Here's a proposal describing some padding negotiation cell primitives that should be useful to defend against website traffic fingerprinting, hidden service circuit fingerprinting, and probably just about any other traffic analysis attack under the sun.
The proposal is in my git remote at: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/mikeperry/torspec.git/tree/proposals/xxx-...
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Filename: xxx-padding-negotiation.txt Title: Padding Negotiation Authors: Mike Perry Created: 01 September 2015 Status: Draft
0. Overview
This proposal aims to describe mechanisms for requesting various types of padding from relays.
These padding primitives are general enough to use to defend against both website traffic fingerprinting as well as hidden service circuit setup fingerprinting.
1. Motivation
Tor already supports both link-level padding via (CELL_PADDING cell types), as well as circuit-level padding (via RELAY_COMMAND_DROP relay cells).
Unfortunately, there is no way for clients to request padding from relays, or request that relays not send them padding to conserve bandwidth. This proposal aims to create a mechanism for clients to do both of these.
It also establishes consensus parameters to limit the amount of padding that relays will send, to prevent custom wingnut clients from requesting too much.
2. Link-level padding
Padding is most useful if it can defend against a malicious or compromised guard node. However, link-level padding is still useful to defend against an adversary that can merely observe a Guard node externally, such as for low-resolution netflow-based attacks (see Proposal 251[1]).
In that scenario, the primary negotiation mechanism we need is a way for mobile clients to tell their Guards to stop padding, or to pad less often. The following Trunnel payloads should cover the needed parameters:
const CELL_PADDING_COMMAND_STOP = 1; const CELL_PADDING_COMMAND_START = 2;
/* This command tells the relay to stop sending any periodic CELL_PADDING cells. */ struct cell_padding_stop { u8 command IN [CELL_PADDING_COMMAND_STOP]; };
/* This command tells the relay to alter its min and max netflow timeout range values, and send padding at that rate (resuming if stopped). */ struct cell_padding_start { u8 command IN [CELL_PADDING_COMMAND_START];
/* Min must not be lower than the current consensus parameter nf_ito_low. */ u16 ito_low_ms;
/* Max must not be lower than ito_low_ms */ u16 ito_high_ms; };
More complicated forms of link-level padding can still be specified using the primitives in Section 3, by using "leaky pipe" topology to send the RELAY commands to the Guard node instead of to later nodes in the circuit.
3. End-to-end circuit padding
For circuit-level padding, we need two types of additional features: the ability to schedule additional incoming cells at one or more fixed points in the future, and the ability to schedule a statistical distribution of arbitrary padding to overlay on top of non-padding traffic (aka "Adaptive Padding").
In both cases, these messages will be sent from clients to middle nodes using the "leaky pipe" property of the 'recognized' field of RELAY cells, allowing padding to originate from middle nodes on a circuit in a way that is not detectable from the Guard node.
This same mechanism can also be used to request padding from the Guard node itself, to achieve link-level padding without the additional overhead requirements on middle nodes.
3.1. Fixed-schedule padding message (RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_SCHEDULE)
The fixed schedule padding will be encoded in a RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_SCHEDULE cell. It specifies a set of up to 80 fixed time points in the future to send cells.
XXX: 80 timers is a lot to allow every client to create. We may want to have something that checks this structure to ensure it actually schedules no more than N in practice, until we figure out how to optimize either libevent or timer scheduling/packet delivery. See also Section 4.3.
The RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_SCHEDULE body is specified in Trunnel as follows:
struct relay_padding_schedule { /* Number of microseconds before sending cells (cumulative) */ u32 when_send[80];
/* Number of cells to send at time point sum(when_send[0..i]) */ u16 num_cells[80];
/* Adaptivity: If 1, and server-originating cells arrive before the next when_send time, then decrement the next non-zero when_send index, so we don't send a padding cell then, too */ u8 adaptive IN [0,1]; };
To allow both high-resolution time values, and the ability to specify timeout values far in the future, the time values are cumulative. In other words, sending a cell with when_send = [MAX_INT, MAX_INT, MAX_INT, 0...] and num_cells = [0, 0, 100, 0...] would cause the relay to reply with 100 cells in 3*MAX_INT microseconds from the receipt of this cell.
