[tor-relays] exit node experience: abuse over HTTP, stealrat infection

[Moritz Bartl]

On 10/21/2014 10:29 PM, Manuel Gebauer wrote:
>>> Although, the greater risk in my opinion, comes from the question
>>> if tor operators can be seen as service providers who would be
>>> exempt from responsibility for transmitted information under the
>>> term of this law. There's no precedence to my knowledge, but
>>> private wireless APs are in fact not exempt from responsibility.
>>
>> Citation needed.
> "Für ein schlecht gesichertes WLAN besteht Störerhaftung." BGH,
> Urteil v. 12.05.2010, Az. I ZR 121/08, Link:
> http://tlmd.in/u/1057

Don't confuse Internet ACCESS Providers and Internet Service Providers.
Legally, they're looked at quite different. And a "wifi with bad
security" does not even mean you can't offer a completely open wifi. Any
layman with a bit of sense could have known that to argue that the wifi
was misconfigured "by mistake" is a bad excuse.

To come back to the topic, I believe it is perfectly fine to announce
_in advance_ that your relay does not want to see/relay particular
traffic. Then, it is not a question of interfering with traffic, since
you don't see that kind of traffic at all. It's different if you stop
dropping packets on purpose.

-- 
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/