January 2017 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/bug19953_030_01'
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 69cb6f34cb87b0b2ba23d84cf19163cb5c9f4929 Merge: 4334a4b e16148a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 18 09:10:46 2017 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/bug19953_030_01' changes/bug19953 | 6 ++++++ src/or/router.c | 7 ++++++- src/or/routerkeys.c | 7 +++++-- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] hs: Allow from 0 to MAX introduction points
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 1636777dc8386a4db67df3a3f1855afd8dacba34 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 17 14:53:06 2017 -0500 hs: Allow from 0 to MAX introduction points An operator couldn't set the number of introduction point below the default value which is 3. With this commit, from 0 to the hardcoded maximum is now allowed. Closes #21033 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/bug21033 | 5 +++++ src/or/rendservice.c | 6 ++---- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug21033 b/changes/bug21033 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c4b3dea --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug21033 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (hidden service): + - Restrict the number of introduction point from 0 to the maximum allowed + instead of the default value to the maximum. That was stopping operators + from using less than 3 introduction points. Closes #21033; bugfix on + tor-0.2.7.2-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index e423cb7..00f2515 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -741,14 +741,12 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only) } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints")) { service->n_intro_points_wanted = (unsigned int) tor_parse_long(line->value, 10, - NUM_INTRO_POINTS_DEFAULT, - NUM_INTRO_POINTS_MAX, &ok, NULL); + 0, NUM_INTRO_POINTS_MAX, &ok, NULL); if (!ok) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints " "should be between %d and %d, not %s", - NUM_INTRO_POINTS_DEFAULT, NUM_INTRO_POINTS_MAX, - line->value); + 0, NUM_INTRO_POINTS_MAX, line->value); goto free_and_return; } log_info(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints=%d for %s",

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/bug21033_030_01'
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 4334a4b784e6c2fb0f969f1a037f85bcd1c3b4fc Merge: e69afb8 1636777 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 18 09:08:16 2017 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/bug21033_030_01' changes/bug21033 | 5 +++++ src/or/rendservice.c | 6 ++---- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug19769_19025_029'
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit e69afb853dde958c6efd94dfdb0cd18f01f7d841 Merge: 92c3926 0151e1d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 18 09:02:48 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'bug19769_19025_029' changes/bug19025 | 4 ++++ changes/ticket19769 | 7 +++++++ src/or/dns.c | 33 ++++++++++++--------------------- src/or/dns.h | 14 ++++++++++++-- src/or/or.h | 12 ------------ src/test/test_cell_formats.c | 6 +++--- src/test/test_dns.c | 28 ++++------------------------ 7 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Initialise DNS TTL for A and AAAA records.
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit eae68fa2d2bde931bf8b9115f7a9cb7a0f0c9073 Author: Philipp Winter <phw(a)nymity.ch> Date: Wed Jul 27 12:01:03 2016 -0400 Initialise DNS TTL for A and AAAA records. So far, the TTLs for both A and AAAA records were not initialised, resulting in exit relays sending back the value 60 to Tor clients. This also impacts exit relays' DNS cache -- the expiry time for all domains is set to 60. This fixes <https://bugs.torproject.org/19025>. --- src/or/dns.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/dns.c b/src/or/dns.c index 41a6dfd..e007a40 100644 --- a/src/or/dns.c +++ b/src/or/dns.c @@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ cached_resolve_add_answer(cached_resolve_t *resolve, resolve->result_ipv4.err_ipv4 = dns_result; resolve->res_status_ipv4 = RES_STATUS_DONE_ERR; } - + resolve->ttl_ipv4 = ttl; } else if (query_type == DNS_IPv6_AAAA) { if (resolve->res_status_ipv6 != RES_STATUS_INFLIGHT) return; @@ -341,6 +341,7 @@ cached_resolve_add_answer(cached_resolve_t *resolve, resolve->result_ipv6.err_ipv6 = dns_result; resolve->res_status_ipv6 = RES_STATUS_DONE_ERR; } + resolve->ttl_ipv6 = ttl; } }

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[tor/master] test_cfmt_connected_cells: use TTL value that's above the new min.
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit a969ae8e2135c5411537b14bcab310341260ef32 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 2 14:57:50 2017 -0500 test_cfmt_connected_cells: use TTL value that's above the new min. Related to 19769. --- src/test/test_cell_formats.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_cell_formats.c b/src/test/test_cell_formats.c index f839a5b..f429f42 100644 --- a/src/test/test_cell_formats.c +++ b/src/test/test_cell_formats.c @@ -345,9 +345,9 @@ test_cfmt_connected_cells(void *arg) memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell)); tor_addr_parse(&addr, "30.40.50.60"); rh.length = connected_cell_format_payload(cell.payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE, - &addr, 128); + &addr, 1024); tt_int_op(rh.length, OP_EQ, 8); - test_memeq_hex(cell.payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE, "1e28323c" "00000080"); + test_memeq_hex(cell.payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE, "1e28323c" "00000e10"); /* Try parsing it. */ tor_addr_make_unspec(&addr); @@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ test_cfmt_connected_cells(void *arg) tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0); tt_int_op(tor_addr_family(&addr), OP_EQ, AF_INET); tt_str_op(fmt_addr(&addr), OP_EQ, "30.40.50.60"); - tt_int_op(ttl, OP_EQ, 128); + tt_int_op(ttl, OP_EQ, 3600); /* not 1024, since we clipped to 3600 */ /* Try an IPv6 address */ memset(&rh, 0, sizeof(rh));