3.2. Adaptive Padding message (RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_ADAPTIVE)
The following message is a generalization of the Adaptive Padding defense specified in "Timing Attacks and Defenses"[2].
The message encodes either one or two state machines, each of which can contain one or two histograms ("Burst" and "Gap") governing their behavior.
The "Burst" histogram specifies the delay probabilities for sending a padding packet after the arrival of a non-padding data packet.
The "Gap" histogram specifies the delay probabilities for sending another padding packet after a padding packet was just sent from this node. This self-triggering property of the "Gap" histogram allows the construction of multi-packet padding trains using a simple statistical distribution.
Both "Gap" and "Burst" histograms each have a special "Infinity" bin, which means "We have decided not to send a packet".
Each histogram is combined with state transition information, which allows a client to specify the types of incoming packets that cause the state machine to decide to schedule padding cells (and/or when to cease scheduling them).
The client also maintains its own local histogram state machine(s), for reacting to traffic on its end.
Note that our generalization of the Adaptive Padding state machine also gives clients full control over the state transition events, even allowing them to specify a single-state Burst-only state machine if desired. See Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for details.
The histograms and the associated state machine packet layout is specified in Trunnel as follows:
/* These constants form a bitfield to specify the types of events * that can cause transitions between state machine states. * * Note that SENT and RECV are relative to this endpoint. For * relays, SENT means packets destined towards the client and * RECV means packets destined towards the relay. On the client, * SENT means packets destined towards the relay, where as RECV * means packets destined towards the client. */ const RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_NONPADDING_RECV = 1; const RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT = 2; const RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_PADDING_SENT = 4; const RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_PADDING_RECV = 8;
/* This payload encodes a histogram delay distribution representing * the probability of sending a single RELAY_DROP cell after a * given delay in response to a non-padding cell. */ struct burst_state { u8 histogram_len IN [2..51]; u16 histogram[histogram_len]; u32 start_usec; u16 max_sec;
/* This is a bitfield that specifies which direction and types * of traffic that cause us to abort our scheduled packet and * return to waiting for another event from transition_burst_events. */ u8 transition_start_events;
/* This is a bitfield that specifies which direction and types * of traffic that cause us to remain in the burst state: Cancel the * pending padding packet (if any), and schedule another padding * packet from our histogram. */ u8 transition_reschedule_events;
/* This is a bitfield that specifies which direction and types * of traffic that cause us to transition to the Gap state. */ u8 transition_gap_events;
/* If true, remove tokens from the histogram upon padding and * non-padding activity. */ u8 remove_toks IN [0,1]; };
/* This histogram encodes a delay distribution representing the * probability of sending a single additional padding packet after * sending a padding packet that originated at this hop. */ struct gap_state { u8 histogram_len IN [2..51]; u16 histogram[histogram_len]; u32 start_usec; u16 max_sec;
/* This is a bitfield which specifies which direction and types * of traffic should cause us to transition back to the start * state (ie: abort scheduling packets completely). */ u8 transition_start_events;
/* This is a bitfield which specifies which direction and types * of traffic should cause us to transition back to the burst * state (and schedule a packet from the burst histogram). */ u8 transition_burst_events;
/* This is a bitfield that specifies which direction and types * of traffic that cause us to remain in the gap state: Cancel the * pending padding packet (if any), and schedule another padding * packet from our histogram. */ u8 transition_reschedule_events;
/* If true, remove tokens from the histogram upon padding and non-padding activity. */ u8 remove_toks IN [0,1]; };
struct adaptive_padding_machine { /* This is a bitfield which specifies which direction and types * of traffic should cause us to transition to the burst * state (and schedule a packet from the burst histogram). */ u8 transition_burst_events;
struct burst_state burst; struct gap_state gap; };
/* This is the full payload of a RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_ADAPTIVE * cell. */ struct relay_command_padding_adaptive { u8 num_machines IN [1,2];
struct adaptive_padding_machine machines[num_machines]; };
3.2.1. Histogram state machine operation
Each of pair of histograms ("Burst" and "Gap") together form a state machine whose transitions are governed by incoming traffic and/or locally generated padding traffic.
