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Fwd: Intent to update bugs: Non-GeckoView bugs in Firefox for Android
by Tom Ritter 23 Jul '18

23 Jul '18

I couldn't find any tor bugs in '*Bugs to close*' In '*Bugs to re-prioritize*' I found 15: Uplift Bugs: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=507641 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=942652 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1282826 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1314776 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1314778 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1371180 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1377509 Test Harness Bugs: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1314793 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1373550 Feature Requests: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1357994 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1337647 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1358040 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1376601 I am going to close the TorOnFennec feature bugs. I think if we want any of those uplift bugs landed we will need to reach out directly to people and come up with a plan for review. If you're fine addressing them locally for the lifetime of Fennec, it would be ideal for us to close them to avoid things in our bug queries. Matt, Igor, let me know what you think! -tom ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Emma Humphries <emma(a)mozilla.com> Date: Wed, Jul 11, 2018 at 7:49 PM Subject: Intent to update bugs: Non-GeckoView bugs in Firefox for Android To: fx-team <fx-team(a)mozilla.com>, Mobile Everyone <mobile-all(a)mozilla.com>, "dev. planning" <dev-planning(a)lists.mozilla.org>, Firefox Dev < firefox-dev(a)mozilla.org> Cc: Susheel Daswani <sdaswani(a)mozilla.com>, Barbara Bermes <b(a)mozilla.com>, Andreas Bovens <abovens(a)mozilla.com>, David Bolter <dbolter(a)mozilla.com>, Kevin Brosnan <kbrosnan(a)mozilla.com> Hello, I want to update you on discussions between Barbara Bermes, Andreas Bovens, David Bolter, Susheel Daswani, Kevin Brosan and myself on unresolved and untriaged bugs in Firefox for Android and the actions we're taking on the bug backlog. Since our strategy for mobile is changing, Susheel's team is focusing on a small number of bugs in Firefox for Android which aren't in the GeckoView component. Non-GeckoView bugs which are not being worked on and have been modified in the past 18 months (~580 days) will be re-prioritized as P5. Unconfirmed, non-GeckoView bugs will be closed as incomplete. Non-GeckoView and non-JimDb bugs unmodified in the past 18 months will be closed as incomplete. Bugs which are enhancement requests will be reviewed, and ones which won't be taken up as features/enhancements will be resolved as wontfix. To summarize: *Bugs to close* - Non-GeckoView, Non-JimDB bugs more than 560 days since last modified https://mzl.la/2Jg2Co4 (~3,500) - Unconfirmed bugs to close https://mzl.la/2L65rgk (~300) *Bugs to re-prioritize* - Bugs to move to P5: https://mzl.la/2L6SpMA (~2,000) *Bugs to review or move* - GeckoView bugs to move to new product (https://mzl.la/2N5M98s) (~120) - Enhancements to be reviewed (https://mzl.la/2JfF6aB) (~190) This work is detailed in https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/ show_bug.cgi?id=1473195. The BMO team will move the GeckoView bugs to a new product https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1460337. I plan to do these moves on Wednesday the 25th of July. If there is a non-GeckoView, non-enhancement, bug in Firefox for Android which you know ought to be addressed, please needinfo Barbara Bermes and Susheel Daswani on the bug so they can determine if it will be prioritized. Emma Humphries EPM/Bugmaster, Firefox Mozilla

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help collecting info for sponsor8 Q2 report
by isabela 23 Jul '18

23 Jul '18

Hello mobile devs! As you won't have a meeting this week (at least that is my understanding maybe I am wrong :) I decided to ping the mobile devs via email to ask for help collecting tickets and all the stuff worked on Q2. Here is the pad for that: https://storm.torproject.org/shared/lVHpb3X36tWaVem8NRarrj0mCgocd0-oz7lj--z… Let me know if you have any questions! cheers, isabela

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HOPE talk
by Matthew Finkel 19 Jul '18

19 Jul '18

Hi Tor Browser Devs, Sorry I didn't send this sooner. On Friday at HOPE we're giving an "Onion Report". During that presentation I'll talk about some of the awesome work you've done over the last year (and continue doing). I'm currently planning on hilighting the new circuit display, the onion+https indicator, and ESR60. Are there any other user-facing features I should mention? I can talk about uplift and some of the progress made with Mozilla, as well. Should I mention http2 should be enabled in 8.0 stable? I'll also talk about TBA and Onion Browser for the mobile-side. Let me know if you have any thoughts - either on-list or off-list. Thanks! Matt

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Missing Today's Meeting
by Matthew Finkel 16 Jul '18

16 Jul '18

Hi All, Unfortunately I'll miss today's team meeting. I'll read through the meeting log. - Matt