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[tor/master] DefecTor countermeasure: change server- and client-side DNS TTL clipping
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 609065f165a8e145f404e55e01e8f5ac5c013bc3 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 2 14:55:39 2017 -0500 DefecTor countermeasure: change server- and client-side DNS TTL clipping The server-side clipping now clamps to one of two values, both for what to report, and how long to cache. Additionally, we move some defines to dns.h, and give them better names. --- changes/ticket19769 | 7 +++++++ src/or/dns.c | 30 ++++++++++-------------------- src/or/dns.h | 14 ++++++++++++-- src/or/or.h | 12 ------------ src/test/test_dns.c | 28 ++++------------------------ 5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket19769 b/changes/ticket19769 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9fc05c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket19769 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Major features (security): + - Change the algorithm used to decide DNS TTLs on client and server side, + to better resist DNS-based correlation attacks like the DefecTor attack + of Greschbach, Pulls, Roberts, Winter, and Feamster). Now + relays only return one of two possible DNS TTL values, and clients + are willing to believe DNS TTL values up to 3 hours long. + Closes ticket 19769. diff --git a/src/or/dns.c b/src/or/dns.c index 5f9813b..41a6dfd 100644 --- a/src/or/dns.c +++ b/src/or/dns.c @@ -243,29 +243,19 @@ has_dns_init_failed(void) } /** Helper: Given a TTL from a DNS response, determine what TTL to give the - * OP that asked us to resolve it. */ + * OP that asked us to resolve it, and how long to cache that record + * ourselves. */ uint32_t dns_clip_ttl(uint32_t ttl) { - if (ttl < MIN_DNS_TTL) - return MIN_DNS_TTL; - else if (ttl > MAX_DNS_TTL) - return MAX_DNS_TTL; - else - return ttl; -} - -/** Helper: Given a TTL from a DNS response, determine how long to hold it in - * our cache. */ -STATIC uint32_t -dns_get_expiry_ttl(uint32_t ttl) -{ - if (ttl < MIN_DNS_TTL) - return MIN_DNS_TTL; - else if (ttl > MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE) - return MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE; + /* This logic is a defense against "DefectTor" DNS-based traffic + * confirmation attacks, as in https://nymity.ch/tor-dns/tor-dns.pdf . + * We only give two values: a "low" value and a "high" value. + */ + if (ttl < MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT) + return MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT; else - return ttl; + return MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT; } /** Helper: free storage held by an entry in the DNS cache. */ @@ -1317,7 +1307,7 @@ make_pending_resolve_cached(cached_resolve_t *resolve) resolve->ttl_hostname < ttl) ttl = resolve->ttl_hostname; - set_expiry(new_resolve, time(NULL) + dns_get_expiry_ttl(ttl)); + set_expiry(new_resolve, time(NULL) + dns_clip_ttl(ttl)); } assert_cache_ok(); diff --git a/src/or/dns.h b/src/or/dns.h index b14f7dd..951a2a3 100644 --- a/src/or/dns.h +++ b/src/or/dns.h @@ -12,6 +12,18 @@ #ifndef TOR_DNS_H #define TOR_DNS_H +/** Lowest value for DNS ttl that a server will give. */ +#define MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT (5*60) +/** Highest value for DNS ttl that a server will give. */ +#define MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT (60*60) + +/** How long do we keep DNS cache entries before purging them (regardless of + * their TTL)? */ +#define MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE (3*60*60) +/** How long do we cache/tell clients to cache DNS records when no TTL is + * known? */ +#define DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30*60) + int dns_init(void); int has_dns_init_failed(void); void dns_free_all(void); @@ -31,8 +43,6 @@ void dump_dns_mem_usage(int severity); #ifdef DNS_PRIVATE #include "dns_structs.h" -STATIC uint32_t dns_get_expiry_ttl(uint32_t ttl); - MOCK_DECL(STATIC int,dns_resolve_impl,(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve,or_circuit_t *oncirc, char **hostname_out, int *made_connection_pending_out, cached_resolve_t **resolve_out)); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 6671779..e48cd92 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -143,18 +143,6 @@ /** Maximum size of a single extrainfo document, as above. */ #define MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE 50000 -/** How long do we keep DNS cache entries before purging them (regardless of - * their TTL)? */ -#define MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE (30*60) -/** How long do we cache/tell clients to cache DNS records when no TTL is - * known? */ -#define DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30*60) -/** How long can a TTL be before we stop believing it? */ -#define MAX_DNS_TTL (3*60*60) -/** How small can a TTL be before we stop believing it? Provides rudimentary - * pinning. */ -#define MIN_DNS_TTL 60 - /** How often do we rotate onion keys? */ #define MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME (7*24*60*60) /** How often do we rotate TLS contexts? */ diff --git a/src/test/test_dns.c b/src/test/test_dns.c index 8346c0a..6a8e92c 100644 --- a/src/test/test_dns.c +++ b/src/test/test_dns.c @@ -16,30 +16,11 @@ NS(test_main)(void *arg) { (void)arg; - uint32_t ttl_mid = MIN_DNS_TTL / 2 + MAX_DNS_TTL / 2; + uint32_t ttl_mid = MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT / 2 + MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT / 2; - tt_int_op(dns_clip_ttl(MIN_DNS_TTL - 1),==,MIN_DNS_TTL); - tt_int_op(dns_clip_ttl(ttl_mid),==,ttl_mid); - tt_int_op(dns_clip_ttl(MAX_DNS_TTL + 1),==,MAX_DNS_TTL); - - done: - return; -} - -#undef NS_SUBMODULE - -#define NS_SUBMODULE expiry_ttl - -static void -NS(test_main)(void *arg) -{ - (void)arg; - - uint32_t ttl_mid = MIN_DNS_TTL / 2 + MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE / 2; - - tt_int_op(dns_get_expiry_ttl(MIN_DNS_TTL - 1),==,MIN_DNS_TTL); - tt_int_op(dns_get_expiry_ttl(ttl_mid),==,ttl_mid); - tt_int_op(dns_get_expiry_ttl(MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE + 1),==,MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE); + tt_int_op(dns_clip_ttl(MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT - 1),==,MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT); + tt_int_op(dns_clip_ttl(ttl_mid),==,MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT); + tt_int_op(dns_clip_ttl(MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT + 1),==,MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT); done: return; @@ -749,7 +730,6 @@ NS(test_main)(void *arg) struct testcase_t dns_tests[] = { TEST_CASE(clip_ttl), - TEST_CASE(expiry_ttl), TEST_CASE(resolve), TEST_CASE_ASPECT(resolve_impl, addr_is_ip_no_need_to_resolve), TEST_CASE_ASPECT(resolve_impl, non_exit),

