commit 5741aef3dc0dc245ab930c21b277a5a829c9970d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> Date: Thu Jan 5 15:08:05 2012 -0500 We no longer need to detect openssl without RAND_poll() We require openssl 0.9.7 or later, and RAND_poll() was first added in openssl 0.9.6. --- changes/readable_ssl_versions | 2 ++ src/common/crypto.c | 10 +--------- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/readable_ssl_versions b/changes/readable_ssl_versions index 8c8e06c..f34998c 100644 --- a/changes/readable_ssl_versions +++ b/changes/readable_ssl_versions @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ o Code simplification and refactoring: - Use macros to indicate OpenSSL versions, so we don't need to worry about accidental hexadecimal bit shifts. + - Remove some workaround code for OpenSSL 0.9.6, which is no longer + supported. diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index aa8ceed..35d6dfa 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -2360,12 +2360,6 @@ crypto_dh_free(crypto_dh_env_t *dh) * work for us too. */ #define ADD_ENTROPY 32 -/** True iff we should use OpenSSL's RAND_poll function to add entropy to its - * pool. - * - * Use RAND_poll if OpenSSL is 0.9.6 release or later. */ -#define HAVE_RAND_POLL (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_NOPATCH(0,9,6)) - /** True iff it's safe to use RAND_poll after setup. * * Versions of OpenSSL prior to 0.9.7k and 0.9.8c had a bug where RAND_poll @@ -2409,8 +2403,7 @@ crypto_seed_rng(int startup) size_t n; #endif -#if HAVE_RAND_POLL - /* OpenSSL 0.9.6 adds a RAND_poll function that knows about more kinds of + /* OpenSSL has a RAND_poll function that knows about more kinds of * entropy than we do. We'll try calling that, *and* calling our own entropy * functions. If one succeeds, we'll accept the RNG as seeded. */ if (startup || RAND_POLL_IS_SAFE) { @@ -2418,7 +2411,6 @@ crypto_seed_rng(int startup) if (rand_poll_status == 0) log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "RAND_poll() failed."); } -#endif #ifdef MS_WINDOWS if (!provider_set) {