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Sandboxing Tor Browser - A New Beginning (?)
by Matthew Finkel 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi All, This is the beginning of a conversation about creating a plan for moving towards sandboxing Tor Browser on every platform. Over the last few years, there existed a Sandboxed Tor Browser on only Linux[0] (created and maintained by Yawning Angel). However, Tor Browser aims at providing a Private Browser on all supported platforms (Microsoft Windows, Apple Mac OS X, GNU/Linux, and Android (AOSP))[1][2], this means we must provide a sandboxed run-time environment on all platforms. Unfortunately, each operating system provides a unique set of sandboxing techniques and capabilities, so we must work with the facilities we are given. In some cases, we may need to be creative about how we achieve our goals. I do not have all the answers, and there are some open questions below. On Windows, we have the Windows integrity mechanism[3], Windows Containers[4], SetProcessMitigationPolicy[5], App Container[6], and maybe some others. Some of this functionality is already used by Firefox. On Mac OS X, there are two sandboxing techniques available. The first is Seatbelt[7]. Apple deprecated it in favor of code signing entitlements[8]. Unfortunately, the code signing entitlements are not as fine-grained as those Seatbelt provides, but we can enable different entitlements per "target"[9]. I don't know if this will be difficult for us. Therefore, we should utilize the code-signing restrictions where they are appropriate, but we should follow Safari[10], Chromium[11], and Firefox[12][13] by applying restrictive Sealtbelt policies where applicable. On GNU/Linux, we can use the namespacing and secure computing (Secure Computing) facilities in the kernel exposed to userspace. Sandboxed Tor Browser on Linux already shows how these can be combined and form a sandbox. In particular, we can use bubblewrap[14] as a setuid sandboxing helper (if user namespace is not enabled), if it is available. In addition, we can reduce the syscall surface area with Seccomp-BFP. CGroups provide a way for limiting the resources available within the sandbox. We may also want to manually proxy/filter other system functionality (X11). Last, but not least, on Android, we begin with a fairly strict sandbox provided by its permissioning model[15], distinct per-app users, and SELinux policies. Because every app is run using a distinct user, and each has its own storage directories, we get Linux's DAC on the file system for "free". In addition, we can use some of the same techniques available on GNU/Linux on Android, namely the seccomp-bpf and namespaces, if they are available. Android provides privilege and permission isolation within an App by using Services. With some refactoring, we can isolate some parts of Firefox into isolated permissionless services[15]. I'll begin by describing the goals, as I see it, for sandboxing Tor Browser. Hopefully, this will help us evaluate the different available techniques. These goals are derived from the Design document[16] and are the means for archieving Tor Browser's end-goal. In particular, the sandboxing techniques preserve the Security Requirements of a private browser when the browser, itself, fails at maintaining those criteria. By this I mean the sandbox should be designed such that if the browser process loses any of the Security properties (through a logical bug, exploited vulnerability, etc), the sandbox provides an additional layer of those properties and the user is not in immediate danger. The sandbox may, in some situations, improve the Privacy properties of Tor Browser, for example if a component/device is emulated instead of providing the browser with raw access. We should use these mechanisms when they are available. 1) Proxy Obedience 2) State Separation 3) Disk Avoidance 4) Application Data Isolation 5) Secure Updating 6) Usable 7) Cross-Origin Fingerprinting Unlinkability We'll go through these one-by-one and describe the role of a sandbox and how we can achieve this on each platform. Note, this design assumes a launcher-based sandboxed architecture (similar to the Sandboxed Tor Browser on Linux): ------------------ | Launcher | ------------------ | | ------------------------------ | | | | v | | ---------------- | v | Sandbox | v ----------------- | ----------- | ----------------- | Sandbox | | | Broker | | | Sandbox | | ------------- | | ----------- | | ------------- | | | Firefox | | --------------- | | Tor | | | ------------- |------/ \_________| ------------- | ----------------- Controller ----------------- |____________________________________| Proxy IPC Note, the sandboxed broker process (or processes) moves some functionality from the launcher process into a child process. This process is not as heavily sandboxed as the Firefox and Tor process, but, for example it would not need networking. This process would handle sending NEWNYM, provide a circuit display, change bridge configuration (general controller functions). In addition, it would handle copying files into and out of the Firefox sandbox, as an example. Unfortunately, there is not an existing cross-platform solution for this design. We can take bits-and-pieces from other solutions, creating this will require engineering effort. 1) Proxy Obedience The last line of defense against a proxy-bypass is a mechanism for dropping all outgoing IP packets from the browser that are: - not TCP - or TCP but not destined for the Tor proxy port (SOCKS or HTTP) - or all packets (including TCP) if the proxy listener is not a TCP port (Unix domain socket, named pipe, etc) We should also consider guarding the creation of all non-Unix domain sockets and non-named pipes with a pref. I believe sandboxing should be optional, but enabled by default (at least with first few versions), so excluding that code at compile-time is not an option. However, a pref-guard only stops unintended proxy-bypass through normal control flow. This only slightly increases the difficulty of some exploit methods. Per-platform sandboxing techniques: a) Microsoft Windows i) Windows 8+ If the user can elevate for administrator permissions, then the launcher can: - install a network filter using the Windows Filter Platform[17]. This can deny any connection from any process (based on the process's fully-qualified file name)[18]. This adds some risk because if the launcher process exits unexpected for whatever reason, the firewall rule may remain in place. ii) Windows 10 We can create a new network namespace[19] using the (undocumented) HNSCall procedure[20]. This is very appealing. iii) Windows 7+ If the platform is Windows 8+ and the user cannot elevate to Administrator or if the platform is Windows 7: - TODO: can/should we use DLL injection of WinSocks and manually filter all proxy-bypass network connections? Is there something we can use for mitigating ROP gadgets within the sandbox? b) Mac OS X i) We can restrict network access using the com.apple.security.network.client and com.apple.security.network.server entitlements[21]. ii) We can further restrict which types of connections the browser is allowed. Previously, there was a seatbelt profile for Tor Browser[22], but it is not usable with newer versions of the browser. We can continue using it for only allowing access requests for Unix domain sockets, and denying all other network connections. c) GNU/Linux i) On Linux, significant progress was already made in terms of sandboxing Tor Browser. There are two methods we can use: - Isolated network namespace via bubblewrap[14] - Seccomp-BPF on socket syscalls ii) If bubblewrap is not available, we can fallback on using unshare if it is available and user namespace is enabled iii) If user namespaces are not avialable, we ask the user for elevated privileges and manually fork into the new network namespace (worst-case). d) Android i) We can use the same (or similar) Seccomp-BPF filter that we use on Linux ii) We can move the Gecko service into an isolated process without any permissions (including Networking). iii) If all networking goes through Necko, and Neck is in the isolated process, then the remaining code, outside the isolated process, should be proxy-safe or it is the tor process. 