commit ddcbe264745a0c10d80d8ad74125d23eb251662d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 25 10:42:00 2015 -0500 Now that crypto_rand() cannot fail, it should return void. --- src/common/crypto.c | 12 +++++------- src/common/crypto.h | 4 ++-- src/common/crypto_curve25519.c | 3 +-- src/common/tortls.c | 3 +-- src/or/config.c | 3 +-- src/or/connection_or.c | 3 +-- src/or/control.c | 3 +-- src/or/ext_orport.c | 3 +-- src/or/onion_fast.c | 8 ++------ src/or/rendclient.c | 6 +----- src/or/rendcommon.c | 12 ++---------- src/test/test_extorport.c | 5 ++--- 12 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 1ca86ea..9e27ad3 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -270,8 +270,7 @@ crypto_init_siphash_key(void) if (have_seeded_siphash) return 0; - if (crypto_rand((char*) &key, sizeof(key)) < 0) - return -1; + crypto_rand((char*) &key, sizeof(key)); siphash_set_global_key(&key); have_seeded_siphash = 1; return 0; @@ -2368,27 +2367,26 @@ crypto_seed_rng(void) /** Write <b>n</b> bytes of strong random data to <b>to</b>. Return 0 on * success, -1 on failure, with support for mocking for unit tests. */ -MOCK_IMPL(int, +MOCK_IMPL(void, crypto_rand, (char *to, size_t n)) { - return crypto_rand_unmocked(to, n); + crypto_rand_unmocked(to, n); } /** Write <b>n</b> bytes of strong random data to <b>to</b>. Return 0 on * success, -1 on failure. Most callers will want crypto_rand instead. */ -int +void crypto_rand_unmocked(char *to, size_t n) { int r; if (n == 0) - return 0; + return; tor_assert(n < INT_MAX); tor_assert(to); r = RAND_bytes((unsigned char*)to, (int)n); tor_assert(r >= 0); - return 0; } /** Return a pseudorandom integer, chosen uniformly from the values diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h index 60f9e28..3b471c2 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.h +++ b/src/common/crypto.h @@ -260,8 +260,8 @@ int crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256( /* random numbers */ int crypto_seed_rng(void) ATTR_WUR; -MOCK_DECL(int,crypto_rand,(char *to, size_t n)); -int crypto_rand_unmocked(char *to, size_t n); +MOCK_DECL(void,crypto_rand,(char *to, size_t n)); +void crypto_rand_unmocked(char *to, size_t n); int crypto_strongest_rand(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len); int crypto_rand_int(unsigned int max); int crypto_rand_int_range(unsigned int min, unsigned int max); diff --git a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c index ac0b08a..00302a2 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c @@ -113,8 +113,7 @@ curve25519_rand_seckey_bytes(uint8_t *out, int extra_strong) { uint8_t k_tmp[CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN]; - if (crypto_rand((char*)out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN) < 0) - return -1; + crypto_rand((char*)out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN); if (extra_strong && !crypto_strongest_rand(k_tmp, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN)) { /* If they asked for extra-strong entropy and we have some, use it as an * HMAC key to improve not-so-good entropy rather than using it directly, diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 536043e..e3c6859 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -601,8 +601,7 @@ tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_t *rsa, goto error; { /* our serial number is 8 random bytes. */ - if (crypto_rand((char *)serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp)) < 0) - goto error; + crypto_rand((char *)serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp)); if (!(serial_number = BN_bin2bn(serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp), NULL))) goto error; if (!(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial_number, X509_get_serialNumber(x509)))) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index fa860af..431d366 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -7329,8 +7329,7 @@ init_cookie_authentication(const char *fname, const char *header, /* Generate the cookie */ *cookie_out = tor_malloc(cookie_len); - if (crypto_rand((char *)*cookie_out, cookie_len) < 0) - goto done; + crypto_rand((char *)*cookie_out, cookie_len); /* Create the string that should be written on the file. */ memcpy(cookie_file_str, header, strlen(header)); diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index a967c93..c454d3f 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -2290,8 +2290,7 @@ connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn) auth_challenge_cell_t *ac = auth_challenge_cell_new(); - if (crypto_rand((char*)ac->challenge, sizeof(ac->challenge)) < 0) - goto