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TASK03: more detailed analysis for ' --enable-rust ' on x86-android target
by WU RUXU 05 Feb '18

05 Feb '18

Hi all I have debug --enable-rust in tor-0.3.2.9 on x86-android target, with compare with arm-android target, find more details about this issue. debug output on x86-android in ffi.rs: Feb 05 02:01:00.161 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning RustString self 0xbf8ec7f8 RUST: rust_welcome_string Tor is running with Rust integration. Please report any bugs you encouter. 0xbf8ec7f8 C: &rust_str = 0xbf8ec870, rust_str = 0xa889a880 //printf(" C: &rust_str = %p, rust_str = %p\n", &rust_str, rust_str); Segmentation fault // when I try to print str:RustString address in rust_str_get, as following pub unsafe extern "C" fn rust_str_get(str: RustString) -> *const c_char { println!(" RUST: rust_str_get &str = {:p} ", &str); debug output on arm-android in ffi.rs: Feb 05 10:12:01.092 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning RustString self 0xbe810814 RUST: rust_welcome_string Tor is running with Rust integration. Please report any bugs you encouter. 0xbe810814 C: &rust_str = 0xbe810890, rust_str = 0xb66eb000 RUST: rust_str_get &str = 0xbe810810 //println!(" RUST: rust_str_get &str = {:p} ", &str); //? I don't known why the address is different with the address return in rust_welcome_string // but two address is very close // in C code, the address of rust_str is also very close to the address in RUST, it make sense. RustString self 0xbe810810 RUST: rust_str_get str = Tor is running with Rust integration. Please report any bugs you encouter. Feb 05 10:12:01.093 [notice] Tor is running with Rust integration. Please report any bugs you encouter. Compare the two debug output, rust_str return from rust_welcome_string is correct on two target. but in rust_str_get, rust_str passed from C code is invalid on x86-android target. the RUST code runing very well on x86-android target, only have issue work with C code -- Thanks PGP Fingerprint: F7BA D6CE 6592 77C7 0D2E 3BD5 5479 A15E B305 B8FE

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TASK03 update
by WU RUXU 04 Feb '18

04 Feb '18

Hi all I have fork tor-android repo from n8fr8, merge previous changes, and some minor update in gralde & Java code. that should be easy to review all changes, and push commit here. https://github.com/wuruxu/tor-android/commit/7dfb581fb106f6d98b803c90c264c8… -- Thanks PGP Fingerprint: F7BA D6CE 6592 77C7 0D2E 3BD5 5479 A15E B305 B8FE

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TASK03 on x86-android target
by WU RUXU 03 Feb '18

03 Feb '18

Hi all I have test tor x86 android binary on x86 android device, it cann't work with --enable-rust , rust_welcome_string & rust_str_get called by C code correctly, but in C code, rust_str_get always return zero length string, it's very strange. after read https://github.com/rust-lang/libc#platforms-and-documentation, I found that arm-linux-androideabi is the only one supported target on android platform. it may be the root cause of the issue on x86-android platform. -- Thanks PGP Fingerprint: F7BA D6CE 6592 77C7 0D2E 3BD5 5479 A15E B305 B8FE

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bug fixed in TASK03
by WU RUXU 03 Feb '18

03 Feb '18

Hi all Today I found a mistake in external/tor-rust-patch-1 after I reboot computer , yesterday I had export env CARGO_TARGET_DIR in bash when I trace cargo build process manually. user@debian:~/dev/tor/tor-android$ git diff external/tor-rust-patch-1 diff --git a/external/tor-rust-patch-1 b/external/tor-rust-patch-1 index 26cda2f6..cf34a4c4 100644 --- a/external/tor-rust-patch-1 +++ b/external/tor-rust-patch-1 @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ index ec3898577..36313fc60 100644 CARGO_HOME="$(abs_top_builddir)/src/rust" \ - $(CARGO) build --release --quiet $(CARGO_ONLINE) ) + $(CARGO) build --release --target $(TOR_CARGO_TARGET) --verbose $(CARGO_ONLINE); \ -+ cd $(CARGO_TARGET_DIR); \ ++ cd "$(abs_top_builddir)/src/rust/target"; \ + mkdir -p release; \ + cp $(TOR_CARGO_TARGET)/release/@TOR_RUST_UTIL_STATIC_NAME@ release;) -- Thanks PGP Fingerprint: F7BA D6CE 6592 77C7 0D2E 3BD5 5479 A15E B305 B8FE

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Tor Browser TorLauncher Proposal
by Matthew Finkel 02 Feb '18

