On Tue, Oct 22, 2024 at 3:47 AM stifle_savage042--- via tor-dev tor-dev@lists.torproject.org wrote:
Hi all,
I want to promote some recent work of mine in the hope that someone here will find it interesting or useful. In my most concise language, it is a "decentralized, asynchronous entropy generator protocol." I've made a somewhat complete demo implementation so far. Here's the repository: https://github.com/devnetsec/rand-num-consensus. The integrity of the entropy can only be compromised if all nodes in the ring are malicious and coinciding. Currently, a Tor client cannot anonymously connect to an onion service by directly contacting the rendezvous point, because that relay could have been chosen maliciously by the onion server. I wager that a scheme like this could enable onion servers and clients to share the same circuit. Both parties would have a guarantee that their relays were chosen randomly.
The most similar solution I could find to this was in the TorCoin paper, but it appears to require a more complicated zero-knowledge proof. If there is serious interest in this, I'd be willing to write a proposal draft. Besides implementation difficulty, is there any outstanding flaw in this idea?
Uh, yes. Depending on how we class implementation difficulty. - A node can go offline before revealing to influence the random choice. This is very hard to deal with in general. - Encryption isn't a commitment, particularly not with AES-GCM
Sincerely, Watson Ladd
Best Regards,
Dylan Downey [devnetsec] _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev