But if you constantly switch guard nodes then chances are that very soon you will use at the same time two compromised nodes, probably revealing which sites you visit. Also Tor users usually use Tor to visit specific sites, not generally browse the web, so even if someone peeks into their circuits once, he can get a good idea of what the user uses Tor for. So fixing the guard nodes means that either no one peeks into your circuits or that someone peeks constantly into your circuits (well 1/3rd of them) for a long time, which is not really worse than peeking for a day into them.
I don't follow tor-talk.
I wouldn't mind of course having the option of excluding your node from the guard position.
----- My blog: http://www.inshame.com My full signature with lots of links etc: http://bit.ly/trtsig
On Sun, Feb 3, 2013 at 4:42 PM, Roman Mamedov rm@romanrm.ru wrote:
On Sun, 3 Feb 2013 16:14:07 +0200 Konstantinos Asimakis inshame@gmail.com wrote:
Why would traffic fall after becoming a guard node? Aren't guard nodes selected as middle nodes too?
"clients avoid using relays with the Guard flag for hops other than the first hop, since they assume they've got lots of load from clients who are using them for the first hop -- but when you first get your Guard flag, nobody uses you as a guard yet, so you don't have much traffic." -- arma@mit.edu
You don't follow tor-talk@?
Personally I don't agree with the theory behind "Guards", and it is
highly
annoying that there is no way to prevent nodes from becoming Guard.
What don't you agree with? With the fact that Tor sticks to a set of
three
nodes for the first hop of each circuit
This ^
or with the way the guard flag is awarded to nodes?
There should exist a torrc option of "I don't want it, dammit."
-- With respect, Roman