January 2017 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] prop224: Add INTRODUCE1 cell relay support
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit e1497744c8887c883541d3cb6d3d63d9ab51f9ad Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 10 16:04:23 2016 -0500 prop224: Add INTRODUCE1 cell relay support Closes #20029 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/hs_intropoint.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- src/or/hs_intropoint.h | 14 +- src/or/rendcommon.c | 2 +- src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c | 3 +- 4 files changed, 335 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_intropoint.c b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c index bfc7ec3..42b2055 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_intropoint.c +++ b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #define HS_INTROPOINT_PRIVATE #include "or.h" +#include "config.h" #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuituse.h" #include "config.h" @@ -16,27 +17,52 @@ #include "rendmid.h" #include "rephist.h" -#include "hs/cell_establish_intro.h" +/* Trunnel */ +#include "ed25519_cert.h" #include "hs/cell_common.h" +#include "hs/cell_establish_intro.h" +#include "hs/cell_introduce1.h" + #include "hs_circuitmap.h" #include "hs_intropoint.h" #include "hs_common.h" -/** Extract the authentication key from an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and - * place it in auth_key_out. */ +/** Extract the authentication key from an ESTABLISH_INTRO or INTRODUCE1 using + * the given cell_type from cell and place it in + * auth_key_out. */ STATIC void -get_auth_key_from_establish_intro_cell(ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key_out, - const hs_cell_establish_intro_t *cell) +get_auth_key_from_cell(ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key_out, + unsigned int cell_type, const void *cell) { + size_t auth_key_len; + const uint8_t *key_array; + tor_assert(auth_key_out); + tor_assert(cell); - const uint8_t *key_array = - hs_cell_establish_intro_getconstarray_auth_key(cell); + switch (cell_type) { + case RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO: + { + const hs_cell_establish_intro_t *c_cell = cell; + key_array = hs_cell_establish_intro_getconstarray_auth_key(c_cell); + auth_key_len = hs_cell_establish_intro_getlen_auth_key(c_cell); + break; + } + case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1: + { + const hs_cell_introduce1_t *c_cell = cell; + key_array = hs_cell_introduce1_getconstarray_auth_key(cell); + auth_key_len = hs_cell_introduce1_getlen_auth_key(c_cell); + break; + } + default: + /* Getting here is really bad as it means we got a unknown cell type from + * this file where every call has an hardcoded value. */ + tor_assert(0); + } tor_assert(key_array); - tor_assert(hs_cell_establish_intro_getlen_auth_key(cell) == - sizeof(auth_key_out->pubkey)); - - memcpy(auth_key_out->pubkey, key_array, cell->auth_key_len); + tor_assert(auth_key_len == sizeof(auth_key_out->pubkey)); + memcpy(auth_key_out->pubkey, key_array, auth_key_len); } /** We received an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. Verify its signature and MAC, @@ -79,7 +105,7 @@ verify_establish_intro_cell(const hs_cell_establish_intro_t *cell, memcpy(sig_struct.sig, sig_array, cell->sig_len); ed25519_public_key_t auth_key; - get_auth_key_from_establish_intro_cell(&auth_key, cell); + get_auth_key_from_cell(&auth_key, RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO, cell); const size_t sig_msg_len = cell->end_sig_fields - msg; int sig_mismatch = ed25519_checksig_prefixed(&sig_struct, @@ -154,7 +180,8 @@ handle_verified_establish_intro_cell(or_circuit_t *circ, { /* Get the auth key of this intro point */ ed25519_public_key_t auth_key; - get_auth_key_from_establish_intro_cell(&auth_key, parsed_cell); + get_auth_key_from_cell(&auth_key, RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO, + parsed_cell); /* Then notify the hidden service that the intro point is established by sending an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell */ @@ -232,26 +259,38 @@ handle_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, return retval; } -/* Return True if circuit is suitable for becoming an intro circuit. */ -int -hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable(const or_circuit_t *circ) +/* Return True if circuit is suitable for being an intro circuit. */ +static int +circuit_is_suitable_intro_point(const or_circuit_t *circ, + const char *log_cell_type_str) { + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(log_cell_type_str); + /* Basic circuit state sanity checks. */ if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Rejecting ESTABLISH_INTRO on non-OR circuit."); + "Rejecting %s on non-OR circuit.", log_cell_type_str); return 0; } if (circ->base_.n_chan) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Rejecting ESTABLISH_INTRO on non-edge circuit."); + "Rejecting %s on non-edge circuit.", log_cell_type_str); return 0; } + /* Suitable. */ return 1; } +/* Return True if circuit is suitable for becoming an intro circuit. */ +int +hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable(const or_circuit_t *circ) +{ + return circuit_is_suitable_intro_point(circ, "ESTABLISH_INTRO"); +} + /* We just received an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell in circ. Figure out of it's * a legacy or a next gen cell, and pass it to the appropriate handler. */ int @@ -286,3 +325,266 @@ hs_intro_received_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, return -1; } +/* Send an INTRODUCE_ACK cell onto the circuit circ with the status + * value in status. Depending on the status, it can be ACK or a NACK. + * Return 0 on success else a negative value on error which will close the + * circuit. */ +static int +send_introduce_ack_cell(or_circuit_t *circ, hs_intro_ack_status_t status) +{ + int ret = -1; + uint8_t *encoded_cell = NULL; + ssize_t encoded_len, result_len; + hs_cell_introduce_ack_t *cell; + cell_extension_t *ext; + + tor_assert(circ); + + /* Setup the INTRODUCE_ACK cell. We have no extensions so the N_EXTENSIONS + * field is set to 0 by default with a new object. */ + cell = hs_cell_introduce_ack_new(); + ret = hs_cell_introduce_ack_set_status(cell, status); + /* We have no cell extensions in an INTRODUCE_ACK cell. */ + ext = cell_extension_new(); + cell_extension_set_num(ext, 0); + hs_cell_introduce_ack_set_extensions(cell, ext); + /* A wrong status is a very bad code flow error as this value is controlled + * by the code in this file and not an external input. This means we use a + * code that is not known by the trunnel ABI. */ + tor_assert(ret == 0); + /* Encode the payload. We should never fail to get the encoded length. */ + encoded_len = hs_cell_introduce_ack_encoded_len(cell); + tor_assert(encoded_len > 0); + encoded_cell = tor_malloc_zero(encoded_len); + result_len = hs_cell_introduce_ack_encode(encoded_cell, encoded_len, cell); + tor_assert(encoded_len == result_len); + + ret = relay_send_command_from_edge(CONTROL_CELL_ID, TO_CIRCUIT(circ), + RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK, + (char *) encoded_cell, encoded_len, + NULL); + /* On failure, the above function will close the circuit. */ + hs_cell_introduce_ack_free(cell); + tor_free(encoded_cell); + return ret; +} + +/* Validate a parsed INTRODUCE1 cell. Return 0 if valid or else a + * negative value for an invalid cell that should be NACKed. */ +static int +validate_introduce1_parsed_cell(const hs_cell_introduce1_t *cell) +{ + size_t legacy_key_id_len; + const uint8_t *legacy_key_id; + + tor_assert(cell); + + /* This code path SHOULD NEVER be reached if the cell is a legacy type so + * safety net here. The legacy ID must be zeroes in this case. */ + legacy_key_id_len = hs_cell_introduce1_getlen_legacy_key_id(cell); + legacy_key_id = hs_cell_introduce1_getconstarray_legacy_key_id(cell); + if (BUG(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) legacy_key_id, legacy_key_id_len))) { + goto invalid; + } + + /* The auth key of an INTRODUCE1 should be of type ed25519 thus leading to a + * known fixed length as well. */ + if (hs_cell_introduce1_get_auth_key_type(cell) != + HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Rejecting invalid INTRODUCE1 cell auth key type. " + "Responding with NACK."); + goto invalid; + } + if (hs_cell_introduce1_get_auth_key_len(cell) != ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN || + hs_cell_introduce1_getlen_auth_key(cell) != ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Rejecting invalid INTRODUCE1 cell auth key length. " + "Responding with NACK."); + goto invalid; + } + if (hs_cell_introduce1_getlen_encrypted(cell) == 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Rejecting invalid INTRODUCE1 cell encrypted length. " + "Responding with NACK."); + goto invalid; + } + + return 