October 2016 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[translation/tor-messenger-prefsdtd] Update translations for tor-messenger-prefsdtd
by translation＠torproject.org 12 Oct '16

12 Oct '16

commit f22c330bc7de46ee610c22f6a41aace448c03f1f Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Oct 12 10:18:06 2016 +0000 Update translations for tor-messenger-prefsdtd --- zh_CN/prefs.dtd | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/zh_CN/prefs.dtd b/zh_CN/prefs.dtd index 7f86897..5f591c5 100644 --- a/zh_CN/prefs.dtd +++ b/zh_CN/prefs.dtd @@ -18,5 +18,5 @@ <!ENTITY prefs.coniksServerPort "端口"> <!ENTITY prefs.coniksAccountPolicy "账户政策"> <!ENTITY prefs.coniksPoliciesForAccount "账号条款"> -<!ENTITY prefs.coniksPrivateLookups "Private lookups"> +<!ENTITY prefs.coniksPrivateLookups "隐私查询"> <!ENTITY prefs.coniksSignedKeyChange "已签名密钥变更"> \ No newline at end of file

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[tor/master] Fix a bug in displaying IPv6 addrs in test_op_ipv6_ with --verbose
by nickm＠torproject.org 12 Oct '16

12 Oct '16

commit 0e1b228aa6b5ed7665ba5167a2b88924e58fb9b5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 11 19:22:46 2016 -0400 Fix a bug in displaying IPv6 addrs in test_op_ipv6_ with --verbose The test code, if it failed, or if it was run in verbose mode, would use the wrong variable for its loop. Patch from rubiate uploaded to 19999. --- src/test/test_addr.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_addr.c b/src/test/test_addr.c index c8a9e6d..49e2480 100644 --- a/src/test/test_addr.c +++ b/src/test/test_addr.c @@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ test_addr_basic(void *arg) char *, "%s", \ { char *cp; \ cp = print_ = tor_malloc(64); \ - for (int ii_=0;i<16;++i) { \ - tor_snprintf(cp, 3,"%02x", (unsigned)value_->s6_addr[i]);\ + for (int ii_=0;ii_<16;++ii_) { \ + tor_snprintf(cp, 3,"%02x", (unsigned)value_->s6_addr[ii_]); \ cp += 2; \ if (ii_ != 15) *cp++ = ':'; \ } \

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[torspec/master] prop224: Minor syntax fix mostly wrapping on 80 chars
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 11 Oct '16

11 Oct '16

commit cbcd62886a76e11328681281ab693ed73f89036b Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 11 15:11:39 2016 -0400 prop224: Minor syntax fix mostly wrapping on 80 chars Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt | 26 ++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt index 0e039e1..edb45ae 100644 --- a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt +++ b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Table of contents: 2.3. Publishing shared random values [PUB-SHAREDRANDOM] 2.3.1. Client behavior in the absense of shared random values 2.3.2. Hidden services and changing shared random values - 2.4. Hidden service descriptors: outer wrapper [DESC-OUTER] + 2.4. Hidden service descriptors: outer wrapper [DESC-OUTER] 2.5. Hidden service descriptors: encryption format [ENCRYPTED-DATA] 3. The introduction protocol 3.1. Registering an introduction point [REG_INTRO_POINT] @@ -691,8 +691,9 @@ Table of contents: 2.2.2. When to publish a hidden service descriptor [WHEN-HSDESC] - Hidden services periodically publish their descriptor to the responsible HSDirs. - The set of responsible HSDirs is determined as specified in [WHERE-HSDESC]. + Hidden services periodically publish their descriptor to the responsible + HSDirs. The set of responsible HSDirs is determined as specified in + [WHERE-HSDESC]. Specifically, everytime a hidden service publishes its descriptor, it also sets up a timer for a random time between 60 minutes and 120 minutes in the @@ -709,7 +710,8 @@ Table of contents: overwhelmed by every host uploading at the same time. To avoid this thundering herd problem, hidden services upload descriptors - for the upcoming time period at a random time _before_ the time period starts. + for the upcoming time period at a random time _before_ the time period + starts. For the above "descriptor overlap" system to work, fresh shared random values must be available multiple hours *before* the time period changes, so @@ -763,8 +765,8 @@ Table of contents: INT_8(period_num) ) where shared_random_value is the shared value generated by the authorities - in section [PUB-SHAREDRANDOM], and node_identity is the ed25519 identity key - of the node. + in section [PUB-SHAREDRANDOM], and node_identity is the ed25519 identity + key of the node. Finally, for replicanum in 1...hsdir_n_replicas, the hidden service host uploads descriptors to the first hsdir_spread_store nodes whose @@ -901,7 +903,8 @@ Table of contents: [Exactly once] The lifetime of a descriptor in minutes. An HSDir SHOULD expire the - hidden service descriptor at least LifetimeMinutes after it was uploaded. + hidden service descriptor at least LifetimeMinutes after it was + uploaded. The LifetimeMinutes field can take values between 30 and 3000 (50 hours). @@ -955,7 +958,8 @@ Table of contents: descriptor even if the content of the descriptor hasn't changed. (So that we don't leak whether the intro point list etc. changed) - secret_input = blinded_public_key | subcredential | INT_8(revision_counter) + secret_input = blinded_public_key | subcredential | + INT_8(revision_counter) keys = KDF(secret_input, salt, "hsdir-encrypted-data", S_KEY_LEN + S_IV_LEN + MAC_KEY_LEN) @@ -1137,7 +1141,8 @@ Table of contents: Otherwise, the node must associate the key with the circuit, for use later in INTRODUCE1 cells. -3.1.2. Registering an introduction point on a legacy Tor node [LEGACY_EST_INTRO] +3.1.2. Registering an introduction point on a legacy Tor node + [LEGACY_EST_INTRO] Tor nodes should also support an older version of the ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, first documented in rend-spec.txt. New hidden service hosts @@ -1355,7 +1360,8 @@ Table of contents: Note that the old TAP-derived protocol of the previous hidden service design achieved the first two requirements, but not the third. -3.3.2. Example encryption handshake: ntor with extra data [NTOR-WITH-EXTRA-DATA] +3.3.2. Example encryption handshake: ntor with extra data + [NTOR-WITH-EXTRA-DATA] [TODO: relocate this]