02 Feb '18

Hi All, Apologies for the delay in sending this. Attached (or below) is the proposal for migrating the TorLauncher legacy extension to WebExtension. The main problem with directly moving TorLauncher to using WebExtensions is the two Extensions APIs are not 1-to-1. There was significant functionality previously available that is not available with WebExtensions. In particular these involve launching a child process and controlling it. This is a primary objective of TorLauncher, so we needed an alternative. As a result, this proposal takes a mixed approach. Part of the functionality of TorLauncher will remain as an extension and the remaining functionality will be directly implemented into Tor Browser. >From the mobile/Android perspective, TorLauncher is a strange requirement at this moment. On Android, Orbot controls and configures tor, and external Apps cannot configure tor which is the purpose of TorLauncher. In the future, we may prefer another design and integration, providing a better user experience. Although the proposal is long, it is mostly documenting the extension's existing functionality. Thanks, Matt

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Tor Button Proposal
by Igor Oliveira 17 Jan '18

17 Jan '18

Howdy, As many of you know. We are bringing Orfox on par with Tor Browser(https://blog.torproject.org/blog/upping-support-mobile-browsing) and one of the steps is porting tor button extension to mobile. That said, I wrote an *initial* proposal(https://storm.torproject.org/shared/fchH0_Liol-cWFQwH1dgQsETUC7whK… and it is also bellow) about what are the challenges, the approach and how we can try to keep as much code from the current extension. Tor Button Next Proposal 1. Introduction Tor button, currently, is implemented as a Firefox extension using the XPCOM API and XUL markup language that are not supported anymore since Firefox 58[1]. This document aims to describe the approach used to revitalize the current extension and the changes needed to make it work on mobile. 1.1 Design Requirements and Philosophy The Tor Button requirements and adversary model can be found in two separated documents[2][3]. 2. Implementation Instead of an extension, we propose the Tor Button to be integrated within the Tor Browser, thus we still can reuse few parts of the current extension code such as the components and chrome code. For the XUL markup language, we also suggest to migrate to XHTML when possible. 2.1 Components This section describes the current components and what changes will be made. 2.1.1 Tor About (contract id: @mozilla.org/network/protocol/about;1?what=tor) Overrides the Firefox/Fennec about page. We can reuse it as it is in the Desktop and mobile version. For the mobile version, we need to be careful about not be overridden by the android/components/AboutRedirector.js. 2.1.2 Content Policy (contract id: @torproject.org/content-policy;1) Avoids the Browser to leak resource:// URI information. We can use as it is, however a fix was shipped in the Firefox 57 and we need to make sure that it works as expected. 2.1.3 Cookie Jar Selector (contract id: @torproject.org/cookie-jar-selector;1) Enable selection of separate cookie jars for (more) anonymous browsing. We can keep it as it is, just improving the comments in the code. 2.1.4 Domain Isolator (contract id: @torproject.org/domain-isolator;1) Put requests from different first party domains on separate tor circuits. We can keep it as it is. 2.1.5 Filter drag events (contract id: @torproject.org/torbutton-dragDropFilter;1) Filter drag events to prevent OS access to URLs (a potential proxy bypass vector). For desktop, we can keep as it is. For mobile, Android 7(API Level 24) added support for displaying more than one window at the same time[4], allowing the users to drag and drop data between activities sharing the screen. Looking looking through code and making manual tests we were not able simulate drag events between other apps and Orfox/Firefox. (Can someone else confirm it?) 2.1.6 External apps confirmation dialogs (contract id: @torproject.org/torbutton-extAppBlocker;1) Handles displaying confirmation dialogs for external apps and protocols. For Desktop, we can keep as it is. For mobile, Android uses the concept of intents to load external apps[5] (in fact, it is known by deep linking). Orfox already disables external apps making the preference network.protocol-handler.external-default false. 2.1.7 Tor Startup Observer (contract id: @torproject.org/startup-observer;1) Sets up Tor Browser networking proxy settings and loads the content-policy and aboutTor scripts. For Desktop, we can keep as it is. For mobile, the proxy settings are made by the Orbot app using the vpn service[6], thus we just need to load the content-policy and aboutTor scripts. 2.1.8 Tor Check Service (contract id: @torproject.org/torbutton-torCheckService;1) Verifies if the Tor Service is up and running. For Desktop we can keep as it is. For Mobile, currently, we can use a hybrid approach where we use Android Intents to verify if Orbot is up and running[7] and the check service component for sanity checks. 2.2. Chrome Mostly of the chrome changes will require definitions by the UX team such as the [8]. 3. External Links [1] https://blog.mozilla.org/addons/2017/11/20/extensions-in-firefox-58/ [2] https://www.torproject.org/docs/torbutton/en/design/index.html.en [3] https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#DesignRequirements [4] https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/ui/multi-window.html [5] https://developer.android.com/training/app-links/deep-linking.html [6] https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService.html [7] https://github.com/guardianproject/tor-browser/blob/orfox-tor-browser-52.2.… [8] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24309

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Re: [tbb-dev] Cloudflare's OPRFs
by Jeff Burdges 15 Jan '18

