tor-commits December 2016

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[tor/release-0.2.9] Remove release notes for things that are also in 0.2.8.11
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Dec '16

14 Dec '16

commit 254b633604b28577842a03d0d1c725093a1c116c Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Dec 14 17:24:21 2016 -0500 Remove release notes for things that are also in 0.2.8.11 --- ReleaseNotes.029 | 88 ++------------------------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-) diff --git a/ReleaseNotes.029 b/ReleaseNotes.029 index f3421fb..53842ea 100644 --- a/ReleaseNotes.029 +++ b/ReleaseNotes.029 @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ [This is a draft for the 0.2.9.x release notes. It should get folded into the ReleaseNotes file before stable.] +[These are changes since 0.2.8.11] + o Required libraries: - When building with OpenSSL, Tor now requires version 1.0.1 or @@ -61,16 +63,6 @@ into the ReleaseNotes file before stable.] "DisableOOSCheck 0", but watch out: it might close some sockets you would rather have it keep.) Closes ticket 18640. - o Major features (security fixes): - - Prevent a class of security bugs caused by treating the contents - of a buffer chunk as if they were a NUL-terminated string. At - least one such bug seems to be present in all currently used - versions of Tor, and would allow an attacker to remotely crash - most Tor instances, especially those compiled with extra compiler - hardening. With this defense in place, such bugs can't crash Tor, - though we should still fix them as they occur. Closes ticket - 20384 (TROVE-2016-10-001). - o Major features (single-hop "hidden" services): - Add experimental HiddenServiceSingleHopMode and HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode options. When both are set to 1, @@ -109,32 +101,6 @@ into the ReleaseNotes file before stable.] point cicruits use the TAP key supplied by the protocol, to avoid epistemic attacks. Fixes bug 19163; bugfix on 0.2.4.18-rc. - o Major bugfixes (client performance): - - Clients now respond to new application stream requests immediately - when they arrive, rather than waiting up to one second before - starting to handle them. Fixes part of bug 19969; bugfix - on 0.2.8.1-alpha. - - o Major bugfixes (client reliability): - - When Tor leaves standby because of a new application request, open - circuits as needed to serve that request. Previously, we would - potentially wait a very long time. Fixes part of bug 19969; bugfix - on 0.2.8.1-alpha. - - o Major bugfixes (client, security, also in 0.2.8.7): - - Only use the ReachableAddresses option to restrict the first hop - in a path. In earlier versions of 0.2.8.x, it would apply to - every hop in the path, with a possible degradation in anonymity - for anyone using an uncommon ReachableAddress setting. Fixes bug - 19973; bugfix on 0.2.8.2-alpha. - - o Major bugfixes (crash, also in 0.2.8.8): - - Fix a complicated crash bug that could affect Tor clients - configured to use bridges when replacing a networkstatus consensus - in which one of their bridges was mentioned. OpenBSD users saw - more crashes here, but all platforms were potentially affected. - Fixes bug 20103; bugfix on 0.2.8.2-alpha. - o Major bugfixes (directory downloads): - Avoid resetting download status for consensuses hourly, since we already have another, smarter retry mechanism. Fixes bug 8625; @@ -172,13 +138,6 @@ into the ReleaseNotes file before stable.] could use to distinguish clients by consensus version. Fixes bug 20012; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. Patch by teor. - o Major bugfixes (relay, OOM handler, also in 0.2.8.8): - - Fix a timing-dependent assertion failure that could occur when we - tried to flush from a circuit after having freed its cells because - of an out-of-memory condition. Fixes bug 20203; bugfix on - 0.2.8.1-alpha. Thanks to "cypherpunks" for help diagnosing - this one. - o Major bugfixes (relay, resolver, logging): - For relays that don't know their own address, avoid attempting a local hostname resolve for each descriptor we download. This @@ -186,12 +145,6 @@ into the ReleaseNotes file before stable.] log lines, and also avoid confusing clock jumps if the resolver is slow. Fixes bugs 20423 and 20610; bugfix on 0.2.8.1-alpha. - o Minor feature (fallback directories): - - Remove broken entries from the hard-coded fallback directory list. - Closes ticket 20190; patch by teor. - - Remove broken fallbacks from the hard-coded fallback directory - list. Closes ticket 20190; patch by teor. - o Minor feature (port flags): - Add new flags to the *Port options to finer control over which requests are allowed. The flags are NoDNSRequest, NoOnionTraffic, @@ -257,20 +210,6 @@ into the ReleaseNotes file before stable.] votes even if we abort the consensus process. Resolves ticket 19036. - o Minor features (geoip): - - Update geoip and geoip6 to the August 2 2016 Maxmind GeoLite2 - Country database. - - Update geoip and geoip6 to the December 7 2016 Maxmind GeoLite2 - Country database. - - Update geoip and geoip6 to the November 3 2016 Maxmind GeoLite2 - Country database. - - Update geoip and geoip6 to the October 4 2016 Maxmind GeoLite2 - Country database. - - o Minor features (geoip, also in 0.2.8.8): - - Update geoip and geoip6 to the September 6 2016 Maxmind GeoLite2 - Country database. - o Minor features (hidden service): - Stop being so strict about the payload length of "rendezvous1" cells. We used to be locked in to the "TAP" handshake length, and @@ -450,11 +389,6 @@ into the ReleaseNotes file before stable.] (Previously, we included only a subset, because of the way we detected them.) Fixes bug 19216; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. - o Minor bugfixes (compilation, also in 0.2.8.7): - - Remove an inappropriate "inline" in tortls.c that was causing - warnings on older versions of GCC. Fixes bug 19903; bugfix - on 0.2.8.1-alpha. - o Minor bugfixes (compilation, OpenBSD): - Detect Libevent2 functions correctly on systems that provide libevent2, but where libevent1 is linked with -levent. Fixes bug @@ -501,11 +435,6 @@ into the ReleaseNotes file before stable.] even if they are not completely open. Fixes bug 18604; bugfix on 0.2.7.1-alpha. - o Minor bugfixes (fallback directories, also in 0.2.8.7): - - Avoid logging a NULL string pointer when loading fallback - directory information. Fixes bug 19947; bugfix on 0.2.4.7-alpha - and 0.2.8.1-alpha. Report and patch by "rubiate". - o Minor bugfixes (getpass): - Defensively fix a non-triggerable heap corruption at do_getpass() to protect ourselves from mistakes in the future. Fixes bug @@ -600,18 +529,11 @@ into the ReleaseNotes file before stable.] alpha. Patch by teor. o Minor bugfixes (portability): - - Fix compilation with OpenSSL 1.1 and less commonly-used CPU - architectures. Closes ticket 20588. - - Fix implicit conversion warnings under OpenSSL 1.1. Fixes bug - 20551; bugfix on 0.2.1.1-alpha. - Run correctly when built on Windows build environments that require _vcsprintf(). Fixes bug 20560; bugfix on 0.2.2.11-alpha. - Use ECDHE ciphers instead of ECDH in tortls tests. LibreSSL has removed the ECDH ciphers which caused the tests to fail on platforms which use it. Fixes bug 20460; bugfix on 0.2.8.1-alpha. - - Work around a bug in the OSX 10.12 SDK that would prevent us from - successfully targeting earlier versions of OSX. Resolves - ticket 20235. o Minor bugfixes (relay bootstrap): - Ensure relays don't make multiple connections during bootstrap. @@ -623,8 +545,6 @@ into the ReleaseNotes file before stable.] - Do not try to parallelize workers more than 16x without the user explicitly configuring us to do so, even if we do detect more than 16 CPU cores. Fixes bug 19968; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha. - - Work around a memory leak in OpenSSL 1.1 when encoding public - keys. Fixes bug 20553; bugfix on 0.0.2pre8. o Minor bugfixes (testing): - Allow clients to retry HSDirs much faster in test networks. Fixes @@ -699,10 +619,6 @@ into the ReleaseNotes file before stable.] NATDListenAddress, ORListenAddress, SocksListenAddress, and TransListenAddress. - o Directory authority changes (also in 0.2.8.7): - - The "Tonga" bridge authority has been retired; the new bridge - authority is "Bifroest". Closes tickets 19728 and 19690. - o Documentation: - Add module-level internal documentation for 36 C files that previously didn't have a high-level overview. Closes ticket #20385.

