July 2016 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[bridgedb/master] Fix a typo in a unittest docstring.
by isis＠torproject.org 28 Jul '16

28 Jul '16

commit 0bb6014377e23c29bc774bc5f080c6534440c9bc Author: Isis Lovecruft <isis(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 2 16:28:17 2016 +0000 Fix a typo in a unittest docstring. --- test/test_util.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/test/test_util.py b/test/test_util.py index da4ddf4..f7a2245 100644 --- a/test/test_util.py +++ b/test/test_util.py @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ class MiscLoggingUtilTests(unittest.TestCase): class LevenshteinDistanceTests(unittest.TestCase): - """Unittests for `bridgedb.util.levenshteinDistance.""" + """Unittests for `bridgedb.util.levenshteinDistance`.""" def test_levenshteinDistance_blank_blank(self): """The Levenshtein Distance between '' and '' should be 0."""

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[bridgedb/master] Bump the Twisted version.
by isis＠torproject.org 28 Jul '16

28 Jul '16

commit 2f3c79c9fad27cdb04ee50573a462f4f9530588e Author: Isis Lovecruft <isis(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 30 15:34:56 2016 +0000 Bump the Twisted version. --- requirements.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/requirements.txt b/requirements.txt index 9e4aac1..4591511 100644 --- a/requirements.txt +++ b/requirements.txt @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ Babel==0.9.6 BeautifulSoup==3.2.1 Mako==0.8.1 -Twisted==13.2.0 +Twisted==14.0.2 https://ipaddr-py.googlecode.com/files/ipaddr-2.1.10.tar.gz#sha1=c608450b07… pycrypto==2.6.1 pyOpenSSL==0.14

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[bridgedb/master] Update CI test matrix to test using Debian Stretch versions.
by isis＠torproject.org 28 Jul '16

28 Jul '16

commit edddab56cf064b4080905ba29116574bb892e977 Author: Isis Lovecruft <isis(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 2 16:15:59 2016 +0000 Update CI test matrix to test using Debian Stretch versions. * FIXES #18949: https://bugs.torproject.org/18949 --- .travis.yml | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/.travis.yml b/.travis.yml index b058d71..4717c23 100644 --- a/.travis.yml +++ b/.travis.yml @@ -35,22 +35,22 @@ env: # https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/issues/459 - PYTHON_EGG_CACHE="${HOME}/.python-eggs-$(echo $RANDOM$PPID$RANDOM | sha256sum | cut -d ' ' -f 1)" matrix: - # Debian Wheezy - - TWISTED_VERSION=13.2.0 PYOPENSSL_VERSION=0.13.1 # Debian Jessie - TWISTED_VERSION=14.0.2 PYOPENSSL_VERSION=0.14 + # Debian Stretch + - TWISTED_VERSION=16.1.1 PYOPENSSL_VERSION=16.0.0 matrix: include: - - python: "2.7" - env: TWISTED_VERSION=15.0.0 PYOPENSSL_VERSION=0.14 - python: "pypy" env: TWISTED_VERSION=14.0.2 PYOPENSSL_VERSION=0.14 + - python: "pypy" + env: TWISTED_VERSION=16.1.1 PYOPENSSL_VERSION=16.0.0 allow_failures: - - python: "2.7" - env: TWISTED_VERSION=15.0.0 PYOPENSSL_VERSION=0.14 - python: "pypy" env: TWISTED_VERSION=14.0.2 PYOPENSSL_VERSION=0.14 + - python: "pypy" + env: TWISTED_VERSION=16.1.1 PYOPENSSL_VERSION=16.0.0 fast_finish: true before_install:

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[bridgedb/master] Revise HTTPS DummyRequest test utility for changes in Twisted>14.0.2.
by isis＠torproject.org 28 Jul '16

