-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 20/10/14 14:37, George Kadianakis wrote:
On an even more researchy tone, Qingping Hou et al wrote a proposal to reduce the length of HS circuits to 5 hops (down from 6). You can find their proposal here: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-February/006198.html
The project is crazy and dangerous and needs lots of analysis, but it's something worth considering. Maybe this is a good time to do this analysis?
One aspect of this proposal that might be problematic: the client and hidden service negotiate a random number and use it to pick a rendezvous point from a list of candidates. They must have matching lists of candidates. With a similar idea in mind, I recently looked into how long it takes for two clients to obtain copies of the same consensus. I found out that this is never guaranteed to happen, because each client may skip a consensus each time it downloads a fresh one. That would need to be addressed before implementing the 5-hop proposal. https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-September/007571.html Cheers, Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJURlAkAAoJEBEET9GfxSfM8u0H/26wRDiVzzYZopgIb1Vlb99q FuPAF5D0quETvAoYxcxpN72+pJjIWOdmccw4NURpJQ7FYYQgbTEirNPqmaeZjDt7 T9IG4goL8CIyxlFA25Kbb6bCf1xLtIOJHksdtCNeLnf8wsLyOYlW7kZEhQQpojzM 1TScWp9rfSfJc/P6juGad6H0BKaLDhsmUb1gtBGYS7JHQNNovruqVugI+Q2iqzOK UhvBW2Lfhnf42HuTfal/oQaq3z00wPPxmqA25GmTmrzhUU0xqqHKHrReV7YqppOw GZH2SSxpcnV1EQ/M/fh8jMtsaGZiQe1bCZQqjwOudkuinpoir7RiCU9QS3PytiM= =2oJx -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----