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[tor/master] Fix double-typedef of or_circuit_t.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Dec '16

14 Dec '16

commit 4098bfa26073551fe3f525ada7fc9079a49fd4bb Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Dec 14 16:46:54 2016 -0500 Fix double-typedef of or_circuit_t. --- src/or/hs_circuitmap.h | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuitmap.h b/src/or/hs_circuitmap.h index 79767dd..b587039 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_circuitmap.h +++ b/src/or/hs_circuitmap.h @@ -12,23 +12,23 @@ typedef HT_HEAD(hs_circuitmap_ht, or_circuit_t) hs_circuitmap_ht; typedef struct hs_token_s hs_token_t; -typedef struct or_circuit_t or_circuit_t; +struct or_circuit_t; /** Public HS circuitmap API: */ -or_circuit_t *hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ(const uint8_t *cookie); -or_circuit_t * -hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v3(const ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key); -or_circuit_t *hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2(const uint8_t *digest); +struct or_circuit_t *hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ(const uint8_t *cookie); +struct or_circuit_t *hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v3( + const ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key); +struct or_circuit_t *hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2(const uint8_t *digest); -void hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ(or_circuit_t *circ, +void hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ(struct or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *cookie); -void hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v2(or_circuit_t *circ, +void hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v2(struct or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *digest); -void hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v3(or_circuit_t *circ, +void hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v3(struct or_circuit_t *circ, const ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key); -void hs_circuitmap_remove_circuit(or_circuit_t *circ); +void hs_circuitmap_remove_circuit(struct or_circuit_t *circ); void hs_circuitmap_init(void); void hs_circuitmap_free_all(void);

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[tor/master] Fix a few clang warnings.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Dec '16

14 Dec '16

commit a8ac2a62cb29bc9831bafc477927b31a3204af98 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Dec 14 16:01:27 2016 -0500 Fix a few clang warnings. --- src/or/hs_circuitmap.c | 4 ++-- src/test/test_hs_service.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuitmap.c b/src/or/hs_circuitmap.c index 321c8dd..5003b4b 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_circuitmap.c +++ b/src/or/hs_circuitmap.c @@ -69,11 +69,11 @@ hs_circuit_hash_token(const or_circuit_t *circuit) HT_PROTOTYPE(hs_circuitmap_ht, // The name of the hashtable struct or_circuit_t, // The name of the element struct, hs_circuitmap_node, // The name of HT_ENTRY member - hs_circuit_hash_token, hs_circuits_have_same_token); + hs_circuit_hash_token, hs_circuits_have_same_token) HT_GENERATE2(hs_circuitmap_ht, or_circuit_t, hs_circuitmap_node, hs_circuit_hash_token, hs_circuits_have_same_token, - 0.6, tor_reallocarray, tor_free_); + 0.6, tor_reallocarray, tor_free_) #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_service.c b/src/test/test_hs_service.c index 8890c11..039d727 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_service.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_service.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ static void test_gen_establish_intro_cell(void *arg) { (void) arg; - int retval; + ssize_t retval; uint8_t circuit_key_material[DIGEST_LEN] = {0}; uint8_t buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; hs_cell_establish_intro_t *cell_out = NULL;

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[tor/master] prop224 prepwork: Introduce HMAC-SHA3 function.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Dec '16

14 Dec '16

commit b9010c8bf5f1231c51cd3c7b134ec8576a8f9de5 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Mon Sep 5 17:21:44 2016 +0200 prop224 prepwork: Introduce HMAC-SHA3 function. --- src/common/crypto.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ src/common/crypto.h | 3 +++ src/test/test_crypto.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index fff516c..e4ef52d 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -2109,6 +2109,28 @@ crypto_hmac_sha256(char *hmac_out, tor_assert(rv); } +/** Compute an SHA3 MAC of msg using key as the key. The format + * used for our MAC is SHA3(k | m). Write the DIGEST256_LEN-byte result into + * mac_out of size mac_out_len. */ +void +crypto_mac_sha3_256(char *mac_out, size_t mac_out_len, + const char *key, size_t key_len, + const char *msg, size_t msg_len) +{ + crypto_digest_t *digest; + + tor_assert(mac_out); + tor_assert(key); + tor_assert(msg); + + digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256); + + crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, key, key_len); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, msg, msg_len); + crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, mac_out, mac_out_len); + crypto_digest_free(digest); +} + /** Internal state for a eXtendable-Output Function (XOF). */ struct crypto_xof_t { keccak_state s; diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h index 116e0a6..32b6531 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.h +++ b/src/common/crypto.h @@ -255,6 +255,9 @@ void crypto_digest_assign(crypto_digest_t *into, void crypto_hmac_sha256(char *hmac_out, const char *key, size_t key_len, const char *msg, size_t msg_len); +void crypto_mac_sha3_256(char *mac_out, size_t mac_out_len, + const char *key, size_t key_len, + const char *msg, size_t msg_len); crypto_xof_t *crypto_xof_new(void); void crypto_xof_add_bytes(crypto_xof_t *xof, const uint8_t *data, size_t len); void crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(crypto_xof_t *xof, uint8_t *out, size_t len); diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index 64a46f7..91c55d8 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -1135,6 +1135,48 @@ test_crypto_sha3_xof(void *arg) tor_free(mem_op_hex_tmp); } +/* Test our MAC-SHA3 function. There are not actually any MAC-SHA3 test + * vectors out there for our H(len(k) || k || m) construction. Hence what we + * are gonna do is test our crypto_mac_sha3_256() function against manually + * doing H(len(k) || k||m). If in the future the Keccak group decides to + * standarize an MAC construction and make test vectors, we should + * incorporate them here. */ +static void +test_crypto_mac_sha3(void *arg) +{ + const char msg[] = "i am in a library somewhere using my computer"; + const char key[] = "i'm from the past talking to the future."; + + char hmac_test[DIGEST256_LEN]; + char hmac_manual[DIGEST256_LEN]; + + (void) arg; + + /* First let's use our nice HMAC-SHA3 function */ + crypto_mac_sha3_256(hmac_test, sizeof(hmac_test), + key, strlen(key), + msg, strlen(msg)); + + /* Now let's try a manual H(k || m) construction */ + { + char *key_msg_concat = NULL; + int result; + + tor_asprintf(&key_msg_concat, "%s%s", key, msg); + + result = crypto_digest256(hmac_manual, + key_msg_concat, strlen(key_msg_concat), + DIGEST_SHA3_256); + tt_int_op(result, ==, 0); + tor_free(key_msg_concat); + } + + /* Now compare the two results */ + tt_mem_op(hmac_test, OP_EQ, hmac_manual, DIGEST256_LEN); + + done: ; +} + /** Run unit tests for our public key crypto functions */ static void test_crypto_pk(void *arg) @@ -2918,6 +2960,7 @@ struct testcase_t crypto_tests[] = { { "digest_names", test_crypto_digest_names, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "sha3", test_crypto_sha3, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL}, { "sha3_xof", test_crypto_sha3_xof, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL}, + { "mac_sha3", test_crypto_mac_sha3, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL}, CRYPTO_LEGACY(dh), { "aes_iv_AES", test_crypto_aes_iv, TT_FORK, &passthrough_setup, (void*)"aes" },

