commit 1f087bf0141b4d34d2f19e170a9f2a006d8bb1a7 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 12 10:08:19 2016 -0500 Apply updated proposal 263 from tor-dev --- proposals/263-ntru-for-pq-handshake.txt | 180 ++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 94 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/263-ntru-for-pq-handshake.txt b/proposals/263-ntru-for-pq-handshake.txt index 0216658..e1bd700 100644 --- a/proposals/263-ntru-for-pq-handshake.txt +++ b/proposals/263-ntru-for-pq-handshake.txt @@ -1,7 +1,8 @@ Filename: 263-ntru-for-pq-handshake.txt -Title: Request to change key exchange protocol for handshake +Title: Request to change key exchange protocol for handshake v1.1 Author: John SCHANCK, William WHYTE and Zhenfei ZHANG Created: 29 Aug 2015 +Updated: 9 Jan 2016 Status: Open 1. Introduction @@ -12,7 +13,7 @@ Status: Open 0x0002 ntor -- the ntor+curve25519+sha256 handshake; Request for a new (set of) handshake type: - 0x010X ntor+qsh -- the hybrid of ntor+curve25519+sha256 handshake + 0x010X ntor+qsh -- the hybrid of ntor+curve25519+sha3 handshake and a quantum-safe key encapsulation mechanism where @@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ Status: Open assigned. 0X0101 ntor+ntru -- the quantum safe KEM is based on NTRUEncrypt, with - parameter ntrueess439ep1 + parameter ntrueess443ep1 0X0102 ntor+ntru -- the quantum safe KEM is based on NTRUEncrypt, with parameter ntrueess743ep1 @@ -31,29 +32,35 @@ Status: Open DEPENDENCY: Proposal 249: Allow CREATE cells with >505 bytes of handshake data - 1.1 Motivation: Quantum resistant key agreement + 1.1 Motivation: Quantum-safe forward-secure key agreement - We are trying to add quantum resistance to the key agreement in Tor - handshake. Current approaches for handling key agreement, for instance, - ntor, are not quantum resistant. ECC will be broken when quantum - computers become available. This allows an adversary with significant - storage capabilities to harvest Tor handshakes now and decrypt them in - the future. + We are trying to add Quantum-safe forward-secrecy to the key agreement in + tor handshake. (Classical) forward-secrecy means that if the long-term key + is compromised, the communication prior to this compromise still stays + secure. Similarly, Quantum-safe forward-secrecy implies if the long-term + key is compromised due to attackers with quantum-computing capabilities, the + prior communication still remains secure. - 1.2 Motivation: Disaster resilience + Current approaches for handling key agreement, for instance, the ntor + handshake protocol, do not have this feature. ntor uses ECC, which will be + broken when quantum computers become available. This allows the simple yet + very effective harvest-then-decrypt attack, where an adversary with + significant storage capabilities harvests Tor handshakes now and decrypt + them in the future. - We are really trying to protect against the disastrous situation of one - key being entirely compromised. By introducing a second cryptographic - primitive, namely, NTRUEncrypt, we ensure that the system remains secure - in those extreme scenarios. + The proposed handshake protocol achieves quantum-safe forward-secrecy and + stops those attacks by introducing a secondary short-term pre-master secret + that is transported via a quantum-safe method. In the case where long-term + key is compromised via quantum algorithm, the attacker still need to recover + the second pre-master secret to be able to decrypt the communication. - 1.3 Motivation: Allowing plug & play for quantum-safe encryption algorithms + 1.2 Motivation: Allowing plug & play for quantum-safe encryption algorithms - We would like to be conservative on the selection of quantum-safe - encryption algorithm. For this purpose, we propose a modular design that - allows any quantum-safe encryption algorithm to be included in this - handshake framework. We will illustrate the proposal with NTRUEncrypt - encryption algorithm. + We would like to be conservative on the selection of quantum-safe encryption + algorithm. For this purpose, we propose a modular design that allows any + quantum-safe encryption algorithm to be included in this handshake + framework. We will illustrate the proposal with NTRUEncrypt encryption + algorithm. 