commit 7ba7b2ca764422232e534d84ec7c87373e0769af Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Fri Nov 20 22:34:34 2015 -0500

Give rend-single-onion a number (260) --- proposals/000-index.txt | 2 + proposals/260-rend-single-onion.txt | 460 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ proposals/ideas/xxx-rend-single-onion.txt | 460 ----------------------------- 3 files changed, 462 insertions(+), 460 deletions(-)

diff --git a/proposals/000-index.txt b/proposals/000-index.txt index 871dfcb..8dcbe26 100644 --- a/proposals/000-index.txt +++ b/proposals/000-index.txt @@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ Proposals by number: 257 Refactoring authorities and taking parts offline [DRAFT] 258 Denial-of-service resistance for directory authorities [OPEN] 259 New Guard Selection Behaviour [DRAFT] +260 Rendezvous Single Onion Services [DRAFT]

Proposals by status: @@ -205,6 +206,7 @@ Proposals by status: 255 Controller features to allow for load-balancing hidden services 257 Refactoring authorities and taking parts offline 259 New Guard Selection Behaviour + 260 Rendezvous Single Onion Services NEEDS-REVISION: 190 Bridge Client Authorization Based on a Shared Secret OPEN: diff --git a/proposals/260-rend-single-onion.txt b/proposals/260-rend-single-onion.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc01551 --- /dev/null +++ b/proposals/260-rend-single-onion.txt @@ -0,0 +1,460 @@ +Filename: 260-rend-single-onion.txt +Title: Rendezvous Single Onion Services +Author: Tim Wilson-Brown, John Brooks, Aaron Johnson, Rob Jansen, George Kadianakis, Paul Syverson, Roger Dingledine +Created: 2015-10-17 +Status: Draft + +1. Overview + + Rendezvous single onion services are an alternative design for single onion + services, which trade service-side location privacy for improved + performance, reliability, and scalability. + + Rendezvous single onion services have a .onion address identical to any + other onion service. The descriptor contains the same information as the + existing double onion (hidden) service descriptors. The introduction point + and rendezvous protocols occur as in double onion services, with one + modification: one-hop connections are made from the onion server to the + introduction and rendezvous points. + + This proposal is a revision of the unnumbered proposal Direct Onion + Services: Fast-but-not-hidden services by Roger Dingledine, and George + Kadianakis at + https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-April/008625.html + + It incorporates much of the discussion around hidden services since April + 2015, including content from Single Onion Services (Proposal #252) by John + Brooks, Paul Syverson, and Roger Dingledine. + +2. Motivation + + Rendezvous single onion services are best used by sites which: + * Don’t require location anonymity + * Would appreciate lower latency or self-authenticated addresses + * Would like to work with existing tor clients and relays + * Can’t accept connections to an open ORPort + + Rendezvous single onion services have a few benefits over double onion + services: + + * Connection latency is lower, as one-hop circuits are built to the + introduction and rendezvous points, rather than three-hop circuits + * Stream latency is reduced on a four-hop circuit + * Less Tor network capacity is consumed by the service, as there are + fewer hops (4 rather than 6) between the client and server via the + rendezvous point + + Rendezvous single onion services have a few benefits over single onion + services: + + * A rendezvous single onion service can load-balance over multiple + rendezvous backends (see proposal #255) + * A rendezvous single onion service doesn't need an accessible ORPort + (it works behind a NAT, and in server enclaves that only allow + outward connections) + * A rendezvous single onion service is compatible with existing tor + clients, hidden service directories, introduction points, and + rendezvous points + + Rendezvous single onion services have a few drawbacks over single onion + services: + + * Connection latency is higher, as one-hop circuits are built to the + introduction and rendezvous points. Single onion services perform one + extend to the single onion service’s ORPort only + + It should also be noted that, while single onion services receive many + incoming connections from different relays, rendezvous single onion + services make many outgoing connections to different relays. This should + be taken into account when planning the connection capacity of the + infrastructure supporting the onion service. + + Rendezvous single onion services are not location hidden on the service + side, but clients retain all of the benefits and privacy of onion + services. (The rationale for the 'single' and 'double' nomenclature is + described in section 7.4 of proposal #252.) + + We believe that it is important for the Tor community to be aware of the + alternative single onion service designs, so that we can reach consensus + on the features and tradeoffs of each design. However, we recognise that + each additional flavour of onion service splits the anonymity set of onion + service users. Therefore, it may be best for user anonymity that not all + designs are adopted, or that mitigations are implemented along with each + additional flavour. (See sections 8 & 9 for a further discussion.) + +3. Onion descriptors + + The rendezvous single onion