0; + invalid: + return -1; +} + +/* We just received a non legacy INTRODUCE1 cell on client_circ with + * the payload in request of size request_len. Return 0 if + * everything went well, or -1 if an error occured. This function is in charge + * of sending back an INTRODUCE_ACK cell and will close client_circ on error. + */ +static int +handle_introduce1(or_circuit_t *client_circ, const uint8_t *request, + size_t request_len) +{ + int ret = -1; + or_circuit_t *service_circ; + hs_cell_introduce1_t *parsed_cell; + hs_intro_ack_status_t status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS; + + tor_assert(client_circ); + tor_assert(request); + + /* Parse cell. Note that we can only parse the non encrypted section for + * which we'll use the authentication key to find the service introduction + * circuit and relay the cell on it. */ + ssize_t cell_size = hs_cell_introduce1_parse(&parsed_cell, request, + request_len); + if (cell_size < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Rejecting %s INTRODUCE1 cell. Responding with NACK.", + cell_size == -1 ? "invalid" : "truncated"); + /* Inform client that the INTRODUCE1 has a bad format. */ + status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT; + goto send_ack; + } + + /* Once parsed, validate the cell expected format once parsed. */ + if (validate_introduce1_parsed_cell(parsed_cell) < 0) { + /* Inform client that the INTRODUCE1 has bad format. */ + status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT; + goto send_ack; + } + + /* Find introduction circuit through our circuit map. */ + { + ed25519_public_key_t auth_key; + get_auth_key_from_cell(&auth_key, RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1, parsed_cell); + service_circ = hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v3(&auth_key); + if (service_circ == NULL) { + char b64_key[ED25519_BASE64_LEN + 1]; + ed25519_public_to_base64(b64_key, &auth_key); + log_info(LD_REND, "No intro circuit found for INTRODUCE1 cell " + "with auth key %s from circuit %" PRIu32 ". " + "Responding with NACK.", + safe_str(b64_key), client_circ->p_circ_id); + /* Inform the client that we don't know the requested service ID. */ + status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID; + goto send_ack; + } + } + + /* Relay the cell to the service on its intro circuit with an INTRODUCE2 + * cell which is the same exact payload. */ + if (relay_send_command_from_edge(CONTROL_CELL_ID, TO_CIRCUIT(service_circ), + RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2, + (char *) request, request_len, NULL)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to send INTRODUCE2 cell to the service."); + /* Inform the client that we can't relay the cell. */ + status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY; + goto send_ack; + } + + /* Success! Send an INTRODUCE_ACK success status onto the client circuit. */ + status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS; + ret = 0; + + send_ack: + /* Send the INTRODUCE_ACK cell to the client with a specific status. */ + if (send_introduce_ack_cell(client_circ, status) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to send an INTRODUCE ACK status %d to client.", + status); + /* Circuit has been closed on failure of transmission. */ + goto done; + } + if (status != HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + /* We just sent a NACK that is a non success status code so close the + * circuit because it's not useful to keep it open. Remember, a client can + * only send one INTRODUCE1 cell on a circuit. */ + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(client_circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); + } + done: + hs_cell_introduce1_free(parsed_cell); + return ret; +} + +/* Identify if the encoded cell we just received is a legacy one or not. The + * request should be at least DIGEST_LEN bytes long. */ +static int +introduce1_cell_is_legacy(const uint8_t *request) +{ + tor_assert(request); + + /* If the first 20 bytes of the cell (DIGEST_LEN) are NOT zeroes, it + * indicates a legacy cell (v2). */ + if (!tor_mem_is_zero((const char *) request, DIGEST_LEN)) { + /* Legacy cell. */ + return 1; + } + /* Not a legacy cell. */ + return 0; +} + +/* Return true iff the circuit circ is suitable for receiving an + * INTRODUCE1 cell. */ +static int +circuit_is_suitable_for_introduce1(const or_circuit_t *circ) +{ + tor_assert(circ); + + /* First of all, do we have a valid circuit to be an