January 2013 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[translation/gettor] Update translations for gettor
by translation＠torproject.org 29 Jan '13

29 Jan '13

commit 79e13cbbd5d06c5dd9d3c9b6c64416d4f76764f4 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 29 12:15:05 2013 +0000 Update translations for gettor --- lv/gettor.po | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/lv/gettor.po b/lv/gettor.po index 59ec0ab..9055138 100644 --- a/lv/gettor.po +++ b/lv/gettor.po @@ -4,12 +4,13 @@ # # Translators: # Ojars Balcers <ojars.balcers(a)gmail.com>, 2012. +# Ojārs Balcers <ojars.balcers(a)gmail.com>, 2013. msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2013-01-19 13:40+0100\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2013-01-19 12:48+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2013-01-29 12:13+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Ojars Balcers <ojars.balcers(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL(a)li.org>\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" @@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ msgid "" " obfs-linux-i386\n" " obfs-linux-x86_64\n" " source" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Es nosūtīšu Jums Tor'a pakotni, ja norādīsiet kura pakotne ir vajadzīga.\nLūdzu, izvēlieties vienu no turpmāk noradītajiem pakotņu nosaukumiem:\n\n windows\n macos-i386\n macos-ppc\n linux-i386\n linux-x86_64\n obfs-windows\n obfs-macos-i386\n obfs-macos-x86_64\n obfs-linux-i386\n obfs-linux-x86_64\n source" #: lib/gettor/i18n.py:61 msgid "" @@ -266,7 +267,7 @@ msgid "" "Another censorship circumvention tool you can request from GetTor is\n" "the Tor Obfsproxy Browser Bundle. Please read the package descriptions for\n" "which package you should request to receive this." -msgstr "" +msgstr "Cits, no GetTor pieprasāms cenzūras apiešanas rīks ir Tor'a Obfsproxy Browser Bundle. Lūdzu, izlasiet pakotņu aprakstus, lai uzzinātu kura no tām ir tā, kas jāpieprasa." #: lib/gettor/i18n.py:179 msgid "" @@ -392,35 +393,35 @@ msgid "" "strong censorship circumvention and you are running some version of the \n" "Windows, like Windows XP, Windows Vista or Windows 7, this is the package\n" "you should get." -msgstr "" +msgstr "obfs-windows:\nTor'a Obfsproxy Browser Bundle Windows operētājsistēmām. Ja jāapiet stipra cenzūra un izmantojat kādu no Windows OS, piem., Windows XP, Windows Vista vai Windows 7, tad šī ir īstā pakotne." #: lib/gettor/i18n.py:250 msgid "" "obfs-macos-i386:\n" "The Tor Obfsproxy Browser Bundle package for OS X, 32bit Intel CPU \n" "architecture." -msgstr "" +msgstr "obfs-macos-i386:\nTor'a Obfsproxy Browser Bundle pakotne OS X 32 bitu Intel CPU \narhitektūrai." #: lib/gettor/i18n.py:254 msgid "" "obfs-macos-x86_64:\n" "The Tor Obfsproxy Browser Bundle package for OS X, 64bit Intel CPU \n" "architecture." -msgstr "" +msgstr "obfs-macos-x86_64:\nTor'a Obfsproxy Browser Bundle pakotne OS X 64 bitu Intel CPU \narhitektūrai." #: lib/gettor/i18n.py:258 msgid "" "obfs-linux-i386:\n" "The Tor Obfsproxy Browser Bundle package for Linux, 32bit Intel CPU \n" "architecture." -msgstr "" +msgstr "obfs-linux-i386:\nTor'a Obfsproxy Browser Bundle pakotne Linux'a 32 bitu Intel CPU \narhitektūrai." #: lib/gettor/i18n.py:262 msgid "" "obfs-linux-x86_64:\n" "The Tor Obfsproxy Browser Bundle package for Linux, 64bit Intel CPU \n" "architecture." -msgstr "" +msgstr "obfs-linux-x86_64:\nTor'a Obfsproxy Browser Bundle pakotne Linux'a 64bitu Intel CPU \narhitektūrai." #: lib/gettor/i18n.py:266 msgid ""

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[metrics-web/master] Add microdesc consensuses to @type list.
by karsten＠torproject.org 29 Jan '13