descriptor format is identical to the double + onion descriptor format. + +4. Reaching a rendezvous single onion service as a client + + Clients reach rendezvous single onion services in an identical fashion + to double onion services. The rendezvous design means that clients do not + know whether they are talking to a double or rendezvous single onion + service, unless that service tells them. (This may be a security issue.) + + However, the use of a four-hop path between client and rendezvous single + onion service may be statistically distinguishable. (See section 8 for + further discussion of security issues.) + + (Please note that this proposal follows the hop counting conventions in the + tor source code. A circuit with a single connections between the client and + the endpoint is one-hop, a circuit with 4 connections (and 3 nodes) between + the client and endpoint is four-hop.) + +5. Publishing a rendezvous single onion service + + To act as a rendezvous single onion service, a tor instance (or cooperating + group of tor instances) must: + + * Publish onion descriptors in the same manner as any onion service, + using three-hop circuits. This avoids service blocking by IP address, + proposal #224 (next-generation hidden services) avoids blocking by + onion address. + * Perform the rendezvous protocol in the same manner as a double + onion service, but make the intro and rendezvous connections one-hop. + (This may allow intro and rendezvous points to block the service.) + +5.1. Configuration options + +5.1.1 RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer + + The tor instance operating a rendezvous single onion service must make + one-hop circuits to the introduction and rendezvous points: + + RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer 0|1 + If set, make one-hop circuits between the Rendezvous Single Onion + Service server, and the introduction and rendezvous points. This + option makes every onion service instance hosted by this tor instance + a Rendezvous Single Onion Service. (Default: 0) + + Because of the grave consequences of misconfiguration here, we have added + ‘NonAnonymous’ to the name of the torrc option. Furthermore, Tor MUST issue + a startup warning message to operators of the onion service if this feature + is enabled. + [Should the name start with ‘NonAnonymous’ instead?] + + As RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer modifies the behaviour + of every onion service on a tor instance, it is impossible to run hidden + (double onion) services and rendezvous single onion services on the same + tor instance. This is considered a feature, as it prevents hidden services + from being discovered via rendezvous single onion services on the same tor + instance. + +5.1.2 Recommended Additional Options: Correctness + + Based on the experiences of Tor2Web with one-hop paths, operators should + consider using the following options with every rendezvous single onion + service, and every single onion service: + + UseEntryGuards 0 + One-hop paths do not use entry guards. This also deactivates the entry + guard pathbias code, which is not compatible with one-hop paths. Entry + guards are a security measure against Sybil attacks. Unfortunately, + they also act as the bottleneck of busy onion services and overload + those Tor relays. + + LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0 + Learning circuit build timeouts is incompatible with one-hop paths. + It also creates additional, unnecessary connections. + + Perhaps these options should be set automatically on (rendezvous) single + onion services. Tor2Web sets these options automatically: + UseEntryGuards 0 + LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0 + +5.1.3 Recommended Additional Options: Performance + + LongLivedPorts + The default LongLivedPorts setting creates additional, unnecessary + connections. This specifies no long-lived ports (the empty list). + + PredictedPortsRelevanceTime 0 seconds + The default PredictedPortsRelevanceTime setting creates additional, + unnecessary connections. + + High-churn / quick-failover RSOS using descriptor competition strategies + should consider setting the following option: + + RendPostPeriod 600 seconds + Refresh onion service descriptors, choosing an interval between + 0 and 2*RendPostPeriod. Tor also posts descriptors on bootstrap, and + when they change. + (Strictly, 30 seconds after they first change, for descriptor + stability.) + + XX - Reduce the minimum RendPostPeriod for RSOS to 1 minute? + XX - Make the initial post 30 + rand(1*rendpostperiod) ? + (Avoid thundering herd, but don't hide startup time) + + However, we do NOT recommend setting the following option to 1, unless bug + #17359 is resolved so tor onion services can bootstrap without predicted + circuits. + + __DisablePredictedCircuits 0 + This option disables all predicted circuits. It is equivalent to: + LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0 + LongLivedPorts + PredictedPortsRelevanceTime 0 seconds + And turning off hidden service server preemptive circuits, which is + currently unimplemented (#17360) + +5.1.3 Recommended Additional Options: Security + + We recommend that no other services are run on a rendezvous single onion + service tor instance. Since tor runs as a client (and not a relay) by + default, rendezvous single onion service operators should set: + + XX - George says we don't allow