introduction point? */ + if (!circuit_is_suitable_intro_point(circ, "INTRODUCE1")) { + return 0; + } + + if (circ->already_received_introduce1) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND, + "Blocking multiple introductions on the same circuit. " + "Someone might be trying to attack a hidden service through " + "this relay."); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* We just received an INTRODUCE1 cell on circ. Figure out which type + * it is and pass it to the appropriate handler. Return 0 on success else a + * negative value and the circuit is closed. */ +int +hs_intro_received_introduce1(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, + size_t request_len) +{ + int ret; + + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(request); + + /* A cell that can't hold a DIGEST_LEN is invalid as we need to check if + * it's a legacy cell or not using the first DIGEST_LEN bytes. */ + if (request_len < DIGEST_LEN) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Invalid INTRODUCE1 cell length."); + goto err; + } + + /* Make sure we have a circuit that can have an INTRODUCE1 cell on it. */ + if (!circuit_is_suitable_for_introduce1(circ)) { + /* We do not send a NACK because the circuit is not suitable for any kind + * of response or transmission as it's a violation of the protocol. */ + goto err; + } + /* Mark the circuit that we got this cell. None are allowed after this as a + * DoS mitigation since one circuit with one client can hammer a service. */ + circ->already_received_introduce1 = 1; + + /* We are sure here to have at least DIGEST_LEN bytes. */ + if (introduce1_cell_is_legacy(request)) { + /* Handle a legacy cell. */ + ret = rend_mid_introduce(circ, request, request_len); + } else { + /* Handle a non legacy cell. */ + ret = handle_introduce1(circ, request, request_len); + } + return ret; + + err: + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + return -1; +} diff --git a/src/or/hs_intropoint.h b/src/or/hs_intropoint.h index 46d8d6f..e1bad47 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_intropoint.h +++ b/src/or/hs_intropoint.h @@ -16,9 +16,19 @@ enum hs_intro_auth_key_type { HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 0x02, }; +/* INTRODUCE_ACK status code. */ +typedef enum { + HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS = 0x0000, + HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID = 0x0001, + HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT = 0x0002, + HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY = 0x0003, +} hs_intro_ack_status_t; + int hs_intro_received_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len); +int hs_intro_received_introduce1(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, + size_t request_len); MOCK_DECL(int, hs_intro_send_intro_established_cell,(or_circuit_t *circ)); @@ -33,8 +43,8 @@ verify_establish_intro_cell(const hs_cell_establish_intro_t *out, size_t circuit_key_material_len); STATIC void -get_auth_key_from_establish_intro_cell(ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key_out, - const hs_cell_establish_intro_t *cell); +get_auth_key_from_cell(ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key_out, + unsigned int cell_type, const void *cell); #endif /* HS_INTROPOINT_PRIVATE */ diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index def51b7..bc53762 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ rend_process_relay_cell(circuit_t *circ, const crypt_path_t *layer_hint, break; case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1: if (or_circ) - r = rend_mid_introduce(or_circ,payload,length); + r = hs_intro_received_introduce1(or_circ,payload,length); break; case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2: if (origin_circ) diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c b/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c index 608988b..7741cff 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c @@ -294,7 +294,8 @@ test_intro_point_registration(void *arg) the_hs_circuitmap = get_hs_circuitmap(); tt_assert(the_hs_circuitmap); tt_int_op(1, ==, HT_SIZE(the_hs_circuitmap)); - get_auth_key_from_establish_intro_cell(&auth_key, establish_intro_cell); + get_auth_key_from_cell(&auth_key, RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO, + establish_intro_cell); returned_intro_circ = hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v3(&auth_key); tt_ptr_op(intro_circ, ==, returned_intro_circ); }

1 0

[tor/master] cell: Add a control cell ID for semantic
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit cacfd82c8dcc74ef8d96c0051649b5eae3e31d61 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 10 16:04:04 2016 -0500 cell: Add a control cell ID for semantic Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/relay.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/relay.h b/src/or/relay.h index e15551c..26b594e 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.h +++ b/src/or/relay.h @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ int relay_send_command_from_edge_(streamid_t stream_id, circuit_t *circ, uint8_t relay_command, const char *payload, size_t payload_len, crypt_path_t *cpath_layer, const char *filename, int lineno); +/* Indicates to relay_send_command_from_edge() that it is a control cell. */ +#define CONTROL_CELL_ID 0 #define relay_send_command_from_edge(stream_id, circ, relay_command, payload, \ payload_len, cpath_layer) \ relay_send_command_from_edge_((stream_id), (circ), (relay_command), \

1 0

[tor/master] hs: Remove useless code in rend_mid_introduce()
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit db77a38da2f661d81ea2c8df1b62e5de64a32488 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Nov 15 14:23:25 2016 -0500 hs: Remove useless code in rend_mid_introduce() With the previous commit, we validate the circuit _before_ calling rend_mid_introduce() which handles the INTRODUCE1 payload. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/rendmid.c | 24 ++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendmid.c b/src/or/rendmid.c index b873ad7..89d2482 100644 --- a/src/or/rendmid.c +++ b/src/or/rendmid.c @@ -143,26 +143,10 @@ rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, log_info(LD_REND, "Received an INTRODUCE1 request on circuit %u", (unsigned)circ->p_circ_id); - if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR || circ->base_.n_chan) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, - "Rejecting INTRODUCE1 on non-OR or non-edge circuit %u.", - (unsigned)circ->p_circ_id); - goto err; - } - - /* We have already done an introduction on this circuit but we just - received a request for another one. We block it since this might - be an attempt to DoS a hidden service (#15515). */ - if (circ->already_received_introduce1) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND, - "Blocking multiple introductions on the same circuit. " - "Someone might be trying to attack a hidden service through " - "this relay."); - circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); - return -1; - } - - circ->already_received_introduce1 = 1; + /* At this point, we know that the circuit is valid for an INTRODUCE1 + * because the validation has been made before calling this function. */ + tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR); + tor_assert(!circ->base_.n_chan); /* We could change this to MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN now that 0.0.9.x is * obsolete; however, there isn't much reason to do so, and we're going

1 0

[tor/master] prop224: Rename hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable()
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 9d7505a62aebaaf2fdf0e3a8178b80be17047e7b Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Nov 15 14:18:48 2016 -0500 prop224: Rename hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable() Adds a better semantic and it also follows the same interface for the INTRODUCE1 API which is circuit_is_suitable_for_introduce1(). Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/hs_intropoint.c | 4 ++-- src/or/hs_intropoint.h | 2 +- src/or/rendmid.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_intropoint.c b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c index 42b2055..2da3ee9 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_intropoint.c +++ b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ handle_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, circ->p_circ_id); /* Check that the circuit is in shape to become an intro point */ - if (!hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable(circ)) { + if (!hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable_for_establish_intro(circ)) { goto err; } @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ circuit_is_suitable_intro_point(const or_circuit_t *circ, /* Return True if circuit is suitable for becoming an intro circuit. */ int -hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable(const or_circuit_t *circ) +hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable_for_establish_intro(const or_circuit_t *circ) { return circuit_is_suitable_intro_point(circ, "ESTABLISH_INTRO"); } diff --git a/src/or/hs_intropoint.h b/src/or/hs_intropoint.h index e1bad47..08b3470 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_intropoint.h +++ b/src/or/hs_intropoint.h @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ int hs_intro_received_introduce1(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, MOCK_DECL(int, hs_intro_send_intro_established_cell,(or_circuit_t *circ)); /* also used by rendservice.c */ -int hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable(const or_circuit_t *circ); +int hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable_for_establish_intro(const or_circuit_t *circ); #ifdef HS_INTROPOINT_PRIVATE diff --git a/src/or/rendmid.c b/src/or/rendmid.c index 3319a63..b873ad7 100644 --- a/src/or/rendmid.c +++ b/src/or/rendmid.c @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ rend_mid_establish_intro_legacy(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, "Received a legacy ESTABLISH_INTRO request on circuit %u", (unsigned) circ->p_circ_id); - if (!hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable(circ)) { + if (!hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable_for_establish_intro(circ)) { reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; goto err; }

1 0

[doctor/master] Limit the hours when the shared random check runs
by atagar＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit f0e9e20373c1ca719083f3262ff6fce57ba46d81 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 17 10:10:24 2017 -0800 Limit the hours when the shared random check runs Shared randomness does different things during different hours so need to add special handling. --- consensus_health_checker.py | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/consensus_health_checker.py b/consensus_health_checker.py index 620c2ef..cca1099 100755 --- a/consensus_health_checker.py +++ b/consensus_health_checker.py @@ -752,6 +752,14 @@ def shared_random_commitment_mismatch(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): authorities. """ + # Check is for the commit phase which is 0:00 to 12:00 UTC. Just gonna check + # near the end of that. + + utc_hour = datetime.datetime.utcnow().hour + + if utc_hour < 8 or utc_hour >= 12: + return + issues = [] self_commitments = {}