Each state machine has a Start state S, a Burst state B, and a Gap state G.
The state machine starts idle (state S) until it receives a packet of a type that matches the bitmask in machines[i].transition_burst_events.
This causes it to enter burst mode (state B), in which a delay t is sampled from the Burst histogram, and a timer is scheduled to count down until either another matching packet arrives, or t expires. If the "Infinity" time is sampled from this histogram, the machine returns to the Start state.
If a packet that matches machines[i].burst.transition_start_events arrives before t expires, the machine transitions back to the Start state.
If a packet that matches machines[i].burst.transition_reschedule_events arrives before t expires, a new delay is sampled and the process is repeated again, i.e. it remains in burst mode.
Otherwise, if t expires, a padding message is sent to the other end.
If a packet that matches machines[i].burst.transition_gap_events arrives (or is sent), the machine transitions to the Gap state G.
In state G, the machine samples from the Gap histogram and sends padding messages when the time it samples expires. If an infinite delay is sampled while being in state G we jump back to state B.
If a packet arrives that matches gap.transition_start_events, the machine transitions back to the Start state.
If a packet arrives that matches gap.transition_burst_events, the machine transitions back to the Burst state.
If a packet arrives that matches machines[i].gap.transition_reschedule_events, the machine remains in G but schedules a new padding time from its Gap histogram.
In the event that a malicious or buggy client specifies conflicting state transition rules with the same bits in multiple transition bitmasks, the transition rules of a state that specify transition to earlier states take priority. So burst.transition_start_events takes priority over burst.transition_reschedule_events, and both of these take priority over burst.transition_gap_events.
Similarly, gap.transition_start_events takes priority over gap.transition_burst_events, and gap.transition_burst_events takes priority over gap.transition_reschedule_events.
In our generalization of Adaptive Padding, either histogram may actually be self-scheduling (by setting the bit RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_PADDING_SENT in their transition_reschedule_events). This allows the client to create a single-state machine if desired.
Clients are expected to maintain their own local version of the state machines, for reacting to their own locally generated traffic, in addition to sending one or more state machines to the middle relay. The histograms that the client uses locally will differ from the ones it sends to the upstream relay.
On the client, the "SENT" direction means packets destined towards the upstream, where as "RECV" means packets destined towards the client. However, on the relay, the "SENT" direction means packets destined towards the client, where as "RECV" means packets destined towards the relay.
3.2.2. The original Adaptive Padding algorithm
As we have noted, the state machines above represent a generalization of the original Adaptive Padding algorithm. To implement the original behavior, the following flags should be set in both the client and the relay state machines:
num_machines = 1;
machines[0].transition_burst_events = RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT;
machines[0].burst.transition_reschedule_events = RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT;
machines[0].burst.transition_gap_events = RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_PADDING_SENT;
machines[0].gap.transition_reschedule_events = RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_PADDING_SENT;
machines[0].gap.transition_burst_events = RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT;
The rest of the transition fields would be 0.
Adding additional transition flags will either increase or decrease the amount of padding sent, depending on their placement.
The second machine slot is provided in the event that it proves useful to have separate state machines reacting to both sent and received traffic.