operators to run HS/Relay any more, + or that we warn them. + + SocksPort 0 + Disallow connections from client applications to the tor network + via this tor instance. + + ClientOnly 1 + Even if the defaults file configures this instance to be a relay, + never relay any traffic or serve any descriptors. + +5.2. Publishing descriptors + + A single onion service must publish descriptors in the same manner as any + onion service, as defined by rend-spec. + +5.3. Authorization + + Client authorization for a rendezvous single onion service is possible via + the same methods used for double onion services. + +6. Related Proposals, Tools, and Features + +6.1. Load balancing + + High capacity services can distribute load and implement failover by: + * running multiple instances that publish to the same onion service + directories, + * publishing descriptors containing multiple introduction points + (OnionBalance), + * publishing different introduction points to different onion service + directories (OnionBalance upcoming(?) feature), + * handing off rendezvous to a different tor instance via control port + messages (proposal #255), + or by a combination of these methods. + +6.2. Ephemeral single onion services (ADD_ONION) + + The ADD_ONION control port command could be extended to support ephemerally + configured rendezvous single onion services. Given that + RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer modifies the behaviour of + all onion services on a tor instance, if it is set, any ephemerally + configured onion service should become a rendezvous single onion service. + +6.3. Proposal 224 ("Next-Generation Hidden Services") + + This proposal is compatible with proposal 224, with onion services + acting just like a next-generation hidden service, but making one-hop + paths to the introduction and rendezvous points. + +6.4. Proposal 246 ("Merging Hidden Service Directories and Intro Points") + + This proposal is compatible with proposal 246. The onion service will + publish its descriptor to the introduction points in the same manner as any + other onion service. Clients will use the merged hidden service directory + and introduction point just as they do for other onion services. + +6.5. Proposal 252 ("Single Onion Services") + + This proposal is compatible with proposal 252. The onion service will + publish its descriptor to the introduction points in the same manner as any + other onion service. Clients can then choose to extend to the single onion + service, or continue with the rendezvous protocol. + + Running a rendezvous single onion service and single onion service allows + older clients to connect via rendezvous, and newer clients to connenct via + extend. This is useful for the transition period where not all clients + support single onion services. + +6.5. Proposal 255 ("Hidden Service Load Balancing") + + This proposal is compatible with proposal 255. The onion service will + perform the rendezvous protocol in the same manner as any other onion + service. Controllers can then choose to handoff the rendezvous point + connection to another tor instance, which should also be configured + as a rendezvous single onion service. + +7. Considerations + +7.1 Modifying RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer at runtime + + Implementations should not reuse introduction points or introduction point + circuits if the value of RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer is + different than it was when the introduction point was selected. This is + because these circuits will have an undesirable length. + + There is specific code in tor that preserves introduction points on a HUP, + if RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer has changed, all circuits + should be closed, and all introduction points must be discarded. + +7.2 Delaying connection expiry + + Tor clients typically expire connections much faster than tor relays + [citation needed]. + + (Rendezvous) single onion service operators may find that keeping + connections open saves on connection latency. However, it may also place an + additional load on the service. (This could be implemented by increasing the + configured connection expiry time.) + +7.3. (No) Benefit to also running a Tor relay + + In tor Trac ticket #8742, running a relay and hidden onion service on the + same tor instance was disabled for security reasons. While there may be + benefits to running a relay on the same instance as a rendezvous single + onion service (existing connections mean lower latency, it helps the tor + network overall), a security analysis of this configuration has not yet + been performed. In addition, a potential drawback is overloading a busy + single onion service. + +6.4 Predicted circuits + + We should look whether we can optimize further the predicted circuits that + Tor makes as a onion service for this mode. + +8. Security Implications + +8.1 Splitting the Anonymity Set + + Each additional flavour of onion service, and each additional externally + visible onion service feature, provides oportunities for fingerprinting. + + Also, each additional type of onion service shrinks the anonymity set for + users of double onion (hidden) services who require server location + anonymity. These users benefit from the cover provided by current users of + onion services, who use them for client anonymity, self-authentication, + NAT-punching, or other