December 2015 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[stem/master] Don't check if authority addresses are accurate
by atagar＠torproject.org 12 Dec '15

12 Dec '15

commit ef9894dca36e18076815362e44ebf639f0c34fcf Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Dec 12 13:23:57 2015 -0800 Don't check if authority addresses are accurate Moria1 and longclaw are have been publishing alternate addresses in a hack to disrupt censors. Looks like they're gonna continue so gonna stop checking this in our tests. --- test/integ/descriptor/remote.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/test/integ/descriptor/remote.py b/test/integ/descriptor/remote.py index 4a9cd9b..fd37b57 100644 --- a/test/integ/descriptor/remote.py +++ b/test/integ/descriptor/remote.py @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ class TestDescriptorDownloader(unittest.TestCase): if not stem_auth: self.fail("%s isn't a recognized directory authority in stem" % auth.nickname) - for attr in ('address', 'v3ident', 'or_port', 'dir_port'): + for attr in ('v3ident', 'or_port', 'dir_port'): if auth.nickname == 'moria1' and attr == 'address': continue # skip due to https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/14955

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[stem/master] Update tor manual options
by atagar＠torproject.org 12 Dec '15

12 Dec '15

commit d4fac7f81c180cf8e83ea81d4f3f2e8d0d2ce491 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Dec 12 13:42:14 2015 -0800 Update tor manual options Updating with a few minor additions such as DataDirectoryGroupReadable... https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/?id=ec4ef68 --- stem/cached_tor_manual.cfg | 13 +++++++++---- stem/settings.cfg | 1 + test/unit/manual.py | 2 +- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/stem/cached_tor_manual.cfg b/stem/cached_tor_manual.cfg index fb7b637..aa6d7d0 100644 --- a/stem/cached_tor_manual.cfg +++ b/stem/cached_tor_manual.cfg @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ description |Basically, Tor provides a distributed network of servers or relays ("onion routers"). Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc. -- around the network, and recipients, observers, and even the relays themselves have difficulty tracking the source of the stream. | |By default, tor will only act as a client only. To help the network by providing bandwidth as a relay, change the ORPort configuration option -- see below. Please also consult the documentation on the Tor Project's website. -man_commit 8661b4b5a2664f2bcda36d51371c0e141be497bd -stem_commit 6d328e8d16c7b34c87d50d4259a6936451225e89 +man_commit ec4ef68271ab65b4ec643088153211e861cdc7b3 +stem_commit ef9894dca36e18076815362e44ebf639f0c34fcf commandline_options -f FILE => Specify a new configuration file to contain further Tor configuration options OR pass - to make Tor read its configuration from standard input. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc, or $HOME/.torrc if that file is not found) commandline_options --ignore-missing-torrc => Specifies that Tor should treat a missing torrc file as though it were empty. Ordinarily, Tor does this for missing default torrc files, but not for those specified on the command line. commandline_options --list-fingerprint => Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint. @@ -844,6 +844,11 @@ config_options.DataDirectory.name DataDirectory config_options.DataDirectory.usage DIR config_options.DataDirectory.summary Location for storing runtime data (state, keys, etc) config_options.DataDirectory.description Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor) +config_options.DataDirectoryGroupReadable.category General +config_options.DataDirectoryGroupReadable.name DataDirectoryGroupReadable +config_options.DataDirectoryGroupReadable.usage 0|1 +config_options.DataDirectoryGroupReadable.summary Group read permissions for the data directory +config_options.DataDirectoryGroupReadable.description If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the DataDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the DataDirectory readable by the default GID. (Default: 0) config_options.FallbackDir.category General config_options.FallbackDir.name FallbackDir config_options.FallbackDir.usage address:port orport=port id=fingerprint [weight=num] @@ -1293,7 +1298,7 @@ config_options.ServerDNSTestAddresses.category Relay config_options.ServerDNSTestAddresses.name ServerDNSTestAddresses config_options.ServerDNSTestAddresses.usage address,address,... config_options.ServerDNSTestAddresses.summary Addresses to test to see if valid DNS queries are being hijacked -config_options.ServerDNSTestAddresses.description When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these valid addresses aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless, and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject :". This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org") +config_options.ServerDNSTestAddresses.description When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these valid addresses aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless, and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject *:*". This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org") config_options.ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames.category Relay config_options.ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames.name ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames config_options.ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames.usage 0|1 @@ -1363,7 +1368,7 @@ config_options.ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses.category Relay config_options.ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses.name ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses config_options.ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses.usage 0|1 config_options.ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses.summary Allow circuits to be extended to the local network -config_options.ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses.description When this option is enabled, Tor routers allow EXTEND request to localhost, RFC1918 addresses, and so on. This can create security issues; you should probably leave it off. (Default: 0) +config_options.ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses.description When this option is enabled, Tor will connect to localhost, RFC1918 addresses, and so on. In particular, Tor will make direct connections, and Tor routers allow EXTEND requests, to these private addresses. This can create security issues; you should probably leave it off. (Default: 0) config_options.MaxMemInQueues.category Relay config_options.MaxMemInQueues.name MaxMemInQueues config_options.MaxMemInQueues.usage N bytes|KB|MB|GB diff --git a/stem/settings.cfg b/stem/settings.cfg index 78bf014..dcedc44 100644 --- a/stem/settings.cfg +++ b/stem/settings.cfg @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ manual.summary.CookieAuthFileGroupReadable Group read permissions for the authen manual.summary.ControlPortWriteToFile Path for a file tor writes containing its control port manual.summary.ControlPortFileGroupReadable Group read permissions for the control port file manual.summary.DataDirectory Location for storing runtime data (state, keys, etc) +manual.summary.DataDirectoryGroupReadable Group read permissions for the data directory manual.summary.FallbackDir Fallback when unable to retrieve descriptor information manual.summary.DirAuthority Alternative directory authorities manual.summary.DirAuthorityFallbackRate Rate at which to use fallback directory diff --git a/test/unit/manual.py b/test/unit/manual.py index 0b9c7cd..ab8219e 100644 --- a/test/unit/manual.py +++ b/test/unit/manual.py @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ class TestManual(unittest.TestCase): self.assertEqual(14, len(manual.commandline_options)) self.assertEqual(8, len(manual.signals)) self.assertEqual(31, len(manual.files)) - self.assertEqual(288, len(manual.config_options)) + self.assertEqual(289, len(manual.config_options)) def test_download_man_page_without_arguments(self): try:

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[tor-browser-bundle/master] Update Changelog
by gk＠torproject.org 12 Dec '15

12 Dec '15

commit 16950f7e29151ca3ebb230d2237128c6882b1930 Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Dec 12 21:33:10 2015 +0000 Update Changelog --- Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt b/Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt index 9d34a21..237fdf9 100644 --- a/Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt +++ b/Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt @@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ Tor Browser 5.5a5 -- December 15 2015 * Bug 17568: Clean up tor-control-port.js * Translation updates * Update Tor Launcher to 0.2.8.1 - * Bug 17344: enumerate available language packs for language prompt + * Bug 17344: Enumerate available language packs for language prompt * Code clean-up * Translation updates - * Bug 9659: Avoid loop due to optimistic data socks code (fix of #3875) + * Bug 9659: Avoid loop due to optimistic data SOCKS code (fix of #3875) * Bug 15564: Isolate SharedWorkers by first-party domain * Bug 16940: After update, load local change notes * Bug 17759: Apply whitelist to local fonts in @font-face (fix of #13313) @@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ Tor Browser 5.5a5 -- December 15 2015 * Bug 17502: Add a preference for hiding "Open with" on download dialog * Bug 17446: Prevent canvas extraction by third parties (fixup of #6253) * Bug 16441: Suppress "Reset Tor Browser" prompt - * Bug 17250: Fix broken Japanese fonts * Windows - * Bug 13819: Ship expert bundles with console + * Bug 13819: Ship expert bundles with console enabled + * Bug 17250: Fix broken Japanese fonts * OS X * Bug 17661: Whitelist font .Helvetica Neue DeskInterface

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[tor-browser-bundle/master] Update changelog
by gk＠torproject.org 12 Dec '15

12 Dec '15

commit 876e23b12d044bd5c68deec7484dd7bab2e0bf75 Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Dec 12 20:55:21 2015 +0000 Update changelog --- Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt b/Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt index 335417f..9d34a21 100644 --- a/Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt +++ b/Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ Tor Browser 5.5a5 -- December 15 2015 * Code clean-up * Translation updates * Bug 9659: Avoid loop due to optimistic data socks code (fix of #3875) + * Bug 15564: Isolate SharedWorkers by first-party domain * Bug 16940: After update, load local change notes * Bug 17759: Apply whitelist to local fonts in @font-face (fix of #13313) * Bug 17747: Add ndnop3 as new default obfs4 bridge @@ -28,8 +29,11 @@ Tor Browser 5.5a5 -- December 15 2015 * Bug 17502: Add a preference for hiding "Open with" on download dialog * Bug 17446: Prevent canvas extraction by third parties (fixup of #6253) * Bug 16441: Suppress "Reset Tor Browser" prompt + * Bug 17250: Fix broken Japanese fonts * Windows * Bug 13819: Ship expert bundles with console + * OS X + * Bug 17661: Whitelist font .Helvetica Neue DeskInterface Tor Browser 5.5a4 -- November 3 2015 * All Platforms