2) State Separation Per-platform sandboxing techniques: a) Microsoft Windows i) I'm not sure if there is more we can do here. b) Mac OS X i) The Seatbelt profile[22] can restrict access to all other Firefox profiles ii) The Seatbelt profile can only allow access for bundled libraries iii) We may exclude entitlements for most system services c) GNU/Linux i) We can create new IPC, mount, and uts namespaces ii) We can provide a clean environment iii) The new mount namespace contains only the required bundled libraries required for running iv) D-Bus/I-Bus access would be nice, if we can do it safely. d) Android i) All apps are isolated by default, so there should never be shared state. ii) Ensure we have the smallest set of intent filters we need iii) Ensure we have the smallest set of exported components we need iv) Ensure we have the smallest set of broadcast receivers we need v) Ensure we only use Broadcast intents where it is necessary vi) Is there something else we should investigate here? 3) Disk Avoidance In general, I'd like #7449 mitigated. Per-platform sandboxing techniques: a) Microsoft Windows i) Windows 10+ - On very recent versions of Windows, we can create temporary filesystem Layers[23][24]. I'm not sure if these are memory-backed or filesystem-backed. - We can create a read-only layer over the installation directory - #18367 may be useful (side-by-side user/app data on Windows) - Can we can isolate the container from system services? b) Mac OS X i) We can use entitlements[25] ii) The Seatbelt profile[22] provided additional access restrictions. iii) Is there a filesystem layering mechanism available in OS X (like tmpfs in Linux)? - Specifically, if we can use this for ~/Library/Caches/TemporaryItems and ~/Downloads c) GNU/Linux i) We can create new IPC, mount, and uts namespaces ii) #18369 may be useful (side-by-side user/app data on Linux) d) Android i) The app is self-contained by default ii) Need #26574 iii) Additional auditing required 4) Application Data Isolation I'll claim the per-platform sandboxing techniques are the same as Disk Avoidance. 5) Secure Updating Nearly the same sandboxing techniques can be used on all platforms. A launcher-component (maybe not the launcher, but a reduced-privileged process, not the browser) downloads the update. Next, on download completion, a launcher-component verifies the download and installs it (I can't justify verifying the download in an unprivileged, sandboxed process - I'd like to do it, but I don't see a benefit). a) Microsoft Windows i) Layer read-only filesystem on top of install dir, prevents presistant modifications b) Mac OS X i) Seatbelt profile prevents write access of app binaries c) GNU/Linux i) Mount namespace provides read-only access of install dir ii) Mount namespace does not include launcher binaries d) Android i) If App was installed using a App Store, then that is responsible for updating ii) If the app was installed by the user (side-loaded), then the we can isolate downloading into a separate process, and then verification can be handled in an isolated process. Finally, the Android Package Manager controls installing the update. 6) Usable Unfortunately, despite the above suggestions, this sandboxing model fails if users find its unusable. In particular, with temporary file systems, we should provide a method for safely extracting a file from the temporary location and copying it to a permanent location using the launcher process. In addition, exposing operating system functionality which may be fingerprintable and/or another attack vector should be optional if it unbreaks the web (such as providing pulseaudio on Linux[26]). As usual. we must be careful about giving users too many customizable switches. 7) Cross-Origin Fingerprinting Unlinkability I've less experience here on non-Linux OS (and Sandboxed Tor Browser is already a good base on Linux). Which other components should we consider spoofing (if possible) or go out of our way and disallow access (if not possible using the above means)? [0] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/Sandbox/Linux [1] https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/60.0esr/system-requirements/ [2] https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/will-firefox-work-my-mobile-device [3] https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb625963.aspx [4] https://github.com/Microsoft/dotnet-computevirtualization/blob/master/src/M… [5] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/processthreadsapi/nf-p… [6] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/apps/hh464936(v=… [7] https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptu… [8] https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/dev88ff319e7 [9] https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptu… [10] https://trac.webkit.org/browser/webkit/releases/Apple/Safari%2011.1.1/WebKi… [11] https://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/sandbox/osx-sandboxing… [12] https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Sandbox#OSX [13] https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/sandbox/mac/Sandbox… [14] https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap [15] https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission [15] https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/service-element#isolated [16] https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/ [17] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/FWP/windows-filtering-plat… [18] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/FWP/permitting-and-blockin… [19] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/virtualization/windowscontainers/container… [20] https://github.com/Microsoft/hcsshim/blob/master/internal/hns/namespace.go#… [21] https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Miscellaneous/Ref… [22] https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-build.git/tree/projects/… [23] https://github.com/Microsoft/hcsshim/blob/master/internal/wclayer/createlay… [24] https://github.com/Microsoft/hcsshim/blob/master/internal/wclayer/createscr… [25] https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptu… [26] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/Sandbox/Linux#…

