commit 8d5dcdbda2160b6375cb479827d8cc2f16e06777 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 30 18:05:39 2018 -0500 backport to make channel_is_client() accurate This commit takes a piece of commit af8cadf3a9 and a piece of commit 46fe353f25, with the goal of making channel_is_client() be based on what sort of connection handshake the other side used, rather than seeing whether the other side ever sent a create_fast cell to us. --- changes/bug24898-029 | 7 +++++++ src/or/channeltls.c | 4 ++++ src/or/connection_or.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug24898-029 b/changes/bug24898-029 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f56dee5c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug24898-029 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Make the internal channel_is_client() function look at what sort + of connection handshake the other side used, rather than whether + the other side ever sent a create_fast cell to us. Backports part + of the fixes from bug 24898. + + diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.c b/src/or/channeltls.c index 09cca95b6..31641c3db 100644 --- a/src/or/channeltls.c +++ b/src/or/channeltls.c @@ -1640,6 +1640,10 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) tor_assert(tor_digest_is_zero( (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> authenticated_peer_id))); + /* If the client never authenticated, it's a tor client or bridge + * relay, and we must not use it for EXTEND requests (nor could we, as + * there are no authenticated peer IDs) */ + channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)); channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), NULL, chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS); diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index dadfdc438..8beedcae7 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -1880,6 +1880,12 @@ connection_or_set_state_open(or_connection_t *conn) connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN); control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED, 0); + /* Link protocol 3 appeared in Tor 0.2.3.6-alpha, so any connection + * that uses an earlier link protocol should not be treated as a relay. */ + if (conn->link_proto < 3) { + channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)); + } + or_handshake_state_free(conn->handshake_state); conn->handshake_state = NULL; connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));