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-38.4.0esr-5.5-1] Bug 15564: Isolate SharedWorker by first party domain
by gk＠torproject.org 12 Dec '15

12 Dec '15

commit 67173fc914d1fb17b942e8f7b1c9de770a21a347 Author: Arthur Edelstein <arthuredelstein(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Oct 8 12:45:37 2015 -0700 Bug 15564: Isolate SharedWorker by first party domain --- dom/workers/RuntimeService.cpp | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++------- dom/workers/RuntimeService.h | 5 ++++- dom/workers/WorkerPrivate.cpp | 5 +++++ dom/workers/WorkerPrivate.h | 8 ++++++++ 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/dom/workers/RuntimeService.cpp b/dom/workers/RuntimeService.cpp index 271c74f..4f5f363 100644 --- a/dom/workers/RuntimeService.cpp +++ b/dom/workers/RuntimeService.cpp @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ #include "WorkerPrivate.h" #include "WorkerRunnable.h" #include "WorkerThread.h" +#include "ThirdPartyUtil.h" #ifdef ENABLE_TESTS #include "BackgroundChildImpl.h" @@ -269,11 +270,13 @@ GetWorkerPref(const nsACString& aPref, // This function creates a key for a SharedWorker composed by "name|scriptSpec". // If the name contains a '|', this will be replaced by '||'. void -GenerateSharedWorkerKey(const nsACString& aScriptSpec, const nsACString& aName, +GenerateSharedWorkerKey(const nsACString& aScriptSpec, + const nsACString& aIsolationKey, + const nsACString& aName, nsCString& aKey) { aKey.Truncate(); - aKey.SetCapacity(aScriptSpec.Length() + aName.Length() + 1); + aKey.SetCapacity(aScriptSpec.Length() + aName.Length() + aIsolationKey.Length() + 2); nsACString::const_iterator start, end; aName.BeginReading(start); @@ -288,6 +291,9 @@ GenerateSharedWorkerKey(const nsACString& aScriptSpec, const nsACString& aName, aKey.Append('|'); aKey.Append(aScriptSpec); + + aKey.Append('|'); + aKey.Append(aIsolationKey); } void @@ -1402,13 +1408,16 @@ RuntimeService::RegisterWorker(JSContext* aCx, WorkerPrivate* aWorkerPrivate) if (isSharedOrServiceWorker) { const nsCString& sharedWorkerName = aWorkerPrivate->SharedWorkerName(); + const nsCString& isolationKey = aWorkerPrivate->IsolationKey(); nsAutoCString key; - GenerateSharedWorkerKey(sharedWorkerScriptSpec, sharedWorkerName, key); + GenerateSharedWorkerKey(sharedWorkerScriptSpec, isolationKey, sharedWorkerName, key); MOZ_ASSERT(!domainInfo->mSharedWorkerInfos.Get(key)); SharedWorkerInfo* sharedWorkerInfo = - new SharedWorkerInfo(aWorkerPrivate, sharedWorkerScriptSpec, + new SharedWorkerInfo(aWorkerPrivate, + sharedWorkerScriptSpec, + isolationKey, sharedWorkerName); domainInfo->mSharedWorkerInfos.Put(key, sharedWorkerInfo); } @@ -1509,7 +1518,9 @@ RuntimeService::UnregisterWorker(JSContext* aCx, WorkerPrivate* aWorkerPrivate) if (match.mSharedWorkerInfo) { nsAutoCString key; GenerateSharedWorkerKey(match.mSharedWorkerInfo->mScriptSpec, - match.mSharedWorkerInfo->mName, key); + match.mSharedWorkerInfo->mIsolationKey, + match.mSharedWorkerInfo->mName, + key); domainInfo->mSharedWorkerInfos.Remove(key); } } @@ -2293,7 +2304,7 @@ RuntimeService::CreateSharedWorkerFromLoadInfo(JSContext* aCx, NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsAutoCString key; - GenerateSharedWorkerKey(scriptSpec, aName, key); + GenerateSharedWorkerKey(scriptSpec, aLoadInfo->mIsolationKey, aName, key); if (mDomainMap.Get(aLoadInfo->mDomain, &domainInfo) && domainInfo->mSharedWorkerInfos.Get(key, &sharedWorkerInfo)) { @@ -2368,7 +2379,9 @@ RuntimeService::ForgetSharedWorker(WorkerPrivate* aWorkerPrivate) if (match.mSharedWorkerInfo) { nsAutoCString key; GenerateSharedWorkerKey(match.mSharedWorkerInfo->mScriptSpec, - match.mSharedWorkerInfo->mName, key); + match.mSharedWorkerInfo->mIsolationKey, + match.mSharedWorkerInfo->mName, + key); domainInfo->mSharedWorkerInfos.Remove(key); } } diff --git a/dom/workers/RuntimeService.h b/dom/workers/RuntimeService.h index 94bff10..8036b60 100644 --- a/dom/workers/RuntimeService.h +++ b/dom/workers/RuntimeService.h @@ -34,12 +34,15 @@ class RuntimeService final : public nsIObserver { WorkerPrivate* mWorkerPrivate; nsCString mScriptSpec; + nsCString mIsolationKey; nsCString mName; SharedWorkerInfo(WorkerPrivate* aWorkerPrivate, const nsACString& aScriptSpec, + const nsACString& aIsolationKey, const nsACString& aName) - : mWorkerPrivate(aWorkerPrivate), mScriptSpec(aScriptSpec), mName(aName) + : mWorkerPrivate(aWorkerPrivate), mScriptSpec(aScriptSpec), + mIsolationKey(aIsolationKey), mName(aName) { } }; diff --git a/dom/workers/WorkerPrivate.cpp b/dom/workers/WorkerPrivate.cpp index 7057b3a..5d0064b 100644 --- a/dom/workers/WorkerPrivate.cpp +++ b/dom/workers/WorkerPrivate.cpp @@ -4355,6 +4355,7 @@ WorkerPrivate::GetLoadInfo(JSContext* aCx, nsPIDOMWindow* aWindow, } loadInfo.mDomain = aParent->Domain(); + loadInfo.mIsolationKey = aParent->IsolationKey(); loadInfo.mFromWindow = aParent->IsFromWindow(); loadInfo.mWindowID = aParent->WindowID(); loadInfo.mIndexedDBAllowed = aParent->IsIndexedDBAllowed(); @@ -4421,6 +4422,10 @@ WorkerPrivate::GetLoadInfo(JSContext* aCx, nsPIDOMWindow* aWindow, loadInfo.mBaseURI = document->GetDocBaseURI(); loadInfo.mLoadGroup = document->GetDocumentLoadGroup(); + nsCString isolationKey; + ThirdPartyUtil::GetFirstPartyHost(document, isolationKey); + loadInfo.mIsolationKey = isolationKey; + // Use the document's NodePrincipal as our principal if we're not being // called from chrome. if (!loadInfo.mPrincipal) { diff --git a/dom/workers/WorkerPrivate.h b/dom/workers/WorkerPrivate.h index a684e6d..a84407c 100644 --- a/dom/workers/WorkerPrivate.h +++ b/dom/workers/WorkerPrivate.h @@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ public: nsAutoPtr<PrincipalInfo> mPrincipalInfo; nsCString mDomain; + nsCString mIsolationKey; uint64_t mWindowID; @@ -218,6 +219,7 @@ public: mPrincipalInfo = aOther.mPrincipalInfo.forget(); mDomain = aOther.mDomain; + mIsolationKey = aOther.mIsolationKey; mWindowID = aOther.mWindowID; mFromWindow = aOther.mFromWindow; mEvalAllowed = aOther.mEvalAllowed; @@ -532,6 +534,12 @@ public: return mLoadInfo.mDomain; } + const nsCString& + IsolationKey() const + { + return mLoadInfo.mIsolationKey; + } + bool IsFromWindow() const {

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-38.4.0esr-5.5-1] Regression tests for Bug 15564: Isolate SharedWorker by first party domain
by gk＠torproject.org 12 Dec '15

12 Dec '15

commit 2c8a18f3f6ccd1a1db86b74b7bfca715890c1ed4 Author: Arthur Edelstein <arthuredelstein(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Oct 8 16:13:59 2015 -0700 Regression tests for Bug 15564: Isolate SharedWorker by first party domain --- dom/base/test/bug15564_child_page.html | 29 ++++++++ dom/base/test/bug15564_sharedworker.js | 7 ++ dom/base/test/mochitest.ini | 3 + dom/base/test/test_tor_bug15564.html | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 159 insertions(+) diff --git a/dom/base/test/bug15564_child_page.html b/dom/base/test/bug15564_child_page.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e84024e --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/base/test/bug15564_child_page.html @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML> +<html> + +<head> + <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"> + <title>Page SharedWorker creator for Tor Browser Bug 15564</title> + <script type="text/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SpawnTask.js"></script> + <script type="text/javascript;version=1.7" src="bug15502_utils.js"></script> +</head> +<body> +<div id="display" style="white-space:pre; font-family:monospace; display:inline;"></div> + +<script type="text/javascript;version=1.7"> + +spawnTask(function* () { + sendMessage(window.parent, "ready"); + let message = yield receiveMessage(window.parent), + worker = new SharedWorker("bug15564_sharedworker.js", message); + worker.port.onmessage = function (e) { + document.getElementById("display").innerHTML = e.data; + sendMessage(window.parent, e.data); + } +}); + +</script> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/dom/base/test/bug15564_sharedworker.js b/dom/base/test/bug15564_sharedworker.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000..56cbc2c --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/base/test/bug15564_sharedworker.js @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +self.randomValue = Math.random(); + +onconnect = function (e) { + var port = e.ports[0]; + port.postMessage(self.randomValue); + port.start(); +}; diff --git a/dom/base/test/mochitest.ini b/dom/base/test/mochitest.ini index 6a8c334..e8812fb 100644 --- a/dom/base/test/mochitest.ini +++ b/dom/base/test/mochitest.ini @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ support-files = bug15502_worker_deblobify.html bug15703_page_create.html bug15703_page_retrieve.html + bug15564_child_page.html + bug15564_sharedworker.js bug282547.sjs bug298064-subframe.html bug313646.txt @@ -738,6 +740,7 @@ skip-if = toolkit == 'android' || e10s #RANDOM [test_textnode_split_in_selection.html] [test_title.html] [test_tor_bug15502.html] +[test_tor_bug15564.html] [test_tor_bug15703.html] [test_tor_bug17207.html] [test_treewalker_nextsibling.xml] diff --git a/dom/base/test/test_tor_bug15564.html b/dom/base/test/test_tor_bug15564.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3609616 --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/base/test/test_tor_bug15564.html @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML> +<html> + +<head> + <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"> + <title>Test for Tor Browser Bug 15564</title> + <script type="text/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script> + <script type="text/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SpawnTask.js"></script> + <script type="text/javascript;version=1.7" src="bug15502_utils.js"></script> + <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" /> +</head> +<body> +<p id="display"></p> +<div id="content"></div> + +<script class="testbody" type="application/javascript;version=1.7"> +SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish(); + +// __setPref(key, value)__. +// Set a pref value asynchronously, returning a promise that resolves +// when it succeeds. +let setPref = function* (key, value) { + return new Promise(function(resolve, reject) { + SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set": [[key, value]]}, resolve); + }); +}; + +// ## Testing constants +let domain1 = "http://example.com", + domain2 = "http://example.net", + path = "/tests/dom/base/test/", + child_page = "bug15564_child_page.html"; + +// __tabIO(domain, child, input)__. +// Open a parent page at the given `domain`, in a new tab. The +// parent page should then open a `child` iframe. Post an +// `input` message to the child. Returns [tab, response]. +let tabIO = function* (domain, child, input) { + // Open a new tab with a parent page at the given (first party) domain. + tab = window.open(domain + path + "bug15502_tab.html", "_blank"); + // Wait for the parent page to report that it has completed loading. + yield receiveMessage(tab); // ready message + // Send a message to the parent page, with a URL for the child page. + // The first-party page will load the child page in an iframe. + // (Note that every child page always has the same origin, example.org, + // but its first-party domain is inherited from the parent page.) + sendMessage(tab, "http://example.org" + path + child); + // Wait for the child page to report that it has finished loading, + // in a message forwarded by the parent page. + yield receiveMessage(tab); // ready message + // Send the input message to the tab's parent page, which will forward + // the message to the child page. + sendMessage(tab, input); + // The child page will attempt to read a secret random number via a + // SharedWorker. If it is unable to find such a number, it + // generates a new random number, posts it to the SharedWorker, + // and also posts it back to us. + // Wait for a message containing the number from the child page, + // forwarded by the parent page. Return the tab and the response. + return [tab, yield receiveMessage(tab)]; +}; + +// __sharedWorkerTest(isolationOn, domainA, domainB, childPage)__. +// Run a test where we set the pref "privacy.thirdparty.isolate" to on or off, +// and then create a shared worker under first party `domainA`, using the page `child_page`, +// and then a matching SharedWorker under first party `domainB`, and see if they match. +let sharedWorkerTest = function* (isolationOn, domainA, domainB, child_page) { + // Set the pref to reflect whether we want isolation on or off. + // 2 means always on; 0 means always off. + yield setPref("privacy.thirdparty.isolate", isolationOn ? 2 : 0); + // Open two tabs with parent pages embedding child iframes. The parent (first party) + // domains are set to domainA and domainB (which may be the same or different). + // The child page always has origin example.org, but gets its first party domain + // from the parent page. Report results: are child pages able to share information? + let input = isolationOn + "|" + domainA + "|" + domainB, + [tabA, firstResult] = yield tabIO(domainA, child_page, input), + [tabB, secondResult] = yield tabIO(domainB, child_page, input), + description = domainA + ":" + child_page + "->" + + domainB + ":" + child_page + + ", isolation " + (isolationOn ? "on." : "off."); + // If the child pages both report the same random number, then they have shared + // that number via a SharedWorker. Otherwise sharing was denied. + if (isolationOn && domainA !== domainB) { + // The isolation pref is enabled and first party domains of the two child pages + // are different, so sharing should have been prevented. + ok(firstResult !== secondResult, description + " Deny sharing SharedWorker"); + } else { + // The isolation pref is disable, or the first party domain is the same for + // both child pages, so the secret data should have been shared. + ok(firstResult === secondResult, description + " Allow sharing SharedWorker"); + } + // Clean up tabs now that this test has finished. + tabA.close(); + tabB.close(); +}; + +// ## The main test +// Run a coroutine that tests various combinations of domains +// methods, and isolation states for sharing (or not sharing) SharedWorkers. +spawnTask(function* () { + let domainA = domain1; + for (let isolate of [false, true]) { + for (let domainB of [domain1, domain2]) { + // For the given isolation state, and a pair of first party domains + // (which may or not be different), test if secret data can be + // shared via a SharedWorker, and if that matches the intended behavior. + // Here domainA is always domain1, and domainB is either + // domain1 or domain2. + yield sharedWorkerTest(isolate, domainA, domainB, child_page); + } + } + SimpleTest.finish(); +}); + +</script> + +</body> +</html>

