Leading on from a discussion on Reddit's /r/onions;
Given an operator who is "dual stacking" their website on both example.com and example.onion yet finds themselves with spare CPU/RAM/bandwidth and wants to operate a relay too what is the current community opinion of this? (given the caveats / conditions detailed below)
On the inverse I operate a set of Exits [1] but these servers also have secondary services (ssh, grafana, httpd) that are exposed with onion services.
There are recommendations for running multiple relays on the same host to maximize the CPU/bandwidth etc so I'd be interested if the community still opposes the running of HS' and Relays given the following conditions;
1. No anonymity concerns from downtime correlation (example.com == example.onion) 2. Relay daemon is a separate instance to HS daemon 3. Relay daemon and HS daemon bind to different IPs
1. https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/flag:exit%20as:AS28715
Gareth Llewellyn gareth@brasshorncommunications.uk writes:
Leading on from a discussion on Reddit's /r/onions;
Given an operator who is "dual stacking" their website on both example.com and example.onion yet finds themselves with spare CPU/RAM/bandwidth and wants to operate a relay too what is the current community opinion of this? (given the caveats / conditions detailed below)
On the inverse I operate a set of Exits [1] but these servers also have secondary services (ssh, grafana, httpd) that are exposed with onion services.
There are recommendations for running multiple relays on the same host to maximize the CPU/bandwidth etc so I'd be interested if the community still opposes the running of HS' and Relays given the following conditions;
- No anonymity concerns from downtime correlation (example.com == example.onion)
- Relay daemon is a separate instance to HS daemon
- Relay daemon and HS daemon bind to different IPs
Hello Gareth,
If you are aware of (1) and you have spare bandwidth/CPU, then I don't see a problem running a relay alongside to your HS daemon.
Do 2 and 3 matter? Are their concerns with running a relay and HS on the same tor instance if you aren't concerned with denonymizing your HS location?
-tom
On 6 June 2018 at 16:13, George Kadianakis desnacked@riseup.net wrote:
Gareth Llewellyn gareth@brasshorncommunications.uk writes:
Leading on from a discussion on Reddit's /r/onions;
Given an operator who is "dual stacking" their website on both example.com and example.onion yet finds themselves with spare CPU/RAM/bandwidth and wants to operate a relay too what is the current community opinion of this? (given the caveats / conditions detailed below)
On the inverse I operate a set of Exits [1] but these servers also have secondary services (ssh, grafana, httpd) that are exposed with onion services.
There are recommendations for running multiple relays on the same host to maximize the CPU/bandwidth etc so I'd be interested if the community still opposes the running of HS' and Relays given the following conditions;
- No anonymity concerns from downtime correlation (example.com == example.onion)
- Relay daemon is a separate instance to HS daemon
- Relay daemon and HS daemon bind to different IPs
Hello Gareth,
If you are aware of (1) and you have spare bandwidth/CPU, then I don't see a problem running a relay alongside to your HS daemon. _______________________________________________ tor-onions mailing list tor-onions@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-onions
On June 6, 2018 4:51 PM, Tom Ritter tom@ritter.vg wrote:
Do 2 and 3 matter? Are their concerns with running a relay and HS on
the same tor instance if you aren't concerned with denonymizing your
HS location?
It was posited that running a HS and a relay from the same IP and/or daemon may result in a performance penalty for one or the other due to the rate limiting work that is being done.
This is not something I've experienced due to the role separation / IP binding but I have not read enough about the rate limiting work to make an educated evaluation as to what the impact could be.
tor-onions@lists.torproject.org