28 Jul '16

commit 22817ee11fd7d21cf38ee6050a9bcd3dd2b7849a Author: Isis Lovecruft <isis(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 2 16:16:40 2016 +0000 Revise HTTPS DummyRequest test utility for changes in Twisted>14.0.2. --- test/https_helpers.py | 228 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 226 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/test/https_helpers.py b/test/https_helpers.py index cc1ddfa..14755ec 100644 --- a/test/https_helpers.py +++ b/test/https_helpers.py @@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ import io +from twisted.internet.defer import Deferred +from twisted.internet.address import IPv4Address +from twisted.web.http_headers import Headers +from twisted.web.server import NOT_DONE_YET, Session from twisted.web.test import requesthelper from bridgedb.persistent import Conf @@ -121,15 +125,232 @@ class DummyHTTPSDistributor(object): return [self._bridge_class() for _ in range(self._bridgesPerResponseMin)] -class DummyRequest(requesthelper.DummyRequest): +class RequestHelperDummyRequest(object): + """ + Represents a dummy or fake request. + + Taken from Twisted-14.0.2 because this helper class changed in 16.0.0. + + @ivar _finishedDeferreds: C{None} or a C{list} of L{Deferreds} which will + be called back with C{None} when C{finish} is called or which will be + errbacked if C{processingFailed} is called. + + @type headers: C{dict} + @ivar headers: A mapping of header name to header value for all request + headers. + + @type outgoingHeaders: C{dict} + @ivar outgoingHeaders: A mapping of header name to header value for all + response headers. + + @type responseCode: C{int} + @ivar responseCode: The response code which was passed to + C{setResponseCode}. + + @type written: C{list} of C{bytes} + @ivar written: The bytes which have been written to the request. + """ + uri = b'http://dummy/' + method = b'GET' + client = None + + def registerProducer(self, prod,s): + self.go = 1 + while self.go: + prod.resumeProducing() + + def unregisterProducer(self): + self.go = 0 + + + def __init__(self, postpath, session=None): + self.sitepath = [] + self.written = [] + self.finished = 0 + self.postpath = postpath + self.prepath = [] + self.session = None + self.protoSession = session or Session(0, self) + self.args = {} + self.outgoingHeaders = {} + self.requestHeaders = Headers() + self.responseHeaders = Headers() + self.responseCode = None + self.headers = {} + self._finishedDeferreds = [] + self._serverName = b"dummy" + self.clientproto = b"HTTP/1.0" + + def getHeader(self, name): + """ + Retrieve the value of a request header. + + @type name: C{bytes} + @param name: The name of the request header for which to retrieve the + value. Header names are compared case-insensitively. + + @rtype: C{bytes} or L{NoneType} + @return: The value of the specified request header. + """ + return self.headers.get(name.lower(), None) + + + def getAllHeaders(self): + """ + Retrieve all the values of the request headers as a dictionary. + + @return: The entire C{headers} L{dict}. + """ + return self.headers + + + def setHeader(self, name, value): + """TODO: make this assert on write() if the header is content-length + """ + self.outgoingHeaders[name.lower()] = value + + def getSession(self): + if self.session: + return self.session + assert not self.written, "Session cannot be requested after data has been written." + self.session = self.protoSession + return self.session + + + def render(self, resource): + """ + Render the given resource as a response to this request. + + This implementation only handles a few of the most common behaviors of + resources. It can handle a render method that returns a string or + C{NOT_DONE_YET}. It doesn't know anything about the semantics of + request methods (eg HEAD) nor how to set any particular headers. + Basically, it's largely broken, but sufficient for some tests at least. + It should B{not} be expanded to do all the same stuff L{Request} does. + Instead, L{DummyRequest} should be phased out and L{Request} (or some + other real code factored in a different way) used. + """ + result = resource.render(self) + if result is NOT_DONE_YET: + return + self.write(result) + self.finish() + + + def write(self, data): + if not isinstance(data, bytes): + raise TypeError("write() only accepts bytes") + self.written.append(data) + + def notifyFinish(self): + """ + Return a L{Deferred} which is called back with C{None} when the request + is finished. This will probably only work if you haven't called + C{finish} yet. + """ + finished = Deferred() + self._finishedDeferreds.append(finished) + return finished + + + def finish(self): + """ + Record that the request is finished and callback and L{Deferred}s + waiting for notification of this. + """ + self.finished = self.finished + 1 + if self._finishedDeferreds is not None: + observers = self._finishedDeferreds + self._finishedDeferreds = None + for obs in observers: + obs.callback(None) + + + def processingFailed(self, reason): + """ + Errback and L{Deferreds} waiting for finish notification. + """ + if self._finishedDeferreds is not None: + observers = self._finishedDeferreds + self._finishedDeferreds = None + for obs in observers: + obs.errback(reason) + + + def addArg(self, name, value): + self.args[name] = [value] + + + def setResponseCode(self, code, message=None): + """ + Set the HTTP status response code, but takes care that this is called + before any data is written. + """ + assert not self.written, "Response code cannot be set after data has been written: %s." % "@@@@".join(self.written) + self.responseCode = code + self.responseMessage = message + + + def setLastModified(self, when): + assert not self.written, "Last-Modified cannot be set after data has been written: %s." % "@@@@".join(self.written) + + + def setETag(self, tag): + assert not self.written, "ETag cannot be set after data has been written: %s." % "@@@@".join(self.written) + + + def getClientIP(self): + """ + Return the IPv4 address of the client which made this request, if there + is one, otherwise C{None}. + """ + if isinstance(self.client, IPv4Address): + return self.client.host + return None + + + def getRequestHostname(self): + """ + Get a dummy hostname associated to the HTTP request. + + @rtype: C{bytes} + @returns: a dummy hostname + """ + return self._serverName + + + def getHost(self): + """ + Get a dummy transport's host. + + @rtype: C{IPv4Address} + @returns: a dummy transport's host + """ + return IPv4Address('TCP', '127.0.0.1', 80) + + + def getClient(self): + """ + Stub to get the client doing the HTTP request. + This merely just ensures that this method exists here. Feel free to + extend it. + """ + + +class DummyRequest(RequestHelperDummyRequest): """Wrapper for :api:`twisted.test.requesthelper.DummyRequest` to add redirect support. """ def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs): - requesthelper.DummyRequest.__init__(self, *args, **kwargs) + RequestHelperDummyRequest.__init__(self, *args, **kwargs) self.redirect = self._redirect(self) self.content = io.StringIO() + self.headers = {} # Needed for Twisted>14.0.2 + #self.outgoingHeaders = {} + #self.responseHeaders = Headers() + #self.requestHeaders = Headers() + def writeContent(self, data): """Add some **data** to the faked body of this request. @@ -159,3 +380,6 @@ class DummyRequest(requesthelper.DummyRequest): newRequest = type(request) newRequest.uri = request.uri return newRequest + + +#DummyRequest = RequestHelperDummyRequest

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[bridgedb/master] Merge branch 'fix/18949' into develop
by isis＠torproject.org 28 Jul '16

28 Jul '16

commit 6164c627a2653a81bcfa4197288b23a504f979e9 Merge: 0bb6014 2f3c79c Author: Isis Lovecruft <isis(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 30 16:06:46 2016 +0000 Merge branch 'fix/18949' into develop .travis.yml | 12 +-- requirements.txt | 2 +- test/https_helpers.py | 228 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Three more -Wshadow fixes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jul '16

28 Jul '16

commit dffc6910b11d88544a93c3e3e80c1155f998f561 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 28 11:24:03 2016 -0400 Three more -Wshadow fixes. --- src/common/util.c | 10 +++++----- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 9 +++++---- src/or/rephist.c | 12 ++++++------ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 0c04eb1..c7dd2a8 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -279,21 +279,21 @@ tor_reallocarray_(void *ptr, size_t sz1, size_t sz2 DMALLOC_PARAMS) char * tor_strdup_(const char *s DMALLOC_PARAMS) { - char *dup; + char *duplicate; tor_assert(s); #ifdef USE_DMALLOC - dup = dmalloc_strdup(file, line, s, 0); + duplicate = dmalloc_strdup(file, line, s, 0); #else - dup = strdup(s); + duplicate = strdup(s); #endif - if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(dup == NULL)) { + if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(duplicate == NULL)) { /* LCOV_EXCL_START */ log_err(LD_MM,"Out of memory on strdup(). Dying."); exit(1); /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } - return dup; + return duplicate; } /** Allocate and return a new string containing the first n diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index f3eab91..b07ddab 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1881,7 +1881,8 @@ choose_good_exit_server(uint8_t purpose, /** Log a warning if the user specified an exit for the circuit that * has been excluded from use by ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes. */ static void -warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) +warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, + const extend_info_t *exit_ei) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); routerset_t *rs = options->ExcludeNodes; @@ -1928,13 +1929,13 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) break; } - if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(rs, exit)) { + if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(rs, exit_ei)) { /* We should never get here if StrictNodes is set to 1. */ if (options->StrictNodes) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in ExcludeNodes%s, " "even though StrictNodes is set. Please report. " "(Circuit purpose: %s)", - description, extend_info_describe(exit), + description, extend_info_describe(exit_ei), rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose)); } else { @@ -1943,7 +1944,7 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) "prevent this (and possibly break your Tor functionality), " "set the StrictNodes configuration option. " "(Circuit purpose: %s)", - description, extend_info_describe(exit), + description, extend_info_describe(exit_ei), rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose)); } diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index 0eab5e0..6a54904 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -2374,7 +2374,7 @@ rep_hist_reset_buffer_stats(time_t now) if (!circuits_for_buffer_stats) circuits_for_buffer_stats = smartlist_new(); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(circuits_for_buffer_stats, circ_buffer_stats_t *, - stat, tor_free(stat)); + stats, tor_free(stats)); smartlist_clear(circuits_for_buffer_stats); start_of_buffer_stats_interval = now; } @@ -2415,15 +2415,15 @@ rep_hist_format_buffer_stats(time_t now) buffer_stats_compare_entries_); i = 0; SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuits_for_buffer_stats, - circ_buffer_stats_t *, stat) + circ_buffer_stats_t *, stats) { int share = i++ * SHARES / number_of_circuits; - processed_cells[share] += stat->processed_cells; - queued_cells[share] += stat->mean_num_cells_in_queue; - time_in_queue[share] += stat->mean_time_cells_in_queue; + processed_cells[share] += stats->processed_cells; + queued_cells[share] += stats->mean_num_cells_in_queue; + time_in_queue[share] += stats->mean_time_cells_in_queue; circs_in_share[share]++; } - SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(stat); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(stats); } /* Write deciles to strings. */