3.2.3. Histogram decoding/representation
Each of the histograms' fields represent a probability distribution that is expanded into bins representing time periods a[i]..b[i] as follows:
start_usec,max_sec,histogram_len initialized from appropriate histogram body.
n = histogram_len-1 INFINITY_BIN = n
a[0] = start_usec; b[0] = start_usec + max_sec*USEC_PER_SEC/2^(n); for(i=1; i < n; i++) { a[i] = start_usec + max_sec*USEC_PER_SEC/2^(n-i) b[i] = start_usec + max_sec*USEC_PER_SEC/2^(n-i-1) }
To sample the delay time to send a padding packet, perform the following:
i = 0; curr_weight = histogram[0];
tot_weight = sum(histogram); bin_choice = crypto_rand_int(tot_weight);
while (curr_weight < bin_choice) { curr_weight += histogram[i]; i++; }
if (i == INFINITY_BIN) return; // Don't send a padding packet
// Sample uniformly between a[i] and b[i] send_padding_packet_at = a[i] + crypto_rand_int(b[i] - a[i]);
In this way, the bin widths are exponentially increasing in width, where the width is set at max_sec/2^(n-i) seconds. This exponentially increasing bin width allows the histograms to most accurately represent small interpacket delay (where accuracy is needed), and devote less accuracy to larger timescales (where accuracy is not as important).
3.2.4. Token removal and refill
If the remove_tok field is set to true for a given state's histogram, then whenever a padding packet is sent, the corresponding histogram bin's token count is decremented by one.
If a packet matching the current state's transition_reschedule_events bitmask arrives from the server before the chosen padding timer expires, then a token is removed from the nearest non-empty bin corresponding to the delay since the last packet was sent, and the padding packet timer is re-sampled from the histogram.
If the entire histogram becomes empty, it is then refilled to the original values.
3.2.5. Constructing the histograms
Care must be taken when constructing the histograms themselves, since their non-uniform widths means that the actual underlying probability distribution needs to be both normalized for total number of tokens, as well as the non-uniform histogram bin widths.
Care should also be taken with interaction with the token removal rules from Section 3.2.4. Obviously using a large number of tokens will cause token removal to have much less of an impact upon the adaptive nature of the padding in the face of existing traffic.
Actual optimal histogram and state transition construction for different traffic types is expected to be a topic for further research.
Intuitively, the burst state is used to detect when the line is idle (and should therefore have few or no tokens in low histogram bins). The lack of tokens in the low histogram bins causes the system to remain in the burst state until the actual application traffic either slows, stalls, or has a gap.
The gap state is used to fill in otherwise idle periods with artificial payloads from the server (and should have many tokens in low bins, and possibly some also at higher bins).
It should be noted that due to our generalization of these states and their transition possibilities, more complicated interactions are also possible.
4. Security considerations and mitigations
The risks from this proposal are primarily DoS/resource exhaustion, and side channels.
4.1. Rate limiting
Fully client-requested padding introduces a vector for resource amplification attacks and general network overload due to overly-aggressive client implementations requesting too much padding.
Current research indicates that this form of statistical padding should be effective at overhead rates of 50-60%. This suggests that clients that use more padding than this are likely to be overly aggressive in their behavior.
We recommend that three consensus parameters be used in the event that the network is being overloaded from padding to such a degree that padding requests should be ignored:
* CircuitPaddingMaxRatio - The maximum ratio of padding traffic to non-padding traffic (expressed as a percent) to allow on a circuit before ceasing to pad. Ex: 75 means 75 padding packets for every 100 non-padding packets. - Default: 100 * CircuitPaddingLimitCount - The number of padding cells that must be transmitted before the ratio limit is applied. - Default: 500 * CircuitPaddingLimitTime - The time period in seconds over which to count padding cells for application of the ratio limit. - Default: 60
XXX: Should we cap padding at these rates, or fully disable it once they're crossed?
Proposal 251 introduced extra-info accounting at relays to enable us to measure the total overhead of both link and circuit-level padding at various relays.
4.2. Malicious state machines
The state machine capabilities of RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_ADAPTIVE are very flexible, and as a result may specify conflicting or non-deterministic state transitions.
