commit 81687f5bc975842bb4d251881b04e19092ab336e Author: teor <teor@torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 17 17:18:40 2020 +1000 relay: Split out relay-only circuit building Move the relay-only circuit building functions into a new file. Part of 33633. --- src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c | 2 +- src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 233 +----------------------------- src/core/or/circuitbuild.h | 19 ++- src/core/or/command.c | 1 + src/core/or/relay.c | 1 + src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c | 253 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h | 60 ++++++++ src/feature/relay/include.am | 2 + 8 files changed, 338 insertions(+), 233 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c b/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c index abd48f886..485ddb974 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c +++ b/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ **/ #include "core/or/or.h" #include "core/or/channel.h" -#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h" #include "core/or/circuitlist.h" #include "core/or/connection_or.h" #include "app/config/config.h" @@ -27,6 +26,7 @@ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" #include "core/or/onion.h" +#include "feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h" #include "feature/relay/onion_queue.h" #include "feature/stats/rephist.h" #include "feature/relay/router.h" diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c index ea51d7b9b..0527548f2 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -21,8 +21,7 @@ * cells arrive, the client will invoke circuit_send_next_onion_skin() to send * CREATE or RELAY_EXTEND cells. * - * On the server side, this module also handles the logic of responding to - * RELAY_EXTEND requests, using circuit_extend(). + * The server side is handled in feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c. **/ #define CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE @@ -35,7 +34,6 @@ #include "core/crypto/onion_crypto.h" #include "core/crypto/onion_fast.h" #include "core/crypto/onion_tap.h" -#include "core/crypto/relay_crypto.h" #include "core/mainloop/connection.h" #include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" #include "core/or/channel.h" @@ -84,13 +82,6 @@ #include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h" #include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h" -static channel_t * channel_connect_for_circuit(const tor_addr_t *addr, - uint16_t port, - const char *id_digest, - const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id); -static int circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, - const create_cell_t *create_cell, - int relayed); static int circuit_send_first_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ); static int circuit_build_no_more_hops(origin_circuit_t *circ); static int circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ, @@ -104,10 +95,10 @@ static const node_t *choose_good_middle_server(uint8_t purpose, * and then calls command_setup_channel() to give it the right * callbacks. */ -static channel_t * +channel_t * channel_connect_for_circuit(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *id_digest, - const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id) + const struct ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id) { channel_t *chan; @@ -707,8 +698,9 @@ circuit_n_chan_done(channel_t *chan, int status, int close_origin_circuits) * gave us via an EXTEND cell, so we shouldn't worry if we don't understand * it. Return -1 if we failed to find a suitable circid, else return 0. */ -static int -circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, const create_cell_t *create_cell, +int +circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, + const struct create_cell_t *create_cell, int relayed) { cell_t cell; @@ -1166,164 +1158,6 @@ circuit_note_clock_jumped(int64_t seconds_elapsed, bool was_idle) } } -/** Take the 'extend' <b>cell</b>, pull out addr/port plus the onion - * skin and identity digest for the next hop. If we're already connected, - * pass the onion skin to the next hop using a create cell; otherwise - * launch a new OR connection, and <b>circ</b> will notice when the - * connection succeeds or fails. - * - * Return -1 if we want to warn and tear down the circuit, else return 0. - */ -int -circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) -{ - channel_t *n_chan; - relay_header_t rh; - extend_cell_t ec; - const char *msg = NULL; - int should_launch = 0; - - if (circ->n_chan) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "n_chan already set. Bug/attack. Closing."); - return -1; - } - if (circ->n_hop) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "conn to next hop already launched. Bug/attack. Closing."); - return -1; - } - - if (!server_mode(get_options())) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Got an extend cell, but running as a client. Closing."); - return -1; - } - - relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); - - if (extend_cell_parse(&ec, rh.command, - cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE, - rh.length) < 0) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Can't parse extend cell. Closing circuit."); - return -1; - } - - if (!ec.orport_ipv4.port || tor_addr_is_null(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr)) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Client asked me to extend to zero destination port or addr."); - return -1; - } - - if (tor_addr_is_internal(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr, 0) && - !get_options()->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Client asked me to extend to a private address"); - return -1; - } - - /* Check if they asked us for 0000..0000. We support using - * an empty fingerprint for the first hop (e.g. for a bridge relay), - * but we don't want to let clients send us extend cells for empty - * fingerprints -- a) because it opens the user up to a mitm attack, - * and b) because it lets an attacker force the relay to hold open a - * new TLS connection for each extend request. */ - if (tor_digest_is_zero((const char*)ec.node_id)) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Client asked me to extend without specifying an id_digest."); - return -1; - } - - /* Fill in ed_pubkey if it was not provided and we can infer it from - * our networkstatus */ - if (ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&ec.ed_pubkey)) { - const node_t *node = node_get_by_id((const char*)ec.node_id); - const ed25519_public_key_t *node_ed_id = NULL; - if (node && - node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node, 1) && - (node_ed_id = node_get_ed25519_id(node))) { - ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ec.ed_pubkey, node_ed_id); - } - } - - /* Next, check if we're being asked to connect to the hop that the - * extend cell came from. There isn't any reason for that, and it can - * assist circular-path attacks. */ - if (tor_memeq(ec.node_id, - TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan->identity_digest, - DIGEST_LEN)) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop."); - return -1; - } - - /* Check the previous hop Ed25519 ID too */ - if (! ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&ec.ed_pubkey) && - ed25519_pubkey_eq(&ec.ed_pubkey, - &TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan->ed25519_identity)) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop " - "(by Ed25519 ID)."); - return -1; - } - - n_chan = channel_get_for_extend((const char*)ec.node_id, - &ec.ed_pubkey, - &ec.orport_ipv4.addr, - &msg, - &should_launch); - - if (!n_chan) { - log_debug(LD_CIRC|LD_OR,"Next router (%s): %s", - fmt_addrport(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr,ec.orport_ipv4.port), - msg?msg:"????"); - - circ->n_hop = extend_info_new(NULL /*nickname*/, - (const char*)ec.node_id, - &ec.ed_pubkey, - NULL, /*onion_key*/ - NULL, /*curve25519_key*/ - &ec.orport_ipv4.addr, - ec.orport_ipv4.port); - - circ->n_chan_create_cell = tor_memdup(&ec.create_cell, - sizeof(ec.create_cell)); - - circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT); - - if (should_launch) { - /* we should try to open a connection */ - n_chan = channel_connect_for_circuit(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr, - ec.orport_ipv4.port, - (const char*)ec.node_id, - &ec.ed_pubkey); - if (!n_chan) { - log_info(LD_CIRC,"Launching n_chan failed. Closing circuit."); - circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED); - return 0; - } - log_debug(LD_CIRC,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good."); - } - /* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of - * automatically (may already have been) whenever n_chan reaches - * OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN. - */ - return 0; - } - - tor_assert(!circ->n_hop); /* Connection is already established. */ - circ->n_chan = n_chan; - log_debug(LD_CIRC, - "n_chan is %s", - channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(n_chan)); - - if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ, &ec.create_cell, 1) < 0) - return -1; - - return 0; -} - /** A "created" cell <b>reply</b> came back to us on circuit <b>circ</b>. * (The body of <b>reply</b> varies depending on what sort of handshake * this is.) @@ -1433,61 +1267,6 @@ circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason) #endif /* 0 */ } -/** Given a response payload and keys, initialize, then send a created - * cell back. - */ -int -onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ, - const created_cell_t *created_cell, - const char *keys, size_t keys_len, - const uint8_t *rend_circ_nonce) -{ - cell_t cell; - - tor_assert(keys_len == CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN); - - if (created_cell_format(&cell, created_cell) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG,"couldn't format created cell (type=%d, len=%d)", - (int)created_cell->cell_type, (int)created_cell->handshake_len); - return -1; - } - cell.circ_id = circ->p_circ_id; - - circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN); - - log_debug(LD_CIRC,"init digest forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.", - (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys), - (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys+20)); - if (relay_crypto_init(&circ->crypto, keys, keys_len, 0, 0)<0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG,"Circuit initialization failed"); - return -1; - } - - memcpy(circ->rend_circ_nonce, rend_circ_nonce, DIGEST_LEN); - - int used_create_fast = (created_cell->cell_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST); - - append_cell_to_circuit_queue(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), - circ->p_chan, &cell, CELL_DIRECTION_IN, 0); - log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Finished sending '%s' cell.", - used_create_fast ? "created_fast" : "created"); - - /* Ignore the local bit when ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses is set: - * it violates the assumption that private addresses are local. - * Also, many test networks run on local addresses, and - * TestingTorNetwork sets ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses. */ - if ((!channel_is_local(circ->p_chan) - || get_options()->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses) - && !channel_is_outgoing(circ->p_chan)) { - /* record that we could process create cells from a non-local conn - * that we didn't initiate; presumably this means that create cells - * can reach us too. */ - router_orport_found_reachable(); - } - - return 0; -} - /** Helper for new_route_len(). Choose a circuit length for purpose * <b>purpose</b>: DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN (+ 1 if someone else chose the * exit). If someone else chose the exit, they could be colluding diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h index 9a35c36ac..c66c0dc75 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h @@ -32,15 +32,10 @@ void circuit_n_chan_done(channel_t *chan, int status, int circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(const origin_circuit_t *circ); int circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ); void circuit_note_clock_jumped(int64_t seconds_elapsed, bool was_idle); -int circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ); struct created_cell_t; int circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, const struct created_cell_t *created_cell); int circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason); -int onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ, - const struct created_cell_t *created_cell, - const char *keys, size_t keys_len, - const uint8_t *rend_circ_nonce); MOCK_DECL(int, circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled, (time_t now, int *need_uptime, int *need_capacity)); @@ -76,6 +71,20 @@ const node_t *choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, struct circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_out); void circuit_upgrade_circuits_from_guard_wait(void); +struct ed25519_public_key_t; + +channel_t * +channel_connect_for_circuit(const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port, + const char *id_digest, + const struct ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id); +struct create_cell_t; + +int +circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, + const struct create_cell_t *create_cell, + int relayed); + #ifdef CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE STATIC circid_t get_unique_circ_id_by_chan(channel_t *chan); STATIC int new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei, diff --git a/src/core/or/command.c b/src/core/or/command.c index 9d946974b..8a1d2066c 100644 --- a/src/core/or/command.c +++ b/src/core/or/command.c @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ #include "feature/nodelist/describe.h" #include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h" #include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h" +#include "feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h" #include "feature/relay/routermode.h" #include "feature/stats/rephist.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" diff --git a/src/core/or/relay.c b/src/core/or/relay.c index 5ddabf347..00bbf77b9 100644 --- a/src/core/or/relay.c +++ b/src/core/or/relay.c @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" #include "feature/dircommon/directory.h" #include "feature/relay/dns.h" +#include "feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h" #include "feature/stats/geoip_stats.h" #include "feature/hs/hs_cache.h" #include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" diff --git a/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c b/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f167d0a8e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c @@ -0,0 +1,253 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * @file circuitbuild_relay.c + * @brief Implements the details of exteding circuits (by relaying extend + * cells as create cells, and answering create cells). + * + * On the server side, this module handles the logic of responding to + * RELAY_EXTEND requests, using circuit_extend() and onionskin_answer(). + * + * The shared client and server code is