Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?
I mean, why aren't some exit nodes kept hidden, at least partially and temporarily, like bridges? This would mitigate web services denying service to Tor users (Gmail is the most recent example), plus would increase security.
On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 01:25:59PM +0200, Rana wrote:
I mean, why aren't some exit nodes kept hidden, at least partially and temporarily, like bridges? This would mitigate web services denying service to Tor users (Gmail is the most recent example), plus would increase security.
I'll simply refer you to the FAQ: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#HideExits
On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 11:51:34AM +0000, Matthew Finkel wrote:
On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 01:25:59PM +0200, Rana wrote:
I mean, why aren't some exit nodes kept hidden, at least partially and temporarily, like bridges? This would mitigate web services denying service to Tor users (Gmail is the most recent example), plus would increase security.
I'll simply refer you to the FAQ:
That was rude of me, answer below. Do you disagree with the reasoning? *You should hide the list of Tor relays, so people can't block the exits.* There are a few reasons we don't: a. We can't help but make the information available, since Tor clients need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers" want it, they can get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell clients about the list of relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections through Tor to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see. b. If people want to block us, we believe that they should be allowed to do so. Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow Tor users to connect to them, but people have the right to decide who their services should allow connections from, and if they want to block anonymous users, they can. c. Being blockable also has tactical advantages: it may be a persuasive response to website maintainers who feel threatened by Tor. Giving them the option may inspire them to stop and think about whether they really want to eliminate private access to their system, and if not, what other options they might have. The time they might otherwise have spent blocking Tor, they may instead spend rethinking their overall approach to privacy and anonymity.
On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 11:51:34AM +0000, Matthew Finkel wrote:
On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 01:25:59PM +0200, Rana wrote:
I mean, why aren't some exit nodes kept hidden, at least partially and temporarily, like bridges? This would mitigate web services denying service to Tor users (Gmail is the most recent example), plus would increase security.
I'll simply refer you to the FAQ:
That was rude of me, answer below. Do you disagree with the reasoning?
That was not rude at all, thank you for the reference to the FAQ. I largely got a satisfactory explanation there although points (b) and (c) might be controversial. The one point I find difficult to agree with is "(a) We can't help but make the information available, since Tor clients need to use it to pick their paths." If bridges can be hidden and provided to clients on as-needed basis, so can exits. Rana
On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 02:25:03PM +0200, Rana wrote:
On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 11:51:34AM +0000, Matthew Finkel wrote:
On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 01:25:59PM +0200, Rana wrote:
I mean, why aren't some exit nodes kept hidden, at least partially and temporarily, like bridges? This would mitigate web services denying service to Tor users (Gmail is the most recent example), plus would increase security.
I'll simply refer you to the FAQ:
That was rude of me, answer below. Do you disagree with the reasoning?
That was not rude at all, thank you for the reference to the FAQ. I largely got a satisfactory explanation there although points (b) and (c) might be controversial.
The one point I find difficult to agree with is "(a) We can't help but make the information available, since Tor clients need to use it to pick their paths." If bridges can be hidden and provided to clients on as-needed basis, so can exits.
Yes, this is true, and it's a topic that comes up every couple years. But, there are significant differences between bridges and exits. First, choosing your circuit's exit manually is a usability nightmare and could destroy your anonymity. Even if you give your tor client a small set of "hidden" exits, over time traffic from these nodes will be linked to your connections and they will be linked to Tor. It's not easy for users know when this happens. Tor tries extremely hard at preventing users from hurting themselves. Research has shown that bridges (and guards) should be used for longer periods of time, but if you use an exit for too long then you risk leaking too much information about your behavior (to both the exit and the destination server). Similarly, using a hidden exit becomes more risky if the user is already using a bridge because there is (currently) less oversight of the bridges than there is for the public network. This would likely be true for hidden exits, as well. This presents the problem that traffic analysis attacks against a small subset of Tor users become incredibly easy. When it comes to hidden nodes, they never remain hidden forever. Some adversaries already crawl the list of bridges and block them, other adversaries would do the same if some exit nodes were not public.
How would that work? First of all, the clients need to know which exit nodes exist, so that they can build circuits. That list, as well as that of the middle nodes, is public, otherwise you'd have to manually request exits by email/web service/… As a result you'd be limited to a few exits, which might not necessarily have an exit policy matching your needs, or might be offline, or simply overloaded on account of there being less than regular exits. By the way, I just checked, Gmail works without problems over Tor (both Web and IMAPS). Regards /peter On 12/07/2016 12:25 PM, Rana wrote:
I mean, why aren’t some exit nodes kept hidden, at least partially and temporarily, like bridges? This would mitigate web services denying service to Tor users (Gmail is the most recent example), plus would increase security.