benefits. + + For this reason, features that shrink the double onion service anonymity + set should be carefully considered. The benefits and drawbacks of + additional features also often depend on a particular threat model. + + It may be that a significant number of users and sites adopt (rendezvous) + single onion services due to their benefits. This could increase the + traffic on the tor network, therefore increasing anonymity overall. + However, the unique behaviour of each type of onion service may still be + distinguishable from both the client and server ends of the connection. + +8.2 Hidden Service Designs can potentially be more secure + + As a side-effect, by optimizing for performance in this feature, it + allows us to lean more heavily towards security decisions for + regular onion services. + +8.3 One-hop onion service paths may encourage more attacks + + There's a possible second-order effect here since both encrypted + services and hidden services will have foo.onion addresses and it's + not clear based on the address whether the service will be hidden -- + if *some* .onion addresses are easy to track down, are we encouraging + adversaries to attack all rendezvous points just in case? + +9. Further Work + +Further proposals or research could attempt to mitigate the anonymity-set +splitting described in section 8. Here are some initial ideas. + +9.1 Making Client Exit connections look like Client Onion Service Connections + + A mitigation to this fingerprinting is to make each (or some) exit + connections look like onion service connections. This provides cover for + particular types of onion service connections. Unfortunately, it is not + possible to make onion service connections look like exit connections, + as there are no suitable dummy servers to exit to on the Internet. + +9.1.1 Making Client Exit connections perform Descriptor Downloads + + (Some) exit connections could perform a dummy descriptor download. + (However, descriptors for recently accessed onion services are cached, so + dummy downloads should only be performed occasionally.) + + Exit connections already involve a four-hop "circuit" to the server + (including the connection between the exit and the server on the Internet). + The server on the Internet is not included in the consensus. Therefore, + this mitigation would effectively cover single onion services which are not + relays. + +9.1.2 Making Client Exit connections perform the Rendezvous Protocol + + (Some) exit connections could perform a dummy rendezvous protocol. + + Exit connections already involve a four-hop "circuit" to the server + (including the connection between the exit and the server on the Internet). + Therefore, this mitigation would effectively cover rendezvous single onion + services, as long as a dummy descriptor download was also performed + occasionally. + +9.1.3 Making Single Onion Service rendezvous points perform name resolution + + Currently, Exits perform DNS name resolution, and changing this behaviour + would cause unacceptable connection latency. Therefore, we could make + onion service connections look like exit connections by making the + rendezvous point do name resolution (that is, descriptor fetching), and, if + needed, the introduction part of the protocol. This could potentially + *reduce* the latency of single onion service connections, depending on the + length of the paths used by the rendezvous point. + + However, this change makes rendezvous points almost as powerful as Exits, + a careful security analysis will need to be performed before this is + implemented. + + There is also a design issue with rendezvous name resolution: a client + wants to leave resolution (descriptor download) to the RP, but it doesn't + know whether it can use the exit-like protocol with an RP until it has + downloaded the descriptor. This might mean that single onion services of + both flavours need a different address style or address namespace. We could + use .single.onion or something. (This would require an update to the HSDir + code.) + +9.2 Performing automated and common queries over onion services + + Tor could create cover traffic for a flavour of onion service by performing + automated or common queries via an onion service of that type. In addition, + onion service-based checks have security benefits over DNS-based checks. + See Genuine Onion, Syverson and Boyce, 2015, at + http://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/chacs/syverson-genuine-onion-simple-fast-flexibl... + + Here are some examples of automated queries that could be performed over + an onion service: + +9.2.1 torcheck over onion service + + torcheck ("Congratulations! This browser is configured to use Tor.") could + be retrieved from an onion service. + + Incidentally, this would resolve the exitmap issues in #17297, but it + would also fail to check that exit connections work, which is important for + many Tor Browser users. + +9.2.2 Tor Browser version checks over onion service + + Running tor browser version checks over an onion service seems to be an + excellent use-case for onion services. It would also have the Tor Project + "eating its own dogfood", that is, using onion services for its essential + services. + +9.2.3 Tor Browser downloads over onion service + + Running tor browser downloads over an onion service might require some work + on the onion service codebase to support high loads, load-balancing, and + failover. It is a good use case for a (rendezvous) single onion service, + as the traffic over the tor network is only slightly higher than for + Tor Browser downloads over tor. (4 hops for [R]SOS, 3 hops for Exit.) + +9.2.4 SSL Observatory submissions over onion service + + HTTPS certificates could be submitted to HTTPS Everywhere's SSL Observatory + over an onion service. + + This option is disabled in Tor Browser by default. Perhaps some users would + be more comfortable enabling submission over an onion service, due to the + additional security benefits. diff --git a/proposals/ideas/xxx-rend-single-onion.txt b/proposals/ideas/xxx-rend-single-onion.txt deleted file mode 100644 index d402618..0000000 --- a/proposals/ideas/xxx-rend-single-onion.