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[trunnel/master] Include trunnel-local.h before any standard C headers
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jul '16

28 Jul '16

commit 26713665d320b5e758dee8c52ffeaf330283c414 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 28 10:49:25 2016 -0400 Include trunnel-local.h before any standard C headers This way, trunnel-local can do things like setting _FILE_OFFSET_BITS other things that need to happen before the standards headers. --- lib/trunnel/__init__.py | 2 +- lib/trunnel/data/trunnel-impl.h | 6 +++--- lib/trunnel/data/trunnel.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/trunnel/__init__.py b/lib/trunnel/__init__.py index 2633dfd..ec7b001 100644 --- a/lib/trunnel/__init__.py +++ b/lib/trunnel/__init__.py @@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ # a package. # -__version__ = "1.4.5" +__version__ = "1.4.6" diff --git a/lib/trunnel/data/trunnel-impl.h b/lib/trunnel/data/trunnel-impl.h index e6de363..98dce21 100644 --- a/lib/trunnel/data/trunnel-impl.h +++ b/lib/trunnel/data/trunnel-impl.h @@ -7,12 +7,12 @@ #ifndef TRUNNEL_IMPL_H_INCLUDED_ #define TRUNNEL_IMPL_H_INCLUDED_ -#include "trunnel.h" -#include <assert.h> -#include <string.h> #ifdef TRUNNEL_LOCAL_H #include "trunnel-local.h" #endif +#include "trunnel.h" +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> #if defined(_MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER < 1600) #define uint8_t unsigned char diff --git a/lib/trunnel/data/trunnel.c b/lib/trunnel/data/trunnel.c index 285a310..b533743 100644 --- a/lib/trunnel/data/trunnel.c +++ b/lib/trunnel/data/trunnel.c @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * See trunnel-impl.h for documentation of these functions. */ +#include "trunnel-impl.h" #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> -#include "trunnel-impl.h" #if defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && defined(__ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) && \ __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__

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[tor/master] Fix a set of variable-shadowing warnings in curve25519-donna.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jul '16

28 Jul '16

commit 0390e1a60cb91fa581ec568879bf300224db6322 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 28 10:03:29 2016 -0400 Fix a set of variable-shadowing warnings in curve25519-donna.c --- src/ext/curve25519_donna/curve25519-donna.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/ext/curve25519_donna/curve25519-donna.c b/src/ext/curve25519_donna/curve25519-donna.c index 5a0c340..1c5a27a 100644 --- a/src/ext/curve25519_donna/curve25519-donna.c +++ b/src/ext/curve25519_donna/curve25519-donna.c @@ -483,7 +483,6 @@ fcontract(u8 *output, limb *input_limbs) { int i; int j; s32 input[10]; - s32 mask; /* |input_limbs[i]| < 2^26, so it's valid to convert to an s32. */ for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { @@ -572,7 +571,7 @@ fcontract(u8 *output, limb *input_limbs) { /* It still remains the case that input might be between 2^255-19 and 2^255. * In this case, input[1..9] must take their maximum value and input[0] must * be >= (2^255-19) & 0x3ffffff, which is 0x3ffffed. */ - mask = s32_gte(input[0], 0x3ffffed); + s32 mask = s32_gte(input[0], 0x3ffffed); for (i = 1; i < 10; i++) { if ((i & 1) == 1) { mask &= s32_eq(input[i], 0x1ffffff);

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[tor/master] Fix a huge pile of -Wshadow warnings.
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jul '16