29 Jan '13

commit a3710052108be1a2c55220d6453ac9159e75f581 Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Tue Jan 29 10:53:39 2013 +0100 Add microdesc consensuses to @type list. --- web/WEB-INF/formats.jsp | 1 + 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/web/WEB-INF/formats.jsp b/web/WEB-INF/formats.jsp index a73adad..966856a 100644 --- a/web/WEB-INF/formats.jsp +++ b/web/WEB-INF/formats.jsp @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ are recent: <li><tt>@type dir-key-certificate-3 1.0</tt></li> <li><tt>@type network-status-consensus-3 1.0</tt></li> <li><tt>@type network-status-vote-3 1.0</tt></li> +<li><tt>@type network-status-microdesc-consensus-3 1.0</tt></li> <li><tt>@type bridge-network-status 1.0</tt></li> <li><tt>@type bridge-server-descriptor 1.0</tt></li> <li><tt><font color="gray">@type bridge-extra-info 1.0</font></tt></li>

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[translation/https_everywhere] Update translations for https_everywhere
by translation＠torproject.org 29 Jan '13

29 Jan '13

commit 83b1adeb0c68721ce184818547d59591f2bf1774 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 29 00:45:48 2013 +0000 Update translations for https_everywhere --- sl/ssl-observatory.dtd | 15 +++++++-------- 1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/sl/ssl-observatory.dtd b/sl/ssl-observatory.dtd index 185beca..d900a72 100644 --- a/sl/ssl-observatory.dtd +++ b/sl/ssl-observatory.dtd @@ -27,8 +27,7 @@ vsiljivo poslovno omrežje:"> "Varno, razen če uporabljate poslovno omrežje s tajnimi imeni lokalnih strežnikov:"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.alt_roots -"Submit and check certificates signed by non-standard root CAs -Predloži in preveri certifikate nestandardnih overoviteljev"> +"Predloži in preveri certifikate nestandardnih overoviteljev"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.alt_roots_tooltip "Omogočanje tega je varno (in priporočljivo), razen če uporabljate vsiljivo poslovno omrežje ali protivirusni program Kaspersky, ki spremlja vaše brskanje s TLS proksijem in privatnim overoviteljem certifikatov. Če je omogočeno v takem omrežju lahko ta možnost objavi dokazila o tem, katere https:// domene so bile obiskane preko tega proksija, ker bi ustvarila edinstvene certifikate. Zato je to privzeto izključeno."> @@ -43,9 +42,9 @@ Predloži in preveri certifikate nestandardnih overoviteljev"> "Ko zasledite nov certifikat povejte Observatoriju h kateremu internetnemu ponudniku ste priključeni"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.asn_tooltip -""> +"To bo pridobilo in poslalo "Avtonomno številko sistema" (ASN) vašega omrežja. To nam bo pomagalo locirati napade na HTTPS in določiti, ali so opažanja iz omrežij na področjih kot so Iran in Sirija, kjer so napadi razmeroma pogosti."> -<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.done ""> +<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.done "Končano"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.explanation ""> @@ -59,16 +58,16 @@ Mouseover the options for further details:">--> ""> -<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.hide ""> +<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.hide "Skrij napredne možnosti"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.nonanon -""> +"Preveri certifikate tudi če ni Tor omrežja"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.nonanon_tooltip -""> +"Poskušali bomo ohraniti anonimnost podatkov, vendar je ta možnost manj varna"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.priv_dns -""> +"Predloži in preveri certifikate za ne-javna imena DNS"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.priv_dns_tooltip "">

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[tor/master] squash! Implement Path use bias accounting.
by andrea＠torproject.org 29 Jan '13

29 Jan '13

commit 06a1d0b0447d3766b6199135f6878c6ce047f3b1 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Sun Jan 20 14:24:25 2013 -0800 squash! Implement Path use bias accounting. Make a debug log more informative. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 105e1ac..a4c67cf 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1582,9 +1582,11 @@ pathbias_count_use_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ) pathbias_check_use_rate(guard); guard->use_attempts++; - log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Marked circuit %d as used for guard %s=%s.", - circ->global_identifier, guard->nickname, - hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + log_debug(LD_CIRC, + "Marked circuit %d (%f/%f) as used for guard %s=%s.", + circ->global_identifier, + guard->use_successes, guard->use_attempts, + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); } circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED; @@ -1664,9 +1666,11 @@ pathbias_count_use_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) guard->use_successes++; log_debug(LD_CIRC, - "Marked circuit %d as used successfully for guard %s=%s.", - circ->global_identifier, guard->nickname, - hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + "Marked circuit %d (%f/%f) as used successfully for guard " + "%s=%s.", + circ->global_identifier, guard->use_successes, + guard->use_attempts, guard->nickname, + hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); } }

