commit fd3e0c154236c59c2972b549500675980bb02507 Author: cypherpunks <cypherpunks@torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 3 07:01:05 2020 +0000 core/mainloop: Limit growth of conn->inbuf If the buf_t's length could potentially become greater than INT_MAX - 1, it sets off an IF_BUG_ONCE in buf_read_from_tls(). All of the rest of the buffers.c code has similar BUG/asserts for this invariant. --- changes/bug33131 | 3 +++ src/core/mainloop/connection.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug33131 b/changes/bug33131 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bc5ef7bc2 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug33131 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (mainloop): + - Better guard against growing a buffer past its maximum 2GB in size. + Fixes bug 33131; bugfix on 0.3.0.4-rc. diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/connection.c b/src/core/mainloop/connection.c index 3595bba85..3c8527dd5 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/connection.c +++ b/src/core/mainloop/connection.c @@ -3684,6 +3684,15 @@ connection_buf_read_from_socket(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, at_most = connection_bucket_read_limit(conn, approx_time()); } + /* Do not allow inbuf to grow past INT_MAX - 1. */ + const ssize_t maximum = INT_MAX - 1 - buf_datalen(conn->inbuf); + if (at_most > maximum) { + log_debug(LD_NET, "%d: inbuf_datalen=%"TOR_PRIuSZ", adding %" + TOR_PRIdSZ" might overflow.", + (int)conn->s, buf_datalen(conn->inbuf), at_most); + at_most = maximum; + } + slack_in_buf = buf_slack(conn->inbuf); again: if ((size_t)at_most > slack_in_buf && slack_in_buf >= 1024) {