We believe that the rules in Section 3.2.1 for prioritizing transitions towards lower states remove any possibility of non-deterministic transitions.
However, because of self-triggering property that allows the state machines to schedule more padding packets after sending their own locally generated padding packets, care must be taken with the interaction with the rate limiting rules in Section 4.1. If the limits in section 4.1 are exceeded, the state machines should stop, rather than continually poll themselves trying to transmit packets and being blocked by the rate limiter at another layer.
4.3. Libevent timer exhaustion
As mentioned in section 3.1, scheduled padding may create an excessive number of libevent timers. Care should be taken in the implementation to devise a way to prevent clients from sending padding requests specifically designed to impact the ability of relays to function by causing too many timers to be scheduled at once.
XXX: Can we suggest any specifics here? I can imagine a few ways of lazily scheduling timers only when they are close to their expiry time, and other ways of minimizing the number of pending timer callbacks at a given time, but I am not sure which would be best for libevent.
4.4. Side channels
In order to prevent relays from introducing side channels by requesting padding from clients, all of these commands should only be valid in the outgoing (from the client/OP) direction.
Clients should perform accounting on the amount of padding that they receive, and if it exceeds the amount that they have requested, they alert the user of a potentially misbehaving node, and/or close the circuit.
Similarly, if RELAY_DROP cells arrive from the last hop of a circuit, rather than from the expected interior node, clients should alert the user of the possibility of that circuit endpoint introducing a side-channel attack, and/or close the circuit.
-------------------
1. https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/251-netflow-padding... 2. http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ShWa-Timing06.pdf
Hi Mike,
Just a few questions about the proposal, inline below:
On 12 Sep 2015, at 10:34, Mike Perry mikeperry@torproject.org wrote:
Here's a proposal describing some padding negotiation cell primitives that should be useful to defend against website traffic fingerprinting, hidden service circuit fingerprinting, and probably just about any other traffic analysis attack under the sun.
The proposal is in my git remote at: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/mikeperry/torspec.git/tree/proposals/xxx-...
==============================
Filename: xxx-padding-negotiation.txt Title: Padding Negotiation Authors: Mike Perry Created: 01 September 2015 Status: Draft
...
- End-to-end circuit padding
For circuit-level padding, we need two types of additional features: the ability to schedule additional incoming cells at one or more fixed points in the future, and the ability to schedule a statistical distribution of arbitrary padding to overlay on top of non-padding traffic (aka "Adaptive Padding").
In both cases, these messages will be sent from clients to middle nodes using the "leaky pipe" property of the 'recognized' field of RELAY cells, allowing padding to originate from middle nodes on a circuit in a way that is not detectable from the Guard node.
This same mechanism can also be used to request padding from the Guard node itself, to achieve link-level padding without the additional overhead requirements on middle nodes.
3.1. Fixed-schedule padding message (RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_SCHEDULE)
The fixed schedule padding will be encoded in a RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_SCHEDULE cell. It specifies a set of up to 80 fixed time points in the future to send cells.
Do we want to add a length field, for schedules with less than 80 time points? Or is this unnecessary?
XXX: 80 timers is a lot to allow every client to create. We may want to have something that checks this structure to ensure it actually schedules no more than N in practice, until we figure out how to optimize either libevent or timer scheduling/packet delivery. See also Section 4.3.
The RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_SCHEDULE body is specified in Trunnel as follows:
struct relay_padding_schedule { /* Number of microseconds before sending cells (cumulative) */ u32 when_send[80];
/* Number of cells to send at time point sum(when_send[0..i]) */ u16 num_cells[80]; /* Adaptivity: If 1, and server-originating cells arrive before the next when_send time, then decrement the next non-zero when_send index, so we don't send a padding cell then, too */ u8 adaptive IN [0,1];
Is this the definition of “adaptivity" that we want?