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[torspec/master] prop224: Set status from Draft to Open
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 11 Oct '16

11 Oct '16

commit 7c0ac12dbf345f4b283481d0079fe8f43d077279 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 11 15:12:21 2016 -0400 prop224: Set status from Draft to Open In theory, we shouldn't use Draft anymore. Also, part of proposal 224 is being implemented while we are still changing part of it. Acked-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- proposals/000-index.txt | 4 ++-- proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/000-index.txt b/proposals/000-index.txt index ebe00eb..f049d76 100644 --- a/proposals/000-index.txt +++ b/proposals/000-index.txt @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ Proposals by number: 221 Stop using CREATE_FAST [CLOSED] 222 Stop sending client timestamps [CLOSED] 223 Ace: Improved circuit-creation key exchange [RESERVE] -224 Next-Generation Hidden Services in Tor [DRAFT] +224 Next-Generation Hidden Services in Tor [OPEN] 225 Strawman proposal: commit-and-reveal shared rng [SUPERSEDED] 226 "Scalability and Stability Improvements to BridgeDB: Switching to a Distributed Database System and RDBMS" [OPEN] 227 Include package fingerprints in consensus documents [CLOSED] @@ -201,7 +201,6 @@ Proposals by status: DRAFT: 195 TLS certificate normalization for Tor 0.2.4.x [for 0.2.4.x] 203 Avoiding censorship by impersonating an HTTPS server - 224 Next-Generation Hidden Services in Tor 230 How to change RSA1024 relay identity keys [for 0.2.?] 231 Migrating authority RSA1024 identity keys [for 0.2.?] 239 Consensus Hash Chaining @@ -242,6 +241,7 @@ Proposals by status: 210 Faster Headless Consensus Bootstrapping [for 0.2.8.x+] 212 Increase Acceptable Consensus Age [for 0.2.4.x+] 219 Support for full DNS and DNSSEC resolution in Tor [for 0.2.5.x] + 224 Next-Generation Hidden Services in Tor 226 "Scalability and Stability Improvements to BridgeDB: Switching to a Distributed Database System and RDBMS" 229 Further SOCKS5 extensions 233 Making Tor2Web mode faster diff --git a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt index edb45ae..558cf1f 100644 --- a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt +++ b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Filename: 224-rend-spec-ng.txt Title: Next-Generation Hidden Services in Tor Author: Nick Mathewson Created: 2013-11-29 -Status: Draft +Status: Open Table of contents:

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[torspec/master] prop224: Clarify descriptor version format
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 11 Oct '16

11 Oct '16

commit fc06ed69ad155ef1b391715d77aa444a48c6e119 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 11 15:04:59 2016 -0400 prop224: Clarify descriptor version format Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt index 76d02a2..0e039e1 100644 --- a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt +++ b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt @@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ Table of contents: [At start, exactly once.] - The version-number contains a positive integer indicating the version + The version-number is a 32 bit unsigned integer indicating the version of the descriptor. Current version is "3". "descriptor-lifetime" SP LifetimeMinutes NL