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
How would that work? First of all, the clients need to know which exit nodes exist, so that they can build circuits. That list, as well as that of the middle nodes, is public, otherwise you'd >have to manually request exits by email/web service/… As a result you'd be limited to a few exits, which might not necessarily have an exit policy matching your needs, or might be offline, >or simply overloaded on account of there being less than regular exits. The same way bridges work. They are not published.
By the way, I just checked, Gmail works without problems over Tor (both Web and IMAPS). Using Gmail over Tor when they already know who you are is self-defeating. Try to register an anonymous Gmail account using Tor.
How would that work? First of all, the clients need to know which exit nodes exist, so that they can build circuits. That list, as well as that of the middle nodes, is public, otherwise you'd >have to manually request exits by email/web service/… As a result you'd be limited to a few exits, which might not necessarily have an exit policy matching your needs, or might be offline, >or simply overloaded on account of there being less than regular exits. The same way bridges work. They are not published.
See the answer by Matthew about that, apparently that question has already been answered in the FAQ.
By the way, I just checked, Gmail works without problems over Tor (both Web and IMAPS). Using Gmail over Tor when they already know who you are is self-defeating. Try to register an anonymous Gmail account using Tor.
Doable. They require a phone number for verification, but that's the same with and without Tor. Besides, if you want an anonymous email, use _anything but Gmail_, eg. ProtonMail.
By the way, I just checked, Gmail works without problems over Tor (both Web and IMAPS). Using Gmail over Tor when they already know who you are is self-defeating. Try to register an anonymous Gmail account using Tor.
Doable. They require a phone number for verification, but that's the same with and without Tor. Besides, if you want an anonymous email, use _anything but Gmail_, eg. ProtonMail.
Providing you phone number during registration = registration is not anonymous, so anonymous registration of a Gmail account using Tor is NOT doable. Last time I tried, this did not work. I provided the SMS number in a Tor registration attempt and Gmail said we cannot register you "at this time", without even trying to send me an SMS. Protonmail is exactly the same thing, if you want to register a free account you need to provide your phone number. You can register "anonymously" in ProtonMail only for paid account, and even if you are willing to pay for anonymity, you need to pay in bitcoin which ultimately discloses you identity - so again, not anonymous.
On 12/7/16 08:41, Rana wrote:
Protonmail is exactly the same thing, if you want to register a free account you need to provide your phone number. You can register "anonymously" in ProtonMail only for paid account, and even if you are willing to pay for anonymity, you need to pay in bitcoin which ultimately discloses you identity - so again, not anonymous.
Protonmail supports receiving a verification code by email. Use a disposable email provider that isn't blocked to receive the code. I _just_ made a protonmail account to test. https://10minutemail.net/ worked for me just now. https://10minutemail.com did not work as protonmail recognized the address I got from it as being temporary. Hope that helps. Matt
Protonmail supports receiving a verification code by email. Use a disposable email provider that isn't blocked to receive the code. I _just_ made a protonmail account to test.
https://10minutemail.net/ worked for me just now.
https://10minutemail.com did not work as protonmail recognized the address I got from it as being temporary.
Hope that helps.
Matt
I already had it solved but I tipped a friend about https://10minutemail.net and it worked for him, for which he thanks you. I wonder how long it will take Protonmail to close this loophole :)
On 2016-12-07 05:41, Rana wrote:
By the way, I just checked, Gmail works without problems over Tor (both Web and IMAPS). Using Gmail over Tor when they already know who you are is self-defeating. Try to register an anonymous Gmail account using Tor.
Doable. They require a phone number for verification, but that's the same with and without Tor. Besides, if you want an anonymous email, use _anything but Gmail_, eg. ProtonMail.
Providing you phone number during registration = registration is not anonymous, so anonymous registration of a Gmail account using Tor is NOT doable.
This depends on your country. In some countries you can purchase a SIM and activate service using only cash. If your threat model includes includes an adversary that could obtain phone company records, you should not reuse the phone or SIM for any other purpose. Obviously not all countries allow for this approach.
Last time I tried, this did not work. I provided the SMS number in a Tor registration attempt and Gmail said we cannot register you "at this time", without even trying to send me an SMS.
