socket\n" +#endif "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient basic alice,bob,eve\n" "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts 1\n" "HiddenServiceMaxStreams 42\n"

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[tor/master] Rename the hybrid_encrypt/decrypt functions; label them as dangerous
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Jul '17

24 Jul '17

commit 6c8c9731915a796c8a1bc11f376793459db1200f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 24 14:32:59 2017 -0400 Rename the hybrid_encrypt/decrypt functions; label them as dangerous We need to keep these around for TAP and old-style hidden services, but they're obsolete, and we shouldn't encourage anyone to use them. So I've added "obsolete" to their names, and a comment explaining what the problem is. Closes ticket 23026. --- changes/bug23026 | 4 ++++ src/common/crypto.c | 15 +++++++++++---- src/common/crypto.h | 4 ++-- src/or/onion_tap.c | 4 ++-- src/or/rendclient.c | 4 ++-- src/or/rendservice.c | 2 +- src/test/test.c | 3 ++- src/test/test_crypto.c | 4 ++-- src/test/test_introduce.c | 4 ++-- 9 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug23026 b/changes/bug23026 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b00745cfa --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug23026 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Code simplification and refactoring: + - Rename the obsolete malleable hybrid_encrypt functions used in + TAP and old hidden services to indicate that they aren't suitable + for new protocols or formats. Closes ticket 23026. diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 875b4eeb5..c258f239a 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -1238,9 +1238,12 @@ crypto_pk_private_sign_digest(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen, * - The beginning of the source data prefixed with a 16-byte symmetric key, * padded and encrypted with the public key; followed by the rest of * the source data encrypted in AES-CTR mode with the symmetric key. + * + * NOTE that this format does not authenticate the symmetrically encrypted + * part of the data, and SHOULD NOT BE USED for new protocols. */ int -crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, +crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen, const char *from, size_t fromlen, @@ -1302,10 +1305,14 @@ crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, return -1; } -/** Invert crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt. Returns the number of bytes - * written on success, -1 on failure. */ +/** Invert crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt. Returns the number of + * bytes written on success, -1 on failure. + * + * NOTE that this format does not authenticate the symmetrically encrypted + * part of the data, and SHOULD NOT BE USED for new protocols. + */ int -crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, +crypto_pk_obsolete_private_hybrid_decrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen, const char *from, diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h index 5951321c0..cde241dd3 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.h +++ b/src/common/crypto.h @@ -197,11 +197,11 @@ int crypto_pk_private_sign(const crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen, const char *from, size_t fromlen); int crypto_pk_private_sign_digest(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen, const char *from, size_t fromlen); -int crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, +int crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen, const char *from, size_t fromlen, int padding, int force); -int crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, +int crypto_pk_obsolete_private_hybrid_decrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen, const char *from, size_t fromlen, int padding, int warnOnFailure); diff --git a/src/or/onion_tap.c b/src/or/onion_tap.c index 928fcaabf..c71fa236e 100644 --- a/src/or/onion_tap.c +++ b/src/or/onion_tap.c @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_create(crypto_pk_t *dest_router_key, goto err; /* set meeting point, meeting cookie, etc here. Leave zero for now. */ - if (crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(dest_router_key, onion_skin_out, + if (crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt(dest_router_key, onion_skin_out, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, challenge, DH_KEY_LEN, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1)<0) @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake( k = i==0?private_key:prev_private_key; if (!k) break; - len = crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt(k, challenge, + len = crypto_pk_obsolete_private_hybrid_decrypt(k, challenge, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, onion_skin, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 441c371ba..e47e1ef63 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -286,9 +286,9 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, goto perm_err; } - /*XXX maybe give crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt a max_len arg, + /*XXX maybe give crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt a max_len arg, * to avoid buffer overflows? */ - r = crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(intro_key, payload+DIGEST_LEN, + r = crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt(intro_key, payload+DIGEST_LEN, sizeof(payload)-DIGEST_LEN, tmp, (int)(dh_offset+DH_KEY_LEN), diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index b5ef72e4f..98ed1100e 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -2732,7 +2732,7 @@ rend_service_decrypt_intro( /* Decrypt the encrypted part */ result = - crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt( + crypto_pk_obsolete_private_hybrid_decrypt( key, (char *)buf, sizeof(buf), (const char *)(intro->ciphertext), intro->ciphertext_len, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1); diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c index b6b11ce94..c5c394900 100644 --- a/src/test/test.c +++ b/src/test/test.c @@ -142,7 +142,8 @@ test_bad_onion_handshake(void *arg) /* Server: Case 1: the encrypted data is degenerate. */ memset(junk_buf, 0, sizeof(junk_buf)); - crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk, junk_buf2, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, + crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk, + junk_buf2, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, junk_buf, DH_KEY_LEN, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1); tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(junk_buf2, pk, NULL, diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index 4d9651db9..11200b4e9 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -1252,10 +1252,10 @@ test_crypto_pk(void *arg) for (i = 85; i < 140; ++i) { memset(data2,0,1024); memset(data3,0,1024); - len = crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk1,data2,sizeof(data2), + len = crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk1,data2,sizeof(data2), data1,i,PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,0); tt_int_op(len, OP_GE, 0); - len = crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt(pk1,data3,sizeof(data3), + len = crypto_pk_obsolete_private_hybrid_decrypt(pk1,data3,sizeof(data3), data2,len,PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,1); tt_int_op(len,OP_EQ, i); tt_mem_op(data1,OP_EQ, data3,i); diff --git a/src/test/test_introduce.c b/src/test/test_introduce.c index cfb8d83b1..5a2463047 100644 --- a/src/test/test_introduce.c +++ b/src/test/test_introduce.c @@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ make_intro_from_plaintext( /* * Figure out an upper bound on how big the ciphertext will be - * (see crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt()) + * (see crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt()) */ ciphertext_size = PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING_OVERHEAD; ciphertext_size += crypto_pk_keysize(key); @@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ make_intro_from_plaintext( tt_assert(r >= 0); /* Do encryption */ - r = crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt( + r = crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt( key, cell + DIGEST_LEN, ciphertext_size, buf, len, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 0);