done; + crypto_rand((char*)ac->challenge, sizeof(ac->challenge)); auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET); auth_challenge_cell_set_n_methods(ac, diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 220e7e5..c89fdde 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -3418,8 +3418,7 @@ handle_control_authchallenge(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, tor_free(client_nonce); return -1; } - const int fail = crypto_rand(server_nonce, SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN); - tor_assert(!fail); + crypto_rand(server_nonce, SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN); /* Now compute and send the server-to-controller response, and the * server's nonce. */ diff --git a/src/or/ext_orport.c b/src/or/ext_orport.c index e8c8aa6..f159f7d 100644 --- a/src/or/ext_orport.c +++ b/src/or/ext_orport.c @@ -193,8 +193,7 @@ handle_client_auth_nonce(const char *client_nonce, size_t client_nonce_len, return -1; /* Get our nonce */ - if (crypto_rand(server_nonce, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN) < 0) - return -1; + crypto_rand(server_nonce, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN); { /* set up macs */ size_t hmac_s_msg_len = strlen(EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_CONST) + diff --git a/src/or/onion_fast.c b/src/or/onion_fast.c index 7584112..22bef4e 100644 --- a/src/or/onion_fast.c +++ b/src/or/onion_fast.c @@ -30,10 +30,7 @@ fast_onionskin_create(fast_handshake_state_t **handshake_state_out, { fast_handshake_state_t *s; *handshake_state_out = s = tor_malloc(sizeof(fast_handshake_state_t)); - if (crypto_rand((char*)s->state, sizeof(s->state)) < 0) { - tor_free(s); - return -1; - } + crypto_rand((char*)s->state, sizeof(s->state)); memcpy(handshake_out, s->state, DIGEST_LEN); return 0; } @@ -56,8 +53,7 @@ fast_server_handshake(const uint8_t *key_in, /* DIGEST_LEN bytes */ size_t out_len; int r = -1; - if (crypto_rand((char*)handshake_reply_out, DIGEST_LEN)<0) - return -1; + crypto_rand((char*)handshake_reply_out, DIGEST_LEN); memcpy(tmp, key_in, DIGEST_LEN); memcpy(tmp+DIGEST_LEN, handshake_reply_out, DIGEST_LEN); diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index a39e518..11e940c 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -65,11 +65,7 @@ rend_client_send_establish_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ) tor_assert(circ->rend_data); log_info(LD_REND, "Sending an ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell"); - if (crypto_rand(circ->rend_data->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: Couldn't produce random cookie."); - circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); - return -1; - } + crypto_rand(circ->rend_data->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN); /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it, * and the rend cookie also means we've used the circ. */ diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index 22599e9..1e6c6da 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -268,11 +268,7 @@ rend_encrypt_v2_intro_points_basic(char **encrypted_out, tor_assert(client_cookies && smartlist_len(client_cookies) > 0); /* Generate session key. */ - if (crypto_rand(session_key, CIPHER_KEY_LEN) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to generate random session key to encrypt " - "introduction point string."); - goto done; - } + crypto_rand(session_key, CIPHER_KEY_LEN); /* Determine length of encrypted introduction points including session * keys. */ @@ -334,11 +330,7 @@ rend_encrypt_v2_intro_points_basic(char **encrypted_out, REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE; i < REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE - 1; i++) { client_part = tor_malloc_zero(REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_ENTRY_LEN); - if (crypto_rand(client_part, REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_ENTRY_LEN) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to generate fake client entry."); - tor_free(client_part); - goto done; - } + crypto_rand(client_part, REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_ENTRY_LEN); smartlist_add(encrypted_session_keys, client_part); } /* Sort smartlist and put elements in result in order. */ diff --git a/src/test/test_extorport.c b/src/test/test_extorport.c index 2e5a32e..5d38ed8 100644 --- a/src/test/test_extorport.c +++ b/src/test/test_extorport.c @@ -309,15 +309,14 @@ test_ext_or_cookie_auth(void *arg) tor_free(client_hash2); } -static int +static void crypto_rand_return_tse_str(char *to, size_t n) { if (n != 32) { TT_FAIL(("Asked for %d bytes, not 32", (int)n)); - return -1; + return; } memcpy(to, "te road There is always another ", 32); - return 0; } static void