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[tor/master] prpo224 prepwork: Decouple legacy ESTABLISH_INTRO creation logic.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Dec '16

14 Dec '16

commit b5b34e62f7fd86c242591dbbf852617a92bfc330 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Fri Sep 2 10:42:34 2016 +0200 prpo224 prepwork: Decouple legacy ESTABLISH_INTRO creation logic. This commit only moves code. --- src/or/rendservice.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 0819d8a..ecb1e27 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -2986,6 +2986,40 @@ count_intro_point_circuits(const rend_service_t *service) return num_ipos; } +static size_t +encode_establish_intro_cell_legacy(char *cell_body_out, crypto_pk_t *intro_key, + char *rend_circ_nonce) +{ +/* Use the intro key instead of the service key in ESTABLISH_INTRO. */ + crypto_pk_t *intro_key = circuit->intro_key; + /* Build the payload for a RELAY_ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. */ + r = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(intro_key, buf+2, + RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE-2); + if (r < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error; failed to establish intro point."); + reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; + goto err; + } + len = r; + set_uint16(buf, htons((uint16_t)len)); + len += 2; + memcpy(auth, circuit->cpath->prev->rend_circ_nonce, DIGEST_LEN); + memcpy(auth+DIGEST_LEN, "INTRODUCE", 9); + if (crypto_digest(buf+len, auth, DIGEST_LEN+9)) + + goto err; + len += 20; + note_crypto_pk_op(REND_SERVER); + r = crypto_pk_private_sign_digest(intro_key, buf+len, sizeof(buf)-len, + buf, len); + if (r<0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't sign introduction request."); + reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; + goto err; + } + len += r; +} + /** Called when we're done building a circuit to an introduction point: * sends a RELAY_ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. */ @@ -2993,9 +3027,7 @@ void rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) { rend_service_t *service; - size_t len; int r; - char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; char auth[DIGEST_LEN + 9]; char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1]; int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; @@ -3071,34 +3103,6 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) (unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id, serviceid); circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO, LD_REND, circuit); - /* Use the intro key instead of the service key in ESTABLISH_INTRO. */ - crypto_pk_t *intro_key = circuit->intro_key; - /* Build the payload for a RELAY_ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. */ - r = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(intro_key, buf+2, - RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE-2); - if (r < 0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error; failed to establish intro point."); - reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; - goto err; - } - len = r; - set_uint16(buf, htons((uint16_t)len)); - len += 2; - memcpy(auth, circuit->cpath->prev->rend_circ_nonce, DIGEST_LEN); - memcpy(auth+DIGEST_LEN, "INTRODUCE", 9); - if (crypto_digest(buf+len, auth, DIGEST_LEN+9)) - goto err; - len += 20; - note_crypto_pk_op(REND_SERVER); - r = crypto_pk_private_sign_digest(intro_key, buf+len, sizeof(buf)-len, - buf, len); - if (r<0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't sign introduction request."); - reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; - goto err; - } - len += r; - if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO, buf, len, circuit->cpath->prev)<0) {

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[tor/master] prop224: Add code that generates ESTABLISH_INTRO cells.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Dec '16