28 Jul '16

commit 9fe6fea1cceb39fc415ad813020bbd863121e0c9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 28 10:22:10 2016 -0400 Fix a huge pile of -Wshadow warnings. These appeared on some of the Jenkins platforms. Apparently some GCCs care when you shadow globals, and some don't. --- src/common/compat.c | 16 ++++++------ src/common/crypto.c | 6 ++--- src/common/log.c | 4 +-- src/common/torgzip.c | 14 +++++----- src/common/util.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- src/ext/timeouts/timeout.c | 6 ++--- src/or/addressmap.c | 24 ++++++++--------- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 42 +++++++++++++++--------------- src/or/circuitstats.c | 10 +++---- src/or/config.c | 12 ++++----- src/or/connection_edge.c | 16 +++++++----- src/or/control.c | 6 ++--- src/or/dirvote.c | 3 --- src/or/policies.c | 8 +++--- src/or/relay.c | 8 +++--- src/or/rendclient.c | 6 ++--- src/or/rephist.c | 19 +++++++------- src/or/routerkeys.c | 12 ++++----- src/or/shared_random.c | 10 +++---- src/test/test_address.c | 8 +++--- src/test/test_util.c | 6 ++--- 21 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 150 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c index 081490d..e0807e4 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.c +++ b/src/common/compat.c @@ -1181,10 +1181,10 @@ tor_open_socket,(int domain, int type, int protocol)) /** Mockable wrapper for connect(). */ MOCK_IMPL(tor_socket_t, -tor_connect_socket,(tor_socket_t socket,const struct sockaddr *address, +tor_connect_socket,(tor_socket_t sock, const struct sockaddr *address, socklen_t address_len)) { - return connect(socket,address,address_len); + return connect(sock,address,address_len); } /** As socket(), but creates a nonblocking socket and @@ -1359,31 +1359,31 @@ get_n_open_sockets(void) /** Mockable wrapper for getsockname(). */ MOCK_IMPL(int, -tor_getsockname,(tor_socket_t socket, struct sockaddr *address, +tor_getsockname,(tor_socket_t sock, struct sockaddr *address, socklen_t *address_len)) { - return getsockname(socket, address, address_len); + return getsockname(sock, address, address_len); } /** Turn socket into a nonblocking socket. Return 0 on success, -1 * on failure. */ int -set_socket_nonblocking(tor_socket_t socket) +set_socket_nonblocking(tor_socket_t sock) { #if defined(_WIN32) unsigned long nonblocking = 1; - ioctlsocket(socket, FIONBIO, (unsigned long*) &nonblocking); + ioctlsocket(sock, FIONBIO, (unsigned long*) &nonblocking); #else int flags; - flags = fcntl(socket, F_GETFL, 0); + flags = fcntl(sock, F_GETFL, 0); if (flags == -1) { log_warn(LD_NET, "Couldn't get file status flags: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } flags |= O_NONBLOCK; - if (fcntl(socket, F_SETFL, flags) == -1) { + if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFL, flags) == -1) { log_warn(LD_NET, "Couldn't set file status flags: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 1c5b599..b87023f 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -3099,8 +3099,8 @@ crypto_rand_double(void) { /* We just use an unsigned int here; we don't really care about getting * more than 32 bits of resolution */ - unsigned int uint; - crypto_rand((char*)&uint, sizeof(uint)); + unsigned int u; + crypto_rand((char*)&u, sizeof(u)); #if SIZEOF_INT == 4 #define UINT_MAX_AS_DOUBLE 4294967296.0 #elif SIZEOF_INT == 8 @@ -3108,7 +3108,7 @@ crypto_rand_double(void) #else #error SIZEOF_INT is neither 4 nor 8 #endif - return ((double)uint) / UINT_MAX_AS_DOUBLE; + return ((double)u) / UINT_MAX_AS_DOUBLE; } /** Generate and return a new random hostname starting with prefix, diff --git a/src/common/log.c b/src/common/log.c index 51309aa..cb62a37 100644 --- a/src/common/log.c +++ b/src/common/log.c @@ -1071,13 +1071,13 @@ mark_logs_temp(void) */ int add_file_log(const log_severity_list_t *severity, const char *filename, - const int truncate) + const int truncate_log) { int fd; logfile_t *lf; int open_flags = O_WRONLY|O_CREAT; - open_flags |= truncate ? O_TRUNC : O_APPEND; + open_flags |= truncate_log ? O_TRUNC : O_APPEND; fd = tor_open_cloexec(filename, open_flags, 0644); if (fd<0) diff --git a/src/common/torgzip.c b/src/common/torgzip.c index 331bb5a..3353f0e 100644 --- a/src/common/torgzip.c +++ b/src/common/torgzip.c @@ -418,13 +418,13 @@ struct tor_zlib_state_t { * compress, it's for compression; otherwise it's for * decompression. */ tor_zlib_state_t * -tor_zlib_new(int compress, compress_method_t method, +tor_zlib_new(int compress_, compress_method_t method, zlib_compression_level_t compression_level) { tor_zlib_state_t *out; int bits, memlevel; - if (! compress) { + if (! compress_) { /* use this setting for decompression, since we might have the * max number of window bits */ compression_level = HIGH_COMPRESSION; @@ -434,10 +434,10 @@ tor_zlib_new(int compress, compress_method_t method, out->stream.zalloc = Z_NULL; out->stream.zfree = Z_NULL; out->stream.opaque = NULL; - out->compress = compress; + out->compress = compress_; bits = method_bits(method, compression_level); memlevel = get_memlevel(compression_level); - if (compress) { + if (compress_) { if (deflateInit2(&out->stream, Z_BEST_COMPRESSION, Z_DEFLATED, bits, memlevel, Z_DEFAULT_STRATEGY) != Z_OK) @@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ tor_zlib_new(int compress, compress_method_t method, if (inflateInit2(&out->stream, bits) != Z_OK) goto err; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE } - out->allocation = tor_zlib_state_size_precalc(!compress, bits, memlevel); + out->allocation = tor_zlib_state_size_precalc(!compress_, bits, memlevel); total_zlib_allocation += out->allocation; @@ -540,13 +540,13 @@ tor_zlib_free(tor_zlib_state_t *state) /** Return an approximate number of bytes used in RAM to hold a state with * window bits windowBits and compression level 'memlevel' */ static size_t -tor_zlib_state_size_precalc(int inflate, int windowbits, int memlevel) +tor_zlib_state_size_precalc(int inflate_, int windowbits, int memlevel) { windowbits &= 15; #define A_FEW_KILOBYTES 2048 - if (inflate) { + if (inflate_) { /* From zconf.h: "The memory requirements for inflate are (in bytes) 1 << windowBits diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 2369c5f..0c04eb1 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -305,17 +305,17 @@ tor_strdup_(const char *s DMALLOC_PARAMS) char * tor_strndup_(const char *s, size_t n DMALLOC_PARAMS) { - char *dup; + char *duplicate; tor_assert(s); tor_assert(n < SIZE_T_CEILING); - dup = tor_malloc_((n+1) DMALLOC_FN_ARGS); + duplicate = tor_malloc_((n+1) DMALLOC_FN_ARGS); /* Performance note: Ordinarily we prefer strlcpy to strncpy. But * this function gets called a whole lot, and platform strncpy is * much faster than strlcpy when strlen(s) is much longer than n. */ - strncpy(dup, s, n); - dup[n]='\0'; - return dup; + strncpy(duplicate, s, n); + duplicate[n]='\0'; + return duplicate; } /** Allocate a chunk of len bytes, with the same contents as the @@ -323,12 +323,12 @@ tor_strndup_(const char *s, size_t n DMALLOC_PARAMS) void * tor_memdup_(const void *mem, size_t len DMALLOC_PARAMS) { - char *dup; + char *duplicate; tor_assert(len < SIZE_T_CEILING); tor_assert(mem); - dup = tor_malloc_(len DMALLOC_FN_ARGS); - memcpy(dup, mem, len); - return dup; + duplicate = tor_malloc_(len DMALLOC_FN_ARGS); + memcpy(duplicate, mem, len); + return duplicate; } /** As tor_memdup(), but add an extra 0 byte at the end of the resulting @@ -336,13 +336,13 @@ tor_memdup_(const void *mem, size_t len DMALLOC_PARAMS) void * tor_memdup_nulterm_(const void *mem, size_t len DMALLOC_PARAMS) { - char *dup; + char *duplicate; tor_assert(len < SIZE_T_CEILING+1); tor_assert(mem); - dup = tor_malloc_(len+1 DMALLOC_FN_ARGS); - memcpy(dup, mem, len); - dup[len] = '\0'; - return dup; + duplicate = tor_malloc_(len+1 DMALLOC_FN_ARGS); + memcpy(duplicate, mem, len); + duplicate[len] = '\0'; + return duplicate; } /** Helper for places that need to take a function pointer to the right @@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ sample_laplace_distribution(double mu, double b, double p) * The epsilon value must be between ]0.0, 1.0]. delta_f must be greater * than 0. */ int64_t -add_laplace_noise(int64_t signal, double random, double delta_f, +add_laplace_noise(int64_t signal_, double random_, double delta_f, double epsilon) { int64_t noise; @@ -569,15 +569,15 @@ add_laplace_noise(int64_t signal, double random, double delta_f, /* Just add noise, no further signal */ noise = sample_laplace_distribution(0.0, delta_f / epsilon, - random); + random_); /* Clip (signal + noise) to [INT64_MIN, INT64_MAX] */ - if (noise > 0 && INT64_MAX - noise < signal) + if (noise > 0 && INT64_MAX - noise < signal_) return INT64_MAX; - else if (noise < 0 && INT64_MIN - noise > signal) + else if (noise < 0 && INT64_MIN - noise > signal_) return INT64_MIN; else - return signal + noise; + return signal_ + noise; } /* Helper: return greatest common divisor of a,b */ @@ -638,12 +638,12 @@ n_bits_set_u8(uint8_t v) void tor_strstrip(char *s, const char *strip) { - char *read = s; - while (*read) { - if (strchr(strip, *read)) { - ++read; + char *readp = s; + while (*readp) { + if (strchr(strip, *readp)) { + ++readp; } else { - *s++ = *read++; + *s++ = *readp++; } } *s = '\0'; @@ -1559,11 +1559,12 @@ tv_to_msec(const struct timeval *tv) #define IS_LEAPYEAR(y) (!