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,460 +0,0 @@ -Filename: xxx-rend-single-onion.txt -Title: Rendezvous Single Onion Services -Author: Tim Wilson-Brown, John Brooks, Aaron Johnson, Rob Jansen, George Kadianakis, Paul Syverson, Roger Dingledine -Created: 2015-10-17 -Status: Draft - -1. Overview - - Rendezvous single onion services are an alternative design for single onion - services, which trade service-side location privacy for improved - performance, reliability, and scalability. - - Rendezvous single onion services have a .onion address identical to any - other onion service. The descriptor contains the same information as the - existing double onion (hidden) service descriptors. The introduction point - and rendezvous protocols occur as in double onion services, with one - modification: one-hop connections are made from the onion server to the - introduction and rendezvous points. - - This proposal is a revision of the unnumbered proposal Direct Onion - Services: Fast-but-not-hidden services by Roger Dingledine, and George - Kadianakis at - https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-April/008625.html - - It incorporates much of the discussion around hidden services since April - 2015, including content from Single Onion Services (Proposal #252) by John - Brooks, Paul Syverson, and Roger Dingledine. - -2. Motivation - - Rendezvous single onion services are best used by sites which: - * Don’t require location anonymity - * Would appreciate lower latency or self-authenticated addresses - * Would like to work with existing tor clients and relays - * Can’t accept connections to an open ORPort - - Rendezvous single onion services have a few benefits over double onion - services: - - * Connection latency is lower, as one-hop circuits are built to the - introduction and rendezvous points, rather than three-hop circuits - * Stream latency is reduced on a four-hop circuit - * Less Tor network capacity is consumed by the service, as there are - fewer hops (4 rather than 6) between the client and server via the - rendezvous point - - Rendezvous single onion services have a few benefits over single onion - services: - - * A rendezvous single onion service can load-balance over multiple - rendezvous backends (see proposal #255) - * A rendezvous single onion service doesn't need an accessible ORPort - (it works behind a NAT, and in server enclaves that only allow - outward connections) - * A rendezvous single onion service is compatible with existing tor - clients, hidden service directories, introduction points, and - rendezvous points - - Rendezvous single onion services have a few drawbacks over single onion - services: - - * Connection latency is higher, as one-hop circuits are built to the - introduction and rendezvous points. Single onion services perform one - extend to the single onion service’s ORPort only - - It should also be noted that, while single onion services receive many - incoming connections from different relays, rendezvous single onion - services make many outgoing connections to different relays. This should - be taken into account when planning the connection capacity of the - infrastructure supporting the onion service. - - Rendezvous single onion services are not location hidden on the service - side, but clients retain all of the benefits and privacy of onion - services. (The rationale for the 'single' and 'double' nomenclature is - described in section 7.4 of proposal #252.) - - We believe that it is important for the Tor community to be aware of the - alternative single onion service designs, so that we can reach consensus - on the features and tradeoffs of each design. However, we recognise that - each additional flavour of onion service splits the anonymity set of onion - service users. Therefore, it may be best for user anonymity that not all - designs are adopted, or that mitigations are implemented along with each - additional flavour. (See sections 8 & 9 for a further discussion.) - -3. Onion descriptors - - The rendezvous single onion descriptor format is identical to the double - onion descriptor format. - -4. Reaching a rendezvous single onion service as a client - - Clients reach rendezvous single onion services in an identical fashion - to double onion services. The rendezvous design means that clients do not - know whether they are talking to a double or rendezvous single onion - service, unless that service tells them. (This may be a security issue.) - - However, the use of a four-hop path between client and rendezvous single - onion service may be statistically distinguishable. (See section 8 for - further