1 0

[doctor/master] Check for shared random partiioning issues
by atagar＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 482304916eedcde95f15c21e7041f28364bda6e9 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 16 13:47:24 2017 -0800 Check for shared random partiioning issues First of four shared random checks requested on... https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17434 --- consensus_health_checker.py | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ data/consensus_health.cfg | 1 + 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/consensus_health_checker.py b/consensus_health_checker.py index bde08cb..620c2ef 100755 --- a/consensus_health_checker.py +++ b/consensus_health_checker.py @@ -325,6 +325,7 @@ def run_checks(consensuses, votes): bad_exits_in_sync, bandwidth_authorities_in_sync, is_orport_reachable, + shared_random_commitment_mismatch, ) all_issues = [] @@ -745,6 +746,25 @@ def is_orport_reachable(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): return issues +def shared_random_commitment_mismatch(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): + """ + Check that each authority's commitment matches the votes from other + authorities. + """ + + issues = [] + self_commitments = {} + + for authority, vote in votes.items(): + our_v3ident = DIRECTORY_AUTHORITIES[authority].v3ident + our_commitment = [c.commit for c in vote.directory_authorities[0].shared_randomness_commitments if c.identity == our_v3ident][0] + self_commitments[our_v3ident] = our_commitment + + for authority, vote in votes.items(): + for commitment in vote.directory_authorities[0].shared_randomness_commitments: + if commitment.commit != self_commitments[commitment.identity]: + issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.WARNING, 'SHARED_RANDOM_COMMITMENT_MISMATCH', authority = authority.nickname, their_v3ident = commitment.identity, our_value = commitment.commit, their_value = self_commitments[commitment.identity], to = [authority])) + def get_consensuses(): """ Provides a mapping of directory authority nicknames to their present consensus. diff --git a/data/consensus_health.cfg b/data/consensus_health.cfg index 5630207..5eb5931 100644 --- a/data/consensus_health.cfg +++ b/data/consensus_health.cfg @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ msg BADEXIT_OUT_OF_SYNC => Authorities disagree about the BadExit flag for {fing msg BANDWIDTH_AUTHORITIES_OUT_OF_SYNC => Bandwidth authorities have a substantially different number of measured entries: {authorities} msg AUTHORITY_UNAVAILABLE => Unable to retrieve the {fetch_type} from {authority} ({url}): {error} msg UNABLE_TO_REACH_ORPORT => Unable to reach the ORPort of {authority} ({address}, port {port}): {error} +msg SHARED_RANDOM_COMMITMENT_MISMATCH => Shared randomness commitment we report for {their_v3ident} doesn't match their actual value (ours: {our_value}, theirs: {their_value}) # hours that we'll suppress messages if it hasn't changed

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[doctor/master] Drop descriptor validation from consensus checks
by atagar＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 73a33c7899d591cab4eaa6baf0ddd1ed7481eb51 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 16 12:22:27 2017 -0800 Drop descriptor validation from consensus checks The descriptor checker (which only notifies me) already runs the descriptor validation checks. No point in having them block consensus health notices. Also, this lets our checks run a lot faster and with less memory usage. --- consensus_health_checker.py | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/consensus_health_checker.py b/consensus_health_checker.py index 8fd5ca6..bde08cb 100755 --- a/consensus_health_checker.py +++ b/consensus_health_checker.py @@ -776,7 +776,6 @@ def _get_documents(label, resource): resource, endpoints = [(authority.address, authority.dir_port)], default_params = False, - validate = True, ) try:

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[doctor/master] Check that authority reveal values match all votes
by atagar＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 5f86ba53a41fc0ffedfc53a21f5534182286a3f7 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 17 10:52:16 2017 -0800 Check that authority reveal values match all votes Second check requested on https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17434 --- consensus_health_checker.py | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- data/consensus_health.cfg | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/consensus_health_checker.py b/consensus_health_checker.py index cca1099..5deb8b1 100755 --- a/consensus_health_checker.py +++ b/consensus_health_checker.py @@ -325,7 +325,8 @@ def run_checks(consensuses, votes): bad_exits_in_sync, bandwidth_authorities_in_sync, is_orport_reachable, - shared_random_commitment_mismatch, + shared_random_commit_partitioning, + shared_random_reveal_partitioning, ) all_issues = [] @@ -746,15 +747,13 @@ def is_orport_reachable(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): return issues -def shared_random_commitment_mismatch(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): +def shared_random_commit_partitioning(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): """ Check that each authority's commitment matches the votes from other - authorities. + authorities during the commit phase. The commit phase is 0:00 to 12:00 UTC + and this just checks near the end of that. """ - # Check is for the commit phase which is 0:00 to 12:00 UTC. Just gonna check - # near the end of that. - utc_hour = datetime.datetime.utcnow().hour if utc_hour < 8 or utc_hour >= 12: @@ -771,7 +770,40 @@ def shared_random_commitment_mismatch(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): for authority, vote in votes.items(): for commitment in vote.directory_authorities[0].shared_randomness_commitments: if commitment.commit != self_commitments[commitment.identity]: - issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.WARNING, 'SHARED_RANDOM_COMMITMENT_MISMATCH', authority = authority.nickname, their_v3ident = commitment.identity, our_value = commitment.commit, their_value = self_commitments[commitment.identity], to = [authority])) + issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.WARNING, 'SHARED_RANDOM_COMMITMENT_MISMATCH', authority = authority, their_v3ident = commitment.identity, our_value = commitment.commit, their_value = self_commitments[commitment.identity], to = [authority])) + +def shared_random_reveal_partitioning(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): + """ + Check that each authority's vote has all commitments during the reveal phase. + The reveal phase is 12:00 to 0:00 UTC and this just checks near the end of + that. + """ + + utc_hour = datetime.datetime.utcnow().hour + + if utc_hour < 20: + return + + issues = [] + self_reveals = {} + + for authority, vote in votes.items(): + our_v3ident = DIRECTORY_AUTHORITIES[authority].v3ident + our_reveal = [c.reveal for c in vote.directory_authorities[0].shared_randomness_commitments if c.identity == our_v3ident][0] + self_reveals[our_v3ident] = our_reveal + + for authority, vote in votes.items(): + commitments = vote.directory_authorities[0].shared_randomness_commitments + + for v3ident, reveal in self_reveals.items(): + matches = [c.reveal for c in commitments if c.identity == v3ident] + + if len(matches) == 0: + issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.WARNING, 'SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_MISSING', authority = authority, their_v3ident = v3ident, their_value = reveal, to = [authority])) + elif len(matches) > 0: + issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.WARNING, 'SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_DUPLICATED', authority = authority, their_v3ident = v3ident, to = [authority])) + elif matches[0] != reveal: + issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.WARNING, 'SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_MISMATCH', authority = authority, their_v3ident = v3ident, our_value = matches[0], their_value = reveal, to = [authority])) def get_consensuses(): """ diff --git a/data/consensus_health.cfg b/data/consensus_health.cfg index 5eb5931..795bd9a 100644 --- a/data/consensus_health.cfg +++ b/data/consensus_health.cfg @@ -20,7 +20,10 @@ msg BADEXIT_OUT_OF_SYNC => Authorities disagree about the BadExit flag for {fing msg BANDWIDTH_AUTHORITIES_OUT_OF_SYNC => Bandwidth authorities have a substantially different number of measured entries: {authorities} msg AUTHORITY_UNAVAILABLE => Unable to retrieve the {fetch_type} from {authority} ({url}): {error} msg UNABLE_TO_REACH_ORPORT => Unable to reach the ORPort of {authority} ({address}, port {port}): {error} -msg SHARED_RANDOM_COMMITMENT_MISMATCH => Shared randomness commitment we report for {their_v3ident} doesn't match their actual value (ours: {our_value}, theirs: {their_value}) +msg SHARED_RANDOM_COMMITMENT_MISMATCH => Shared randomness commitment {authority} reported for {their_v3ident} doesn't match their actual value ({authority}: {our_value}, theirs: {their_value}) +msg SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_MISSING => During the reveal phase the vote from {authority} lacked a shared random value for {their_v3ident}, which should be {their_value} +msg SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_DUPLICATED => During the reveal phase the vote from {authority} reported multiple commitments for {their_v3ident} +msg SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_MISMATCH => During the reveal phase the vote from {authority} had a reveal value for {their_v3ident} that mismatched theirs ({authority}: {our_value}, theirs: {their_value}) # hours that we'll suppress messages if it hasn't changed

