Re: [tor-dev] [tor-relays] Hidden service policies
On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 9:57 PM, Thomas White <thomaswhite@riseup.net> wrote:
Mike Hearn, Simple. If you start filtering anything at all, regardless of what it is ... then I will block any connection of your relays to mine ... Freedom isn't free unless it is totally free and a selective reading policy through Tor is not just a bad idea as stated below, I find it outright insulting to me and everyone else who cares about the free and open internet. The fact somebody has the audacity to come to a project like Tor and propose blacklisting mechanisms is jaw-dropping. ... As I recall, you are also the person who raised the idea of coin tinting or a similar concept in the bitcoin community to identify "suspect" coins and that backfired spectacularly on you.
Yes, that is the person. Though the term is known as 'taint'. One of many discussions from that suggestion is here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=333824.0
so while you are reading this, let me know if you run any relays so I can avoid them.
router riker 207.12.89.16 9001 0 0 fingerprint 8657 6CF6 AA84 496F 62C0 5AFE 9F26 8962 A5F0 B2BD contact Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> accept *:8333 reject *:* Normally I would thank exits for passing BTC traffic, but now I'm unsure of this one (and a few others), especially given that's the only exit policy of the above node. To identify anon (Tor) coins for marking and tracking?
As I recall, you are also the person who raised the idea of coin tinting or a similar concept in the bitcoin community to identify "suspect" coins and that backfired spectacularly on you.
Yes, that is the person. Though the term is known as 'taint'. One of many discussions from that suggestion is here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=333824.0
I don't agree that it backfired. Yes, some people didn't like such discussions at all. Other people did though (I got a lot of fan mail for starting that discussion). If you think there's some kind of iron-clad consensus on these topics you need to leave your mailing lists and go talk to the general public, or heck, just try counting the number of services that are blocking Tor because of how it's being abused. Historically the crypto community has pursued absolute unbreakability and absolute privacy at all costs, including mainstream acceptability. This rendered its mathematical capabilities irrelevant. When Snowden wanted to talk to Greenwald using PGP he couldn't do it because PGP sucks so badly. The failure doesn't get more epic than that. The rare crypto products that are both strong and usable end up in an under-explored area: how tolerant is society of the resultant abuse? Tor is finding out the hard way that you don't need government coercion to end up widely shunned. Even the developers own IRC network is now blocking Tor. Gregory Maxwell has described Tor as heading towards a read only web, and he's not wrong. This inherently limits its mainstream appeal and weakens the "anonymity loves company" principle it relies on for protection. If we're going to make crypto both strong and mainstream, then the community needs to start thinking through the consequences of that for society at large.
Normally I would thank exits for passing BTC traffic, but now I'm unsure of this one (and a few others), especially given that's the only exit policy of the above node. To identify anon (Tor) coins for marking and tracking?
I allow only Bitcoin exit traffic because I have no desire to get raided because someone abused my exit. Currently regular Tor doesn't really exit any traffic through that node because it speculatively builds circuits to exits on the assumption they'll be used for web browsing, but we're in the process of integrating Orchid into bitcoinj (actually it's done but Orchid has a few bugs). So at some point Bitcoin wallets will start using Tor and they will know to build circuits to any exit that can support 8333.
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grarpamp -
Mike Hearn