14 Dec '16

commit c4c90d56b543887ee9bee6553725151b09891d8e Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Mon Sep 5 18:58:19 2016 +0300 prop224: Add code that generates ESTABLISH_INTRO cells. Currently unused. It will only be used for creating ESTABLISH_INTRO cells in unittests :) --- src/or/hs_common.h | 7 ++- src/or/hs_service.c | 175 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/hs_service.h | 31 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_common.h b/src/or/hs_common.h index 2502f35..55710b7 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_common.h +++ b/src/or/hs_common.h @@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ /* Version 3 of the protocol (prop224). */ #define HS_VERSION_THREE 3 +/* Denotes ed25519 authentication key on ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. */ +#define AUTH_KEY_ED25519 0x02 + +/* String prefix for the signature of ESTABLISH_INTRO */ +#define ESTABLISH_INTRO_SIG_PREFIX "Tor establish-intro cell v1" + void rend_data_free(rend_data_t *data); rend_data_t *rend_data_dup(const rend_data_t *data); rend_data_t *rend_data_client_create(const char *onion_address, @@ -36,4 +42,3 @@ const uint8_t *rend_data_get_pk_digest(const rend_data_t *rend_data, int hs_v3_protocol_is_enabled(void); #endif /* TOR_HS_COMMON_H */ - diff --git a/src/or/hs_service.c b/src/or/hs_service.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..69f83cf --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/hs_service.c @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file hs_service.c + * \brief Implement next generation hidden service functionality + **/ + +#define HS_SERVICE_PRIVATE + +#include "or.h" +#include "relay.h" +#include "rendservice.h" +#include "circuitlist.h" +#include "circpathbias.h" + +#include "hs_service.h" +#include "hs_common.h" + +#include "hs/cell_establish_intro.h" +#include "hs/cell_common.h" + +/* XXX We don't currently use these functions, apart from generating unittest + data. When we start implementing the service-side support for prop224 we + should revisit these functions and use them. For now we mark them as + unittest-only code: */ +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS + +/** Given an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, encode it and place its payload in + * buf_out which has size buf_out_len. Return the number of + * bytes written, or a negative integer if there was an error. */ +STATIC ssize_t +get_establish_intro_payload(uint8_t *buf_out, size_t buf_out_len, + const hs_cell_establish_intro_t *cell) +{ + ssize_t bytes_used = 0; + + if (buf_out_len < RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE) { + return -1; + } + + bytes_used = hs_cell_establish_intro_encode(buf_out, buf_out_len, + cell); + return bytes_used; +} + +/* Set the cell extensions of cell. */ +static void +set_cell_extensions(hs_cell_establish_intro_t *cell) +{ + cell_extension_t *cell_extensions = cell_extension_new(); + + /* For now, we don't use extensions at all. */ + cell_extensions->num = 0; /* It's already zeroed, but be explicit. */ + hs_cell_establish_intro_set_extensions(cell, cell_extensions); +} + +/** Given the circuit handshake info in circuit_key_material, create and + * return an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. Return NULL if something went wrong. The + * returned cell is allocated on the heap and it's the responsibility of the + * caller to free it. */ +STATIC hs_cell_establish_intro_t * +generate_establish_intro_cell(const char *circuit_key_material, + size_t circuit_key_material_len) +{ + hs_cell_establish_intro_t *cell = NULL; + ssize_t encoded_len; + + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, + "Generating ESTABLISH_INTRO cell (key_material_len: %u)", + (unsigned) circuit_key_material_len); + + /* Generate short-term keypair for use in ESTABLISH_INTRO */ + ed25519_keypair_t key_struct; + if (ed25519_keypair_generate(&key_struct, 0) < 0) { + goto err; + } + + cell = hs_cell_establish_intro_new(); + + /* Set AUTH_KEY_TYPE: 2 means ed25519 */ + hs_cell_establish_intro_set_auth_key_type(cell, AUTH_KEY_ED25519); + + /* Set AUTH_KEY_LEN field */ + /* Must also set byte-length of AUTH_KEY to match */ + int auth_key_len = ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN; + hs_cell_establish_intro_set_auth_key_len(cell, auth_key_len); + hs_cell_establish_intro_setlen_auth_key(cell, auth_key_len); + + /* Set AUTH_KEY field */ + uint8_t *auth_key_ptr = hs_cell_establish_intro_getarray_auth_key(cell); + memcpy(auth_key_ptr, key_struct.pubkey.pubkey, auth_key_len); + + /* No cell extensions needed */ + set_cell_extensions(cell); + + /* Set signature size. + We need to do this up here, because _encode() needs it and we need to call + _encode() to calculate the MAC and signature. + */ + int sig_len = ED25519_SIG_LEN; + hs_cell_establish_intro_set_sig_len(cell, sig_len); + hs_cell_establish_intro_setlen_sig(cell, sig_len); + + /* XXX How to make this process easier and nicer? */ + + /* Calculate the cell MAC (aka HANDSHAKE_AUTH). */ + { + /* To calculate HANDSHAKE_AUTH, we dump the cell in bytes, and then derive + the MAC from it. */ + uint8_t cell_bytes_tmp[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE] = {0}; + char mac[TRUNNEL_SHA3_256_LEN]; + + encoded_len = hs_cell_establish_intro_encode(cell_bytes_tmp, + sizeof(cell_bytes_tmp), + cell); + if (encoded_len < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to pre-encode ESTABLISH_INTRO cell."); + goto err; + } + + /* sanity check */ + tor_assert(encoded_len > ED25519_SIG_LEN + 2 + TRUNNEL_SHA3_256_LEN); + + /* Calculate MAC of all fields before HANDSHAKE_AUTH */ + crypto_mac_sha3_256(mac, sizeof(mac), + circuit_key_material, circuit_key_material_len, + (const char*)cell_bytes_tmp, + encoded_len - (ED25519_SIG_LEN + 2 + TRUNNEL_SHA3_256_LEN)); + /* Write the MAC to the cell */ + uint8_t *handshake_ptr = + hs_cell_establish_intro_getarray_handshake_mac(cell); + memcpy(handshake_ptr, mac, sizeof(mac)); + } + + /* Calculate the cell signature */ + { + /* To calculate the sig we follow the same procedure as above. We first + dump the cell up to the sig, and then calculate the sig */ + uint8_t cell_bytes_tmp[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE] = {0}; + ed25519_signature_t sig; + + encoded_len = hs_cell_establish_intro_encode(cell_bytes_tmp, + sizeof(cell_bytes_tmp), + cell); + if (encoded_len < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to pre-encode ESTABLISH_INTRO cell (2)."); + goto err; + } + + tor_assert(encoded_len > ED25519_SIG_LEN); + + if (ed25519_sign_prefixed(&sig, + (uint8_t*) cell_bytes_tmp, + encoded_len - ED25519_SIG_LEN, + ESTABLISH_INTRO_SIG_PREFIX, + &key_struct)) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to gen signature for ESTABLISH_INTRO cell."); + goto err; + } + + /* And write the signature to the cell */ + uint8_t *sig_ptr = hs_cell_establish_intro_getarray_sig(cell); + memcpy(sig_ptr, sig.sig, sig_len); + } + + /* We are done! Return the cell! */ + return cell; + + err: + hs_cell_establish_intro_free(cell); + return NULL; +} + +#endif /* TOR_UNIT_TESTS */ diff --git a/src/or/hs_service.h b/src/or/hs_service.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a76007 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/hs_service.h @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file hs_service.h + * \brief Header file for hs_service.c. + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_HS_SERVICE_H +#define TOR_HS_SERVICE_H + +#include "or.h" +#include "hs/cell_establish_intro.h" + +#ifdef HS_SERVICE_PRIVATE + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS + +STATIC hs_cell_establish_intro_t * +generate_establish_intro_cell(const char *circuit_key_material, + size_t circuit_key_material_len); + +STATIC ssize_t +get_establish_intro_payload(uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len, + const hs_cell_establish_intro_t *cell); + +#endif /* TOR_UNIT_TESTS */ + +#endif /* HS_SERVICE_PRIVATE */ + +#endif /* TOR_HS_SERVICE_H */

1 0

[tor/master] prop224 prepwork: Use of HS circuitmap in existing HS code.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Dec '16