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Next Tor Browser meeting on July 16, 1800 UTC
by Georg Koppen 05 Jul '18

05 Jul '18

Hi! We'll have the next Tor Browser meeting on July 16, 1800 UTC, as I'll be on vacation and likely unavailable on July 9. The meeting location is, as usual, #tor-meeting on the OFTC IRC network. Georg

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Why Tor Browser and not Tor + $browser
by Georg Koppen 27 Jun '18

27 Jun '18

Hi! One thing I wanted to bring up yesterday in the meeting was asking around whether anybody from the team would like to help Stephanie with drafting a blog post about why we don't recommend Tor with any other browser, explaining the benefits Tor Browser has compared to setups like using Tor + Chrome. Is someone interested in helping out? If so, that would be awesome. Georg

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Re: [tbb-dev] Favicons are nasty!
by The Dude 27 Jun '18

27 Jun '18

IMO this "feature" should be disabled! via: about:config browser.chrome. browser.chrome.favicons;false browser.chrome.site_icons;false browser.chrome.image_icons.max_size;0 I never liked this feature anyway. In addition to finding questionable privacy/security issues in the past, if it's enabled and you bookmark websites it inserts a bunch of garbage into the bookmarks for that bookmarked site and just increases the size of the bookmarks file if you keep it. I'd just configure it per above in future versions of TBB.

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Moving next Tor Browser meeting to June 26, 1800 UTC
by Georg Koppen 26 Jun '18

26 Jun '18

Hi! We'll move the next Tor Browser meeting to June 26 (which is the Tuesday next week), 1800 UTC as I'll be traveling and likely unavailable during our regular meeting time. The meeting location is, as usual, #tor-meeting on the OFTC IRC network. Georg

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Fwd: Favicons are now loaded in the content process
by Tom Ritter 26 Jun '18

26 Jun '18

Not in ESR60; but wanted to let you know since there have been favicon issues in the past. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Dave Townsend <dtownsend(a)mozilla.com> Date: Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 6:02 PM Subject: Favicons are now loaded in the content process To: Firefox Dev <firefox-dev(a)mozilla.org> I just landed a fairly major change to how favicons are loaded on mozilla-inbound and it looks like it might stick. Previously we relied on the places service and XUL image elements to load favicons from the main process but now we load the favicon data in the content process and then just re-use that data everywhere we need it, currently as a data URI. This should mean we now honour CSP rules for favicons, expose favicon requests properly to webextensions and a few other things. But the change is significant enough that there might be some edge cases that changed. If you notice any oddities around favicons in tabs, the new tab page or the all tabs menu please CC me on the bugs you file. _______________________________________________ firefox-dev mailing list firefox-dev(a)mozilla.org https://mail.mozilla.org/listinfo/firefox-dev

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