(y % 4) && ((y % 100) || !(y % 400))) /** Helper: Return the number of leap-days between Jan 1, y1 and Jan 1, y2. */ static int -n_leapdays(int y1, int y2) +n_leapdays(int year1, int year2) { - --y1; - --y2; - return (y2/4 - y1/4) - (y2/100 - y1/100) + (y2/400 - y1/400); + --year1; + --year2; + return (year2/4 - year1/4) - (year2/100 - year1/100) + + (year2/400 - year1/400); } /** Number of days per month in non-leap year; used by tor_timegm and * parse_rfc1123_time. */ @@ -5688,7 +5689,7 @@ tor_weak_random_range(tor_weak_rng_t *rng, int32_t top) int64_t clamp_double_to_int64(double number) { - int exp; + int exponent; /* NaN is a special case that can't be used with the logic below. */ if (isnan(number)) { @@ -5702,14 +5703,14 @@ clamp_double_to_int64(double number) * magnitude of number is strictly less than 2^exp. * * If number is infinite, the call to frexp is legal but the contents of - * exp are unspecified. */ - frexp(number, &exp); + * are exponent unspecified. */ + frexp(number, &exponent); /* If the magnitude of number is strictly less than 2^63, the truncated * version of number is guaranteed to be representable. The only * representable integer for which this is not the case is INT64_MIN, but * it is covered by the logic below. */ - if (isfinite(number) && exp <= 63) { + if (isfinite(number) && exponent <= 63) { return (int64_t)number; } diff --git a/src/ext/timeouts/timeout.c b/src/ext/timeouts/timeout.c index bd463a7..713ec21 100644 --- a/src/ext/timeouts/timeout.c +++ b/src/ext/timeouts/timeout.c @@ -299,9 +299,9 @@ TIMEOUT_PUBLIC void timeouts_del(struct timeouts *T, struct timeout *to) { TOR_TAILQ_REMOVE(to->pending, to, tqe); if (to->pending != &T->expired && TOR_TAILQ_EMPTY(to->pending)) { - ptrdiff_t index = to->pending - &T->wheel[0][0]; - int wheel = (int) (index / WHEEL_LEN); - int slot = index % WHEEL_LEN; + ptrdiff_t index_ = to->pending - &T->wheel[0][0]; + int wheel = (int) (index_ / WHEEL_LEN); + int slot = index_ % WHEEL_LEN; T->pending[wheel] &= ~(WHEEL_C(1) << slot); } diff --git a/src/or/addressmap.c b/src/or/addressmap.c index 047a863..f7544ab 100644 --- a/src/or/addressmap.c +++ b/src/or/addressmap.c @@ -264,18 +264,18 @@ addressmap_clear_invalid_automaps(const or_options_t *options) clear_all = 1; /* This should be impossible, but let's be sure. */ STRMAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(addressmap, src_address, addressmap_entry_t *, ent) { - int remove = clear_all; + int remove_this = clear_all; if (ent->source != ADDRMAPSRC_AUTOMAP) continue; /* not an automap mapping. */ - if (!remove) { - remove = ! addressmap_address_should_automap(src_address, options); + if (!remove_this) { + remove_this = ! addressmap_address_should_automap(src_address, options); } - if (!remove && ! address_is_in_virtual_range(ent->new_address)) - remove = 1; + if (!remove_this && ! address_is_in_virtual_range(ent->new_address)) + remove_this = 1; - if (remove) { + if (remove_this) { addressmap_ent_remove(src_address, ent); MAP_DEL_CURRENT(src_address); } @@ -896,10 +896,10 @@ addressmap_get_virtual_address(int type) tor_assert(addressmap); if (type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME) { - char rand[10]; + char rand_bytes[10]; do { - crypto_rand(rand, sizeof(rand)); - base32_encode(buf,sizeof(buf),rand,sizeof(rand)); + crypto_rand(rand_bytes, sizeof(rand_bytes)); + base32_encode(buf,sizeof(buf),rand_bytes,sizeof(rand_bytes)); strlcat(buf, ".virtual", sizeof(buf)); } while (strmap_get(addressmap, buf)); return tor_strdup(buf); @@ -1107,11 +1107,11 @@ addressmap_get_mappings(smartlist_t *sl, time_t min_expires, smartlist_add_asprintf(sl, "%s%s %s%s NEVER", src_wc, key, dst_wc, val->new_address); else { - char time[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; - format_iso_time(time, val->expires); + char isotime[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; + format_iso_time(isotime, val->expires); smartlist_add_asprintf(sl, "%s%s %s%s \"%s\"", src_wc, key, dst_wc, val->new_address, - time); + isotime); } } else { smartlist_add_asprintf(sl, "%s%s %s%s", diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index dab378f..f3eab91 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -457,14 +457,14 @@ origin_circuit_init(uint8_t purpose, int flags) * it's not open already. */ origin_circuit_t * -circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, int flags) +circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei, int flags) { origin_circuit_t *circ; int err_reason = 0; circ = origin_circuit_init(purpose, flags); - if (onion_pick_cpath_exit(circ, exit) < 0 || + if (onion_pick_cpath_exit(circ, exit_ei) < 0 || onion_populate_cpath(circ) < 0) { circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_NOPATH); return NULL; @@ -1433,7 +1433,7 @@ onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ, * to handle the desired path length, return -1. */ static int -new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, smartlist_t *nodes) +new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei, smartlist_t *nodes) { int num_acceptable_routers; int routelen; @@ -1441,7 +1441,7 @@ new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, smartlist_t *nodes) tor_assert(nodes); routelen = DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN; - if (exit && + if (exit_ei && purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING && purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO) routelen++; @@ -1957,7 +1957,7 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) * router (or use exit if provided). Store these in the * cpath. Return 0 if ok, -1 if circuit should be closed. */ static int -onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit) +onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei) { cpath_build_state_t *state = circ->build_state; @@ -1965,17 +1965,17 @@ onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit) log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Launching a one-hop circuit for dir tunnel."); state->desired_path_len = 1; } else { - int r = new_route_len(circ->base_.purpose, exit, nodelist_get_list()); + int r = new_route_len(circ->base_.purpose, exit_ei, nodelist_get_list()); if (r < 1) /* must be at least 1 */ return -1; state->desired_path_len = r; } - if (exit) { /* the circuit-builder pre-requested one */ - warn_if_last_router_excluded(circ, exit); + if (exit_ei) { /* the circuit-builder pre-requested one */ + warn_if_last_router_excluded(circ, exit_ei); log_info(LD_CIRC,"Using requested exit node '%s'", - extend_info_describe(exit)); - exit = extend_info_dup(exit); + extend_info_describe(exit_ei)); + exit_ei = extend_info_dup(exit_ei); } else { /* we have to decide one */ const node_t *node = choose_good_exit_server(circ->base_.purpose, state->need_uptime, @@ -1984,10 +1984,10 @@ onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit) log_warn(LD_CIRC,"Failed to choose an exit server"); return -1; } - exit = extend_info_from_node(node, 0); - tor_assert(exit); + exit_ei = extend_info_from_node(node, 0); + tor_assert(exit_ei); } - state->chosen_exit = exit; + state->chosen_exit = exit_ei; return 0; } @@ -1996,19 +1996,19 @@ onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit) * the caller will do this if it wants to. */ int -circuit_append_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit) +circuit_append_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei) { cpath_build_state_t *state; - tor_assert(exit); + tor_assert(exit_ei); tor_assert(circ); state = circ->build_state; tor_assert(state); extend_info_free(state->chosen_exit); - state->chosen_exit = extend_info_dup(exit); + state->chosen_exit = extend_info_dup(exit_ei); ++circ->build_state->desired_path_len; - onion_append_hop(&circ->cpath, exit); + onion_append_hop(&circ->cpath, exit_ei); return 0; } @@ -2017,18 +2017,18 @@ circuit_append_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit) * send the next extend cell to begin connecting to that hop. */ int -circuit_extend_to_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit) +circuit_extend_to_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei) { int err_reason = 0; - warn_if_last_router_excluded(circ, exit); + warn_if_last_router_excluded(circ, exit_ei); tor_gettimeofday(&circ->base_.timestamp_began); - circuit_append_new_exit(circ, exit); + circuit_append_new_exit(circ, exit_ei); circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING); if ((err_reason = circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ))<0) { log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Couldn't extend circuit to new point %s.", - extend_info_describe(exit)); + extend_info_describe(exit_ei)); circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), -err_reason); return -1; } diff --git a/src/or/circuitstats.c b/src/or/circuitstats.c index 9ac2d56..f4db64e 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitstats.c +++ b/src/or/circuitstats.c @@ -578,18 +578,18 @@ circuit_build_times_rewind_history(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, int n) * array is full. */ int -circuit_build_times_add_time(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, build_time_t time) +circuit_build_times_add_time(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, build_time_t btime) { - if (time <= 0 || time > CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX) { + if (btime <= 0 || btime > CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Circuit build time is too large (%u)." - "This is probably a bug.", time); + "This is probably a bug.", btime); tor_fragile_assert(); return -1; } - log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Adding circuit build time %u", time); + log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Adding circuit build time %u", btime); - cbt->circuit_build_times[cbt->build_times_idx] = time; + cbt->circuit_build_times[cbt->build_times_idx] = btime; cbt->build_times_idx = (cbt->build_times_idx + 1) % CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; if (cbt->total_build_times < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE) cbt->total_build_times++; diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index fb2ab5a..64c9796 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -5073,7 +5073,7 @@ options_init_logs(const or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, config_line_t *opt; int ok; smartlist_t *elts; - int daemon = + int run_as_daemon = #ifdef _WIN32 0; #else @@ -5134,7 +5134,7 @@ options_init_logs(const or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, int err = smartlist_len(elts) && !strcasecmp(smartlist_get(elts,0), "stderr"); if (!validate_only) { - if (daemon) { + if (run_as_daemon) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Can't log to %s with RunAsDaemon set; skipping stdout", err?"stderr":"stdout"); @@ -5163,19 +5163,19 @@ options_init_logs(const or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, char *fname = expand_filename(smartlist_get(elts, 1)); /* Truncate if TruncateLogFile is set and we haven't seen this option line before. */ - int truncate = 0; + int truncate_log = 0; if (options->TruncateLogFile) { - truncate = 1; + truncate_log = 1; if (old_options) { config_line_t *opt2; for (opt2 = old_options->Logs; opt2; opt2 = opt2->next) if (!strcmp(opt->value, opt2->value)) { - truncate = 0; + truncate_log = 0; break; } } } - if (add_file_log(severity, fname, truncate) < 0) { + if (add_file_log(severity, fname, truncate_log) < 0) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Couldn't open file for 'Log %s': %s", opt->value, strerror(errno)); ok = 0; diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index cb79de6..0ef5310 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -3333,19 +3333,20 @@ connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_connection_t *conn) return 0; } -/** Return 1 if router exit is likely to allow stream conn +/** Return 1 if router exit_node is likely to allow stream conn * to exit from it, or 0 if it probably will not allow it. * (We might be uncertain if conn's destination address has not yet been * resolved.) */ int -connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit) +connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn, + const node_t *exit_node) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); tor_assert(conn); tor_assert(conn->socks_request); - tor_assert(exit); + tor_assert(exit_node); /* If a particular exit node has been requested for the new connection, * make sure the exit node of the existing circuit matches exactly. @@ -3354,7 +3355,7 @@ connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit) const node_t *chosen_exit = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); if (!chosen_exit || tor_memneq(chosen_exit->identity, - exit->identity, DIGEST_LEN)) { + exit_node->identity, DIGEST_LEN)) { /* doesn't match */ // log_debug(LD_APP,"Requested node '%s', considering node '%s'. No.", // conn->chosen_exit_name, exit->nickname); @@ -3379,7 +3380,8 @@ connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit) tor_addr_make_null(&addr, AF_INET); addrp = &addr; } - r = compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(addrp, conn->socks_request->port,exit); + r = compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(addrp, conn->socks_request->port, + exit_node); if (r == ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED) return 0; /* We know the address, and the exit policy rejects it. */ if (r == ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED && !conn->chosen_exit_name) @@ -3388,10 +3390,10 @@ connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit) * this node, err on the side of caution. */ } else if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(conn->socks_request->command)) { /* Don't send DNS requests to non-exit servers by default. */ - if (!conn->chosen_exit_name && node_exit_policy_rejects_all(exit)) + if (!conn->chosen_exit_name && node_exit_policy_rejects_all(exit_node)) return 0; } - if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_, exit)) { + if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_, exit_node)) { /* Not a suitable exit. Refuse it. */ return 0; } diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 0c4bcbd..ec76ecf 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -6084,14 +6084,14 @@ control_event_buildtimeout_set(buildtimeout_set_event_t type, /** Called when a signal has been processed from signal_callback */ int -control_event_signal(uintptr_t signal) +control_event_signal(uintptr_t signal_num) { const char *signal_string = NULL; if (!control_event_is_interesting(EVENT_GOT_SIGNAL)) return 0; - switch (signal) { + switch (signal_num) { case SIGHUP: signal_string = "RELOAD"; break; @@ -6112,7 +6112,7 @@ control_event_signal(uintptr_t signal) break; default: log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unrecognized signal %lu in control_event_signal", - (unsigned long)signal); + (unsigned long)signal_num); return -1; } diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.c b/src/or/dirvote.c index 2db8731..94a13e3 100644 --- a/src/or/dirvote.c +++ b/src/or/dirvote.c @@ -1431,7 +1431,6 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes, /* Add the actual router entries. */ { - int *index; /* index[j] is the current index into votes[j]. */ int *size; /* size[j] is the number of routerstatuses in votes[j]. */ int *flag_counts; /* The number of voters that list flag[j] for the * currently considered router. */ @@ -1466,7 +1465,6 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes, memset(conflict, 0, sizeof(conflict)); memset(unknown, 0xff, sizeof(conflict)); - index = tor_calloc(smartlist_len(votes), sizeof(int)); size = tor_calloc(smartlist_len(votes), sizeof(int)); n_voter_flags = tor_calloc(smartlist_len(votes), sizeof(int)); n_flag_voters = tor_calloc(smartlist_len(flags), sizeof(int)); @@ -1932,7 +1930,6 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes, /* And the loop is over and we move on to the next router */ } - tor_free(index); tor_free(size); tor_free(n_voter_flags); tor_free(n_flag_voters); diff --git a/src/or/policies.c b/src/or/policies.c index 0b8f335..07f256f 100644 --- a/src/or/policies.c +++ b/src/or/policies.c @@ -2669,7 +2669,7 @@ compare_tor_addr_to_short_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, { int i; int found_match = 0; - int accept; + int accept_; tor_assert(port != 0); @@ -2689,9 +2689,9 @@ compare_tor_addr_to_short_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, } if (found_match) - accept = policy->is_accept; + accept_ = policy->is_accept; else - accept = ! policy->is_accept; + accept_ = ! policy->is_accept; /* ???? are these right? -NM */ /* We should be sure not to return ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED in the accept @@ -2704,7 +2704,7 @@ compare_tor_addr_to_short_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, * * Once microdescriptors can handle addresses in special cases (e.g. if * we ever solve ticket 1774), we can provide certainty here. -RD */ - if (accept) + if (accept_) return ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_ACCEPTED; else return ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED; diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index 51b33cc..309bb40 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -255,12 +255,12 @@ circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_splice && cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) { - or_circuit_t *splice = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_splice; + or_circuit_t *splice_ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_splice; tor_assert(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED); - tor_assert(splice->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED); - cell->circ_id = splice->p_circ_id; + tor_assert(splice_->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED); + cell->circ_id = splice_->p_circ_id; cell->command = CELL_RELAY; /* can't be relay_early anyway */ - if ((reason = circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell, TO_CIRCUIT(splice), + if ((reason = circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell, TO_CIRCUIT(splice_), CELL_DIRECTION_IN)) < 0) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Error relaying cell across rendezvous; closing " "circuits"); diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 2d47e12..3468b07 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -830,9 +830,9 @@ fetch_v2_desc_by_addr(rend_data_t *query, smartlist_t *hsdirs) tries_left = REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS; while (tries_left > 0) { - int rand = crypto_rand_int(tries_left); - int chosen_replica = replicas_left_to_try[rand]; - replicas_left_to_try[rand] = replicas_left_to_try[--tries_left]; + int rand_val = crypto_rand_int(tries_left); + int chosen_replica = replicas_left_to_try[rand_val]; + replicas_left_to_try[rand_val] = replicas_left_to_try[--tries_left]; ret = rend_compute_v2_desc_id(descriptor_id, query->onion_address, query->auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH ? diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index 929e95d..0eab5e0 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -743,14 +743,15 @@ rep_history_clean(time_t before) orhist_it = digestmap_iter_init(history_map); while (!digestmap_iter_done(orhist_it)) { - int remove; + int should_remove; digestmap_iter_get(orhist_it, &d1, &or_history_p); or_history = or_history_p; - remove = authority ? (or_history->total_run_weights < STABILITY_EPSILON && + should_remove = authority ? + (or_history->total_run_weights < STABILITY_EPSILON && !or_history->start_of_run) : (or_history->changed < before); - if (remove) { + if (should_remove) { orhist_it = digestmap_iter_next_rmv(history_map, orhist_it); free_or_history(or_history); continue; @@ -2294,16 +2295,16 @@ void rep_hist_add_buffer_stats(double mean_num_cells_in_queue, double mean_time_cells_in_queue, uint32_t processed_cells) { - circ_buffer_stats_t *stat; + circ_buffer_stats_t *stats; if (!start_of_buffer_stats_interval) return; /* Not initialized. */ - stat = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circ_buffer_stats_t)); - stat->mean_num_cells_in_queue = mean_num_cells_in_queue; - stat->mean_time_cells_in_queue = mean_time_cells_in_queue; - stat->processed_cells = processed_cells; + stats = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circ_buffer_stats_t)); + stats->mean_num_cells_in_queue = mean_num_cells_in_queue; + stats->mean_time_cells_in_queue = mean_time_cells_in_queue; + stats->processed_cells = processed_cells; if (!circuits_for_buffer_stats) circuits_for_buffer_stats = smartlist_new(); - smartlist_add(circuits_for_buffer_stats, stat); + smartlist_add(circuits_for_buffer_stats, stats); } /** Remember cell statistics for circuit circ at time diff --git a/src/or/routerkeys.c b/src/or/routerkeys.c index 27a19f5..060ffd8 100644 --- a/src/or/routerkeys.c +++ b/src/or/routerkeys.c @@ -931,15 +931,15 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now) int generate_ed_link_cert(const or_options_t *options, time_t now) { - const tor_x509_cert_t *link = NULL, *id = NULL; + const tor_x509_cert_t *link_ = NULL, *id = NULL; tor_cert_t *link_cert = NULL; - if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link, &id) < 0 || link == NULL) { + if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link_, &id) < 0 || link_ == NULL) { log_warn(LD_OR, "Can't get my x509 link cert."); return -1; } - const common_digests_t *digests = tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(link); + const common_digests_t *digests = tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(link_); if (link_cert_cert && ! EXPIRES_SOON(link_cert_cert, options->TestingLinkKeySlop) && @@ -979,12 +979,12 @@ should_make_new_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, const time_t now) EXPIRES_SOON(link_cert_cert, options->TestingLinkKeySlop)) return 1; - const tor_x509_cert_t *link = NULL, *id = NULL; + const tor_x509_cert_t *link_ = NULL, *id = NULL; - if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link, &id) < 0 || link == NULL) + if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link_, &id) < 0 || link_ == NULL) return 1; - const common_digests_t *digests = tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(link); + const common_digests_t *digests = tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(link_); if (!fast_memeq(digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256], link_cert_cert->signed_key.pubkey, diff --git a/src/or/shared_random.c b/src/or/shared_random.c index c9886d9..0a1f24a 100644 --- a/src/or/shared_random.c +++ b/src/or/shared_random.c @@ -115,16 +115,16 @@ static int32_t num_srv_agreements_from_vote; STATIC sr_srv_t * srv_dup(const sr_srv_t *orig) { - sr_srv_t *dup = NULL; + sr_srv_t *duplicate = NULL; if (!orig) { return NULL; } - dup = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(sr_srv_t)); - dup->num_reveals = orig->num_reveals; - memcpy(dup->value, orig->value, sizeof(dup->value)); - return dup; + duplicate = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(sr_srv_t)); + duplicate->num_reveals = orig->num_reveals; + memcpy(duplicate->value, orig->value, sizeof(duplicate->value)); + return duplicate; } /* Allocate a new commit object and initializing it with rsa_identity diff --git a/src/test/test_address.c b/src/test/test_address.c index 82d6bc7..b4638f0 100644 --- a/src/test/test_address.c +++ b/src/test/test_address.c @@ -562,13 +562,13 @@ static int last_connected_socket_fd = 0; static int connect_retval = 0; static tor_socket_t -pretend_to_connect(tor_socket_t socket, const struct sockaddr *address, +pretend_to_connect(tor_socket_t sock, const struct sockaddr *address, socklen_t address_len) { (void)address; (void)address_len; - last_connected_socket_fd = socket; + last_connected_socket_fd = sock; return connect_retval; } @@ -576,11 +576,11 @@ pretend_to_connect(tor_socket_t socket, const struct sockaddr *address, static struct sockaddr *mock_addr = NULL; static int -fake_getsockname(tor_socket_t socket, struct sockaddr *address, +fake_getsockname(tor_socket_t sock, struct sockaddr *address, socklen_t *address_len) { socklen_t bytes_to_copy = 0; - (void) socket; + (void) sock; if (!mock_addr) return -1; diff --git a/src/test/test_util.c b/src/test/test_util.c index 843a57a..5432b2c 100644 --- a/src/test/test_util.c +++ b/src/test/test_util.c @@ -5240,12 +5240,12 @@ test_util_pwdb(void *arg) tt_assert(dir != NULL); /* Try failing cases. First find a user that doesn't exist by name */ - char rand[4]; + char randbytes[4]; char badname[9]; int i, found=0; for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) { - crypto_rand(rand, sizeof(rand)); - base16_encode(badname, sizeof(badname), rand, sizeof(rand)); + crypto_rand(randbytes, sizeof(randbytes)); + base16_encode(badname, sizeof(badname), randbytes, sizeof(randbytes)); if (tor_getpwnam(badname) == NULL) { found = 1; break;