2. Proposal @@ -63,8 +70,8 @@ Status: Open protocol. This proposed new handshake protocol is consistent with that approach. - We aim to provide quantum resistance and disaster resilience to the Tor - network, with the minimum impact on the current version. We aim to use + We aim to provide quantum-safe forward-secrecy and modular design to the Tor + handshake, with the minimum impact on the current version. We aim to use as many existing mechanisms as possible. For purposes of comparison, proposed modifications are indicated with * at @@ -72,50 +79,39 @@ Status: Open are marked with # when applicable. In order to enable variant quantum-safe algorithms for Tor handshake, we - propose a modular approach that allows any quantum-safe encryption - algorithm to be adopted in this framework. Our approach is a hybridization - of ntor protocol and a KEM. We instantiate this framework with NTRUEncrypt, - a lattice-based encryption scheme that is believed to be quantum resistant. - This framework is expandable to other quantum-safe encrypt schemes such as - Ring Learning with Error (R-LWE) based schemes. + propose a modular approach that allows any quantum-safe encryption algorithm + to be adopted in this framework. Our approach is a hybridization of ntor + protocol and a KEM. We instantiate this framework with NTRUEncrypt, a + lattice-based encryption scheme that is believed to be quantum resistant. + This framework is expandable to other quantum-safe encryptions such as Ring + Learning with Error (R-LWE) based schemes. 2.1.1 Achieved Property: - 1) The proposed key exchange method is quantum resistant: The forward - secrecy of the scheme assumes future adversaries are equipped with - quantum computers. + 1) The proposed key exchange method is quantum-safe forward-secure: two + secrets are exchanged, one protected by ECC, one protected by NTRUEncrypt, + and then put through the native Tor Key Derivation Function (KDF) to + derive the encryption and authentication keys. Both secrets are protected + with one-time keys for their respective public key algorithms. - 2) The proposed key exchange method is disaster resilient: The protocol - depends on two cryptographic primitives. Compromising one does not break - the security of the whole system. - - 3) The proposed key exchange method provides one-way authentication: The + 2) The proposed key exchange method provides one-way authentication: The server is authenticated, while the client remains anonymous. - 4) The protocol is almost backward compatible with its previous version: - ntor. By omitting a single field, one obtains the exact ntor + 3) The protocol is almost backward compatible with its previous + version: ntor. By omitting a single field, one obtains the exact ntor protocol. That is, the protocol is at least as secure as ntor. - 5) The protocol provides perfect forward secrecy: two secrets are - exchanged, one protected by ECC, one protected by NTRUEncrypt, and then - put through the native Tor Key Derivation Function (KDF) to derive the - encryption and authentication keys. Both secrets are protected with - one-time keys for their respective public key algorithms. - 2.1.2 General idea: When a client wishes to establish a one-way authenticated key K with a server, through following steps a session key is established: - - 1) Establish a common secret E (classical cryptography, i.e., ECC) using - a one-way authenticated key exchange protocol. #ntor currently uses this - approach#; - - 2) Establish a common "parallel" secret P using a key encapsulation + 1) Establish a common secret E (classical cryptography, i.e., ECC) using + a one-way authenticated key exchange protocol. + #ntor currently uses this approach#; + 2) Establish a common "parallel" secret P using a key encapsulation mechanism similar to TLS_RSA. In this feature request we use NTRUEncrypt as an example. - - 3) Establish a new session key k = KDF(E|P, info, i), where KDF is a Key + 3) Establish a new session key k = KDF(E|P, info, i), where KDF is a Key Derivation Function. 2.1.3 Building Blocks @@ -129,12 +125,14 @@ Status: Open 3) HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function - KDF-RFC5869; ##existing approach: See 5.2.2 tor-spec.txt## + Note: a new hash function, SHA3 as in FIPS 202, will be used, rather than + SHA256 as in ntor. 2.2 The protocol 2.2.1 Initialization - H(x,t) as HMAC_SHA256 with message x and key t. + H(x,t) as HMAC_SHA3 with message x and key t. H_LENGTH = 32 ID_LENGTH = 20 G_LENGTH = 32 @@ -142,16 +140,14 @@ Status: Open * QSPK_LENGTH = XXX length of QSE public key * QSC_LENGTH = XXX length of QSE cipher -* PROTOID = "ntor-curve25519-sha256-1-[qseid]" +* PROTOID = "ntor-curve25519-sha3-1-[qseid]" #pre PORTOID = "ntor-curve25519-sha256-1" t_mac = PROTOID | ":mac" t_key = PROTOID | ":key_extract" t_verify = PROTOID | ":verify" - These three variables define three different cryptographic hash - functions: - + These three variables define three different cryptographic hash functions: hash1 = HMAC(*, t_mac); hash2 = HMAC(*, t_key); hash3 = HMAC(*, t_verify); @@ -180,21 +176,21 @@ Status: Open The client generates a temporary key pair: x, X = KEYGEN(); - an NTRU temporary key pair: + an QSE temporary key pair: * QSSK, QSPK = QSKEYGEN(); -============================================================================== +================================================================================ and generates a client-side handshake with contents: NODEID Server