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[doctor/master] Pick dry-run status based on user
by atagar＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit d00a61c31d60f781f8e795a10bf0187c6a722a54 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 16 10:44:14 2017 -0800 Pick dry-run status based on user Rather than hardcoding this flag to True when developing why not simply base it on our user? The doctor virt is usually the only place we want this to be 'False'. --- util.py | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/util.py b/util.py index 9d4adcb..fc9601c 100644 --- a/util.py +++ b/util.py @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ Module for issuing email notifications to me via gmail. """ +import getpass import logging import os import socket @@ -17,7 +18,7 @@ FROM_ADDRESS = 'atagar(a)torproject.org' TO_ADDRESSES = ['tor-consensus-health(a)lists.torproject.org'] ERROR_ADDRESS = 'atagar(a)torproject.org' -TEST_RUN = False # print script results rather than emailing +TEST_RUN = getpass.getuser() != 'doctor' # print script results rather than emailing def get_path(*comp):

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[doctor/master] Alert if shared random value is missing from the consensus
by atagar＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit d4794c77ada6cd6a67433e551e6876b6bc33cd30 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 18 10:51:42 2017 -0800 Alert if shared random value is missing from the consensus Third check for https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17434 --- consensus_health_checker.py | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ data/consensus_health.cfg | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/consensus_health_checker.py b/consensus_health_checker.py index 5deb8b1..0f633c8 100755 --- a/consensus_health_checker.py +++ b/consensus_health_checker.py @@ -325,6 +325,7 @@ def run_checks(consensuses, votes): bad_exits_in_sync, bandwidth_authorities_in_sync, is_orport_reachable, + shared_random_present, shared_random_commit_partitioning, shared_random_reveal_partitioning, ) @@ -747,6 +748,23 @@ def is_orport_reachable(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): return issues +def shared_random_present(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): + """ + Check that the consensus has shared randomness values necessary for hidden + services to function. + """ + + issues = [] + + if latest_consensus.shared_randomness_current_value is None: + issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.ERROR, 'CURRENT_SHARED_RANDOM_MISSING')) + + if latest_consensus.shared_randomness_previous_value is None: + issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.ERROR, 'PREVIOUS_SHARED_RANDOM_MISSING')) + + return issues + + def shared_random_commit_partitioning(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): """ Check that each authority's commitment matches the votes from other diff --git a/data/consensus_health.cfg b/data/consensus_health.cfg index 795bd9a..be58b26 100644 --- a/data/consensus_health.cfg +++ b/data/consensus_health.cfg @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ msg BADEXIT_OUT_OF_SYNC => Authorities disagree about the BadExit flag for {fing msg BANDWIDTH_AUTHORITIES_OUT_OF_SYNC => Bandwidth authorities have a substantially different number of measured entries: {authorities} msg AUTHORITY_UNAVAILABLE => Unable to retrieve the {fetch_type} from {authority} ({url}): {error} msg UNABLE_TO_REACH_ORPORT => Unable to reach the ORPort of {authority} ({address}, port {port}): {error} +msg CURRENT_SHARED_RANDOM_MISSING => Consensus is missing a current shared random value (shared-rand-current-value) +msg PREVIOUS_SHARED_RANDOM_MISSING => Consensus is missing a previous shared random value (shared-rand-previous-value) msg SHARED_RANDOM_COMMITMENT_MISMATCH => Shared randomness commitment {authority} reported for {their_v3ident} doesn't match their actual value ({authority}: {our_value}, theirs: {their_value}) msg SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_MISSING => During the reveal phase the vote from {authority} lacked a shared random value for {their_v3ident}, which should be {their_value} msg SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_DUPLICATED => During the reveal phase the vote from {authority} reported multiple commitments for {their_v3ident}

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