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[translation/torbutton-torbuttondtd] Update translations for torbutton-torbuttondtd
by translation＠torproject.org 11 Oct '16

11 Oct '16

commit fc01e60086e9cc59868e0c8c9e5f6f8ce37f69df Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 11 17:46:33 2016 +0000 Update translations for torbutton-torbuttondtd --- de/torbutton.dtd | 8 ++++---- el/torbutton.dtd | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/de/torbutton.dtd b/de/torbutton.dtd index c5e101f..039e82e 100644 --- a/de/torbutton.dtd +++ b/de/torbutton.dtd @@ -29,13 +29,13 @@ <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.block_disk "Browser-Verlauf und Internetdaten nicht speichern (aktiviert den privaten Browser-Modus)"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.block_disk_tooltip "Lassen Sie dieses Feld ausgewählt um zu verhindern, dass sensible Daten, einschließlich des Browser-Puffers und Browser-Verlaufs, der Cookie-Datenbank, des Download-Verlaufs, mittelfristiger TLS-Zertifikate und Webportal-Berechtigungen auf Ihre Festplatte gespeichert werden."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.restrict_thirdparty "Profildateien (Cookies) von Drittanbietern und andere Überwachungsdaten einschränken"> -<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.restrict_thirdparty_tooltip "Keep this box checked to prevent various browser features from being abused to track you as you browse the web. Modified features include blob URLs, broadcast channels, the browser cache, cookies, favicons, HTTP Auth headers, link preconnects, localStorage, mediaSource URLs, OCSP requests, SharedWorkers, and TLS session tickets."> +<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.restrict_thirdparty_tooltip "Lassen Sie dieses Feld ausgewählt um zu verhindern, das verschiedene Browserfunktionen ausgenutzt werden um Ihr Surfverhalten nachzuverfolgen. Die veränderten Funktionen betreffen: BLOB-URLs, Rundruf-Kanäle, den Browser-Puffer, Cookies, Favicons, HTTP-Authentifizierungs-Kopfdaten, Verknüpfungs-Vorverbindungen, den lokalen Speicher, URLs von Medienquellen, OCSP-Anfrage, gemeinsame JavaScript-Instanzen und Tickets von TLS-Sitzungen."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.block_plugins "Browser-Erweiterungen deaktivieren (wie z.B. Flash)"> -<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.block_plugins_tooltip "Keep this box checked to stop all binary plugins from being loaded. Plugins are a serious privacy risk because they can leak your browsing history or otherwise make you easy to track."> +<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.block_plugins_tooltip "Lassen Sie dieses Feld ausgewählt um das Laden aller binär vorliegenden Erweiterungen zu verhindern. Erweiterungen sind eine ernste Bedrohung für Ihre Privatsphäre, weil sie Ihren Browser-Verlauf weitergeben oder Sie in anderer Weise nachverfolgbar machen können."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.resist_fingerprinting "Details ändern, die Sie von anderen Tor-Browser-Benutzern unterscheiden"> -<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.resist_fingerprinting_tooltip "Keep this box checked to hide things from websites that could be unique about you, including your battery status, computer performance, keyboard layout, locale, the location of installed plugins, the list of installed plugins, your network status, screen orientation, screen size, site-specific zoom levels, supported file types, system colors, and WebGL capabilities."> +<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.resist_fingerprinting_tooltip "Lassen Sie dieses Feld ausgewählt um bestimmte einzigartige Informationen Ihres Systems vor Webportalen zu verbergen, wie Ihrem Akku-Status, der Rechnerleistung, Tastaturbelegung, dem Sprachprofil, dem Installationsort von Erweiterungen, der Liste der intallierten Erweiterungen, Ihrem Netzwerkstatus, der Bildschirmausrichtung, Bildschirmgröße, seitenspezifischen Vergrößerungseinstellungen, unterstützten Dateitypen, Farbschema und WebGL-Unterstützung."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_caption "Sicherheitsstufe"> -<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_caption_tooltip "The Security Slider lets you disable certain browser features that may make your browser more vulnerable to hacking attempts."> +<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_caption_tooltip "Der Sicherheitsschieberegler gestattet Ihnen bestimmte Browserfunktionen, die Ihren Browser für mögliche Attacken anfälliger machen, zu deaktivieren."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_low "gering (Standard)"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_low_usable_desc "Dies liefert die am meisten nutzbaren Erfahrungen."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_low_desc "Auf dieser Sicherheitsstufe sind alle Browserfunktionen aktiviert."> diff --git a/el/torbutton.dtd b/el/torbutton.dtd index 09e94ed..c721187 100644 --- a/el/torbutton.dtd +++ b/el/torbutton.dtd @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_mathml_desc "Κάποιοι μηχανισμοί για εμφάνιση μαθηματικών εξισώσεων είναι απενεργοποιημένοι."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_mathml_desc_tooltip "MathML ειναι επενεργοποιημένο."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_med_high "Μεσαίο-υψηλό"> -<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_all_jit_desc "On sites where JavaScript is enabled, performance optimizations are disabled."> +<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_all_jit_desc "Σε ιστότοπους που η JavaScript είναι ενεργοποιημένη, οι ρυθμίσεις απόδοσης είναι απενεργοποιημένες."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_font_rend_desc "Κάποιες λειτουργίες rendering γραμματοσειράς είναι απενεργοποιημένες."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_font_rend_graphite_tooltip "Ο μηχανισμός rendering της γραμματοσειράς Graphite είναι απενεργοποιημένος."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_svg_desc "Κάποιοι τύποι εικόνων είναι απενεργοποιημένοι.">

