My personal opinion is that hosting a bridge or middle at your home doesn't risk de-anonymizing you unless you go misconfigure your client to use your bridge or specifically only your middle.
Maybe there is a chance of deanoymisation if you happen to use your own middle inadvertently, but it seems changing the default configuration to exclude your own relay is more of a deanoymisation risk.
Running a middle instead of a bridge will make extra work for any ISP or NSA snoop to determine which tor traffic is yours, as most of the tor traffic won't be yours and even some tor traffic from middles goes to guard relays, which will require filtering out to determine which is your tor traffic to guards.
I would host a tor exit at home if I could get extra IPv4 addresses at a reasonable price, but I can't.
My personal opinion is that hosting a bridge or middle at your home doesn't risk de-anonymizing
Thank you, I am counting on that too. However, I haven't seen it recommended anywhere else before. Are you aware of any articles or studies backing this up? If that's a preferred setup I would have expected it to be more popular?
I would host a tor exit at home if I could get extra IPv4 addresses
Interesting, I haven't thought about that.
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