Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 11:58:25 -0400 From: 12xBTM 12xbtm@gmail.com
This is a little write-up on the quality of data connections involving nodes, and some thoughts on that. So, as of today, the quality of nodes is determined by their bandwidth, uptime, and not being malicious. There are two major missing factors from this, and I wanted to bounce some ideas around: Latency and Packet Loss. These are fairly simple tests that can be performed on nodes, albeit, it would increase the resource load on the bwauths. However, nodes with high latency or packet loss should be identified, and nodes should be measured with these two important factors.
High latency will increase the delay of the circuit, but will not appear in the consesus at all. A node can have enormous latency and hamper that circuit without anyone knowing. The same could be said for a node that drops a lot of packets, or drops a lot of packets at a certain time of day (peak usage).
Do the bwauths only measure the time to transmit the data, or do they include the time to connect as well? Including the time to connect would be a measure of latency, particularly for smaller file transfers. Are the bwauths only using one size of file transfer to measure bandwidth? Using a small and large size would allow measurement of mostly-latency and mostly-throughput with the current infrastructure.
Since, as far as I know, Tor connections are in-order delivery, dropping packets will cause retransmits, and back up (parts of) the transmission. This will reduce the bandwidth as a side-effect. This reduction in bandwidth is currently measured by the bwauths - but, as you say, it isn't a direct measurement.
In future, it would be great to have separate statistics for latency and packet loss - but this is perhaps a job for something more like Ooniprobe?
teor
teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5
teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7
I once ran a node on a college network for just a few weeks. Then I found out at peak hours, packet loss was >90%. My measured bandwidth never reflected that. Now, scale that up. An enemy makes a ton of nodes like that, and now has a large portion of circuit going through them. That will cripple the usability of those circuits and their users. Likewise with latency.
On 2.6.15 12:26, teor wrote:
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 11:58:25 -0400 From: 12xBTM 12xbtm@gmail.com
This is a little write-up on the quality of data connections involving nodes, and some thoughts on that. So, as of today, the quality of nodes is determined by their bandwidth, uptime, and not being malicious. There are two major missing factors from this, and I wanted to bounce some ideas around: Latency and Packet Loss. These are fairly simple tests that can be performed on nodes, albeit, it would increase the resource load on the bwauths. However, nodes with high latency or packet loss should be identified, and nodes should be measured with these two important factors.
High latency will increase the delay of the circuit, but will not appear in the consesus at all. A node can have enormous latency and hamper that circuit without anyone knowing. The same could be said for a node that drops a lot of packets, or drops a lot of packets at a certain time of day (peak usage).
Do the bwauths only measure the time to transmit the data, or do they include the time to connect as well? Including the time to connect would be a measure of latency, particularly for smaller file transfers. Are the bwauths only using one size of file transfer to measure bandwidth? Using a small and large size would allow measurement of mostly-latency and mostly-throughput with the current infrastructure.
Since, as far as I know, Tor connections are in-order delivery, dropping packets will cause retransmits, and back up (parts of) the transmission. This will reduce the bandwidth as a side-effect. This reduction in bandwidth is currently measured by the bwauths - but, as you say, it isn't a direct measurement.
In future, it would be great to have separate statistics for latency and packet loss - but this is perhaps a job for something more like Ooniprobe?
teor
teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5
teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
(Ugggggghhh, top posting. /rant)
On 2.6.15 12:26, teor wrote:
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 11:58:25 -0400 From: 12xBTM 12xbtm@gmail.com
Since, as far as I know, Tor connections are in-order delivery, dropping packets will cause retransmits, and back up (parts of) the transmission. This will reduce the bandwidth as a side-effect. This reduction in bandwidth is currently measured by the bwauths - but, as you say, it isn't a direct measurement.
All connections are over TCP, so loss plays a huge factor in available bandwidth. Measured performance will be utterly abysmal if loss is high, because congestion control uses loss as feedback and backs off quite aggressively (NB: Certain exotic variants that shouldn't be used with Tor are less aggressive here).
On Tue, 02 Jun 2015 12:45:59 -0400 12xBTM 12xbtm@gmail.com wrote:
I once ran a node on a college network for just a few weeks. Then I found out at peak hours, packet loss was >90%. My measured bandwidth never reflected that. Now, scale that up. An enemy makes a ton of nodes like that, and now has a large portion of circuit going through them. That will cripple the usability of those circuits and their users. Likewise with latency.
This is likely because your node's bandwidth never happened to get measured when loss was that high. The bwauths could attempt to perform more frequent measurements here, but IIRC even with the recent much needed improvements, it takes quite a while to fully measure the entire network (and the new code is a dramatic improvement over the code used when you were running your relay).
I don't see why measuring latency would be any better in this regard, and of all the things to do wrt the bwauths, bolting more features on is not something I would personally consider important right now.
Regards,
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
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12xBTM -
teor -
Yawning Angel