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[tor/master] squash! Remove a source of error during path bias scaling
by andrea＠torproject.org 29 Jan '13

29 Jan '13

commit b810d322bfc55d202dbbd2e8ebe4529cf0778c8b Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Sun Jan 20 14:30:02 2013 -0800 squash! Remove a source of error during path bias scaling Improve debug logs and fix a state fencepost error. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index a4c67cf..97a26dd 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2105,6 +2105,9 @@ pathbias_count_circs_in_states(entry_guard_t *guard, fast_memeq(guard->identity, ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) { + log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Found opened circuit %d in path_state %s", + ocirc->global_identifier, + pathbias_state_to_string(ocirc->path_state)); open_circuits++; } } @@ -2245,7 +2248,7 @@ pathbias_check_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) const int scale_factor = pathbias_get_scale_factor(options); const int mult_factor = pathbias_get_mult_factor(options); int opened_attempts = pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, - PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED, PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED); + PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED, PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED); guard->use_attempts -= opened_attempts; guard->use_attempts *= mult_factor; @@ -2257,8 +2260,8 @@ pathbias_check_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) guard->use_attempts += opened_attempts; log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Scaled pathbias use counts to %f/%f for guard %s=%s", - guard->use_successes, guard->use_attempts, + "Scaled pathbias use counts to %f/%f (%d open) for guard %s=%s", + guard->use_successes, guard->use_attempts, opened_attempts, guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); } @@ -2416,10 +2419,11 @@ pathbias_check_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) guard->circ_successes += opened_built; log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Scaled pathbias counts to (%f,%f)/%f for guard %s=%s", + "Scaled pathbias counts to (%f,%f)/%f (%d/%d open) for guard " + "%s=%s", guard->circ_successes, guard->successful_circuits_closed, - guard->circ_attempts, guard->nickname, - hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + guard->circ_attempts, opened_built, opened_attempts, + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); } return 0;

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[tor/master] Prevent early close of path bias testing circuits.
by andrea＠torproject.org 29 Jan '13

29 Jan '13

commit f858370233a7d01d89949f79f92e8b67acd69f46 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Sat Jan 19 21:16:24 2013 -0800 Prevent early close of path bias testing circuits. We need to let them live long enough to perform the test. --- src/or/circuituse.c | 5 ++++- src/or/rendservice.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 0b2fe9e..48a7743 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1078,7 +1078,10 @@ circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void) "purpose %d)", circ->n_circ_id, (long)(now.tv_sec - circ->timestamp_dirty), circ->purpose); - circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); + /* Don't do this magic for testing circuits. Their death is governed + * by circuit_expire_building */ + if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING) + circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); } else if (!circ->timestamp_dirty && circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) { if (timercmp(&circ->timestamp_began, &cutoff, <)) { if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL || diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 3b2eeb4..f115d8b 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -3068,7 +3068,8 @@ rend_services_introduce(void) if (intro->time_expiring + INTRO_POINT_EXPIRATION_GRACE_PERIOD > now) { /* This intro point has completely expired. Remove it, and * mark the circuit for close if it's still alive. */ - if (intro_circ != NULL) { + if (intro_circ != NULL && + intro_circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING) { circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); }

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[tor/master] Bug 8024: Check for null/closed channel before probing.
by andrea＠torproject.org 29 Jan '13

29 Jan '13

commit a78542f0c30a6d8a25b3a8c92fec61c04c3feeaf Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Tue Jan 22 21:03:28 2013 -0800 Bug 8024: Check for null/closed channel before probing. --- changes/bug7802 | 1 + src/or/circuitbuild.c | 10 ++++++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug7802 b/changes/bug7802 index 1d09757..9bc0f36 100644 --- a/changes/bug7802 +++ b/changes/bug7802 @@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ - Remove a source of rounding error during path bias count scaling. - Don't count cannibalized circuits as used for path bias until we actually try to use them. + - Fix circuit_package_relay_cell warning message about n_chan==NULL. diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 97a26dd..e3a9d59 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1727,6 +1727,16 @@ pathbias_send_usable_probe(circuit_t *circ) return -1; } + /* Can't probe if the channel isn't open */ + if (circ->n_chan == NULL || + (circ->n_chan->state != CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN + && circ->n_chan->state != CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT)) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Skipping pathbias probe for circuit %d: Channel is not open.", + ocirc->global_identifier); + return -1; + } + circuit_change_purpose(circ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING); /* Update timestamp for when circuit_expire_building() should kill us */