discussion of security issues.) - - (Please note that this proposal follows the hop counting conventions in the - tor source code. A circuit with a single connections between the client and - the endpoint is one-hop, a circuit with 4 connections (and 3 nodes) between - the client and endpoint is four-hop.) - -5. Publishing a rendezvous single onion service - - To act as a rendezvous single onion service, a tor instance (or cooperating - group of tor instances) must: - - * Publish onion descriptors in the same manner as any onion service, - using three-hop circuits. This avoids service blocking by IP address, - proposal #224 (next-generation hidden services) avoids blocking by - onion address. - * Perform the rendezvous protocol in the same manner as a double - onion service, but make the intro and rendezvous connections one-hop. - (This may allow intro and rendezvous points to block the service.) - -5.1. Configuration options - -5.1.1 RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer - - The tor instance operating a rendezvous single onion service must make - one-hop circuits to the introduction and rendezvous points: - - RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer 0|1 - If set, make one-hop circuits between the Rendezvous Single Onion - Service server, and the introduction and rendezvous points. This - option makes every onion service instance hosted by this tor instance - a Rendezvous Single Onion Service. (Default: 0) - - Because of the grave consequences of misconfiguration here, we have added - ‘NonAnonymous’ to the name of the torrc option. Furthermore, Tor MUST issue - a startup warning message to operators of the onion service if this feature - is enabled. - [Should the name start with ‘NonAnonymous’ instead?] - - As RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer modifies the behaviour - of every onion service on a tor instance, it is impossible to run hidden - (double onion) services and rendezvous single onion services on the same - tor instance. This is considered a feature, as it prevents hidden services - from being discovered via rendezvous single onion services on the same tor - instance. - -5.1.2 Recommended Additional Options: Correctness - - Based on the experiences of Tor2Web with one-hop paths, operators should - consider using the following options with every rendezvous single onion - service, and every single onion service: - - UseEntryGuards 0 - One-hop paths do not use entry guards. This also deactivates the entry - guard pathbias code, which is not compatible with one-hop paths. Entry - guards are a security measure against Sybil attacks. Unfortunately, - they also act as the bottleneck of busy onion services and overload - those Tor relays. - - LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0 - Learning circuit build timeouts is incompatible with one-hop paths. - It also creates additional, unnecessary connections. - - Perhaps these options should be set automatically on (rendezvous) single - onion services. Tor2Web sets these options automatically: - UseEntryGuards 0 - LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0 - -5.1.3 Recommended Additional Options: Performance - - LongLivedPorts - The default LongLivedPorts setting creates additional, unnecessary - connections. This specifies no long-lived ports (the empty list). - - PredictedPortsRelevanceTime 0 seconds - The default PredictedPortsRelevanceTime setting creates additional, - unnecessary connections. - - High-churn / quick-failover RSOS using descriptor competition strategies - should consider setting the following option: - - RendPostPeriod 600 seconds - Refresh onion service descriptors, choosing an interval between - 0 and 2*RendPostPeriod. Tor also posts descriptors on bootstrap, and - when they change. - (Strictly, 30 seconds after they first change, for descriptor - stability.) - - XX - Reduce the minimum RendPostPeriod for RSOS to 1 minute? - XX - Make the initial post 30 + rand(1*rendpostperiod) ? - (Avoid thundering herd, but don't hide startup time) - - However, we do NOT recommend setting the following option to 1, unless bug - #17359 is resolved so tor onion services can bootstrap without predicted - circuits. - - __DisablePredictedCircuits 0 - This option disables all predicted circuits. It is equivalent to: - LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0 - LongLivedPorts - PredictedPortsRelevanceTime 0 seconds - And turning off hidden service server preemptive circuits, which is - currently unimplemented (#17360) - -5.1.3 Recommended Additional Options: Security - - We recommend that no other services are run on a rendezvous single onion - service tor instance. Since tor runs as a client (and not a relay) by - default, rendezvous single onion service operators should set: - - XX - George says we don't allow operators to run HS/Relay any more, - or that we warn them. - - SocksPort 0 - Disallow connections from client applications to the tor network - via this tor instance. - - ClientOnly 1 - Even if the defaults file configures this instance to be a relay, - never relay any traffic or serve any descriptors. - -5.2. Publishing descriptors - - A single onion service must publish descriptors in the same manner as any - onion service, as defined by rend-spec. - -5.3. Authorization - - Client authorization for a rendezvous single onion service is possible via - the same methods used for