Thanks for the info guys!(:
On Sunday, August 17, 2014, Paul Syverson paul.syverson@nrl.navy.mil wrote:
On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 04:41:33PM +1200, Christian Gagneraud wrote:
On 18/08/2014 4:26 p.m., Rex Wolf wrote:
On 17/08/2014 9:11 PM, IceFish ThreeTwo wrote:
I'm pretty sure I read somewhere that the Family option in torrc is used so that nodes administrated by the same person never make a circuit with each other, which somehow protects anonymity. Should my friend and I put each other's fingerprints in the Family field? Seems logical since we know each other and if the point of theFamily field is to protect anonymity.
Hi IceFish,
The MyFamily option is what you've described--an option used so that nodes administered by the same person / entity will only be used once in any given circuit (other nodes from the same family will not be used in the same circuit).
This isn't so much to protect your anonymity as a relay operator, but to limit any one client's potential vulnerability. For example, if one relay operator happens to control both the guard node and the exit node in a circuit, they can correlate the timing of packets entering and exiting the network, and determine both a person's identity and the content of their traffic.
On the other hand, if I'm a bad guy who as lot of entry and exit nodes, I will certainly not disclosed it by using a "MyFamily" flag...
Right. It's not meant to guard against that. But if you're honest and you are threatened or coerced or your relays are otherwise collectively compromised, MyFamily limits the damage.
aloha, Paul
Chris
You and your friend may know each other, but unless you both administer each other's nodes, I don't think you would need to use the MyFamily
option.
-Rex
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