15 Jan '18

On Fri, 2018-01-12 at 08:53 +0000, Georg Koppen wrote: > Could you elaborate on the problem you see a bit? What exactly > would be the attack scenario given edge1, edge2, ..., edgeN and > why are DLEQ proofs not sufficient for that? What do you mean > by "your edge public key"? There is a secret scalar k used in CloudFlare's OPRF scheme which yields a public curve point K = g^k. https://blog.cloudflare.com/privacy-pass-the-math/ If different k are used for different clients then those clients are distinguished from one another later when using the tokens. In batching the DLEQ proofs, they prove that all tokens within a batch share the same k, but the important question is: How do you know if different users are given different K? George said K was originally simply pinned in the Privacy Pass plugin, which works fine. It's hard to know if CloudFlare wants to keep it that way, maybe they're okay with sharing the secret k among many servers, or maybe they've no choice base on how Tor users move. In general, CloudFlare's answer is an unspecified certificate transparency scheme. I'm nervous about nebulously saying certificate transparency here because it's problematic if CloudFlare starts using different k on different servers, which they might do if they want to protect k better. I think short version for Tor Browser is: You can deploy Privacy Pass with a pinned K safely, but.. Anytime CloudFlare updates Privacy Pass, Tor Browser folk should check if they change handling of K. If they do, then any new scheme requires careful review. Ideally Tor Browser users should not independently update to any new CloudFlare version. Jeff p.s. We might ask if a purely local certificate transparency logs work: If Tor is anonymous, then CloudFlare cannot detect when the same users withdraws some new batch, so if they give this user a new K and their client remembers the old K then their client can detect this and raise an alarm. I think this fails for several reasons: First, there are attacks on Tor, including attacks we believe many adversaries do not use due to cost, but Privacy Pass without an external certificate transparency magnifies these attacks effectiveness. Second, Tor is typically run in situations like Tails where its hard to persist a local certificate transparency log. p.s.2 Any such scheme runs into this problem. In Taler, denomination keys face similar problems, except our tokens already represent money, so we already have a full PKI for denomination keys, extensive error reporting, and our merchants provide a de facto certificate transparency scheme. In other words, an adversarial exchange must tell merchants all the denomination keys, make all auditors sign them all, and then tell a targeted user only about a subset. That said, Taler can any certificate transparency scheme used by Privacy Pass can also be used by Taler, presumably

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Meeting on Monday
by Georg Koppen 12 Jan '18

12 Jan '18

Hi all, Alright, we have a new year and I forgot a national US holiday again which is on Monday. :/ As it is quite late to find a different meeting day/time next week let's keep the meeting as was planned. US-based folks feel free to take the day off and skip the meeting. (Thanks Isa for reminding me, I try to get better at that business, promised) Georg

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Tor Browser team sync with UX team next wed jan 10?
by isabela 09 Jan '18

09 Jan '18

Hello Tor Browser team o/ Happy 2018! I am writing this email to see if we could have a sync TB and UX teams :) to talk about the upcoming work we will be doing. Don't know what I am talking about? One more reason to join the conversation :) But you might remember that we wrote a grant for Antonela to work on some UI changes for Tor Browser, we have already started to work on some of these activities. All these are listed on both teams roadmaps, but this sync can be another opportunity to make sure we are all on the same page for when things need to be ready for development etc. Also catch up on other work we are doing that is not necessary part of this grant. We normally host our team meetings with 'guests' on Wednesdays, I was wondering if you would be available next week for meeting with us and what would be a good time on your timezone? I was thinking of 1900 utc, Wednesday Jan 10th. Does this time works for you? I will be sharing a pad with all the tickets/items I would like us to review :) my main goal is to make sure this work is on your radar or better saying, your roadmap hehehe cheers, isabela

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Fwd: Tor Browser Settings | WebExtensions
by Nathan Freitas 08 Jan '18

08 Jan '18

Forwarding this email from August related to the renewed tor browser mobile work ----- Original message ----- From: Thomas Rientjes <thomas(a)synz.io> Subject: Tor Browser Settings | WebExtensions Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2017 09:40:32 -0400 Hi everyone! I have been closely following the developments around the new WebExtensions APIs, and believe said interfaces are finally capable of powering new versions of Tor Browser Settings. Firefox (and Firefox for Android) 56 will be supporting a new [browserSettings API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/browserS… that will allow us to modify browser settings, which is the most essential feature as far as I'm concerned. Also, if you now define a "browser_action" for your extension, Firefox for Android will automatically create a menu entry and a main menu button tap listener that runs a custom function. I'm still not completely sure if there's a way for our extension to get access to local config data of other extensions (e.g. NoScript), since settings are no longer saved as globally available values. If it turns out to be impossible, we might want to take the route of directly interacting with such extensions. This will likely require work on the side of developers of the other extensions as well. Note that the settings storage issue only applies to preferences of non-legacy extensions. So, this is not directly related to porting Tor Browser Settings, which will only put us in a better spot. This means that we can either use the browserSettings API to read and modify the settings of legacy extensions, or (once they switch to WebExtensions) have all the latest tools to interact. Please let me know what you guys think :) Cheers! Tom

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