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[torspec/master] Add a note on (not) using TLS compression.
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Jul '17

24 Jul '17

commit 7411e54cd7d7f2bbb70364218a35f2b48a8ee0ed Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 24 14:19:40 2017 -0400 Add a note on (not) using TLS compression. --- tor-spec.txt | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/tor-spec.txt b/tor-spec.txt index 86fdcc6..3be622f 100644 --- a/tor-spec.txt +++ b/tor-spec.txt @@ -390,6 +390,10 @@ see tor-design.pdf. exacerbate some attacks (e.g. the "Triple Handshake" attack from Feb 2013), and it plays havoc with forward secrecy guarantees. + Implementations SHOULD NOT allow TLS compression -- although we don't + know a way to apply a CRIME-style attack to current Tor directly, + it's a waste of resources. + 3. Cell Packet format The basic unit of communication for onion routers and onion

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[tor/master] Improve comment about why we disable TLS compression.
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Jul '17

24 Jul '17

commit db1664e5932ae0435b23c2ca92e74f3a5c64c1f8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 24 14:15:40 2017 -0400 Improve comment about why we disable TLS compression. Closes bug 22964. Based on Teor's replacement there, but tries to put the comment in a more logical place, and explain why we're actually disabling compression in the first place. --- src/common/tortls.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 44db3aec5..dfc85ee31 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -1174,17 +1174,20 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION); } + + /* Don't actually allow compression; it uses RAM and time, it makes TLS + * vulnerable to CRIME-style attacks, and most of the data we transmit over + * TLS is encrypted (and therefore uncompressible) anyway. */ #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION); #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - /* Don't actually allow compression; it uses ram and time, but the data - * we transmit is all encrypted anyway. */ if (result->ctx->comp_methods) result->ctx->comp_methods = NULL; #endif #endif + #ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS); #endif

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[tor/master] test: Remove buggy unit test in test_hs_service
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Jul '17

24 Jul '17

commit 10331081c731cba3e45fd2ffe2649e10797e193b Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 24 11:31:54 2017 -0400 test: Remove buggy unit test in test_hs_service There isn't much of a point of this buggy test afterall to add twice the same service object but with a different key which ultinately can end up failing the test because 1/N_BUCKETS of probability that we end up to put the service in the same bucket. Fixes #23023 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/test/test_hs_service.c | 11 ++++------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_service.c b/src/test/test_hs_service.c index 24fca08a1..4a7cb8114 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_service.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_service.c @@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ test_access_service(void *arg) char *conf = NULL; char *hsdir_v3 = tor_strdup(get_fname("hs3")); hs_service_ht *global_map; + hs_service_t *s = NULL; (void) arg; @@ -513,7 +514,7 @@ test_access_service(void *arg) * in the global map. */ hs_service_load_all_keys(); tt_int_op(get_hs_service_map_size(), OP_EQ, 1); - hs_service_t *s = get_first_service(); + s = get_first_service(); tt_assert(s); global_map = get_hs_service_map(); tt_assert(global_map); @@ -535,14 +536,9 @@ test_access_service(void *arg) /* Twice should fail. */ ret = register_service(global_map, s); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - /* Modify key of service and we should be able to put it back in. */ - s->keys.identity_pk.pubkey[1] = '\x42'; - ret = register_service(global_map, s); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - tt_int_op(get_hs_service_map_size(), OP_EQ, 2); /* Remove service from map so we don't double free on cleanup. */ remove_service(global_map, s); - tt_int_op(get_hs_service_map_size(), OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(get_hs_service_map_size(), OP_EQ, 0); query = find_service(global_map, &s->keys.identity_pk); tt_assert(!query); /* Let's try to remove twice for fun. */ @@ -552,6 +548,7 @@ test_access_service(void *arg) teardown_capture_of_logs(); done: + hs_service_free(s); tor_free(hsdir_v3); hs_free_all(); }

