tor-commits January 2017

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[tor/master] hs: Rename rend_mid_introduce() with legacy semantic
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 5208085be1deff4711b634b108052970aed6a127 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Nov 15 14:29:02 2016 -0500 hs: Rename rend_mid_introduce() with legacy semantic Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/hs_intropoint.c | 2 +- src/or/rendmid.c | 4 ++-- src/or/rendmid.h | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_intropoint.c b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c index 2da3ee9..b7dae7d 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_intropoint.c +++ b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c @@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ hs_intro_received_introduce1(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, /* We are sure here to have at least DIGEST_LEN bytes. */ if (introduce1_cell_is_legacy(request)) { /* Handle a legacy cell. */ - ret = rend_mid_introduce(circ, request, request_len); + ret = rend_mid_introduce_legacy(circ, request, request_len); } else { /* Handle a non legacy cell. */ ret = handle_introduce1(circ, request, request_len); diff --git a/src/or/rendmid.c b/src/or/rendmid.c index 89d2482..57c8cfa 100644 --- a/src/or/rendmid.c +++ b/src/or/rendmid.c @@ -133,8 +133,8 @@ rend_mid_establish_intro_legacy(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, * INTRODUCE2 cell. */ int -rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, - size_t request_len) +rend_mid_introduce_legacy(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, + size_t request_len) { or_circuit_t *intro_circ; char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1]; diff --git a/src/or/rendmid.h b/src/or/rendmid.h index 374f2b7..347d745 100644 --- a/src/or/rendmid.h +++ b/src/or/rendmid.h @@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ int rend_mid_establish_intro_legacy(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len); -int rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, - size_t request_len); +int rend_mid_introduce_legacy(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, + size_t request_len); int rend_mid_establish_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len); int rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/ticket20029_030_06-resquash'
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 88e4ffab9ea98d135de592c3af368940ee4f0c5f Merge: e167a0e d6c1491 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 18 17:13:36 2017 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/ticket20029_030_06-resquash' src/or/hs_intropoint.c | 340 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- src/or/hs_intropoint.h | 25 +++- src/or/relay.c | 10 +- src/or/relay.h | 7 +- src/or/rendcommon.c | 2 +- src/or/rendmid.c | 30 +--- src/or/rendmid.h | 4 +- src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c | 332 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 8 files changed, 693 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-) diff --cc src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c index dbd884c,f8f4460..e126cbc --- a/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c @@@ -12,15 -12,18 +12,19 @@@ #define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE #include "test.h" +#include "log_test_helpers.h" #include "crypto.h" + #include "log_test_helpers.h" #include "or.h" #include "ht.h" + /* Trunnel. */ #include "hs/cell_establish_intro.h" - #include "hs_common.h" + #include "hs/cell_introduce1.h" + #include "hs/cell_common.h" - #include "hs_service.h" ++#include "hs_common.h" #include "hs_circuitmap.h" #include "hs_intropoint.h" @@@ -515,15 -673,18 +831,27 @@@ struct testcase_t hs_intropoint_tests[ { "receive_establish_intro_wrong_sig", test_establish_intro_wrong_sig, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + { "receive_establish_intro_wrong_sig_len", + test_establish_intro_wrong_sig_len, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + + { "receive_establish_intro_wrong_auth_key_len", + test_establish_intro_wrong_auth_key_len, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + + { "receive_establish_intro_wrong_mac", + test_establish_intro_wrong_mac, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + + { "introduce1_suitable_circuit", + test_introduce1_suitable_circuit, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + + { "introduce1_is_legacy", + test_introduce1_is_legacy, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + + { "introduce1_validation", + test_introduce1_validation, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + + { "received_introduce1_handling", + test_received_introduce1_handling, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + END_OF_TESTCASES };

