commit 609065f165a8e145f404e55e01e8f5ac5c013bc3 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> Date: Mon Jan 2 14:55:39 2017 -0500 DefecTor countermeasure: change server- and client-side DNS TTL clipping The server-side clipping now clamps to one of two values, both for what to report, and how long to cache. Additionally, we move some defines to dns.h, and give them better names. --- changes/ticket19769 | 7 +++++++ src/or/dns.c | 30 ++++++++++-------------------- src/or/dns.h | 14 ++++++++++++-- src/or/or.h | 12 ------------ src/test/test_dns.c | 28 ++++------------------------ 5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket19769 b/changes/ticket19769 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9fc05c3e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket19769 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Major features (security): + - Change the algorithm used to decide DNS TTLs on client and server side, + to better resist DNS-based correlation attacks like the DefecTor attack + of Greschbach, Pulls, Roberts, Winter, and Feamster). Now + relays only return one of two possible DNS TTL values, and clients + are willing to believe DNS TTL values up to 3 hours long. + Closes ticket 19769. diff --git a/src/or/dns.c b/src/or/dns.c index 5f9813b91..41a6dfd0a 100644 --- a/src/or/dns.c +++ b/src/or/dns.c @@ -243,29 +243,19 @@ has_dns_init_failed(void) } /** Helper: Given a TTL from a DNS response, determine what TTL to give the - * OP that asked us to resolve it. */ + * OP that asked us to resolve it, and how long to cache that record + * ourselves. */ uint32_t dns_clip_ttl(uint32_t ttl) { - if (ttl < MIN_DNS_TTL) - return MIN_DNS_TTL; - else if (ttl > MAX_DNS_TTL) - return MAX_DNS_TTL; - else - return ttl; -} - -/** Helper: Given a TTL from a DNS response, determine how long to hold it in - * our cache. */ -STATIC uint32_t -dns_get_expiry_ttl(uint32_t ttl) -{ - if (ttl < MIN_DNS_TTL) - return MIN_DNS_TTL; - else if (ttl > MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE) - return MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE; + /* This logic is a defense against "DefectTor" DNS-based traffic + * confirmation attacks, as in https://nymity.ch/tor-dns/tor-dns.pdf . + * We only give two values: a "low" value and a "high" value. + */ + if (ttl < MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT) + return MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT; else - return ttl; + return MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT; } /** Helper: free storage held by an entry in the DNS cache. */ @@ -1317,7 +1307,7 @@ make_pending_resolve_cached(cached_resolve_t *resolve) resolve->ttl_hostname < ttl) ttl = resolve->ttl_hostname; - set_expiry(new_resolve, time(NULL) + dns_get_expiry_ttl(ttl)); + set_expiry(new_resolve, time(NULL) + dns_clip_ttl(ttl)); } assert_cache_ok(); diff --git a/src/or/dns.h b/src/or/dns.h index b14f7dd29..951a2a346 100644 --- a/src/or/dns.h +++ b/src/or/dns.h @@ -12,6 +12,18 @@ #ifndef TOR_DNS_H #define TOR_DNS_H +/** Lowest value for DNS ttl that a server will give. */ +#define MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT (5*60) +/** Highest value for DNS ttl that a server will give. */ +#define MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT (60*60) + +/** How long do we keep DNS cache entries before purging them (regardless of + * their TTL)? */ +#define MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE (3*60*60) +/** How long do we cache/tell clients to cache DNS records when no TTL is + * known? */ +#define DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30*60) + int dns_init(void); int has_dns_init_failed(void); void dns_free_all(void); @@ -31,8 +43,6 @@ void dump_dns_mem_usage(int severity); #ifdef DNS_PRIVATE #include "dns_structs.h" -STATIC uint32_t dns_get_expiry_ttl(uint32_t ttl); - MOCK_DECL(STATIC int,dns_resolve_impl,(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve,or_circuit_t *oncirc, char **hostname_out, int *made_connection_pending_out, cached_resolve_t **resolve_out)); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 66717792b..e48cd92f0 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -143,18 +143,6 @@ /** Maximum size of a single extrainfo document, as above. */ #define MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE 50000 -/** How long do we keep DNS cache entries before purging them (regardless of - * their TTL)? */ -#define MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE (30*60) -/** How long do we cache/tell clients to cache DNS records when no TTL is - * known? */ -#define DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30*60) -/** How long can a TTL be before we stop believing it? */ -#define MAX_DNS_TTL (3*60*60) -/** How small can a TTL be before we stop believing it? Provides rudimentary - * pinning. */ -#define MIN_DNS_TTL 60 - /** How often do we rotate onion keys? */ #define MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME (7*24*60*60) /** How often do we rotate TLS contexts? */ diff --git a/src/test/test_dns.c b/src/test/test_dns.c index 8346c0a33..6a8e92cb4 100644 --- a/src/test/test_dns.c +++ b/src/test/test_dns.c @@ -16,30 +16,11 @@ NS(test_main)(void *arg) { (void)arg; - uint32_t ttl_mid = MIN_DNS_TTL / 2 + MAX_DNS_TTL / 2; + uint32_t ttl_mid = MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT / 2 + MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT / 2; - tt_int_op(dns_clip_ttl(MIN_DNS_TTL - 1),==,MIN_DNS_TTL); - tt_int_op(dns_clip_ttl(ttl_mid),==,ttl_mid); - tt_int_op(dns_clip_ttl(MAX_DNS_TTL + 1),==,MAX_DNS_TTL); - - done: - return; -} - -#undef NS_SUBMODULE - -#define NS_SUBMODULE expiry_ttl - -static void -NS(test_main)(void *arg) -{ - (void)arg; - - uint32_t ttl_mid = MIN_DNS_TTL / 2 + MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE / 2; - - tt_int_op(dns_get_expiry_ttl(MIN_DNS_TTL - 1),==,MIN_DNS_TTL); - tt_int_op(dns_get_expiry_ttl(ttl_mid),==,ttl_mid); - tt_int_op(dns_get_expiry_ttl(MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE + 1),==,MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE); + tt_int_op(dns_clip_ttl(MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT - 1),==,MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT); + tt_int_op(dns_clip_ttl(ttl_mid),==,MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT); + tt_int_op(dns_clip_ttl(MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT + 1),==,MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT); done: return; @@ -749,7 +730,6 @@ NS(test_main)(void *arg) struct testcase_t dns_tests[] = { TEST_CASE(clip_ttl), - TEST_CASE(expiry_ttl), TEST_CASE(resolve), TEST_CASE_ASPECT(resolve_impl, addr_is_ip_no_need_to_resolve), TEST_CASE_ASPECT(resolve_impl, non_exit),