Hi Jonathan,
Jonathan D. Proulx:
On Sat, Sep 23, 2017 at 02:36:00PM +0000, Duncan wrote: :Hi Jonathan, : :Jonathan Proulx: :> :> To the initial question for a honest operator who's open about their :> ownership and enters proper family membership data I can't see how :> more exit volume is a problem. TOR needs to be resilient against :> malicious operators who don't disclose, nto sure what the current :> value of "global" is but I should hope it's well above 5%... :> : :Firstly, it's Tor not "TOR"! :)
Tru but I type bad. :)
:I'm curious about what you mean by "global" here, and how it relates to :[potentially] malicious operators (suspicious relays of which are :frequently thrown off the Tor network).
"global" as in a global passive adversary, though I suppose running nodes is an active adversary.
If that's what you mean, can you clarify what you meant by "I should hope it's well above 5%"?
If an adversary is a global passive adversary, surely that would mean that they are for all intents and purposes seeing pretty much all of the traffic?
I think it is worth remembering that there isn't evidence there is a global passive adversary at the moment, even if certain agencies and organizations clearly aspire to be one.
main point, for well behaved servers that are labled and abviously part of the same administrative domain clients won't use two of them for any circuit, so where's the harm? Not rehtorical there it woudl be at soem fraction of the network (as I say hopefully well abouve 5%), if there is have could someone smarter than me say where it is?
-Jon
Best, Duncan