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[tor/master] Improve a few comments.
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit d6c14915cd3c6379973340afe3fd7f4e3f069166 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Sun Jan 8 15:06:39 2017 +0200 Improve a few comments. - Also remove LCOV marks from blocks of code that can be reachable by tests if we mock relay_send_command_from_edge(). Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/hs_intropoint.c | 12 ++++-------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_intropoint.c b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c index 25721e9..902b2e3 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_intropoint.c +++ b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ circuit_is_suitable_intro_point(const or_circuit_t *circ, return 1; } -/* Return True if circuit is suitable for becoming an intro circuit. */ +/* Return True if circuit is suitable for being service-side intro circuit. */ int hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable_for_establish_intro(const or_circuit_t *circ) { @@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ handle_introduce1(or_circuit_t *client_circ, const uint8_t *request, goto send_ack; } - /* Once parsed, validate the cell expected format once parsed. */ + /* Once parsed validate the cell format. */ if (validate_introduce1_parsed_cell(parsed_cell) < 0) { /* Inform client that the INTRODUCE1 has bad format. */ status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT; @@ -476,12 +476,10 @@ handle_introduce1(or_circuit_t *client_circ, const uint8_t *request, if (relay_send_command_from_edge(CONTROL_CELL_ID, TO_CIRCUIT(service_circ), RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2, (char *) request, request_len, NULL)) { - /* LCOV_EXCL_START */ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to send INTRODUCE2 cell to the service."); /* Inform the client that we can't relay the cell. */ status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY; goto send_ack; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } /* Success! Send an INTRODUCE_ACK success status onto the client circuit. */ @@ -489,14 +487,12 @@ handle_introduce1(or_circuit_t *client_circ, const uint8_t *request, ret = 0; send_ack: - /* Send the INTRODUCE_ACK cell to the client with a specific status. */ + /* Send INTRODUCE_ACK or INTRODUCE_NACK to client */ if (send_introduce_ack_cell(client_circ, status) < 0) { - /* LCOV_EXCL_START */ log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to send an INTRODUCE ACK status %d to client.", status); /* Circuit has been closed on failure of transmission. */ goto done; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } if (status != HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS) { /* We just sent a NACK that is a non success status code so close the @@ -533,7 +529,7 @@ circuit_is_suitable_for_introduce1(const or_circuit_t *circ) { tor_assert(circ); - /* First of all, do we have a valid circuit to be an introduction point? */ + /* Is this circuit an intro point circuit? */ if (!circuit_is_suitable_intro_point(circ, "INTRODUCE1")) { return 0; }

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[tor/master] whitespace fixes
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 85a17ee2e784eeb6db32c178cbc2e2620ef3b765 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 18 17:14:42 2017 -0500 whitespace fixes --- src/or/hs_intropoint.c | 1 + src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_intropoint.c b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c index 04f8c62..db4ba79 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_intropoint.c +++ b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c @@ -592,3 +592,4 @@ hs_intro_received_introduce1(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); return -1; } + diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c b/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c index e126cbc..1d620e1 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c @@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ mock_send_intro_established_cell(or_circuit_t *circ) static int mock_relay_send_command_from_edge(streamid_t stream_id, circuit_t *circ, uint8_t relay_command, const char *payload, - size_t payload_len, crypt_path_t *cpath_layer, + size_t payload_len, + crypt_path_t *cpath_layer, const char *filename, int lineno) { (void) stream_id; @@ -763,12 +764,14 @@ test_received_introduce1_handling(void *arg) size_t request_len = hs_cell_introduce1_encoded_len(cell); tt_size_op(request_len, OP_GT, 0); request = tor_malloc_zero(request_len); - ssize_t encoded_len = hs_cell_introduce1_encode(request, request_len, cell); + ssize_t encoded_len = + hs_cell_introduce1_encode(request, request_len, cell); tt_size_op(encoded_len, OP_GT, 0); circ = helper_create_intro_circuit(); or_circuit_t *service_circ = helper_create_intro_circuit(); - circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(service_circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT); + circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(service_circ), + CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT); /* Register the circuit in the map for the auth key of the cell. */ ed25519_public_key_t auth_key; const uint8_t *cell_auth_key = @@ -792,12 +795,14 @@ test_received_introduce1_handling(void *arg) size_t request_len = hs_cell_introduce1_encoded_len(cell) + 256; tt_size_op(request_len, OP_GT, 0); request = tor_malloc_zero(request_len + 256); - ssize_t encoded_len = hs_cell_introduce1_encode(request, request_len, cell); + ssize_t encoded_len = + hs_cell_introduce1_encode(request, request_len, cell); tt_size_op(encoded_len, OP_GT, 0); circ = helper_create_intro_circuit(); or_circuit_t *service_circ = helper_create_intro_circuit(); - circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(service_circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT); + circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(service_circ), + CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT); /* Register the circuit in the map for the auth key of the cell. */ uint8_t token[REND_TOKEN_LEN]; memcpy(token, legacy_key_id, sizeof(token));