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-38.4.0esr-5.5-1] fixup! TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides.
by gk＠torproject.org 12 Dec '15

12 Dec '15

commit f5f40cedc6d47e995b5530b1f436e4c578ae693b Author: Arthur Edelstein <arthuredelstein(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Sep 22 14:59:35 2015 -0700 fixup! TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides. Allow SharedWorkers to be used --- browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js index c7039a0..bf33260 100644 --- a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js +++ b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js @@ -130,7 +130,6 @@ pref("network.http.spdy.enabled.v2", false); // Seems redundant, but just in cas pref("network.http.spdy.enabled.v3", false); // Seems redundant, but just in case pref("network.http.spdy.enabled.v3-1", false); // Seems redundant, but just in case pref("privacy.thirdparty.isolate", 2); // Always enforce third party isolation -pref("dom.workers.sharedWorkers.enabled", false); // See https://bugs.torproject.org/15562 pref("network.http.spdy.enabled.http2", false); // Temporarily disabled pending implementation review pref("network.http.spdy.enabled.http2draft", false); // Temporarily disabled pending implementation review pref("network.predictor.enabled", false); // Temporarily disabled. See https://bugs.torproject.org/16633

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-38.4.0esr-5.5-1] fixup! Regression tests for Bug 15564: Isolate SharedWorker by first party domain
by gk＠torproject.org 12 Dec '15