14 Dec '16

commit 9192e5928c0b974ba7c1b908b6f2538cd6f56c79 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Mon Sep 5 18:54:59 2016 +0300 prop224 prepwork: Use of HS circuitmap in existing HS code. The new HS circuitmap API replaces old public functions as follows: circuit_clear_rend_token -> hs_circuitmap_remove_circuit circuit_get_rendezvous -> hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ circuit_get_intro_point -> hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2 circuit_set_rendezvous_cookie -> hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ circuit_set_intro_point_digest -> hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v2 This commit also removes the old rendinfo code that is now unused. It also fixes the broken rendinfo unittests. --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 179 +------------------------------------------- src/or/circuitlist.h | 4 - src/or/main.c | 5 ++ src/or/or.h | 14 ---- src/or/rendmid.c | 14 ++-- src/test/test_circuitlist.c | 63 +++++++++------- 6 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 229 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index dee103e..b7ae3f5 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ #include "connection_edge.h" #include "connection_or.h" #include "control.h" +#include "hs_circuitmap.h" #include "main.h" #include "hs_common.h" #include "networkstatus.h" @@ -93,9 +94,6 @@ static smartlist_t *circuits_pending_close = NULL; static void circuit_free_cpath_node(crypt_path_t *victim); static void cpath_ref_decref(crypt_path_reference_t *cpath_ref); -//static void circuit_set_rend_token(or_circuit_t *circ, int is_rend_circ, -// const uint8_t *token); -static void circuit_clear_rend_token(or_circuit_t *circ); static void circuit_about_to_free_atexit(circuit_t *circ); static void circuit_about_to_free(circuit_t *circ); @@ -866,7 +864,9 @@ circuit_free(circuit_t *circ) crypto_cipher_free(ocirc->n_crypto); crypto_digest_free(ocirc->n_digest); - circuit_clear_rend_token(ocirc); + if (ocirc->hs_token) { + hs_circuitmap_remove_circuit(ocirc); + } if (ocirc->rend_splice) { or_circuit_t *other = ocirc->rend_splice; @@ -1409,177 +1409,6 @@ circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(origin_circuit_t *start, return NULL; } -/** Map from rendezvous cookie to or_circuit_t */ -static digestmap_t *rend_cookie_map = NULL; - -/** Map from introduction point digest to or_circuit_t */ -static digestmap_t *intro_digest_map = NULL; - -/** Return the OR circuit whose purpose is purpose, and whose - * rend_token is the REND_TOKEN_LEN-byte token. If is_rend_circ, - * look for rendezvous point circuits; otherwise look for introduction point - * circuits. */ -static or_circuit_t * -circuit_get_by_rend_token_and_purpose(uint8_t purpose, int is_rend_circ, - const char *token) -{ - or_circuit_t *circ; - digestmap_t *map = is_rend_circ ? rend_cookie_map : intro_digest_map; - - if (!map) - return NULL; - - circ = digestmap_get(map, token); - if (!circ || - circ->base_.purpose != purpose || - circ->base_.marked_for_close) - return NULL; - - if (!circ->rendinfo) { - char *t = tor_strdup(hex_str(token, REND_TOKEN_LEN)); - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Wanted a circuit with %s:%d, but lookup returned a " - "circuit with no rendinfo set.", - safe_str(t), is_rend_circ); - tor_free(t); - return NULL; - } - - if (! bool_eq(circ->rendinfo->is_rend_circ, is_rend_circ) || - tor_memneq(circ->rendinfo->rend_token, token, REND_TOKEN_LEN)) { - char *t = tor_strdup(hex_str(token, REND_TOKEN_LEN)); - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Wanted a circuit with %s:%d, but lookup returned %s:%d", - safe_str(t), is_rend_circ, - safe_str(hex_str(circ->rendinfo->rend_token, REND_TOKEN_LEN)), - (int)circ->rendinfo->is_rend_circ); - tor_free(t); - return NULL; - } - - return circ; -} - -/** Clear the rendezvous cookie or introduction point key digest that's - * configured on circ, if any, and remove it from any such maps. */ -static void -circuit_clear_rend_token(or_circuit_t *circ) -{ - or_circuit_t *found_circ; - digestmap_t *map; - - if (!circ || !circ->rendinfo) - return; - - map = circ->rendinfo->is_rend_circ ? rend_cookie_map : intro_digest_map; - - if (!map) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to clear rend token on circuit, but found no map"); - return; - } - - found_circ = digestmap_get(map, circ->rendinfo->rend_token); - if (found_circ == circ) { - /* Great, this is the right one. */ - digestmap_remove(map, circ->rendinfo->rend_token); - } else if (found_circ) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to clear rend token on circuit, but " - "it was already replaced in the map."); - } else { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to clear rend token on circuit, but " - "it not in the map at all."); - } - - tor_free(circ->rendinfo); /* Sets it to NULL too */ -} - -/** Set the rendezvous cookie (if is_rend_circ), or the introduction point - * digest (if ! is_rend_circ) of circ to the REND_TOKEN_LEN-byte value - * in token, and add it to the appropriate map. If it previously had a - * token, clear it. If another circuit previously had the same - * cookie/intro-digest, mark that circuit and remove it from the map. */ -static void -circuit_set_rend_token(or_circuit_t *circ, int is_rend_circ, - const uint8_t *token) -{ - digestmap_t **map_p, *map; - or_circuit_t *found_circ; - - /* Find the right map, creating it as needed */ - map_p = is_rend_circ ? &rend_cookie_map : &intro_digest_map; - - if (!*map_p) - *map_p = digestmap_new(); - - map = *map_p; - - /* If this circuit already has a token, we need to remove that. */ - if (circ->rendinfo) - circuit_clear_rend_token(circ); - - if (token == NULL) { - /* We were only trying to remove this token, not set a new one. */ - return; - } - - found_circ = digestmap_get(map, (const char *)token); - if (found_circ) { - tor_assert(found_circ != circ); - circuit_clear_rend_token(found_circ); - if (! found_circ->base_.marked_for_close) { - circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(found_circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); - if (is_rend_circ) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND, - "Duplicate rendezvous cookie (%s...) used on two circuits", - hex_str((const char*)token, 4)); /* only log first 4 chars */ - } - } - } - - /* Now set up the rendinfo */ - circ->rendinfo = tor_malloc(sizeof(*circ->rendinfo)); - memcpy(circ->rendinfo->rend_token, token, REND_TOKEN_LEN); - circ->rendinfo->is_rend_circ = is_rend_circ ? 1 : 0; - - digestmap_set(map, (const char *)token, circ); -} - -/** Return the circuit waiting for a rendezvous with the provided cookie. - * Return NULL if no such circuit is found. - */ -or_circuit_t * -circuit_get_rendezvous(const uint8_t *cookie) -{ - return circuit_get_by_rend_token_and_purpose( - CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING, - 1, (const char*)cookie); -} - -/** Return the circuit waiting for intro cells of the given digest. - * Return NULL if no such circuit is found. - */ -or_circuit_t * -circuit_get_intro_point(const uint8_t *digest) -{ - return circuit_get_by_rend_token_and_purpose( - CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT, 0, - (const char *)digest); -} - -/** Set the rendezvous cookie of circ to cookie. If another - * circuit previously had that cookie, mark it. */ -void -circuit_set_rendezvous_cookie(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *cookie) -{ - circuit_set_rend_token(circ, 1, cookie); -} - -/** Set the intro point key digest of circ to cookie. If another - * circuit previously had that intro point digest, mark it. */ -void -circuit_set_intro_point_digest(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *digest) -{ - circuit_set_rend_token(circ, 0, digest); -} - /** Return a circuit that is open, is CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, * has a timestamp_dirty value of 0, has flags matching the CIRCLAUNCH_* * flags in flags, and if info is defined, does not already use info diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.h b/src/or/circuitlist.h index 989c02a..b38b6d1 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.h +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.h @@ -46,10 +46,6 @@ origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data( const rend_data_t *rend_data); origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(origin_circuit_t *start, const uint8_t *digest, uint8_t purpose); -or_circuit_t *circuit_get_rendezvous(const uint8_t *cookie); -or_circuit_t *circuit_get_intro_point(const uint8_t *digest); -void circuit_set_rendezvous_cookie(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *cookie); -void circuit_set_intro_point_digest(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *digest); origin_circuit_t *circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, int flags); void circuit_mark_all_unused_circs(void); diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index c10f627..ff477db 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ #include "geoip.h" #include "hibernate.h" #include "hs_cache.h" +#include "hs_circuitmap.h" #include "keypin.h" #include "main.h" #include "microdesc.h" @@ -2400,6 +2401,9 @@ do_main_loop(void) } } + /* Initialize relay-side HS circuitmap */ + hs_circuitmap_init(); + /* set up once-a-second callback. */ if (! second_timer) { struct timeval one_second; @@ -3108,6 +3112,7 @@ tor_free_all(int postfork) connection_edge_free_all(); scheduler_free_all(); nodelist_free_all(); + hs_circuitmap_free_all(); microdesc_free_all(); routerparse_free_all(); ext_orport_free_all(); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 9581c6d..10cfc76 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3393,25 +3393,11 @@ typedef struct or_circuit_t { uint32_t max_middle_cells; } or_circuit_t; -typedef struct or_circuit_rendinfo_s { - #if REND_COOKIE_LEN != DIGEST_LEN #error "The REND_TOKEN_LEN macro assumes REND_COOKIE_LEN == DIGEST_LEN" #endif #define REND_TOKEN_LEN DIGEST_LEN - /** A hash of location-hidden service's PK if purpose is INTRO_POINT, or a - * rendezvous cookie if purpose is REND_POINT_WAITING. Filled with zeroes - * otherwise. - */ - char rend_token[REND_TOKEN_LEN]; - - /** True if this is a rendezvous point circuit; false if this is an - * introduction point. */ - unsigned is_rend_circ; - -} or_circuit_rendinfo_t; - /** Convert a circuit subtype to a circuit_t. */ #define TO_CIRCUIT(x) (&((x)->base_)) diff --git a/src/or/rendmid.c b/src/or/rendmid.c index f39c92a..6b44aa1 100644 --- a/src/or/rendmid.c +++ b/src/or/rendmid.c @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, /* Close any other intro circuits with the same pk. */ c = NULL; - while ((c = circuit_get_intro_point((const uint8_t *)pk_digest))) { + while ((c = hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2((const uint8_t *)pk_digest))) { log_info(LD_REND, "Replacing old circuit for service %s", safe_str(serviceid)); circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(c), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, /* Now, set up this circuit. */ circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT); - circuit_set_intro_point_digest(circ, (uint8_t *)pk_digest); + hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v2(circ, (uint8_t *)pk_digest); log_info(LD_REND, "Established introduction point on circuit %u for service %s", @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, /* The first 20 bytes are all we look at: they have a hash of the service's * PK. */ - intro_circ = circuit_get_intro_point((const uint8_t*)request); + intro_circ = hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2((const uint8_t*)request); if (!intro_circ) { log_info(LD_REND, "No intro circ found for INTRODUCE1 cell (%s) from circuit %u; " @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ rend_mid_establish_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, goto err; } - if (circuit_get_rendezvous(request)) { + if (hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ(request)) { log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS."); goto err; @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ rend_mid_establish_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, } circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING); - circuit_set_rendezvous_cookie(circ, request); + hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ(circ, request); base16_encode(hexid,9,(char*)request,4); @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, "Got request for rendezvous from circuit %u to cookie %s.", (unsigned)circ->p_circ_id, hexid); - rend_circ = circuit_get_rendezvous(request); + rend_circ = hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ(request); if (!rend_circ) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Rejecting RENDEZVOUS1 cell with unrecognized rendezvous cookie %s.", @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED); circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(rend_circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED); - circuit_set_rendezvous_cookie(circ, NULL); + hs_circuitmap_remove_circuit(circ); rend_circ->rend_splice = circ; circ->rend_splice = rend_circ; diff --git a/src/test/test_circuitlist.c b/src/test/test_circuitlist.c index e996c42..7eed5fe 100644 --- a/src/test/test_circuitlist.c +++ b/src/test/test_circuitlist.c @@ -4,10 +4,12 @@ #define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ #define CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE #define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE +#define HS_CIRCUITMAP_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "channel.h" #include "circuitbuild.h" #include "circuitlist.h" +#include "hs_circuitmap.h" #include "test.h" #include "log_test_helpers.h" @@ -185,6 +187,9 @@ test_rend_token_maps(void *arg) (void)arg; (void)tok1; //xxxx + + hs_circuitmap_init(); + c1 = or_circuit_new(0, NULL); c2 = or_circuit_new(0, NULL); c3 = or_circuit_new(0, NULL); @@ -196,68 +201,68 @@ test_rend_token_maps(void *arg) tt_int_op(tok3[REND_TOKEN_LEN-1], OP_EQ, '.'); /* No maps; nothing there. */ - tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, circuit_get_rendezvous(tok1)); - tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, circuit_get_intro_point(tok1)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ(tok1)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2(tok1)); - circuit_set_rendezvous_cookie(c1, tok1); - circuit_set_intro_point_digest(c2, tok2); + hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ(c1, tok1); + hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v2(c2, tok2); - tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, circuit_get_rendezvous(tok3)); - tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, circuit_get_intro_point(tok3)); - tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, circuit_get_rendezvous(tok2)); - tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, circuit_get_intro_point(tok1)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ(tok3)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2(tok3)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ(tok2)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2(tok1)); /* Without purpose set, we don't get the circuits */ - tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, circuit_get_rendezvous(tok1)); - tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, circuit_get_intro_point(tok2)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ(tok1)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2(tok2)); c1->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING; c2->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT; /* Okay, make sure they show up now. */ - tt_ptr_op(c1, OP_EQ, circuit_get_rendezvous(tok1)); - tt_ptr_op(c2, OP_EQ, circuit_get_intro_point(tok2)); + tt_ptr_op(c1, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ(tok1)); + tt_ptr_op(c2, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2(tok2)); /* Two items at the same place with the same token. */ c3->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING; - circuit_set_rendezvous_cookie(c3, tok2); - tt_ptr_op(c2, OP_EQ, circuit_get_intro_point(tok2)); - tt_ptr_op(c3, OP_EQ, circuit_get_rendezvous(tok2)); + hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ(c3, tok2); + tt_ptr_op(c2, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2(tok2)); + tt_ptr_op(c3, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ(tok2)); /* Marking a circuit makes it not get returned any more */ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(c1), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); - tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, circuit_get_rendezvous(tok1)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ(tok1)); circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(c1)); c1 = NULL; /* Freeing a circuit makes it not get returned any more. */ circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(c2)); c2 = NULL; - tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, circuit_get_intro_point(tok2)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2(tok2)); /* c3 -- are you still there? */ - tt_ptr_op(c3, OP_EQ, circuit_get_rendezvous(tok2)); + tt_ptr_op(c3, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ(tok2)); /* Change its cookie. This never happens in Tor per se, but hey. */ c3->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT; - circuit_set_intro_point_digest(c3, tok3); + hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v2(c3, tok3); - tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, circuit_get_rendezvous(tok2)); - tt_ptr_op(c3, OP_EQ, circuit_get_intro_point(tok3)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ(tok2)); + tt_ptr_op(c3, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2(tok3)); /* Now replace c3 with c4. */ c4->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT; - circuit_set_intro_point_digest(c4, tok3); + hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v2(c4, tok3); - tt_ptr_op(c4, OP_EQ, circuit_get_intro_point(tok3)); + tt_ptr_op(c4, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2(tok3)); - tt_ptr_op(c3->rendinfo, OP_EQ, NULL); - tt_ptr_op(c4->rendinfo, OP_NE, NULL); - tt_mem_op(c4->rendinfo, OP_EQ, tok3, REND_TOKEN_LEN); + tt_ptr_op(c3->hs_token, OP_EQ, NULL); + tt_ptr_op(c4->hs_token, OP_NE, NULL); + tt_mem_op(c4->hs_token->token, OP_EQ, tok3, REND_TOKEN_LEN); /* Now clear c4's cookie. */ - circuit_set_intro_point_digest(c4, NULL); - tt_ptr_op(c4->rendinfo, OP_EQ, NULL); - tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, circuit_get_intro_point(tok3)); + hs_circuitmap_remove_circuit(c4); + tt_ptr_op(c4->hs_token, OP_EQ, NULL); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2(tok3)); done: if (c1)