I can see that it works in the scenario where a client wants a minimum of X cells delivered at-or-before time T (adaptively), where T is a single schedule arbitrarily far in the future.
But if a client wants a minimum of X cells delivered every T microseconds (adaptively), then there’s no way to reliably specify that using this scheme. If 10*X cells originate at the server due to regular traffic in the first interval, that will cause the next 10 intervals to be skipped.
I can see that the histograms work around this issue by refilling with the original figures, but I’m not sure that works for fixed-point padding.
};
To allow both high-resolution time values, and the ability to specify timeout values far in the future, the time values are cumulative. In other words, sending a cell with when_send = [MAX_INT, MAX_INT, MAX_INT, 0...] and num_cells = [0, 0, 100, 0...] would cause the relay to reply with 100 cells in 3*MAX_INT microseconds from the receipt of this cell.
3.2. Adaptive Padding message (RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_ADAPTIVE)
...
3.2.4. Token removal and refill
If the remove_tok field is set to true for a given state's histogram, then whenever a padding packet is sent, the corresponding histogram bin's token count is decremented by one.
If a packet matching the current state's transition_reschedule_events bitmask arrives from the server before the chosen padding timer expires, then a token is removed from the nearest non-empty bin corresponding to the delay since the last packet was sent, and the padding packet timer is re-sampled from the histogram.
Does nearest mean “next highest” or “closest”?
If the entire histogram becomes empty, it is then refilled to the original values.
...
Thanks
Tim
Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)
teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP: 968F094B (ABFED1AC & A39A9058 expire 15 Sep 2015)
teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F (From 1 Sep 2015)
Tim Wilson-Brown - teor:
Hi Mike,
Just a few questions about the proposal, inline below:
On 12 Sep 2015, at 10:34, Mike Perry mikeperry@torproject.org wrote:
Here's a proposal describing some padding negotiation cell primitives that should be useful to defend against website traffic fingerprinting, hidden service circuit fingerprinting, and probably just about any other traffic analysis attack under the sun.
The proposal is in my git remote at: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/mikeperry/torspec.git/tree/proposals/xxx-...
==============================
Filename: xxx-padding-negotiation.txt Title: Padding Negotiation Authors: Mike Perry Created: 01 September 2015 Status: Draft
...
- End-to-end circuit padding
For circuit-level padding, we need two types of additional features: the ability to schedule additional incoming cells at one or more fixed points in the future, and the ability to schedule a statistical distribution of arbitrary padding to overlay on top of non-padding traffic (aka "Adaptive Padding").
In both cases, these messages will be sent from clients to middle nodes using the "leaky pipe" property of the 'recognized' field of RELAY cells, allowing padding to originate from middle nodes on a circuit in a way that is not detectable from the Guard node.
This same mechanism can also be used to request padding from the Guard node itself, to achieve link-level padding without the additional overhead requirements on middle nodes.
3.1. Fixed-schedule padding message (RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_SCHEDULE)
The fixed schedule padding will be encoded in a RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_SCHEDULE cell. It specifies a set of up to 80 fixed time points in the future to send cells.
Do we want to add a length field, for schedules with less than 80 time points? Or is this unnecessary?
At first, I thought this was unnecessary, as it is completely acceptable to leave unused fields as 0s in my definition. Since Trunnel should make working with variable fields more safe and less cumbersome, I've simplified this to use variable lengths.
XXX: 80 timers is a lot to allow every client to create. We may want to have something that checks this structure to ensure it actually schedules no more than N in practice, until we figure out how to optimize either libevent or timer scheduling/packet delivery. See also Section 4.3.
The RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_SCHEDULE body is specified in Trunnel as follows:
struct relay_padding_schedule { /* Number of microseconds before sending cells (cumulative) */ u32 when_send[80];
/* Number of cells to send at time point sum(when_send[0..i]) */ u16 num_cells[80]; /* Adaptivity: If 1, and server-originating cells arrive before the next when_send time, then decrement the next non-zero when_send index, so we don't send a padding cell then, too */ u8 adaptive IN [0,1];Is this the definition of “adaptivity" that we want?