12 Dec '15

commit 69f1279b009afc2625bb6d5038fc1fd90cf56b14 Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Dec 12 20:33:08 2015 +0000 fixup! Regression tests for Bug 15564: Isolate SharedWorker by first party domain --- dom/base/test/test_tor_bug15564.html | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/dom/base/test/test_tor_bug15564.html b/dom/base/test/test_tor_bug15564.html index 3609616..b8f7544 100644 --- a/dom/base/test/test_tor_bug15564.html +++ b/dom/base/test/test_tor_bug15564.html @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ let domain1 = "http://example.com", // parent page should then open a `child` iframe. Post an // `input` message to the child. Returns [tab, response]. let tabIO = function* (domain, child, input) { - // Open a new tab with a parent page at the given (first party) domain. + // Open a new tab with a parent page at the given (first-party) domain. tab = window.open(domain + path + "bug15502_tab.html", "_blank"); // Wait for the parent page to report that it has completed loading. yield receiveMessage(tab); // ready message @@ -64,15 +64,15 @@ let tabIO = function* (domain, child, input) { // __sharedWorkerTest(isolationOn, domainA, domainB, childPage)__. // Run a test where we set the pref "privacy.thirdparty.isolate" to on or off, -// and then create a shared worker under first party `domainA`, using the page `child_page`, -// and then a matching SharedWorker under first party `domainB`, and see if they match. +// and then create a SharedWorker under first-party `domainA`, using the page `child_page`, +// and then a matching SharedWorker under first-party `domainB`, and see if they match. let sharedWorkerTest = function* (isolationOn, domainA, domainB, child_page) { // Set the pref to reflect whether we want isolation on or off. // 2 means always on; 0 means always off. yield setPref("privacy.thirdparty.isolate", isolationOn ? 2 : 0); - // Open two tabs with parent pages embedding child iframes. The parent (first party) + // Open two tabs with parent pages embedding child iframes. The parent (first-party) // domains are set to domainA and domainB (which may be the same or different). - // The child page always has origin example.org, but gets its first party domain + // The child page always has origin example.org, but gets its first-party domain // from the parent page. Report results: are child pages able to share information? let input = isolationOn + "|" + domainA + "|" + domainB, [tabA, firstResult] = yield tabIO(domainA, child_page, input), @@ -83,11 +83,11 @@ let sharedWorkerTest = function* (isolationOn, domainA, domainB, child_page) { // If the child pages both report the same random number, then they have shared // that number via a SharedWorker. Otherwise sharing was denied. if (isolationOn && domainA !== domainB) { - // The isolation pref is enabled and first party domains of the two child pages + // The isolation pref is enabled and first-party domains of the two child pages // are different, so sharing should have been prevented. ok(firstResult !== secondResult, description + " Deny sharing SharedWorker"); } else { - // The isolation pref is disable, or the first party domain is the same for + // The isolation pref is disabled, or the first-party domain is the same for // both child pages, so the secret data should have been shared. ok(firstResult === secondResult, description + " Allow sharing SharedWorker"); } @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ spawnTask(function* () { let domainA = domain1; for (let isolate of [false, true]) { for (let domainB of [domain1, domain2]) { - // For the given isolation state, and a pair of first party domains - // (which may or not be different), test if secret data can be + // For the given isolation state, and a pair of first-party domains + // (which may or may not be different), test if secret data can be // shared via a SharedWorker, and if that matches the intended behavior. // Here domainA is always domain1, and domainB is either // domain1 or domain2.

