commit 5b8956df3b3bc4593c0372703cfb07d75b4fc15e Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Mon Aug 28 10:11:49 2017 -0400

In test_establish_intro_wrong_purpose, use tt_i64_op on ssize_t

Since ssize_t is signed and might be 64 bits, we should use tt_i64_op to make sure it's positive. Otherwise, if it is negative, and we use tt_u64_op, we'll be treating it as a uint64_t, and we won't detect negative values.

This fixes CID 1416338 and 1416339. Bug not in any released Tor. --- src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c b/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c index 2c8f78008..2cce8a370 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c @@ -48,10 +48,10 @@ new_establish_intro_cell(const char *circ_nonce, ip = service_intro_point_new(NULL, 0); tt_assert(ip); cell_len = hs_cell_build_establish_intro(circ_nonce, ip, buf); - tt_u64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); + tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0);

cell_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_parse(&cell, buf, sizeof(buf)); - tt_int_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); + tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); tt_assert(cell); *cell_out = cell;

@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ new_establish_intro_encoded_cell(const char *circ_nonce, uint8_t *cell_out) ip = service_intro_point_new(NULL, 0); tt_assert(ip); cell_len = hs_cell_build_establish_intro(circ_nonce, ip, cell_out); - tt_u64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); + tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0);

done: service_intro_point_free(ip); @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ test_establish_intro_wrong_purpose(void *arg) /* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we attempt to parse it. */ cell_len = new_establish_intro_encoded_cell(circ_nonce, cell_body); - tt_u64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); + tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0);

/* Receive the cell. Should fail. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ test_establish_intro_wrong_keytype2(void *arg) /* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we * attempt to parse it. */ cell_len = new_establish_intro_encoded_cell(circ_nonce, cell_body); - tt_u64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); + tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0);

/* Mutate the auth key type! :) */ cell_body[0] = 42; @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ test_establish_intro_wrong_mac(void *arg) /* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we * attempt to parse it. */ cell_len = new_establish_intro_cell(circ_nonce, &cell); - tt_u64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); + tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); tt_assert(cell);

/* Mangle one byte of the MAC. */ @@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ test_establish_intro_wrong_mac(void *arg) /* Encode payload so we can sign it. */ cell_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body), cell); - tt_int_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); + tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0);

retval = ed25519_sign_prefixed(&sig, cell_body, cell_len - @@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ test_establish_intro_wrong_mac(void *arg) /* Re-encode with the new signature. */ cell_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body), cell); - tt_int_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); + tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); }

/* Receive the cell. Should fail because our MAC is wrong. */ @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ test_establish_intro_wrong_auth_key_len(void *arg) /* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we * attempt to parse it. */ cell_len = new_establish_intro_cell(circ_nonce, &cell); - tt_u64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); + tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); tt_assert(cell);

/* Mangle the auth key length. */ @@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ test_establish_intro_wrong_sig_len(void *arg) /* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we * attempt to parse it. */ cell_len = new_establish_intro_cell(circ_nonce, &cell); - tt_u64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); + tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); tt_assert(cell);

/* Mangle the signature length. */