double onion services. - -6. Related Proposals, Tools, and Features - -6.1. Load balancing - - High capacity services can distribute load and implement failover by: - * running multiple instances that publish to the same onion service - directories, - * publishing descriptors containing multiple introduction points - (OnionBalance), - * publishing different introduction points to different onion service - directories (OnionBalance upcoming(?) feature), - * handing off rendezvous to a different tor instance via control port - messages (proposal #255), - or by a combination of these methods. - -6.2. Ephemeral single onion services (ADD_ONION) - - The ADD_ONION control port command could be extended to support ephemerally - configured rendezvous single onion services. Given that - RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer modifies the behaviour of - all onion services on a tor instance, if it is set, any ephemerally - configured onion service should become a rendezvous single onion service. - -6.3. Proposal 224 ("Next-Generation Hidden Services") - - This proposal is compatible with proposal 224, with onion services - acting just like a next-generation hidden service, but making one-hop - paths to the introduction and rendezvous points. - -6.4. Proposal 246 ("Merging Hidden Service Directories and Intro Points") - - This proposal is compatible with proposal 246. The onion service will - publish its descriptor to the introduction points in the same manner as any - other onion service. Clients will use the merged hidden service directory - and introduction point just as they do for other onion services. - -6.5. Proposal 252 ("Single Onion Services") - - This proposal is compatible with proposal 252. The onion service will - publish its descriptor to the introduction points in the same manner as any - other onion service. Clients can then choose to extend to the single onion - service, or continue with the rendezvous protocol. - - Running a rendezvous single onion service and single onion service allows - older clients to connect via rendezvous, and newer clients to connenct via - extend. This is useful for the transition period where not all clients - support single onion services. - -6.5. Proposal 255 ("Hidden Service Load Balancing") - - This proposal is compatible with proposal 255. The onion service will - perform the rendezvous protocol in the same manner as any other onion - service. Controllers can then choose to handoff the rendezvous point - connection to another tor instance, which should also be configured - as a rendezvous single onion service. - -7. Considerations - -7.1 Modifying RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer at runtime - - Implementations should not reuse introduction points or introduction point - circuits if the value of RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer is - different than it was when the introduction point was selected. This is - because these circuits will have an undesirable length. - - There is specific code in tor that preserves introduction points on a HUP, - if RendezvousSingleOnionServiceNonAnonymousServer has changed, all circuits - should be closed, and all introduction points must be discarded. - -7.2 Delaying connection expiry - - Tor clients typically expire connections much faster than tor relays - [citation needed]. - - (Rendezvous) single onion service operators may find that keeping - connections open saves on connection latency. However, it may also place an - additional load on the service. (This could be implemented by increasing the - configured connection expiry time.) - -7.3. (No) Benefit to also running a Tor relay - - In tor Trac ticket #8742, running a relay and hidden onion service on the - same tor instance was disabled for security reasons. While there may be - benefits to running a relay on the same instance as a rendezvous single - onion service (existing connections mean lower latency, it helps the tor - network overall), a security analysis of this configuration has not yet - been performed. In addition, a potential drawback is overloading a busy - single onion service. - -6.4 Predicted circuits - - We should look whether we can optimize further the predicted circuits that - Tor makes as a onion service for this mode. - -8. Security Implications - -8.1 Splitting the Anonymity Set - - Each additional flavour of onion service, and each additional externally - visible onion service feature, provides oportunities for fingerprinting. - - Also, each additional type of onion service shrinks the anonymity set for - users of double onion (hidden) services who require server location - anonymity. These users benefit from the cover provided by current users of - onion services, who use them for client anonymity, self-authentication, - NAT-punching, or other benefits. - - For this reason, features that shrink the double onion service anonymity - set should be carefully considered. The benefits and drawbacks of - additional features also often depend on a particular threat model. - - It may be that a significant number of users and sites adopt (rendezvous) - single onion services due to their benefits. This could increase the - traffic on the tor network, therefore increasing anonymity overall. - However, the unique behaviour of each type of onion service may still be - distinguishable from both the client and server ends of the connection. - -8.2 