22% of bridges run by a single entity?
Hi, is it known that (likely) a single entity is running ~22% of all bridges? (not the 'ki' bridges [1]) I'm not necessarily saying that this is bad, just curious and wondering if this is somehow known. Since contactinfo is removed from bridge descriptors before publication I can not tell whether this is i.e. torservers, Frenn vun der Enn, AccessNow, ... Added on [2] 2016-01-17 2016-01-18 2016-01-24 [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-project/2016-December/000851.html [2] https://github.com/nusenu/tor-network-observations/blob/master/bridges_added...
Wow! And I was planning on stopping at 6%...
On Mar 27, 2017, at 10:49, nusenu <nusenu@openmailbox.org> wrote:
Hi,
is it known that (likely) a single entity is running ~22% of all bridges? (not the 'ki' bridges [1])
I'm not necessarily saying that this is bad, just curious and wondering if this is somehow known. Since contactinfo is removed from bridge descriptors before publication I can not tell whether this is i.e. torservers, Frenn vun der Enn, AccessNow, ...
Added on [2] 2016-01-17 2016-01-18 2016-01-24
[1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-project/2016-December/000851.html [2] https://github.com/nusenu/tor-network-observations/blob/master/bridges_added...
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Not me. I only have one bridge. niftybunny abuse@to-surf-and-protect.net Where ignorance is bliss, 'Tis folly to be wise. Thomas Gray
On 27 Mar 2017, at 17:51, nusenu <nusenu@openmailbox.org> wrote:
Hi,
is it known that (likely) a single entity is running ~22% of all bridges? (not the 'ki' bridges [1])
I'm not necessarily saying that this is bad, just curious and wondering if this is somehow known. Since contactinfo is removed from bridge descriptors before publication I can not tell whether this is i.e. torservers, Frenn vun der Enn, AccessNow, ...
Added on [2] 2016-01-17 2016-01-18 2016-01-24
[1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-project/2016-December/000851.html [2] https://github.com/nusenu/tor-network-observations/blob/master/bridges_added...
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* nusenu schrieb am 2017-03-27 um 17:51 Uhr:
is it known that (likely) a single entity is running ~22% of all bridges? (not the 'ki' bridges [1])
I don't know if it is a well-known fact, but TorServers.net ran quite some time a lot of bridges (up to 2000). Since the funding ended at some point in time we stopped running most of them. The above number are most probably the remaining TorServers.net bridges. -- Jens Kubieziel http://www.kubieziel.de Jemand, der ganz unrecht hat, ist leichter zu überzeugen, als einer, der zur Hälfte recht hat. Ralph Waldo Emerson
Hi Jens, thanks for your reply. Jens Kubieziel:
The above number are most probably the remaining TorServers.net bridges.
Could you please publish a maintained list of all your tor relay fingerprints and hashed bridge fingerprints for transparency? (so people can make an informed decision whether they want to use your bridges (currenty ~22% by count and ~32% by adv. bw) _and_ exits (currently ~10% exit_probability) at the same time) thanks, nusenu
On 29.03.2017 15:32, nusenu wrote:
Could you please publish a maintained list of all your tor relay fingerprints and hashed bridge fingerprints for transparency?
(so people can make an informed decision whether they want to use your bridges (currenty ~22% by count and ~32% by adv. bw) _and_ exits (currently ~10% exit_probability) at the same time)
Yeah, this is pretty fucked up. We got the grant _NOT_ to run exits _and_ bridges ourselves, but to find partner organizations that would run the bridges. And then all the communication failed too because the people who wanted to be part of the grant didn't do it. I don't think they ever worked well anyway, and weren't supposed to be used in that way. We should just shut them down finally. -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/
Moritz Bartl:
Yeah, this is pretty fucked up. We got the grant _NOT_ to run exits _and_ bridges ourselves, but to find partner organizations that would run the bridges. And then all the communication failed too because the people who wanted to be part of the grant didn't do it. I don't think they ever worked well anyway, and weren't supposed to be used in that way. We should just shut them down finally.
Please keep us updated - thanks.
participants (5)
-
Jens Kubieziel -
John Ricketts -
Moritz Bartl -
niftybunny -
nusenu