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug7802' of ssh://git-rw.torproject.org/mikeperry/tor
by andrea＠torproject.org 29 Jan '13

29 Jan '13

commit 123daffb600cb1b581bee9dd576a980a06926f9c Merge: dfbd19d a78542f Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 28 16:16:45 2013 -0800 Merge branch 'bug7802' of ssh://git-rw.torproject.org/mikeperry/tor changes/bug7802 | 11 + doc/tor.1.txt | 31 ++- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 618 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- src/or/circuitbuild.h | 3 + src/or/circuituse.c | 30 ++- src/or/config.c | 7 +- src/or/connection_edge.c | 28 ++- src/or/entrynodes.c | 48 ++++- src/or/entrynodes.h | 7 +- src/or/or.h | 32 ++- src/or/relay.c | 2 +- src/or/rendclient.c | 9 +- src/or/rendservice.c | 16 +- 13 files changed, 691 insertions(+), 151 deletions(-) diff --cc src/or/or.h index 251512d,409a603..cfcddba --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@@ -2998,11 -3013,8 +3014,10 @@@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t * ISO_STREAM. */ uint64_t associated_isolated_stream_global_id; /**@}*/ - } origin_circuit_t; +struct onion_queue_t; + /** An or_circuit_t holds information needed to implement a circuit at an * OR. */ typedef struct or_circuit_t {

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[tor/master] Don't immediately count cannibalized circs as used.
by andrea＠torproject.org 29 Jan '13

29 Jan '13

commit a2db17a1aab77c4183f589815800a779a5f24524 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Fri Jan 18 19:34:01 2013 -0800 Don't immediately count cannibalized circs as used. Since they use RELAY_EARLY (which can be seen by all hops on the path), it's not safe to say they actually count as a successful use. There are also problems with trying to allow them to finish extending due to the circuit purpose state machine logic. It is way less complicated (and possibly more semantically coherent) to simply wait until we actually try to do something with them before claiming we 'used' them. Also, we shouldn't call timed out circuits 'used' either, for semantic consistency. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 7 +------ src/or/circuituse.c | 14 +------------- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 435ccd9..8880f14 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -823,9 +823,6 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ) /* We're done with measurement circuits here. Just close them */ if (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { - /* If a measurement circ ever gets back to us, consider it - * succeeded for path bias */ - circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED; circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); } return 0; @@ -3140,9 +3137,7 @@ circuit_extend_to_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit) return -1; } - /* Set timestamp_dirty, so we can check it for path use bias */ - if (!circ->base_.timestamp_dirty) - circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); + // XXX: Should cannibalized circuits be dirty or not? Not easy to say.. return 0; } diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index d0b1b49..0b2fe9e 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -668,18 +668,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) circuit_build_times_set_timeout(&circ_times); } } - - if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened && - victim->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING) { - /* For path bias: we want to let these guys live for a while - * so we get a chance to test them. */ - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Allowing cannibalized circuit %d time to finish building " - "as a pathbias testing circ.", - TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier); - circuit_change_purpose(victim, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING); - continue; /* It now should have a longer timeout next time */ - } } /* If this is a hidden service client circuit which is far enough @@ -1517,7 +1505,7 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose, * If we decide to probe the initial portion of these circs, * (up to the adversaries final hop), we need to remove this. */ - circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED; + /* This must be called before the purpose change */ pathbias_check_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); }

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[tor/master] Remove a source of error during path bias scaling
by andrea＠torproject.org 29 Jan '13