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[doctor/master] Alert if shared random value is missing from the consensus
by atagar＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit d4794c77ada6cd6a67433e551e6876b6bc33cd30 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 18 10:51:42 2017 -0800 Alert if shared random value is missing from the consensus Third check for https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17434 --- consensus_health_checker.py | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ data/consensus_health.cfg | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/consensus_health_checker.py b/consensus_health_checker.py index 5deb8b1..0f633c8 100755 --- a/consensus_health_checker.py +++ b/consensus_health_checker.py @@ -325,6 +325,7 @@ def run_checks(consensuses, votes): bad_exits_in_sync, bandwidth_authorities_in_sync, is_orport_reachable, + shared_random_present, shared_random_commit_partitioning, shared_random_reveal_partitioning, ) @@ -747,6 +748,23 @@ def is_orport_reachable(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): return issues +def shared_random_present(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): + """ + Check that the consensus has shared randomness values necessary for hidden + services to function. + """ + + issues = [] + + if latest_consensus.shared_randomness_current_value is None: + issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.ERROR, 'CURRENT_SHARED_RANDOM_MISSING')) + + if latest_consensus.shared_randomness_previous_value is None: + issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.ERROR, 'PREVIOUS_SHARED_RANDOM_MISSING')) + + return issues + + def shared_random_commit_partitioning(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): """ Check that each authority's commitment matches the votes from other diff --git a/data/consensus_health.cfg b/data/consensus_health.cfg index 795bd9a..be58b26 100644 --- a/data/consensus_health.cfg +++ b/data/consensus_health.cfg @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ msg BADEXIT_OUT_OF_SYNC => Authorities disagree about the BadExit flag for {fing msg BANDWIDTH_AUTHORITIES_OUT_OF_SYNC => Bandwidth authorities have a substantially different number of measured entries: {authorities} msg AUTHORITY_UNAVAILABLE => Unable to retrieve the {fetch_type} from {authority} ({url}): {error} msg UNABLE_TO_REACH_ORPORT => Unable to reach the ORPort of {authority} ({address}, port {port}): {error} +msg CURRENT_SHARED_RANDOM_MISSING => Consensus is missing a current shared random value (shared-rand-current-value) +msg PREVIOUS_SHARED_RANDOM_MISSING => Consensus is missing a previous shared random value (shared-rand-previous-value) msg SHARED_RANDOM_COMMITMENT_MISMATCH => Shared randomness commitment {authority} reported for {their_v3ident} doesn't match their actual value ({authority}: {our_value}, theirs: {their_value}) msg SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_MISSING => During the reveal phase the vote from {authority} lacked a shared random value for {their_v3ident}, which should be {their_value} msg SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_DUPLICATED => During the reveal phase the vote from {authority} reported multiple commitments for {their_v3ident}

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[doctor/master] Pick dry-run status based on user
by atagar＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit d00a61c31d60f781f8e795a10bf0187c6a722a54 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 16 10:44:14 2017 -0800 Pick dry-run status based on user Rather than hardcoding this flag to True when developing why not simply base it on our user? The doctor virt is usually the only place we want this to be 'False'. --- util.py | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/util.py b/util.py index 9d4adcb..fc9601c 100644 --- a/util.py +++ b/util.py @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ Module for issuing email notifications to me via gmail. """ +import getpass import logging import os import socket @@ -17,7 +18,7 @@ FROM_ADDRESS = 'atagar(a)torproject.org' TO_ADDRESSES = ['tor-consensus-health(a)lists.torproject.org'] ERROR_ADDRESS = 'atagar(a)torproject.org' -TEST_RUN = False # print script results rather than emailing +TEST_RUN = getpass.getuser() != 'doctor' # print script results rather than emailing def get_path(*comp):

