commit 85e96a0a294b6a43b216a6261d7eb55771150491 Author: Damian Johnson atagar@torproject.org Date: Fri Mar 1 16:27:44 2019 -0800
Adjust safecookie faq wording
Couple small tweaks suggested by wagon:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28300#comment:11 --- docs/faq.rst | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/faq.rst b/docs/faq.rst index 3aa7b02a..23d0c3f1 100644 --- a/docs/faq.rst +++ b/docs/faq.rst @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ you vulnerable to replay attacks if you accidently connect to a malicious port or have a man-in-the-middle. **SAFECOOKIE** authentication avoids this through a two way handshake, but authenticating by hand requires some extra work.
-This demonstration will use **xxd** to for hex conversion and **openssl** for +This demonstration will use **xxd** for hex conversion and **openssl** for crypto. First we need to call **AUTHCHALLENGE** with a random one-time token...
:: @@ -231,9 +231,9 @@ crypto. First we need to call **AUTHCHALLENGE** with a random one-time token... 250 AUTHCHALLENGE SERVERHASH=16274D83FC2240DF9D50D74009D9AE107B77EA317F0034D3638C7942F350D1F9 SERVERNONCE=1C2E73C41FA8537FDD3A59C2ECBE26DFC85E0A05389373AD8C130C0F5795A036
-Next combine the server challenge with our cookie content. This token will -prove to Tor that we have our authentication cookie without divulging its -content... +In another terminal prompt next combine the server challenge with our cookie +content. This token will prove to Tor that we have our authentication cookie +without divulging its content...
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