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[tor/master] Fix a variable-shadowing bug in check_private_dir
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jul '16

28 Jul '16

commit 1135405c8c6ea315cd035171770a6701edae57f0 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jul 5 13:43:58 2016 -0400 Fix a variable-shadowing bug in check_private_dir We introduded a shadowed variable, thereby causing a log message to be wrong. Fixes 19578. I believe the bug was introduced by 54d7d31cba84232 in 0.2.2.29-beta. --- changes/bug19578 | 3 +++ src/common/util.c | 9 +++++---- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug19578 b/changes/bug19578 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b3355b --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug19578 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (logging): + - When logging a directory ownership mismatch, log the owning username + correctly. Fixes bug 19578; bugfix on 0.2.2.29-beta. diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 538aeb1..d61985e 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -2291,13 +2291,14 @@ check_private_dir,(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, running_gid = getgid(); } if (st.st_uid != running_uid) { - const struct passwd *pw = NULL; + const struct passwd *pw_uid = NULL; char *process_ownername = NULL; - pw = tor_getpwuid(running_uid); - process_ownername = pw ? tor_strdup(pw->pw_name) : tor_strdup("<unknown>"); + pw_uid = tor_getpwuid(running_uid); + process_ownername = pw_uid ? tor_strdup(pw_uid->pw_name) : + tor_strdup("<unknown>"); - pw = tor_getpwuid(st.st_uid); + pw_uid = tor_getpwuid(st.st_uid); log_warn(LD_FS, "%s is not owned by this user (%s, %d) but by " "%s (%d). Perhaps you are running Tor as the wrong user?",

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