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[torspec/master] Clarify how clients find the expected identity key
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Jul '17

24 Jul '17

commit 6c19e603c825cdbf4a6dc33196c792bf47c19bba Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 24 13:52:41 2017 -0400 Clarify how clients find the expected identity key Fixes bug 22862; based on patch from Teor. --- tor-spec.txt | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tor-spec.txt b/tor-spec.txt index f61e98f..86fdcc6 100644 --- a/tor-spec.txt +++ b/tor-spec.txt @@ -287,10 +287,15 @@ see tor-design.pdf. In all handshake variants, once all certificates are exchanged, all parties receiving certificates must confirm that the identity key is as - expected. (When initiating a connection, the expected identity key is - the one given in the directory; when creating a connection because of an - EXTEND cell, the expected identity key is the one given in the cell.) If - the key is not as expected, the party must close the connection. + expected. If the key is not as expected, the party must close the + connection. + + (When initiating a connection, if a reasonably live consensus is + available, then the expected identity key is taken from that + consensus. But when initiating a connection otherwise, the expected + identity key is the one given in the hard-coded authority or fallback + list. Finally, when creating a connection because of an EXTEND cell, the + expected identity key is the one given in the cell.) When connecting to an OR, all parties SHOULD reject the connection if that OR has a malformed or missing certificate. When accepting an incoming

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[sandboxed-tor-browser/master] Default disable `dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions`.
by yawning＠torproject.org 24 Jul '17

24 Jul '17

commit 26c9478ed9539a12a3a2939ccd7ef28ce916215d Author: Yawning Angel <yawning(a)schwanenlied.me> Date: Mon Jul 24 15:59:07 2017 +0000 Default disable `dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions`. Honestly, bluring the line between CA signed HTTPS and onions is terrible. --- ChangeLog | 1 + data/installer/mozilla.cfg | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 0484a7b..bc20c39 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ Changes in version 0.0.12 - UNRELEASED: * Bug 22984: Force IDNs to be displayed as punycode to thwart homograph attacks. * Bug 22967: Force disable crashdump reporting. + * Default disable `dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions`. Changes in version 0.0.11 - 2017-07-18: * Bug 22910: Deprecate the volatile extension dir option. diff --git a/data/installer/mozilla.cfg b/data/installer/mozilla.cfg index dc03adb..1b8f97d 100644 --- a/data/installer/mozilla.cfg +++ b/data/installer/mozilla.cfg @@ -37,3 +37,7 @@ lockPref("extensions.blocklist.enabled", false); // Force IDNs to be displayed as punycode to thwart homograph attacks. defaultPref("network.IDN_show_punycode", true); + +// Anything that tries to blur the line between CA signed HTTPS and Onion +// Services is misguided at best. +defaultPref("dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions", false);

1 0

[webwml/master] Update Stephanie's entry
by atagar＠torproject.org 24 Jul '17

24 Jul '17

commit f20b35819b8cf4eff6bc086ebbabf15a297c9f81 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 24 09:01:40 2017 -0700 Update Stephanie's entry Seems like a step backward on both counts, but done per her request. --- about/en/corepeople.wml | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/about/en/corepeople.wml b/about/en/corepeople.wml index 310927b9..2d6a90eb 100644 --- a/about/en/corepeople.wml +++ b/about/en/corepeople.wml @@ -682,9 +682,9 @@ table.people tr td:first-child { <div class="photo"><img src="$(IMGROOT)/people/stephw.png" alt="stephw" /></div> <div class="icon"><a href="https://twitter.com/walnutwordsalad"><img src="$(IMGROOT)/twitter-small.png" alt="twitter" /></a></div> <div class="icon"><a href="../keys/stephw.txt"><img src="$(IMGROOT)/pgp-key.png" alt="pgp key" /></a></div> - <div class="name"><a href="#stephw">Stephanie Whited</a></div> + <div class="name"><a href="#stephw">Stephanie A. Whited</a></div> <div class="field"><b>IRC:</b> stephw</div> - <div class="description">Directs communications to consistently articulate and promote the Tor Project's mission.</div> + <div class="description">Directs communications.</div> </td> </tr>

1 0