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-38.4.0esr-5.5-1] fixup! TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides.
by gk＠torproject.org 12 Dec '15

12 Dec '15

commit 7cda561f125169f05a539be1b5afd88522d4fc46 Author: Arthur Edelstein <arthuredelstein(a)gmail.com> Date: Fri Dec 11 13:36:48 2015 -0800 fixup! TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides. --- browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js index ffb0a63..c7039a0 100644 --- a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js +++ b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ pref("browser.download.panel.shown", true); #ifdef MOZ_BUNDLED_FONTS #ifdef XP_MACOSX -pref("font.system.whitelist", "AppleGothic, Arial, Courier, Geneva, Georgia, Heiti TC, Helvetica, Helvetica Neue, Hiragino Kaku Gothic ProN, Lucida Grande, Monaco, Noto Sans Armenian, Noto Sans Bengali, Noto Sans Canadian Aboriginal, Noto Sans Cherokee, Noto Sans Devanagari, Noto Sans Ethiopic, Noto Sans Gujarati, Noto Sans Gurmukhi, Noto Sans Kannada, Noto Sans Khmer, Noto Sans Lao, Noto Sans Malayalam, Noto Sans Mongolian, Noto Sans Myanmar, Noto Sans Oriya, Noto Sans Sinhala, Noto Sans Tamil, Noto Sans Telugu, Noto Sans Thaana, Noto Sans Tibetan, Noto Sans Yi, STHeiti, STIX Math, Tahoma, Thonburi, Times, Times New Roman, Verdana"); +pref("font.system.whitelist", "AppleGothic, Arial, Courier, Geneva, Georgia, Heiti TC, Helvetica, Helvetica Neue, .Helvetica Neue DeskInterface, Hiragino Kaku Gothic ProN, Lucida Grande, Monaco, Noto Sans Armenian, Noto Sans Bengali, Noto Sans Canadian Aboriginal, Noto Sans Cherokee, Noto Sans Devanagari, Noto Sans Ethiopic, Noto Sans Gujarati, Noto Sans Gurmukhi, Noto Sans Kannada, Noto Sans Khmer, Noto Sans Lao, Noto Sans Malayalam, Noto Sans Mongolian, Noto Sans Myanmar, Noto Sans Oriya, Noto Sans Sinhala, Noto Sans Tamil, Noto Sans Telugu, Noto Sans Thaana, Noto Sans Tibetan, Noto Sans Yi, STHeiti, STIX Math, Tahoma, Thonburi, Times, Times New Roman, Verdana"); pref("font.name-list.cursive.x-unicode", "Apple Chancery, Noto Sans Armenian, Noto Sans Bengali, Noto Sans Canadian Aboriginal, Noto Sans Cherokee, Noto Sans Devanagari, Noto Sans Ethiopic, Noto Sans Gujarati, Noto Sans Gurmukhi, Noto Sans Kannada, Noto Sans Khmer, Noto Sans Lao, Noto Sans Malayalam, Noto Sans Mongolian, Noto Sans Myanmar, Noto Sans Oriya, Noto Sans Sinhala, Noto Sans Tamil, Noto Sans Telugu, Noto Sans Thaana, Noto Sans Tibetan, Noto Sans Yi"); pref("font.name-list.fantasy.x-unicode", "Papyrus, Noto Sans Armenian, Noto Sans Bengali, Noto Sans Canadian Aboriginal, Noto Sans Cherokee, Noto Sans Devanagari, Noto Sans Ethiopic, Noto Sans Gujarati, Noto Sans Gurmukhi, Noto Sans Kannada, Noto Sans Khmer, Noto Sans Lao, Noto Sans Malayalam, Noto Sans Mongolian, Noto Sans Myanmar, Noto Sans Oriya, Noto Sans Sinhala, Noto Sans Tamil, Noto Sans Telugu, Noto Sans Thaana, Noto Sans Tibetan, Noto Sans Yi"); pref("font.name-list.monospace.x-unicode", "Courier, Arial, Noto Sans Armenian, Noto Sans Bengali, Noto Sans Canadian Aboriginal, Noto Sans Cherokee, Noto Sans Devanagari, Noto Sans Ethiopic, Noto Sans Gujarati, Noto Sans Gurmukhi, Noto Sans Kannada, Noto Sans Khmer, Noto Sans Lao, Noto Sans Malayalam, Noto Sans Mongolian, Noto Sans Myanmar, Noto Sans Oriya, Noto Sans Sinhala, Noto Sans Tamil, Noto Sans Telugu, Noto Sans Thaana, Noto Sans Tibetan, Noto Sans Yi");