I can see that it works in the scenario where a client wants a minimum of X cells delivered at-or-before time T (adaptively), where T is a single schedule arbitrarily far in the future.
This cell is meant to request a one-shot amount of padding, not a periodic cycle. Anything periodic like this should use Adaptive padding.
But if a client wants a minimum of X cells delivered every T microseconds (adaptively), then there’s no way to reliably specify that using this scheme. If 10*X cells originate at the server due to regular traffic in the first interval, that will cause the next 10 intervals to be skipped.
I can see that the histograms work around this issue by refilling with the original figures, but I’m not sure that works for fixed-point padding.
I believe that we should ensure that the Adaptive Padding machine can specify this and any other type of periodic padding. If it can't, we should generalize it further, not add another primitive for specifying periodic padding.
In fact, I've pushed updates to the adaptive padding rules in order to allow three different versions of what you've asked, and provided the example machine specifications for these examples. Please let me know if you feel that we still need further flexibility to cover another related example. You probably want a pen and paper handy to draw the state machines and their transitions out as you read through the rules.
Example 1: X cells delivered over T microseconds, spread evenly. If a non-padding cell is sent, padding is skipped for the next T/X microseconds.
num_machines = 1;
machines[0].transition_burst_events = 0;
machines[0].burst.histogram_len = 2; machines[0].burst.histogram = {1, 0};
machines[0].burst.transition_reschedule_events = RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT | RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_PADDING_SENT;
machines[0].burst.remove_toks = 0; machines[0].burst.start_usec = T/X; machines[0].burst.max_sec = MAX_INT16; // Minimizes bin 0's width
machines[0].burst.transition_start_events = 0; machines[0].burst.transition_gap_events = 0;
Example 2: X cells delivered in a consecutive burst, every T microseconds. Bursts are delayed if there is any non-padding activity prior to a burst. Any non-padding cell during a burst means one less padding cell during that burst.
num_machines = 1;
machines[0].transition_burst_events = 0;
machines[0].burst.histogram_len = 2; machines[0].burst.histogram = {1, 0};
machines[0].burst.transition_reschedule_events = RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT;
machines[0].burst.remove_toks = 0; machines[0].burst.start_usec = T; machines[0].burst.max_sec = MAX_INT16; // Minimizes bin 0's width
machines[0].burst.transition_start_events = 0; machines[0].burst.transition_gap_events = RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_PADDING_SENT;
machines[0].gap.histogram_len = 2; machines[0].gap.histogram = {X-1, 0};
machines[0].gap.transition_reschedule_events = RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT | RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_PADDING_SENT;
machines[0].gap.remove_toks = 1; machines[0].gap.start_usec = 0; machines[0].gap.max_sec = MAX_INT16; // Minimizes bin 0's width
machines[0].gap.transition_start_events = 0; machines[0].gap.transition_burst_events = RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_BINS_EMPTY;
Example 3: X cells delivered in a consecutive burst, every T microseconds. Bursts are triggered if there is any non-padding activity before T expires, and another burst is scheduled T microseconds later. Any non-padding cell during a burst means one less padding cell during that burst.
num_machines = 1;
machines[0].transition_burst_events = 0;
machines[0].burst.histogram_len = 2; machines[0].burst.histogram = {1, 0};
machines[0].burst.transition_reschedule_events = 0;
machines[0].burst.remove_toks = 0; machines[0].burst.start_usec = T; machines[0].burst.max_sec = MAX_INT16; // Minimizes bin 0's width
machines[0].burst.transition_start_events = 0; machines[0].burst.transition_gap_events = RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT | RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_PADDING_SENT;
machines[0].gap.histogram_len = 2; machines[0].gap.histogram = {X-1, 0};
machines[0].gap.transition_reschedule_events = RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT | RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_PADDING_SENT;
machines[0].gap.remove_toks = 1; machines[0].gap.start_usec = 0; machines[0].gap.max_sec = MAX_INT16; // Minimizes bin 0's width
machines[0].gap.transition_start_events = 0; machines[0].gap.transition_burst_events = RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_BINS_EMPTY;
The examples required the following proposal changes (which I've pushed to that remote):
1. A zero machines.transition_burst_events means an immediate transition to the burst state. 2. Added RELAY_PADDING_TRANSITION_EVENT_BINS_EMPTY to allow a state transition when the bins become empty.