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[doctor/master] Check that authority reveal values match all votes
by atagar＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 5f86ba53a41fc0ffedfc53a21f5534182286a3f7 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 17 10:52:16 2017 -0800 Check that authority reveal values match all votes Second check requested on https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17434 --- consensus_health_checker.py | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- data/consensus_health.cfg | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/consensus_health_checker.py b/consensus_health_checker.py index cca1099..5deb8b1 100755 --- a/consensus_health_checker.py +++ b/consensus_health_checker.py @@ -325,7 +325,8 @@ def run_checks(consensuses, votes): bad_exits_in_sync, bandwidth_authorities_in_sync, is_orport_reachable, - shared_random_commitment_mismatch, + shared_random_commit_partitioning, + shared_random_reveal_partitioning, ) all_issues = [] @@ -746,15 +747,13 @@ def is_orport_reachable(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): return issues -def shared_random_commitment_mismatch(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): +def shared_random_commit_partitioning(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): """ Check that each authority's commitment matches the votes from other - authorities. + authorities during the commit phase. The commit phase is 0:00 to 12:00 UTC + and this just checks near the end of that. """ - # Check is for the commit phase which is 0:00 to 12:00 UTC. Just gonna check - # near the end of that. - utc_hour = datetime.datetime.utcnow().hour if utc_hour < 8 or utc_hour >= 12: @@ -771,7 +770,40 @@ def shared_random_commitment_mismatch(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): for authority, vote in votes.items(): for commitment in vote.directory_authorities[0].shared_randomness_commitments: if commitment.commit != self_commitments[commitment.identity]: - issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.WARNING, 'SHARED_RANDOM_COMMITMENT_MISMATCH', authority = authority.nickname, their_v3ident = commitment.identity, our_value = commitment.commit, their_value = self_commitments[commitment.identity], to = [authority])) + issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.WARNING, 'SHARED_RANDOM_COMMITMENT_MISMATCH', authority = authority, their_v3ident = commitment.identity, our_value = commitment.commit, their_value = self_commitments[commitment.identity], to = [authority])) + +def shared_random_reveal_partitioning(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): + """ + Check that each authority's vote has all commitments during the reveal phase. + The reveal phase is 12:00 to 0:00 UTC and this just checks near the end of + that. + """ + + utc_hour = datetime.datetime.utcnow().hour + + if utc_hour < 20: + return + + issues = [] + self_reveals = {} + + for authority, vote in votes.items(): + our_v3ident = DIRECTORY_AUTHORITIES[authority].v3ident + our_reveal = [c.reveal for c in vote.directory_authorities[0].shared_randomness_commitments if c.identity == our_v3ident][0] + self_reveals[our_v3ident] = our_reveal + + for authority, vote in votes.items(): + commitments = vote.directory_authorities[0].shared_randomness_commitments + + for v3ident, reveal in self_reveals.items(): + matches = [c.reveal for c in commitments if c.identity == v3ident] + + if len(matches) == 0: + issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.WARNING, 'SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_MISSING', authority = authority, their_v3ident = v3ident, their_value = reveal, to = [authority])) + elif len(matches) > 0: + issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.WARNING, 'SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_DUPLICATED', authority = authority, their_v3ident = v3ident, to = [authority])) + elif matches[0] != reveal: + issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.WARNING, 'SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_MISMATCH', authority = authority, their_v3ident = v3ident, our_value = matches[0], their_value = reveal, to = [authority])) def get_consensuses(): """ diff --git a/data/consensus_health.cfg b/data/consensus_health.cfg index 5eb5931..795bd9a 100644 --- a/data/consensus_health.cfg +++ b/data/consensus_health.cfg @@ -20,7 +20,10 @@ msg BADEXIT_OUT_OF_SYNC => Authorities disagree about the BadExit flag for {fing msg BANDWIDTH_AUTHORITIES_OUT_OF_SYNC => Bandwidth authorities have a substantially different number of measured entries: {authorities} msg AUTHORITY_UNAVAILABLE => Unable to retrieve the {fetch_type} from {authority} ({url}): {error} msg UNABLE_TO_REACH_ORPORT => Unable to reach the ORPort of {authority} ({address}, port {port}): {error} -msg SHARED_RANDOM_COMMITMENT_MISMATCH => Shared randomness commitment we report for {their_v3ident} doesn't match their actual value (ours: {our_value}, theirs: {their_value}) +msg SHARED_RANDOM_COMMITMENT_MISMATCH => Shared randomness commitment {authority} reported for {their_v3ident} doesn't match their actual value ({authority}: {our_value}, theirs: {their_value}) +msg SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_MISSING => During the reveal phase the vote from {authority} lacked a shared random value for {their_v3ident}, which should be {their_value} +msg SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_DUPLICATED => During the reveal phase the vote from {authority} reported multiple commitments for {their_v3ident} +msg SHARED_RANDOM_REVEAL_MISMATCH => During the reveal phase the vote from {authority} had a reveal value for {their_v3ident} that mismatched theirs ({authority}: {our_value}, theirs: {their_value}) # hours that we'll suppress messages if it hasn't changed