Protonmail is exactly the same thing, if you want to register a free account you need to provide your phone number. You can register "anonymously" in ProtonMail only for paid account, and even if you are willing to pay for anonymity, you need to pay in bitcoin which ultimately discloses you identity - so again, not anonymous.
As someone who previously ran a small freemail service, I can tell you that it's extremely difficult to block abusers from signing up without also blocking legitimate users. I gave up trying. If you can acquire an untrackable prepaid credit card (again, something that can be done using only cash here, but perhaps not everywhere), you may be able to find a VoIP service which can be used for this purpose. I have registered both Gmail and Outlook.com accounts at a VoIP SMS phone number, although I had to register a few phone numbers in different area codes before I found one that would work. It's a tough problem to solve, I will admit. On 2016-12-07 04:15, Rana wrote:
Using Gmail over Tor when they already know who you are is self-defeating. Try to register an anonymous Gmail account using Tor.
Gmail might know who I am, but my connectivity provider doesn't and I might not want them to know I'm using Gmail.
On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 02:15:55PM +0200, Rana wrote:
How would that work? First of all, the clients need to know which exit nodes exist, so that they can build circuits. That list, as well as that of the middle nodes, is public, otherwise you'd >have to manually request exits by email/web service/… As a result you'd be limited to a few exits, which might not necessarily have an exit policy matching your needs, or might be offline, >or simply overloaded on account of there being less than regular exits. The same way bridges work. They are not published.
By the way, I just checked, Gmail works without problems over Tor (both Web and IMAPS). Using Gmail over Tor when they already know who you are is self-defeating. Try to register an anonymous Gmail account using Tor.
Responses have already been given in this thread about trying to obtain an email account that is anonymous (err, pseudonymous) with the intended meaning that the service provider is not directly given another identity (phone number, etc.) intended to be kept separate---where "given" means that the service provider can (easily) associate these. (So not some sort of ZKP of a blinded credential, etc.) 'Anonymous' often gets thrown around quite recklessly, but the much more important problem with the above statement is perpetuating the false impression that letting a service provider know such associations must be contrary to the goals of Tor. As we wrote in 1996, "Our motivation here is not to provide anonymous communication, but to separate identification from routing. Authenticating information must be carried in the data stream... use of a public network should not automatically reveal the identities of communicating parties. The goal here is anonymous routing, not anonymity." As of last April, FaceBook reported over a million users per month via Tor. As to GMail, you might want to access GMail over Tor to complicate geo-location by GMail, or because you don't want a local ISP (or your VPN provider or...) to know you are accessing GMail, or... aloha, Paul
-----Original Message----- From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-bounces@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of Paul Syverson Sent: Wednesday, December 07, 2016 4:34 PM To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public? On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 02:15:55PM +0200, Rana wrote:
As of last April, FaceBook reported over a million users per month via Tor.
I am sure that the 1 million FB users connect via Tor not because they want to hide their location but the want to hide WHO they are. Hence their authentication information is mostly false and they use Tor for personal anonymity, not for anonymous routing.
As one of the Tor users who connects to services where I have to use my real name (e.g., my banks), I think it's not helpful to make assumptions about everyone's use case. Part of why I use Tor is to keep my ISPs from snooping on what I'm doing, and it's possible some of these millions of facebook users are doing the same. -h On 12/07/2016 04:07 PM, Rana wrote:
-----Original Message----- From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-bounces@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of Paul Syverson Sent: Wednesday, December 07, 2016 4:34 PM To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?
On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 02:15:55PM +0200, Rana wrote:
As of last April, FaceBook reported over a million users per month via Tor.
I am sure that the 1 million FB users connect via Tor not because they want to hide their location but the want to hide WHO they are. Hence their authentication information is mostly false and they use Tor for personal anonymity, not for anonymous routing.
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
This is exactly why I use Tor. I imagine a lot of people use Tor to bypass network restrictions, like school/University firewalls or counties like China and Pakistan. On Dec 7, 2016 9:11 AM, "heartsucker" <heartsucker@autistici.org> wrote:
As one of the Tor users who connects to services where I have to use my real name (e.g., my banks), I think it's not helpful to make assumptions about everyone's use case. Part of why I use Tor is to keep my ISPs from snooping on what I'm doing, and it's possible some of these millions of facebook users are doing the same.
-h
On 12/07/2016 04:07 PM, Rana wrote:
-----Original Message----- From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-bounces@lists.torproject.org] On
Behalf Of Paul Syverson
Sent: Wednesday, December 07, 2016 4:34 PM To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?