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[tor/master] prop224: Introduce the new introduction point code.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Dec '16

14 Dec '16

commit d7be1fd5197ad984d45c1d9a0a033a2b95a9fd9e Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Wed Nov 2 11:37:50 2016 -0400 prop224: Introduce the new introduction point code. (pun not intended) Now our code supports both legacy and prop224 ESTABLISH_INTRO cells :) hs_intro_received_establish_intro() is the new entry point. --- src/or/hs_intropoint.c | 279 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/hs_intropoint.h | 40 +++++++ src/or/include.am | 6 ++ src/or/rendcommon.c | 3 +- src/or/rendmid.c | 7 +- src/or/rendmid.h | 4 +- 6 files changed, 334 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_intropoint.c b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb8637b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c @@ -0,0 +1,279 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file hs_intropoint.c + * \brief Implement next generation introductions point functionality + **/ + +#define HS_INTROPOINT_PRIVATE + +#include "or.h" +#include "circuitlist.h" +#include "circuituse.h" +#include "relay.h" +#include "rendmid.h" +#include "rephist.h" + +#include "hs/cell_establish_intro.h" +#include "hs/cell_common.h" +#include "hs_circuitmap.h" +#include "hs_intropoint.h" +#include "hs_common.h" + +/** Extract the authentication key from an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and + * place it in auth_key_out. */ +STATIC void +get_auth_key_from_establish_intro_cell(ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key_out, + const hs_cell_establish_intro_t *cell) +{ + tor_assert(auth_key_out); + + const uint8_t *key_array = + hs_cell_establish_intro_getconstarray_auth_key(cell); + tor_assert(key_array); + tor_assert(hs_cell_establish_intro_getlen_auth_key(cell) == + sizeof(auth_key_out->pubkey)); + + memcpy(auth_key_out->pubkey, key_array, cell->auth_key_len); +} + +/** We received an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. Verify its signature and MAC, + * given circuit_key_material. Return 0 on success else -1 on error. */ +STATIC int +verify_establish_intro_cell(const hs_cell_establish_intro_t *cell, + const char *circuit_key_material, + size_t circuit_key_material_len) +{ + /* We only reach this function if the first byte of the cell is 0x02 which + * means that auth_key_type is AUTH_KEY_ED25519, hence this check should + * always pass. See hs_intro_received_establish_intro(). */ + if (BUG(cell->auth_key_type != AUTH_KEY_ED25519)) { + return -1; + } + + /* Make sure the auth key length is of the right size for this type. For + * EXTRA safety, we check both the size of the array and the length which + * must be the same. Safety first!*/ + if (hs_cell_establish_intro_getlen_auth_key(cell) != ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN || + hs_cell_establish_intro_get_auth_key_len(cell) != ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "ESTABLISH_INTRO auth key length is invalid"); + return -1; + } + + const char *msg = (char*) cell->start_cell; + + /* Verify the sig */ + { + ed25519_signature_t sig_struct; + const uint8_t *sig_array = hs_cell_establish_intro_getconstarray_sig(cell); + + if (hs_cell_establish_intro_getlen_sig(cell) != sizeof(sig_struct.sig)) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "ESTABLISH_INTRO sig len is invalid"); + return -1; + } + /* We are now sure that sig_len is of the right size. */ + memcpy(sig_struct.sig, sig_array, cell->sig_len); + + ed25519_public_key_t auth_key; + get_auth_key_from_establish_intro_cell(&auth_key, cell); + + const size_t sig_msg_len = (char*) (cell->end_sig_fields) - msg; + int sig_mismatch = ed25519_checksig_prefixed(&sig_struct, + (uint8_t*) msg, sig_msg_len, + ESTABLISH_INTRO_SIG_PREFIX, + &auth_key); + if (sig_mismatch) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "ESTABLISH_INTRO signature not as expected"); + return -1; + } + } + + /* Verify the MAC */ + { + const size_t auth_msg_len = (char*) (cell->end_mac_fields) - msg; + char mac[DIGEST256_LEN]; + crypto_mac_sha3_256(mac, sizeof(mac), + circuit_key_material, circuit_key_material_len, + msg, auth_msg_len); + if (tor_memneq(mac, cell->handshake_mac, sizeof(mac))) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "ESTABLISH_INTRO handshake_auth not as expected"); + return -1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Send an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell to circ. */ +MOCK_IMPL(int, +hs_intro_send_intro_established_cell,(or_circuit_t *circ)) +{ + int ret; + uint8_t *encoded_cell = NULL; + ssize_t encoded_len, result_len; + hs_cell_intro_established_t *cell; + cell_extension_t *ext; + + tor_assert(circ); + + /* Build the cell payload. */ + cell = hs_cell_intro_established_new(); + ext = cell_extension_new(); + cell_extension_set_num(ext, 0); + hs_cell_intro_established_set_extensions(cell, ext); + /* Encode the cell to binary format. */ + encoded_len = hs_cell_intro_established_encoded_len(cell); + tor_assert(encoded_len > 0); + encoded_cell = tor_malloc_zero(encoded_len); + result_len = hs_cell_intro_established_encode(encoded_cell, encoded_len, + cell); + tor_assert(encoded_len == result_len); + + ret = relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ), + RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED, + (char *) encoded_cell, encoded_len, + NULL); + /* On failure, the above function will close the circuit. */ + hs_cell_intro_established_free(cell); + tor_free(encoded_cell); + return ret; +} + +/** We received an ESTABLISH_INTRO parsed_cell on circ. It's + * well-formed and passed our verifications. Perform appropriate actions to + * establish an intro point. */ +static int +handle_verified_establish_intro_cell(or_circuit_t *circ, + const hs_cell_establish_intro_t *parsed_cell) +{ + /* Get the auth key of this intro point */ + ed25519_public_key_t auth_key; + get_auth_key_from_establish_intro_cell(&auth_key, parsed_cell); + + /* Then notify the hidden service that the intro point is established by + sending an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell */ + if (hs_intro_send_intro_established_cell(circ)) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't send INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell."); + return -1; + } + + /* Associate intro point auth key with this circuit. */ + hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v3(circ, &auth_key); + /* Repurpose this circuit into an intro circuit. */ + circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT); + + return 0; +} + +/** We just received an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell in circ with payload in + * request. Handle it by making circ an intro circuit. Return 0 + * if everything went well, or -1 if there were errors. */ +static int +handle_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, + size_t request_len) +{ + int cell_ok, retval = -1; + hs_cell_establish_intro_t *parsed_cell = NULL; + + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(request); + + log_info(LD_REND, "Received an ESTABLISH_INTRO request on circuit %" PRIu32, + circ->p_circ_id); + + /* Check that the circuit is in shape to become an intro point */ + if (!hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable(circ)) { + goto err; + } + + /* Parse the cell */ + ssize_t parsing_result = hs_cell_establish_intro_parse(&parsed_cell, + request, request_len); + if (parsing_result < 0) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Rejecting %s ESTABLISH_INTRO cell.", + parsing_result == -1 ? "invalid" : "truncated"); + goto err; + } + + cell_ok = verify_establish_intro_cell(parsed_cell, + circ->rend_circ_nonce, + sizeof(circ->rend_circ_nonce)); + if (cell_ok < 0) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Failed to verify ESTABLISH_INTRO cell."); + goto err; + } + + /* This cell is legit. Take the appropriate actions. */ + cell_ok = handle_verified_establish_intro_cell(circ, parsed_cell); + if (cell_ok < 0) { + goto err; + } + + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Established prop224 intro point on circuit %" PRIu32, + circ->p_circ_id); + + /* We are done! */ + retval = 0; + goto done; + + err: + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + + done: + hs_cell_establish_intro_free(parsed_cell); + return retval; +} + + +/* Return True if circuit is suitable for becoming an intro circuit. */ +int +hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable(const or_circuit_t *circ) +{ + /* Basic circuit state sanity checks. */ + if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Rejecting ESTABLISH_INTRO on non-OR circuit."); + return 0; + } + + if (circ->base_.n_chan) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Rejecting ESTABLISH_INTRO on non-edge circuit."); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* We just received an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell in circ. Figure out of it's + * a legacy or a next gen cell, and pass it to the appropriate handler. */ +int +hs_intro_received_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, + size_t request_len) +{ + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(request); + + if (request_len == 0) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Empty ESTABLISH_INTRO cell."); + goto err; + } + + /* Using the first byte of the cell, figure out the version of + * ESTABLISH_INTRO and pass it to the appropriate cell handler */ + const uint8_t first_byte = request[0]; + switch (first_byte) { + case HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0: + case HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1: + return rend_mid_establish_intro_legacy(circ, request, request_len); + case HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519: + return handle_establish_intro(circ, request, request_len); + default: + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unrecognized AUTH_KEY_TYPE %u.", first_byte); + goto err; + } + + err: + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + return -1; +} diff --git a/src/or/hs_intropoint.h b/src/or/hs_intropoint.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..651e2dc --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/hs_intropoint.h @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file hs_intropoint.h + * \brief Header file for hs_intropoint.c. + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_HS_INTRO_H +#define TOR_HS_INTRO_H + +/* Authentication key type in an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. */ +enum hs_intro_auth_key_type { + HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY0 = 0x00, + HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY1 = 0x01, + HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 0x02, +}; + +int hs_intro_received_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, + size_t request_len); + +MOCK_DECL(int, hs_intro_send_intro_established_cell,(or_circuit_t *circ)); + +/* also used by rendservice.c */ +int hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable(const or_circuit_t *circ); + +#ifdef HS_INTROPOINT_PRIVATE + +STATIC int +verify_establish_intro_cell(const hs_cell_establish_intro_t *out, + const char *circuit_key_material, + size_t circuit_key_material_len); + +STATIC void +get_auth_key_from_establish_intro_cell(ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key_out, + const hs_cell_establish_intro_t *cell); + +#endif /* HS_INTROPOINT_PRIVATE */ + +#endif /* TOR_HS_INTRO_H */ diff --git a/src/or/include.am b/src/or/include.am index 10f8b85..38777cc 100644 --- a/src/or/include.am +++ b/src/or/include.am @@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \ src/or/dnsserv.c \ src/or/fp_pair.c \ src/or/geoip.c \ + src/or/hs_intropoint.c \ + src/or/hs_circuitmap.c \ + src/or/hs_service.c \ src/or/entrynodes.c \ src/or/ext_orport.c \ src/or/hibernate.c \ @@ -164,6 +167,9 @@ ORHEADERS = \ src/or/hs_cache.h \ src/or/hs_common.h \ src/or/hs_descriptor.h \ + src/or/hs_intropoint.h \ + src/or/hs_circuitmap.h \ + src/or/hs_service.h \ src/or/keypin.h \ src/or/main.h \ src/or/microdesc.h \ diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index f2060e5..def51b7 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include "rendclient.h" #include "rendcommon.h" #include "rendmid.h" +#include "hs_intropoint.h" #include "rendservice.h" #include "rephist.h" #include "router.h" @@ -762,7 +763,7 @@ rend_process_relay_cell(circuit_t *circ, const crypt_path_t *layer_hint, switch (command) { case RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO: if (or_circ) - r = rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circ,payload,length); + r = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(or_circ,payload,length); break; case RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS: if (or_circ) diff --git a/src/or/rendmid.c b/src/or/rendmid.c index 6b44aa1..f3841ab 100644 --- a/src/or/rendmid.c +++ b/src/or/rendmid.c @@ -11,16 +11,19 @@ #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuituse.h" #include "config.h" +#include "crypto.h" #include "relay.h" #include "rendmid.h" #include "rephist.h" +#include "hs_circuitmap.h" +#include "hs_intropoint.h" /** Respond to an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell by checking the signed data and * setting the circuit's purpose and service pk digest. */ int -rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, - size_t request_len) +rend_mid_establish_intro_legacy(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, + size_t request_len) { crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL; char buf[DIGEST_LEN+9]; diff --git a/src/or/rendmid.h b/src/or/rendmid.h index 10d1287..374f2b7 100644 --- a/src/or/rendmid.h +++ b/src/or/rendmid.h @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ #ifndef TOR_RENDMID_H #define TOR_RENDMID_H -int rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, - size_t request_len); +int rend_mid_establish_intro_legacy(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, + size_t request_len); int rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len); int rend_mid_establish_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,

