nusenu transcribed 3.9K bytes:
Or, alternately, if they submit a bridge descriptor from an AS they are watching, then they know all the bridges in that AS.
And they don't actually need to be in the AS to submit a descriptor with an IP address from that AS.
Ok that makes it bad to a point where it is pointless. I'm surprised that you can get bridge auth to distribute fake bridges for arbitrary IPs - I assume that is not actually the case.
Hi nusenu!
Right, these bridges do not actually get distributed.
The BridgeAuthority accepts the descriptor, and, assuming it can't open a connection to the bridge on the IP:port within the signed bridge descriptor, it doesn't mark the bridge with the "Running" flag. Later, BridgeDB receives a tarball of all the new descriptors from the BridgeAuthority, and BridgeDB chucks out the bridges without the Running flag (i.e. they don't get added to the hashring). [0]
[0]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/bridgedb.git/tree/bridgedb/Bridges.p...
Best regards,