commit 3a69fcb01f131e8a241aa0d806d5ed7aef6b9314 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> Date: Wed Dec 9 08:31:29 2015 -0500 try a little harder with getrandom types to avoid warnings --- src/common/crypto.c | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 34e94b5..4554933 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -2397,13 +2397,14 @@ crypto_strongest_rand_syscall(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) * /dev/srandom followed by opening and reading from /dev/urandom. */ if (PREDICT_LIKELY(getrandom_works)) { - int ret; + long ret; + /* A flag of '0' here means to read from '/dev/urandom', and to + * block if insufficient entropy is available to service the + * request. + */ + const unsigned int flags = 0; do { - /* A flag of '0' here means to read from '/dev/urandom', and to - * block if insufficient entropy is available to service the - * request. - */ - ret = syscall(SYS_getrandom, out, out_len, 0); + ret = syscall(SYS_getrandom, out, out_len, flags); } while (ret == -1 && ((errno == EINTR) ||(errno == EAGAIN))); if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(ret == -1)) { @@ -2416,7 +2417,7 @@ crypto_strongest_rand_syscall(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) return -1; } - tor_assert(ret == (int)out_len); + tor_assert(ret == (long)out_len); return 0; }