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[translation/torbutton-torbuttondtd] Update translations for torbutton-torbuttondtd
by translation＠torproject.org 11 Oct '16

11 Oct '16

commit d25c70db4c6b42af2c9be467bd320294c5dbd7b7 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 11 17:16:34 2016 +0000 Update translations for torbutton-torbuttondtd --- de/torbutton.dtd | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/de/torbutton.dtd b/de/torbutton.dtd index 4cc658c..c5e101f 100644 --- a/de/torbutton.dtd +++ b/de/torbutton.dtd @@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ <!ENTITY torbutton.cookiedialog.saveAllCookies "Neue Cookies schützen"> <!ENTITY torbutton.cookiedialog.doNotSaveAllCookies "Neue Cookies nicht schützen"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.priv_caption "Privatsphäreneinstellungen"> -<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.priv_caption_tooltip "When checked, the following settings help to keep your identity and browsing history private. We strongly recommend that you keep all privacy boxes checked for normal Tor Browser use."> +<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.priv_caption_tooltip "Wenn ausgewählt, unterstützen Sie die folgenden Einstellungen dabei Ihre Identität und Ihren Browserverlauf geheim zu halten. Wir empfehlen dringend für den normalen Tor-Browser-Gebrauch alle Privatsphären-Felder ausgewählt zu lassen."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.block_disk "Browser-Verlauf und Internetdaten nicht speichern (aktiviert den privaten Browser-Modus)"> -<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.block_disk_tooltip "Keep this box checked to avoid saving sensitive data to disk, including the browser cache, your browsing history, the cookie database, your download history, intermediate TLS certificates, and permissions you have granted to websites."> +<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.block_disk_tooltip "Lassen Sie dieses Feld ausgewählt um zu verhindern, dass sensible Daten, einschließlich des Browser-Puffers und Browser-Verlaufs, der Cookie-Datenbank, des Download-Verlaufs, mittelfristiger TLS-Zertifikate und Webportal-Berechtigungen auf Ihre Festplatte gespeichert werden."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.restrict_thirdparty "Profildateien (Cookies) von Drittanbietern und andere Überwachungsdaten einschränken"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.restrict_thirdparty_tooltip "Keep this box checked to prevent various browser features from being abused to track you as you browse the web. Modified features include blob URLs, broadcast channels, the browser cache, cookies, favicons, HTTP Auth headers, link preconnects, localStorage, mediaSource URLs, OCSP requests, SharedWorkers, and TLS session tickets."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.block_plugins "Browser-Erweiterungen deaktivieren (wie z.B. Flash)">

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[webwml/master] Fix display of ipv6 addresses on the website
by sebastian＠torproject.org 11 Oct '16

11 Oct '16

commit 6c84e8022ee16fcb532ebeaa0744d2dea3da379c Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 11 17:23:28 2016 +0200 Fix display of ipv6 addresses on the website I don't know what WML is doing, but somehow it's treating [FE80::] as a special thing it doesn't want to display (unlike [::], which it displays just fine). Fixes bug 18667. --- docs/en/tor-manual.wml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/en/tor-manual.wml b/docs/en/tor-manual.wml index 3c81813..3d55e65 100644 --- a/docs/en/tor-manual.wml +++ b/docs/en/tor-manual.wml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ <div id="maincol"> <: die "Missing git clone at $(TORGIT)" unless -d "$(TORGIT)"; - my $man = `GIT_DIR=$(TORGIT) git show $(STABLETAG):doc/tor.1.txt | asciidoc -d manpage -s -o - -`; + my $man = `GIT_DIR=$(TORGIT) git show $(STABLETAG):doc/tor.1.txt | asciidoc -d manpage -s -o - - | sed 's/\\[/\\[/g'`; die "No manpage because of asciidoc error or file not available from git" unless $man; print $man; :>

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[tor/master] Bug 20261: Disable IsolateClientAddr on AF_LOCAL SocksPorts.
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Oct '16

11 Oct '16

commit 847e001d288b7d02d589d8df699e84d4d6d363b6 Author: Yawning Angel <yawning(a)schwanenlied.me> Date: Fri Sep 30 18:43:31 2016 +0000 Bug 20261: Disable IsolateClientAddr on AF_LOCAL SocksPorts. The client addr is essentially meaningless in this context (yes, it is possible to explicitly `bind()` AF_LOCAL client side sockets to a path, but no one does it, and there are better ways to grant that sort of feature if people want it like using `SO_PASSCRED`). --- changes/bug20261 | 4 ++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 5 +++-- src/or/config.c | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug20261 b/changes/bug20261 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dfdd159 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug20261 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (client, unix domain sockets): + - Disable IsolateClientAddr when using AF_UNIX backed SocksPorts + as the client address is meaningless. Fixes bug 20261; bugfix on + 0.2.6.3-alpha. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 2e73b27..330f0c1 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1046,8 +1046,9 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if another. Recognized isolation flags are: **IsolateClientAddr**;; Don't share circuits with streams from a different - client address. (On by default and strongly recommended; - you can disable it with **NoIsolateClientAddr**.) + client address. (On by default and strongly recommended when + supported; you can disable it with **NoIsolateClientAddr**. + Unsupported and force-disabled when using Unix domain sockets.) **IsolateSOCKSAuth**;; Don't share circuits with streams for which different SOCKS authentication was provided. (On by default; diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 18cbe34..93e753b 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -6838,6 +6838,13 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out, goto err; } + if (unix_socket_path && (isolation & ISO_CLIENTADDR)) { + /* `IsolateClientAddr` is nonsensical in the context of AF_LOCAL. + * just silently remove the isolation flag. + */ + isolation &= ~ISO_CLIENTADDR; + } + if (out && port) { size_t namelen = unix_socket_path ? strlen(unix_socket_path) : 0; port_cfg_t *cfg = port_cfg_new(namelen);

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[tor/master] Bug 20261: Treat AF_UNIX addresses as equal when comparing them.
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Oct '16

11 Oct '16

commit 7b2c856785b226ee20867450daa8436c3020e950 Author: Yawning Angel <yawning(a)schwanenlied.me> Date: Mon Oct 10 20:57:45 2016 +0000 Bug 20261: Treat AF_UNIX addresses as equal when comparing them. This is a kludge to deal with the fact that `tor_addr_t` doesn't contain `sun_path`. This currently ONLY happens when circuit isolation is being checked, for an isolation mode that is force disabled anyway, so the kludge is "ugly but adequate", but realistically, making `tor_addr_t` and the AF_UNIX SocksPort code do the right thing is probably the better option. --- src/common/address.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/common/address.c b/src/common/address.c index 6799dd6..dd2164e 100644 --- a/src/common/address.c +++ b/src/common/address.c @@ -1041,6 +1041,10 @@ tor_addr_copy_tight(tor_addr_t *dest, const tor_addr_t *src) * Different address families (IPv4 vs IPv6) are always considered unequal if * <b>how</b> is CMP_EXACT; otherwise, IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses are * considered equivalent to their IPv4 equivalents. + * + * As a special case, all AF_UNIX addresses are always considered equal + * since tor_addr_t currently does not contain the information required to + * make the comparison. */ int tor_addr_compare(const tor_addr_t *addr1, const tor_addr_t *addr2, @@ -1114,6 +1118,18 @@ tor_addr_compare_masked(const tor_addr_t *addr1, const tor_addr_t *addr2, return 0; } } + case AF_UNIX: + /* HACKHACKHACKHACKHACK: + * tor_addr_t doesn't contain a copy of sun_path, so it's not + * possible to comapre this at all. + * + * Since the only time we currently actually should be comparing + * 2 AF_UNIX addresses is when dealing with ISO_CLIENTADDR (which + * is diesabled for AF_UNIX SocksPorts anyway), this just returns 0. + * + * See: #20261. + */ + return 0; default: /* LCOV_EXCL_START */ tor_fragile_assert();

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