Hidden Service Designs can potentially be more secure - - As a side-effect, by optimizing for performance in this feature, it - allows us to lean more heavily towards security decisions for - regular onion services. - -8.3 One-hop onion service paths may encourage more attacks - - There's a possible second-order effect here since both encrypted - services and hidden services will have foo.onion addresses and it's - not clear based on the address whether the service will be hidden -- - if *some* .onion addresses are easy to track down, are we encouraging - adversaries to attack all rendezvous points just in case? - -9. Further Work - -Further proposals or research could attempt to mitigate the anonymity-set -splitting described in section 8. Here are some initial ideas. - -9.1 Making Client Exit connections look like Client Onion Service Connections - - A mitigation to this fingerprinting is to make each (or some) exit - connections look like onion service connections. This provides cover for - particular types of onion service connections. Unfortunately, it is not - possible to make onion service connections look like exit connections, - as there are no suitable dummy servers to exit to on the Internet. - -9.1.1 Making Client Exit connections perform Descriptor Downloads - - (Some) exit connections could perform a dummy descriptor download. - (However, descriptors for recently accessed onion services are cached, so - dummy downloads should only be performed occasionally.) - - Exit connections already involve a four-hop "circuit" to the server - (including the connection between the exit and the server on the Internet). - The server on the Internet is not included in the consensus. Therefore, - this mitigation would effectively cover single onion services which are not - relays. - -9.1.2 Making Client Exit connections perform the Rendezvous Protocol - - (Some) exit connections could perform a dummy rendezvous protocol. - - Exit connections already involve a four-hop "circuit" to the server - (including the connection between the exit and the server on the Internet). - Therefore, this mitigation would effectively cover rendezvous single onion - services, as long as a dummy descriptor download was also performed - occasionally. - -9.1.3 Making Single Onion Service rendezvous points perform name resolution - - Currently, Exits perform DNS name resolution, and changing this behaviour - would cause unacceptable connection latency. Therefore, we could make - onion service connections look like exit connections by making the - rendezvous point do name resolution (that is, descriptor fetching), and, if - needed, the introduction part of the protocol. This could potentially - *reduce* the latency of single onion service connections, depending on the - length of the paths used by the rendezvous point. - - However, this change makes rendezvous points almost as powerful as Exits, - a careful security analysis will need to be performed before this is - implemented. - - There is also a design issue with rendezvous name resolution: a client - wants to leave resolution (descriptor download) to the RP, but it doesn't - know whether it can use the exit-like protocol with an RP until it has - downloaded the descriptor. This might mean that single onion services of - both flavours need a different address style or address namespace. We could - use .single.onion or something. (This would require an update to the HSDir - code.) - -9.2 Performing automated and common queries over onion services - - Tor could create cover traffic for a flavour of onion service by performing - automated or common queries via an onion service of that type. In addition, - onion service-based checks have security benefits over DNS-based checks. - See Genuine Onion, Syverson and Boyce, 2015, at - http://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/chacs/syverson-genuine-onion-simple-fast-flexibl... - - Here are some examples of automated queries that could be performed over - an onion service: - -9.2.1 torcheck over onion service - - torcheck ("Congratulations! This browser is configured to use Tor.") could - be retrieved from an onion service. - - Incidentally, this would resolve the exitmap issues in #17297, but it - would also fail to check that exit connections work, which is important for - many Tor Browser users. - -9.2.2 Tor Browser version checks over onion service - - Running tor browser version checks over an onion service seems to be an - excellent use-case for onion services. It would also have the Tor Project - "eating its own dogfood", that is, using onion services for its essential - services. - -9.2.3 Tor Browser downloads over onion service - - Running tor browser downloads over an onion service might require some work - on the onion service codebase to support high loads, load-balancing, and - failover. It is a good use case for a (rendezvous) single onion service, - as the traffic over the tor network is only slightly higher than for - Tor Browser downloads over tor. (4 hops for [R]SOS, 3 hops for Exit.) - -9.2.4 SSL Observatory submissions over onion service - - HTTPS certificates could be submitted to HTTPS Everywhere's SSL Observatory - over an onion service. - - This option is disabled in Tor Browser by default. Perhaps some users would - be more comfortable enabling submission over an onion service, due to the - additional security benefits.