Hi,
Have we considered removing countries with low counts from metrics? (This probably means removing the metrics at the relays, not just the graphs.)
For example, two places that are close to home for me: https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?graph=userstats-... https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?graph=userstats-...
If you suspected that someone was one of the few users on either of these small islands, it would be easy to monitor these graphs and determine when they were using Tor.
Particularly in combination with the Australian Government's ISP-based metadata retention.
T
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On 02/11/16 07:38, teor wrote:
Hi,
Have we considered removing countries with low counts from metrics? (This probably means removing the metrics at the relays, not just the graphs.)
For example, two places that are close to home for me: https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?graph=userstats-...
https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?graph=userstats-...
If you suspected that someone was one of the few users on either of these small islands, it would be easy to monitor these graphs and determine when they were using Tor.
Particularly in combination with the Australian Government's ISP-based metadata retention.
T
Hi teor,
good question! I don't have a good answer right now, but I'm optimistic that I'll have one after we finished the following milestone:
2017-01: Perform an analysis on reducing the amount of sensitive, potentially personally identifying data stored in memory of Tor relays and bridges or reported to the directory authorities. (Sponsor X 4.1. Tor daemon)
(from https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/MetricsTeam#Roadmapf...)
The results will be posted to this mailing list, and intermediate results will either be discussed on the metrics-team@ mailing list or on Trac. Please feel free to watch or contribute as you like!
All the best, Karsten
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Karsten Loesing -
teor