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[doctor/master] Drop descriptor validation from consensus checks
by atagar＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 73a33c7899d591cab4eaa6baf0ddd1ed7481eb51 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 16 12:22:27 2017 -0800 Drop descriptor validation from consensus checks The descriptor checker (which only notifies me) already runs the descriptor validation checks. No point in having them block consensus health notices. Also, this lets our checks run a lot faster and with less memory usage. --- consensus_health_checker.py | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/consensus_health_checker.py b/consensus_health_checker.py index 8fd5ca6..bde08cb 100755 --- a/consensus_health_checker.py +++ b/consensus_health_checker.py @@ -776,7 +776,6 @@ def _get_documents(label, resource): resource, endpoints = [(authority.address, authority.dir_port)], default_params = False, - validate = True, ) try:

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[doctor/master] Check for shared random partiioning issues
by atagar＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit 482304916eedcde95f15c21e7041f28364bda6e9 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 16 13:47:24 2017 -0800 Check for shared random partiioning issues First of four shared random checks requested on... https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17434 --- consensus_health_checker.py | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ data/consensus_health.cfg | 1 + 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/consensus_health_checker.py b/consensus_health_checker.py index bde08cb..620c2ef 100755 --- a/consensus_health_checker.py +++ b/consensus_health_checker.py @@ -325,6 +325,7 @@ def run_checks(consensuses, votes): bad_exits_in_sync, bandwidth_authorities_in_sync, is_orport_reachable, + shared_random_commitment_mismatch, ) all_issues = [] @@ -745,6 +746,25 @@ def is_orport_reachable(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): return issues +def shared_random_commitment_mismatch(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): + """ + Check that each authority's commitment matches the votes from other + authorities. + """ + + issues = [] + self_commitments = {} + + for authority, vote in votes.items(): + our_v3ident = DIRECTORY_AUTHORITIES[authority].v3ident + our_commitment = [c.commit for c in vote.directory_authorities[0].shared_randomness_commitments if c.identity == our_v3ident][0] + self_commitments[our_v3ident] = our_commitment + + for authority, vote in votes.items(): + for commitment in vote.directory_authorities[0].shared_randomness_commitments: + if commitment.commit != self_commitments[commitment.identity]: + issues.append(Issue(Runlevel.WARNING, 'SHARED_RANDOM_COMMITMENT_MISMATCH', authority = authority.nickname, their_v3ident = commitment.identity, our_value = commitment.commit, their_value = self_commitments[commitment.identity], to = [authority])) + def get_consensuses(): """ Provides a mapping of directory authority nicknames to their present consensus. diff --git a/data/consensus_health.cfg b/data/consensus_health.cfg index 5630207..5eb5931 100644 --- a/data/consensus_health.cfg +++ b/data/consensus_health.cfg @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ msg BADEXIT_OUT_OF_SYNC => Authorities disagree about the BadExit flag for {fing msg BANDWIDTH_AUTHORITIES_OUT_OF_SYNC => Bandwidth authorities have a substantially different number of measured entries: {authorities} msg AUTHORITY_UNAVAILABLE => Unable to retrieve the {fetch_type} from {authority} ({url}): {error} msg UNABLE_TO_REACH_ORPORT => Unable to reach the ORPort of {authority} ({address}, port {port}): {error} +msg SHARED_RANDOM_COMMITMENT_MISMATCH => Shared randomness commitment we report for {their_v3ident} doesn't match their actual value (ours: {our_value}, theirs: {their_value}) # hours that we'll suppress messages if it hasn't changed

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[doctor/master] Limit the hours when the shared random check runs
by atagar＠torproject.org 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

commit f0e9e20373c1ca719083f3262ff6fce57ba46d81 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 17 10:10:24 2017 -0800 Limit the hours when the shared random check runs Shared randomness does different things during different hours so need to add special handling. --- consensus_health_checker.py | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/consensus_health_checker.py b/consensus_health_checker.py index 620c2ef..cca1099 100755 --- a/consensus_health_checker.py +++ b/consensus_health_checker.py @@ -752,6 +752,14 @@ def shared_random_commitment_mismatch(latest_consensus, consensuses, votes): authorities. """ + # Check is for the commit phase which is 0:00 to 12:00 UTC. Just gonna check + # near the end of that. + + utc_hour = datetime.datetime.utcnow().hour + + if utc_hour < 8 or utc_hour >= 12: + return + issues = [] self_commitments = {}

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tor-commits January 2017