Recent DDoS attacks caused me to update the DDoS solution [1] and to roll it out to Tor instances using [2]. The metrics below shows the effect for the (highly overloaded vCPU before), the throughput and the amount of protocol violations of a tiny Tor cloud instance: Another example is Tor instance at a bare metal server, attacked between 12 and 13 UTC (no Tor metrics during that time) and again after 16 UTC. The new rule set was developed between 14 and 15, and fully applies after a reboot at 15:20: The graph below shows that the ipset (which holds malicious ip addresses to be blocked) was not updated at 12 UTC. But with the new rule set in place it was updated soon at 16 UTCk. The green line here is the (now first half) of the changed rule whilst the yellow line reflects the addition for that rule. And finally a graph of the DOS Tor metric for this instance which shows that the Tor process has much less DOS to handle than before: I'm still fine tuning the solution. [1] https://github.com/toralf/torutils#the-rule-set [2] https://github.com/toralf/tor-relays -- Toralf
