[tor-relays] Trying Trusted Tor Traceroutes

Sebastian Urbach sebastian at urbach.org
Wed Oct 8 10:04:51 UTC 2014

Dear list members,

We are happy to present the preleminary analysis results from TTTT:


The conclusions are:

1. We have found that AS-path prediction techniques significantly 
overestimate ASes and IXes traversed by Tor traffic, calling into question 
the results of previous evaluations of the network-level adversary threat. 

2. Our simulations show that Tor may currently be less vulnerable to an AS 
or IXP adversary than has been previously found. We also find that proposed 
path-selection algorithms to avoid a network adversary still leave a 
significant chance for users to be deanonymized over time due to the errors 
in path prediction, and these algorithms lead to significant rates of 
connection failures, even though in the large majority of cases the 
failures could be avoided with better measurement. 

3. Thus our results suggest the importance of accurate measurement both for 
understanding Tor security and for improving it.

Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours

Sebastian Urbach

Definition of TOR:
10% luck, 20% skill, 15% concentrated
power of will, 5% pleasure, 50% pain and
100% reason to remember the name!

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