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[tor/master] Changes file for 19025.
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 0151e1d1586b2e96dffb667cf2825e4fe993b62e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 18 09:01:26 2017 -0500 Changes file for 19025. --- changes/bug19025 | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug19025 b/changes/bug19025 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f365f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug19025 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Major bugfixes (DNS): + - Fix a bug that prevented exit nodes from caching DNS records for more + than 60 seconds. + Fixes bug 19025; bugfix on 0.2.4.7-alpha.

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[translation/tor-browser-manual] Update translations for tor-browser-manual
by translation＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 2cb0c3a3b6d6d7e92406e42520345981f68f1ce4 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 18 12:18:34 2017 +0000 Update translations for tor-browser-manual --- da/da.po | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/da/da.po b/da/da.po index 8233063..af3caa2 100644 --- a/da/da.po +++ b/da/da.po @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ # scootergrisen <scootergrisen(a)gmail.com>, 2016 # Aputsiak Niels Janussen <aj(a)isit.gl>, 2016 # Anders Damsgaard <andersd(a)riseup.net>, 2016 -# Christian Villum <villum(a)autofunk.dk>, 2016 # OliverMller <theoliver(a)live.co.uk>, 2016 msgid "" msgstr "" @@ -716,7 +715,7 @@ msgstr "" #: managing-identities.page:123 msgid "New Tor Circuit for this Site" -msgstr "Nyt Tor Circuit for dette site" +msgstr "Nyt Tor Circuit for dette sted" #: managing-identities.page:124 msgid ""

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[translation/exoneratorproperties_completed] Update translations for exoneratorproperties_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit bad48f6c782244f2349cb0f327a55cd6dbcaf510 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 18 12:18:31 2017 +0000 Update translations for exoneratorproperties_completed --- da/exonerator.properties | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/da/exonerator.properties b/da/exonerator.properties index 0faca4d..f747a35 100644 --- a/da/exonerator.properties +++ b/da/exonerator.properties @@ -47,6 +47,6 @@ footer.abouttor.body.link2=Finde mere information om Tor footer.abouttor.body.link3=Kontakt Tor Projektet Inc. footer.aboutexonerator.heading=Information om Exonera Tor footer.aboutexonerator.body=ExoneraTor-tjenesten vedligeholder en database af IP-adresser som har været del af Tor-netværket.  Det besvarer spørgsmålet om hvorvidt der kørte et Tor-relæ på en given IP-adresse på en given dato.  ExoneraTor kan lagre mere end én IP-adresse pr. relæ hvis relæene bruger en anden IP-adresse til afslutning til internettet end til registrering i Tor-netværket, og det lagre hvorvidt et relæ tillod transit af Tor-traffik til det åbne internet på det tidspunkt. -footer.trademark.text="Tor" og "Onion Logo" er %s af Tor Projektet, Inc. +footer.trademark.text="Tor" og "løg-logoet" er %s tilhørende Tor Projektet, Inc. footer.trademark.link=registrerede varemærker

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