in core/or/circuitbuild.c. + **/ + +#include "orconfig.h" +#include "feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h" + +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "app/config/config.h" + +#include "core/crypto/relay_crypto.h" + +#include "core/or/cell_st.h" +#include "core/or/circuit_st.h" +#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h" +#include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h" + +#include "core/or/channel.h" +#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h" +#include "core/or/circuitlist.h" +#include "core/or/onion.h" +#include "core/or/relay.h" + +#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h" + +#include "feature/relay/routermode.h" +#include "feature/relay/selftest.h" + +/** Take the 'extend' <b>cell</b>, pull out addr/port plus the onion + * skin and identity digest for the next hop. If we're already connected, + * pass the onion skin to the next hop using a create cell; otherwise + * launch a new OR connection, and <b>circ</b> will notice when the + * connection succeeds or fails. + * + * Return -1 if we want to warn and tear down the circuit, else return 0. + */ +int +circuit_extend(struct cell_t *cell, struct circuit_t *circ) +{ + channel_t *n_chan; + relay_header_t rh; + extend_cell_t ec; + const char *msg = NULL; + int should_launch = 0; + + if (circ->n_chan) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "n_chan already set. Bug/attack. Closing."); + return -1; + } + if (circ->n_hop) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "conn to next hop already launched. Bug/attack. Closing."); + return -1; + } + + if (!server_mode(get_options())) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Got an extend cell, but running as a client. Closing."); + return -1; + } + + relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); + + if (extend_cell_parse(&ec, rh.command, + cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE, + rh.length) < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Can't parse extend cell. Closing circuit."); + return -1; + } + + if (!ec.orport_ipv4.port || tor_addr_is_null(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Client asked me to extend to zero destination port or addr."); + return -1; + } + + if (tor_addr_is_internal(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr, 0) && + !get_options()->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Client asked me to extend to a private address"); + return -1; + } + + /* Check if they asked us for 0000..0000. We support using + * an empty fingerprint for the first hop (e.g. for a bridge relay), + * but we don't want to let clients send us extend cells for empty + * fingerprints -- a) because it opens the user up to a mitm attack, + * and b) because it lets an attacker force the relay to hold open a + * new TLS connection for each extend request. */ + if (tor_digest_is_zero((const char*)ec.node_id)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Client asked me to extend without specifying an id_digest."); + return -1; + } + + /* Fill in ed_pubkey if it was not provided and we can infer it from + * our networkstatus */ + if (ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&ec.ed_pubkey)) { + const node_t *node = node_get_by_id((const char*)ec.node_id); + const ed25519_public_key_t *node_ed_id = NULL; + if (node && + node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node, 1) && + (node_ed_id = node_get_ed25519_id(node))) { + ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ec.ed_pubkey, node_ed_id); + } + } + + /* Next, check if we're being asked to connect to the hop that the + * extend cell came from. There isn't any reason for that, and it can + * assist circular-path attacks. */ + if (tor_memeq(ec.node_id, + TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan->identity_digest, + DIGEST_LEN)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop."); + return -1; + } + + /* Check the previous hop Ed25519 ID too */ + if (! ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&ec.ed_pubkey) && + ed25519_pubkey_eq(&ec.ed_pubkey, + &TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan->ed25519_identity)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop " + "(by Ed25519 ID)."); + return -1; + } + + n_chan = channel_get_for_extend((const char*)ec.node_id, + &ec.ed_pubkey, + &ec.orport_ipv4.addr, + &msg, + &should_launch); + + if (!n_chan) { + log_debug(LD_CIRC|LD_OR,"Next router (%s): %s", + fmt_addrport(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr,ec.orport_ipv4.port), + msg?msg:"????"); + + circ->n_hop = extend_info_new(NULL /*nickname*/, + (const char*)ec.node_id, + &ec.ed_pubkey, + NULL, /*onion_key*/ + NULL, /*curve25519_key*/ + &ec.orport_ipv4.addr, + ec.orport_ipv4.port); + + circ->n_chan_create_cell = tor_memdup(&ec.create_cell, + sizeof(ec.create_cell)); + + circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT); + + if (should_launch) { + /* we should try to open a connection */ + n_chan = channel_connect_for_circuit(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr, + ec.orport_ipv4.port, + (const