};
To allow both high-resolution time values, and the ability to specify timeout values far in the future, the time values are cumulative. In other words, sending a cell with when_send = [MAX_INT, MAX_INT, MAX_INT, 0...] and num_cells = [0, 0, 100, 0...] would cause the relay to reply with 100 cells in 3*MAX_INT microseconds from the receipt of this cell.
3.2. Adaptive Padding message (RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_ADAPTIVE)
...
3.2.4. Token removal and refill
If the remove_tok field is set to true for a given state's histogram, then whenever a padding packet is sent, the corresponding histogram bin's token count is decremented by one.
If a packet matching the current state's transition_reschedule_events bitmask arrives from the server before the chosen padding timer expires, then a token is removed from the nearest non-empty bin corresponding to the delay since the last packet was sent, and the padding packet timer is re-sampled from the histogram.
Does nearest mean “next highest” or “closest”?
The original Adaptive Padding paper did indeed specify "next highest". "Closest" makes more sense to me, but I've gone ahead and parameterized this in the proposal, in case optimal token removal policy turns out to vary depending on application.
On 12/09/15 01:34, Mike Perry wrote:
4.1. Rate limiting
Fully client-requested padding introduces a vector for resource amplification attacks and general network overload due to overly-aggressive client implementations requesting too much padding.
Current research indicates that this form of statistical padding should be effective at overhead rates of 50-60%. This suggests that clients that use more padding than this are likely to be overly aggressive in their behavior.
We recommend that three consensus parameters be used in the event that the network is being overloaded from padding to such a degree that padding requests should be ignored:
- CircuitPaddingMaxRatio
- The maximum ratio of padding traffic to non-padding traffic (expressed as a percent) to allow on a circuit before ceasing to pad. Ex: 75 means 75 padding packets for every 100 non-padding packets.
- Default: 100
- CircuitPaddingLimitCount
- The number of padding cells that must be transmitted before the ratio limit is applied.
- Default: 500
- CircuitPaddingLimitTime
- The time period in seconds over which to count padding cells for application of the ratio limit.
- Default: 60
Without disputing the need for limits, I wonder whether the ratio of padding to non-padding traffic during a fixed time period is definitely the right thing to limit. I'm guessing that the research showing that an overhead of 50-60% is effective applies to website fingerprinting - what about other applications?
Consider a chat client that sends a very small amount of very bursty traffic. It will be hard to choose a padding distribution that provides any useful concealment of the real traffic pattern without risking exceeding the padding-to-traffic limit during some time periods. But this client is hardly a threat to the network, even if it sometimes sends more padding than traffic.
Calculating the ratio over the whole lifetime of the circuit would be an improvement, but the problem would still arise at the start of the circuit's lifetime (it seems like the appropriate value of CircuitPaddingLimitCount would be application-dependent).
I'm not sure what to suggest here, but it seems a shame to have a super-flexible way to specify padding distributions and then impose limits that mean clients will only use simple padding distributions that they can be sure will stay within the limits.
XXX: Should we cap padding at these rates, or fully disable it once they're crossed?
If the ratio exceeds the limit and the relay stops padding, will the client know that the circuit's no longer protected? Perhaps the safe thing would be to kill the circuit?
Cheers, Michael
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Michael Rogers -
Mike Perry -
Tim Wilson-Brown - teor