On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 02:15:55PM +0200, Rana wrote:
As of last April, FaceBook reported over a million users per month via Tor.
I am sure that the 1 million FB users connect via Tor not because they want to hide their location but the want to hide WHO they are. Hence their authentication information is mostly false and they use Tor for personal anonymity, not for anonymous routing.
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
-----Original Message-----
From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-bounces@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of heartsucker Sent: Wednesday, December 07, 2016 5:11 PM : tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?
As one of the Tor users who connects to services where I have to use my real name (e.g., my banks), I think it's not helpful to make assumptions about everyone's use case. Part of why I use Tor is to keep my ISPs from snooping on what I'm doing, and it's possible some of these millions of facebook users are doing the same.
We will never know the breakdown of the Facebook users by the reason why they use Tor. However, surely many of them are under repressive regimes and do not want their ass kicked for what they write on Facebook. Protecting them is fine purpose and anyhow, Tor has no control over how people use the network and certainly not over why they use it. Rana
On 2016-12-07 07:20, Rana wrote:
We will never know the breakdown of the Facebook users by the reason why they use Tor. However, surely many of them are under repressive regimes and do not want their ass kicked for what they write on Facebook. Protecting them is fine purpose and anyhow, Tor has no control over how people use the network and certainly not over why they use it.
I use Tor to access Facebook because it exists, and because I believe that legitimate use of both hidden services and exit nodes improves the overall legitimacy of Tor. I believe that if the only use of Tor is users with something to hide, it becomes easier to justify blocking and therefore is less effective and less useful overall. I use Facebook with my real name and real photo because I'm not hiding anything from anyone in this situation (except perhaps my local connectivity provider, should I be traveling at the time). I'm probably a minority in this case, and certainly an anecdote is not of statistical significance, but that's me.
The problem with Facebook is that their policies on real names somewhat goes against hiding from a repressive regime. Their terms and conditions mandate that they kick people who use pseudonyms, and make fellow Facebook users rat on each other. If I was an activist I would be wary of using it on or off Tor at all. If I am going to be harassed for using Facebook, it's probably unsafe to use Tor altogether. It isn't worth the risk, except in a very limited manner. I think the hidden service in this case is just gesture politics. It's not really for citizens in repressive regimes, but people who have little to fear from using Tor. Duncan On 7 December 2016 3:20:05 pm GMT+00:00, Rana <ranaventures@gmail.com> wrote:
-----Original Message-----
From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-bounces@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of heartsucker Sent: Wednesday, December 07, 2016 5:11 PM : tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?
As one of the Tor users who connects to services where I have to use my real name (e.g., my banks), I think it's not helpful to make assumptions about everyone's use case. Part of why I use Tor is to keep my ISPs from snooping on what I'm doing, and it's possible some of these millions of facebook users are doing the same.
We will never know the breakdown of the Facebook users by the reason why they use Tor. However, surely many of them are under repressive regimes and do not want their ass kicked for what they write on Facebook. Protecting them is fine purpose and anyhow, Tor has no control over how people use the network and certainly not over why they use it.
Rana
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
I agree 100%. And yet, it's still useful for those who don't have anything to fear from using Tor, but still want the privacy and security from the last mile. On Wed, Dec 7, 2016, at 23:45, Duncan Guthrie wrote:
The problem with Facebook is that their policies on real names somewhat goes against hiding from a repressive regime. Their terms and conditions mandate that they kick people who use pseudonyms, and make fellow Facebook users rat on each other. If I was an activist I would be wary of using it on or off Tor at all. If I am going to be harassed for using Facebook, it's probably unsafe to use Tor altogether. It isn't worth the risk, except in a very limited manner. I think the hidden service in this case is just gesture politics. It's not really for citizens in repressive regimes, but people who have little to fear from using Tor.
Duncan
On 7 December 2016 3:20:05 pm GMT+00:00, Rana <ranaventures@gmail.com> wrote:
-----Original Message-----
From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-bounces@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of heartsucker
Sent: Wednesday, December 07, 2016 5:11 PM
: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?
As one of the Tor users who connects to services where I have to use my real name (e.g., my banks), I think it's not helpful to make assumptions about everyone's use case. Part of why I use Tor is to
keep my ISPs from snooping on what I'm doing, and it's possible some of these millions of facebook users are doing the same.
We will never know the breakdown of the Facebook users by the reason why they use Tor. However, surely many of them are under repressive regimes and do not want their ass kicked for what they write on Facebook. Protecting them is fine purpose and anyhow, Tor has no control over how people use the network and certainly not over why they use it.
Rana
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
_________________________________________________
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Well, apart from using Facebook... On 8 December 2016 7:51:09 am GMT+00:00, Dave Warren <davew@hireahit.com> wrote:
I agree 100%. And yet, it's still useful for those who don't have anything to fear from using Tor, but still want the privacy and security from the last mile.
On Wed, Dec 7, 2016, at 23:45, Duncan Guthrie wrote:
The problem with Facebook is that their policies on real names somewhat goes against hiding from a repressive regime. Their terms and conditions mandate that they kick people who use pseudonyms, and make fellow Facebook users rat on each other. If I was an activist I would be wary of using it on or off Tor at all. If I am going to be harassed for using Facebook, it's probably unsafe to use Tor altogether. It isn't worth the risk, except in a very limited manner. I think the hidden service in this case is just gesture politics. It's not really for citizens in repressive regimes, but people who have little to fear from using Tor.
Duncan
On 7 December 2016 3:20:05 pm GMT+00:00, Rana <ranaventures@gmail.com> wrote:
-----Original Message-----
From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-bounces@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of heartsucker
Sent: Wednesday, December 07, 2016 5:11 PM
: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?
As one of the Tor users who connects to services where I have to use my real name (e.g., my banks), I think it's not helpful to make assumptions about everyone's use case. Part of why I use Tor is to
keep my ISPs from snooping on what I'm doing, and it's possible some of these millions of facebook users are doing the same.
We will never know the breakdown of the Facebook users by the reason why they use Tor. However, surely many of them are under repressive regimes and do not want their ass kicked for what they write on Facebook. Protecting them is fine purpose and anyhow, Tor has no control over how people use the network and certainly not over why they use it.
Rana
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
_________________________________________________
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
------------------------------------------------------------------------
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Again, I think I was quite clear on that: I don't care. I'm not using Tor to hide anything from Facebook, and I'm quite aware that any data Facebook can touch is recorded and I assume it is or will be published. That's not acceptable to everyone but it's fine for me in many cases. Even here, Tor helps because when you login to Facebook via the hidden service, and then create a New Identity and continue browsing other sites, Facebook can no longer associate my general web surfing with my Facebook account, so suddenly I am in control of what data I provide to Facebook rather than Facebook collecting anything and everything they can. If you have a different threat model, that's fine, use Tor and the internet appropriate to your needs. On Thu, Dec 8, 2016, at 00:22, Duncan Guthrie wrote:
Well, apart from using Facebook...
On 8 December 2016 7:51:09 am GMT+00:00, Dave Warren <davew@hireahit.com> wrote:
I agree 100%. And yet, it's still useful for those who don't have anything to fear from using Tor, but still want the privacy and security from the last mile.
On Wed, Dec 7, 2016, at 23:45, Duncan Guthrie wrote:
The problem with Facebook is that their policies on real names somewhat goes against hiding from a repressive regime. Their terms and conditions mandate that they kick people who use pseudonyms, and make fellow Facebook users rat on each other. If I was an activist I would be wary of using it on or off Tor at all. If I am going to be harassed for using Facebook, it's probably unsafe to use Tor altogether. It isn't worth the risk, except in a very limited manner. I think the hidden service in this case is just gesture politics. It's not really for citizens in repressive regimes, but people who have little to fear from using Tor.
Duncan
On 7 December 2016 3:20:05 pm GMT+00:00, Rana <ranaventures@gmail.com> wrote:
-----Original Message-----
From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-bounces@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of heartsucker
Sent: Wednesday, December 07, 2016 5:11 PM
: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?
As one of the Tor users who connects to services where I have to use my real name (e.g., my banks), I think it's not helpful to make assumptions about everyone's use case. Part of why I use Tor is to
keep my ISPs from snooping on what I'm doing, and it's possible some of these millions of facebook users are doing the same.
We will never know the breakdown of the Facebook users by the reason why they use Tor. However, surely many of them are under repressive regimes and do not want their ass kicked for what they write on Facebook. Protecting them is fine purpose and anyhow, Tor has no control over how people use the network and certainly not over why they use it.
Rana
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
_________________________________________________
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
_________________________________________________
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
participants (10)
-
Dave Warren -
Duncan Guthrie -
heartsucker -
Matt Traudt -
Matthew Finkel -
Paul Syverson -
Peter Ludikovsky -
Rana -
Tristan -
Volker Mink