identity digest [ID_LENGTH bytes] KEYID KEYID(B) [H_LENGTH bytes] CLIENT_PK X [G_LENGTH bytes] * QSPK QSPK [QSPK_LENGTH bytes] -============================================================================== +================================================================================ The server generates an ephemeral curve25519 keypair: y, Y = KEYGEN(); - a ephemeral "parallel" secret for encryption with NTRU: + a ephemeral "parallel" secret for encryption with QSE: * PAR_SEC P [H_LENGTH bytes] and computes: @@ -214,12 +210,12 @@ Status: Open | ID | PROTOID | "Server" #pre auth_input = verify | B | Y | X | ID | PROTOID | "Server" -============================================================================== +================================================================================ The server's handshake reply is: SERVER_PK Y [G_LENGTH bytes] AUTH H(auth_input, t_mac) [H_LENGTH bytes] * QSCIPHER C [QSPK_LENGTH bytes] -============================================================================== +================================================================================ The client then checks Y is in G^*, and computes E = EXP(Y,x) | EXP(B,x) | B | X | Y @@ -242,18 +238,19 @@ Status: Open 2.3 Instantiation with NTRUEncrypt - The example uses the NTRU parameter set NTRU_EESS439EP1. This has keys - and ciphertexts of length 604 bytes. This parameter set delivers 128 bits - classical security. For 128 bits quantum security, use NTRU_EESS743EP1. + The example uses the NTRU parameter set NTRU_EESS443EP1. This has keys + and ciphertexts of length 610 bytes. This parameter set delivers 128 bits + classical security and quantum security. For 256 bits classcial and quantum + security, use NTRU_EESS743EP1. We adjust the following parameters: handshake type: 0X0101 ntor+ntru the quantum safe KEM is based on NTRUEncrypt, with - parameter ntrueess439ep1 - PROTOID = "ntor-curve25519-sha256-1-ntrueess439ep1" - QSPK_LENGTH = 609 length of NTRU_EESS439EP1 public key - QSC_LENGTH = 604 length of NTRU_EESS439EP1 cipher + parameter ntrueess443ep1 + PROTOID = "ntor-curve25519-sha3-1-ntrueess443ep1" + QSPK_LENGTH = 610 length of NTRU_EESS439EP1 public key + QSC_LENGTH = 610 length of NTRU_EESS439EP1 cipher NTRUEncrypt can be adopted in our framework without further modification. @@ -272,29 +269,40 @@ Status: Open model can be found at https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/287. 3.3 Cryptographic hash function - The default hash function HMAC_SHA256 from Tor suffice all requirements of - our proposal. + The default hash function HMAC_SHA256 from Tor. This is suffice to provide + desired security for the present day. However, to be more future proof, we + propose to use HMAC_SHA3 when Tor starts to migrant to SHA3. 3.4 Key Encapsulation Mechanism The KEM in our protocol can be proved to be KEM-CCA-2 secure. - 3.5 Forward Secrecy - The forward secrecy is achieved. + 3.5 Quantum-safe Forward Secrecy + The quantum-safe forward secrecy is achieved. - Note that although this protocol meets the indicated goals, it is secure - only until a quantum computer is developed that is capable of breaking the - onion keys in real time. Such a computer can compromise the authentication - of ntor online; the security of this approach depends on the authentication - being secure at the time the handshake is executed. This approach is - intended to provide security against the harvest-then-decrypt attack while - an acceptable quantum-safe approach with security against an active - attacker is developed. - + 3.6 Quantum-safe authentication + The proposed protocol is secure only until a quantum computer is developed + that is capable of breaking the onion keys in real time. Such a computer can + compromise the authentication of ntor online; the security of this approach + depends on the authentication being secure at the time the handshake is + executed. This approach is intended to provide security against the + harvest-then-decrypt attack while an acceptable quantum-safe approach with + security against an active attacker is developed. -4. Bibliography +4. Candidate quantum-safe encryption algorithms + + We do not propose any quantum-safe encryption algorithms in this proposal. + This documents focus on the hybrid design. The implementer should modularize + the protocol with appropriate interfaces that allows any quantum-safe + encryption algorithms to be used in this setting. + + Candidate quantum-safe encryption algorithms will be included in another + proposal. This document will refer to the proposal when both proposals are + mature. + + +5. Bibliography [DK05] Y. Dodis, J. Katz, "Chosen-Ciphertext Security of Mulitple Encryption", Theory of Cryptography Conference, 2005. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-540-30576-7_11 (conference version) or http://cs.nyu.edu/~dodis/ps/2enc.pdf (preprint) -