29 Jan '13

commit d80b881a52644fc05a65c0ff440449ea4c82c61b Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Fri Jan 18 20:17:23 2013 -0800 Remove a source of error during path bias scaling If any circuits were opened during a scaling event, we were scaling attempts and successes by different amounts. This leads to rounding error. The fix is to record how many circuits are in a state that hasn't been fully counted yet, and subtract that before scaling, and add it back afterwords. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 8880f14..8c7bd87 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2071,20 +2071,20 @@ pathbias_count_timeout(origin_circuit_t *circ) } /** - * Return the number of circuits counted as successfully closed for - * this guard. - * - * Also add in the currently open circuits to give them the benefit - * of the doubt. + * Helper function to count all of the currently opened circuits + * for a guard that are in a given path state range. The state + * range is inclusive on both ends. */ -double -pathbias_get_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard) +static int +pathbias_count_circs_in_states(entry_guard_t *guard, + path_state_t from, + path_state_t to) { - circuit_t *circ; + circuit_t *circ = global_circuitlist; int open_circuits = 0; - /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt. */ - for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { + /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt */ + for ( ; circ; circ = circ->next) { origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL; if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) || /* didn't originate here */ circ->marked_for_close) /* already counted */ @@ -2095,20 +2095,33 @@ pathbias_get_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard) if (!ocirc->cpath || !ocirc->cpath->extend_info) continue; - /* Don't count known failed or already counted circuits */ - if (ocirc->path_state >= PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED) - continue; - - if (ocirc->path_state >= PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED && + if (ocirc->path_state >= from && + ocirc->path_state <= to && pathbias_should_count(ocirc) && fast_memeq(guard->identity, - ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest, - DIGEST_LEN)) { + ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest, + DIGEST_LEN)) { open_circuits++; } } - return guard->successful_circuits_closed + open_circuits; + return open_circuits; +} + +/** + * Return the number of circuits counted as successfully closed for + * this guard. + * + * Also add in the currently open circuits to give them the benefit + * of the doubt. + */ +double +pathbias_get_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard) +{ + return guard->successful_circuits_closed + + pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, + PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED, + PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED); } /** @@ -2121,35 +2134,10 @@ pathbias_get_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard) double pathbias_get_use_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard) { - circuit_t *circ = global_circuitlist; - int open_circuits = 0; - - /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt */ - for ( ; circ; circ = circ->next) { - origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL; - if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) || /* didn't originate here */ - circ->marked_for_close) /* already counted */ - continue; - - ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); - - if (!ocirc->cpath || !ocirc->cpath->extend_info) - continue; - - /* Don't count known failed or already counted circuits */ - if (ocirc->path_state >= PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED) - continue; - - if (ocirc->path_state >= PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED && - pathbias_should_count(ocirc) && - fast_memeq(guard->identity, - ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest, - DIGEST_LEN)) { - open_circuits++; - } - } - - return guard->use_successes + open_circuits; + return guard->use_successes + + pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, + PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED, + PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED); } /** @@ -2252,6 +2240,10 @@ pathbias_check_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) if (guard->use_attempts > pathbias_get_scale_use_threshold(options)) { const int scale_factor = pathbias_get_scale_factor(options); const int mult_factor = pathbias_get_mult_factor(options); + int opened_attempts = pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, + PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED, PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED); + guard->use_attempts -= opened_attempts; + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Scaling pathbias use counts to (%f/%f)*(%d/%d) for guard %s=%s", guard->use_successes, guard->use_attempts, @@ -2263,6 +2255,8 @@ pathbias_check_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) guard->use_attempts /= scale_factor; guard->use_successes /= scale_factor; + + guard->use_attempts += opened_attempts; } return 0; @@ -2393,6 +2387,13 @@ pathbias_check_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) if (guard->circ_attempts > pathbias_get_scale_threshold(options)) { const int scale_factor = pathbias_get_scale_factor(options); const int mult_factor = pathbias_get_mult_factor(options); + int opened_attempts = pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, + PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED, PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED); + int opened_built = pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, + PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED, + PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED); + guard->circ_attempts -= opened_attempts; + guard->circ_successes -= opened_built; log_info(LD_CIRC, "Scaling pathbias counts to (%f/%f)*(%d/%d) for guard %s=%s", guard->circ_successes, guard->circ_attempts, @@ -2412,6 +2413,9 @@ pathbias_check_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) guard->successful_circuits_closed /= scale_factor; guard->collapsed_circuits /= scale_factor; guard->unusable_circuits /= scale_factor; + + guard->circ_attempts += opened_attempts; + guard->circ_successes += opened_built; } return 0;

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