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-38.4.0esr-5.5-1] fixup! TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides.
by gk＠torproject.org 12 Dec '15

12 Dec '15

commit 2c2d625aef55b9bd1ed1b1ec459e4f1a8b11eadb Author: Arthur Edelstein <arthuredelstein(a)gmail.com> Date: Fri Dec 11 13:35:27 2015 -0800 fixup! TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides. --- browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js index ed0d3ce..ffb0a63 100644 --- a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js +++ b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ pref("font.name.sans-serif.ar", "Arial"); #endif #ifdef XP_WIN -pref("font.system.whitelist", "Arial, Batang, 바탕, Cambria Math, Courier New, Euphemia, Gautami, Georgia, Gulim, 굴림, GulimChe, 굴림체, Iskoola Pota, Kalinga, Kartika, Latha, Lucida Console, MS Gothic, ＭＳゴシック, MS Mincho, ＭＳ明朝, MS PGothic, ＭＳＰゴシック, MS PMincho, ＭＳＰ明朝, MV Boli, Mangal, Microsoft Himalaya, Microsoft YaHei, 微软雅黑, MingLiU, 細明體, Noto Sans Buginese, Noto Sans Khmer, Noto Sans Lao, Noto Sans Myanmar, Noto Sans Yi, Nyala, PMingLiU, 新細明體, Plantagenet Cherokee, Raavi, Segoe UI, Shruti, SimSun, 宋体, Sylfaen, Tahoma, Times New Roman, Tunga, Verdana, Vrinda"); +pref("font.system.whitelist", "Arial, Batang, 바탕, Cambria Math, Courier New, Euphemia, Gautami, Georgia, Gulim, 굴림, GulimChe, 굴림체, Iskoola Pota, Kalinga, Kartika, Latha, Lucida Console, MS Gothic, ＭＳゴシック, MS Mincho, ＭＳ明朝, MS PGothic, ＭＳＰゴシック, MS PMincho, ＭＳＰ明朝, MV Boli, Malgun Gothic, Mangal, Meiryo, Meiryo UI, Microsoft Himalaya, Microsoft JhengHei, Microsoft YaHei, 微软雅黑, MingLiU, 細明體, Noto Sans Buginese, Noto Sans Khmer, Noto Sans Lao, Noto Sans Myanmar, Noto Sans Yi, Nyala, PMingLiU, 新細明體, Plantagenet Cherokee, Raavi, Segoe UI, Shruti, SimSun, 宋体, Sylfaen, Tahoma, Times New Roman, Tunga, Verdana, Vrinda, Yu Gothic UI"); #endif #ifdef XP_LINUX

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