char*)ec.node_id, + &ec.ed_pubkey); + if (!n_chan) { + log_info(LD_CIRC,"Launching n_chan failed. Closing circuit."); + circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED); + return 0; + } + log_debug(LD_CIRC,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good."); + } + /* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of + * automatically (may already have been) whenever n_chan reaches + * OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN. + */ + return 0; + } + + tor_assert(!circ->n_hop); /* Connection is already established. */ + circ->n_chan = n_chan; + log_debug(LD_CIRC, + "n_chan is %s", + channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(n_chan)); + + if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ, &ec.create_cell, 1) < 0) + return -1; + + return 0; +} + +/** Given a response payload and keys, initialize, then send a created + * cell back. + */ +int +onionskin_answer(struct or_circuit_t *circ, + const created_cell_t *created_cell, + const char *keys, size_t keys_len, + const uint8_t *rend_circ_nonce) +{ + cell_t cell; + + tor_assert(keys_len == CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN); + + if (created_cell_format(&cell, created_cell) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG,"couldn't format created cell (type=%d, len=%d)", + (int)created_cell->cell_type, (int)created_cell->handshake_len); + return -1; + } + cell.circ_id = circ->p_circ_id; + + circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN); + + log_debug(LD_CIRC,"init digest forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.", + (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys), + (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys+20)); + if (relay_crypto_init(&circ->crypto, keys, keys_len, 0, 0)<0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Circuit initialization failed"); + return -1; + } + + memcpy(circ->rend_circ_nonce, rend_circ_nonce, DIGEST_LEN); + + int used_create_fast = (created_cell->cell_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST); + + append_cell_to_circuit_queue(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), + circ->p_chan, &cell, CELL_DIRECTION_IN, 0); + log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Finished sending '%s' cell.", + used_create_fast ? "created_fast" : "created"); + + /* Ignore the local bit when ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses is set: + * it violates the assumption that private addresses are local. + * Also, many test networks run on local addresses, and + * TestingTorNetwork sets ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses. */ + if ((!channel_is_local(circ->p_chan) + || get_options()->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses) + && !channel_is_outgoing(circ->p_chan)) { + /* record that we could process create cells from a non-local conn + * that we didn't initiate; presumably this means that create cells + * can reach us too. */ + router_orport_found_reachable(); + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h b/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..decc28d3a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * @file circuitbuild_relay.h + * @brief Header for feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_CIRCUITBUILD_RELAY_H +#define TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_CIRCUITBUILD_RELAY_H + +#include "lib/cc/torint.h" + +struct cell_t; +struct created_cell_t; + +struct circuit_t; +struct or_circuit_t; + +#ifdef HAVE_MODULE_RELAY + +int circuit_extend(struct cell_t *cell, struct circuit_t *circ); + +int onionskin_answer(struct or_circuit_t *circ, + const struct created_cell_t *created_cell, + const char *keys, size_t keys_len, + const uint8_t *rend_circ_nonce); + +#else + +static inline int +circuit_extend(struct cell_t *cell, struct circuit_t *circ) +{ + (void)cell; + (void)circ; + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); + return -1; +} + +static inline int +onionskin_answer(struct or_circuit_t *circ, + const struct created_cell_t *created_cell, + const char *keys, size_t keys_len, + const uint8_t *rend_circ_nonce) +{ + (void)circ; + (void)created_cell; + (void)keys; + (void)keys_len; + (void)rend_circ_nonce; + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); + return -1; +} + +#endif + +#endif /* !defined(TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_CIRCUITBUILD_RELAY_H) */ diff --git a/src/feature/relay/include.am b/src/feature/relay/include.am index 813ddb8fb..654432c34 100644 --- a/src/feature/relay/include.am +++ b/src/feature/relay/include.am @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES += \ # ADD_C_FILE: INSERT SOURCES HERE. MODULE_RELAY_SOURCES = \ + src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c \ src/feature/relay/dns.c \ src/feature/relay/ext_orport.c \ src/feature/relay/routermode.c \ @@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ MODULE_RELAY_SOURCES = \ # ADD_C_FILE: INSERT HEADERS HERE. noinst_HEADERS += \ + src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h \ src/feature/relay/dns.h \ src/feature/relay/dns_structs.h \ src/feature/relay/ext_orport.h \