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[tor/master] prop224: Use new HS functions in old HS code.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Dec '16

14 Dec '16

commit 12dfe56b1cf9ec9852f27b8d10f2dcfad354f416 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Wed Nov 2 11:38:45 2016 -0400 prop224: Use new HS functions in old HS code. This is needed to make old code unittestable. --- src/or/rendmid.c | 11 ++++------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendmid.c b/src/or/rendmid.c index f3841ab..3319a63 100644 --- a/src/or/rendmid.c +++ b/src/or/rendmid.c @@ -35,15 +35,14 @@ rend_mid_establish_intro_legacy(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; log_info(LD_REND, - "Received an ESTABLISH_INTRO request on circuit %u", + "Received a legacy ESTABLISH_INTRO request on circuit %u", (unsigned) circ->p_circ_id); - if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR || circ->base_.n_chan) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Rejecting ESTABLISH_INTRO on non-OR or non-edge circuit."); + if (!hs_intro_circuit_is_suitable(circ)) { reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; goto err; } + if (request_len < 2+DIGEST_LEN) goto truncated; /* First 2 bytes: length of asn1-encoded key. */ @@ -105,9 +104,7 @@ rend_mid_establish_intro_legacy(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, } /* Acknowledge the request. */ - if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ), - RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED, - "", 0, NULL)<0) { + if (hs_intro_send_intro_established_cell(circ) < 0) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't send INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell."); goto err_no_close; }

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[tor/master] prop224: Add a changes file for v3 ESTABLISH_INTRO.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Dec '16

14 Dec '16

commit 7a204ae8f9c54c15e9bc05b9c2bd62c7e46d6ebb Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Mon Sep 5 19:54:06 2016 +0300 prop224: Add a changes file for v3 ESTABLISH_INTRO. --- changes/bug19043 | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug19043 b/changes/bug19043 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..70c35df --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug19043 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Major features (hidden services): + - Relays can now handle v3 ESTABLISH_INTRO cells as specified by prop224 + aka "Next Generation Hidden Services". Service and clients don't yet use + this code functionnality. It marks another step towards prop224 + deployment. Resolves ticket 19043. Initial code by Alec Heifetz.

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