Re: [tor-relays] Possible problem with NYX

There are so many edge cases for this check.

Flags are a *recommendation* to clients. They don't force clients to behave a certain way.

For example:

• clients connecting via bridges can use a middle node as their second hop. These middle nodes will leak bridge addresses via nyx.
• clients and relays can have different consensuses:
  • if a relay loses the Guard flag, and finds out earlier than its clients, nyx will stop protecting those clients
  • if a client finds out before the relay, nyx won't protect those clients
• some Tor client versions don't check the guard flag at all. Others keep their guards, even if they lose the flag
• middle and exit relays can be used as bridges, even if they don't set BridgeRelay
• older Tor versions have a non-zero probability of choosing any relay as an entry, even if it doesn't have the guard flag
• various config options make tor clients ignore the Guard flag

Please only show an IP if the relay is already public in the consensus.

Thanks teor, great point. Will do: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27475