r24435: {website} include stable man page from the old website (in website/trunk/docs: ar en fr my pl ru)
Author: runa Date: 2011-03-25 13:08:28 +0000 (Fri, 25 Mar 2011) New Revision: 24435
Modified: website/trunk/docs/ar/sidenav.wmi website/trunk/docs/en/sidenav.wmi website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml website/trunk/docs/fr/sidenav.wmi website/trunk/docs/my/sidenav.wmi website/trunk/docs/pl/sidenav.wmi website/trunk/docs/ru/sidenav.wmi Log: include stable man page from the old website
Modified: website/trunk/docs/ar/sidenav.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/ar/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) +++ website/trunk/docs/ar/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435) @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ {'url' => 'docs/running-a-mirror', 'txt' => 'ضبط مرآة', }, -# {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', -# 'txt' => 'تور- دليل الإصدارة الثابتة', -# }, + {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', + 'txt' => 'تور- دليل الإصدارة الثابتة', + }, {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual-dev', 'txt' => 'تور- دليل الإصدارة ألفا', },
Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/sidenav.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435) @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ {'url' => 'docs/running-a-mirror', 'txt' => 'Configuring a Mirror', }, -# {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', -# 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', -# }, + {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', + 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', + }, {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual-dev', 'txt' => 'Tor -alpha Manual', },
Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml 2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435) @@ -9,22 +9,2321 @@ <div id="breadcrumbs"> <a href="<page index>">Home » </a> <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation » </a> - <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>">Tor Dev Manual</a> + <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>">Tor Manual</a> </div> - <div id="maincol"> - <: - die "Missing git clone at $(TORGIT)" unless -d "$(TORGIT)"; - my $man = `GIT_DIR=$(TORGIT) git show $(STABLETAG):doc/tor.1.txt | asciidoc -d manpage -s -o - -`; - die "No manpage because of asciidoc error or file not available from git" unless $man; - print $man; - :> - </div> + <div id="maincol"> + <h2 id="_synopsis">SYNOPSIS</h2> + <div class="sectionbody"> + <div class="paragraph"><p><strong>tor</strong> [<em>OPTION</em> <em>value</em>]…</p> + </div> + </div> + <h2 id="_description">DESCRIPTION</h2> + <div class="sectionbody"> + <div class="paragraph"><p><em>tor</em> is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication + service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and + negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node + knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down + the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals + the downstream node.<br /></p></div> + + <div class="paragraph"><p>Basically <em>tor</em> provides a distributed network of servers ("onion routers"). + Users bounce their TCP streams — web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc — around the + routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers themselves have + difficulty tracking the source of the stream.</p></div> + </div> + <h2 id="_options">OPTIONS</h2> + <div class="sectionbody"> + <div class="dlist"><dl> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>-h</strong>, <strong>-help</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + Display a short help message and exit. + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>-f</strong> <em>FILE</em> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc) + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>--hash-password</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + Generates a hashed password for control port access. + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>--list-fingerprint</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint. + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>--verify-config</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + Verify the configuration file is valid. + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>--nt-service</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + <strong>--service [install|remove|start|stop]</strong> Manage the Tor Windows + NT/2000/XP service. Current instructions can be found at + <a href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService">https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService</a> + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>--list-torrc-options</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + List all valid options. + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>--version</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + Display Tor version and exit. + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>--quiet</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + Do not start Tor with a console log unless explicitly requested to do so. + (By default, Tor starts out logging messages at level "notice" or higher to + the console, until it has parsed its configuration.) + </p> + </dd> + </dl> + </div> + <div class="paragraph"> + <p>Other options can be specified either on the command-line (--option + value), or in the configuration file (option value or option "value"). + Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside + quoted values. Options on the command line take precedence over + options found in the configuration file, except indicated otherwise. To + split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single \ before + the end of the line. Comments can be used in such multiline entries, but + they must start at the beginning of a line.</p> + </div> + <div class="dlist"><dl> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>BandwidthRate</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to + the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing + bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a relay in the + public network, this needs to be <em>at the very least</em> 20 KB (that is, + 20480 bytes). (Default: 5 MB) + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>BandwidthBurst</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given + number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB) + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>MaxAdvertisedBandwidth</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our + BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients + who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to + advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server + without impacting network performance. + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>RelayBandwidthRate</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth + usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes + per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. + Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory + requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0) + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>RelayBandwidthBurst</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for + _relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction. + (Default: 0) + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>ConnLimit</strong> <em>NUM</em> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor + process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file + descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n"). + If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start.<br /> + <br /> + You probably don’t need to adjust this. It has no effect on Windows + since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000) + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>ConstrainedSockets</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all + sockets to the size specified in <strong>ConstrainedSockSize</strong>. This is useful for + virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may + be limited. If you’re on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error + creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are + likely experiencing this problem.<br /> + <br /> + The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for + the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility; + this configuration option is a second-resort.<br /> + <br /> + The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The + cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates + the problem.<br /> + <br /> + You should <strong>not</strong> enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer + space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for + the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip + time on long paths. (Default: 0.) + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>ConstrainedSockSize</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + When <strong>ConstrainedSockets</strong> is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for + all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and + 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended. + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>ControlPort</strong> <em>Port</em> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those + connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol + (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one of + <strong>HashedControlPassword</strong> or <strong>CookieAuthentication</strong>, setting this option will + cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to control it. This + option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051. + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>ControlListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>] + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port, bind + to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We strongly + recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you’re doing, + since giving attackers access to your control listener is really + dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1) This directive can be specified multiple + times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>ControlSocket</strong> <em>Path</em> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP + socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.) + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>HashedControlPassword</strong> <em>hashed_password</em> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + Don’t allow any connections on the control port except when the other + process knows the password whose one-way hash is <em>hashed_password</em>. You + can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password + <em>password</em>". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more + than one HashedControlPassword line. + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>CookieAuthentication</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + If this option is set to 1, don’t allow any connections on the control port + except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named + "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This + authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem + security. (Default: 0) + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + <strong>CookieAuthFile</strong> <em>Path</em> + </dt> + <dd> + <p> + If set, this option overrides the default location and file name + for Tor’s cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.) + </p> + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>CookieAuthFileGroupReadable</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>|<em>Groupname</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the filesystem group to read the + cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by + the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet + implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>DataDirectory</strong> <em>DIR</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>DirServer</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address + and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated + many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are + separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory + is. By default, every authority is authoritative for current ("v2")-style + directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is + provided, Tor will use this server as an authority for old-style (v1) + directories as well. (Only directory mirrors care about this.) Tor will + use this server as an authority for hidden service information if the "hs" + flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is <strong>not</strong> set. + Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the + "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=<strong>port</strong>" is given, Tor will use the + given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a + flag "v3ident=<strong>fp</strong>" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority + whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint <strong>fp</strong>.<br /> +<br /> + If no <strong>dirserver</strong> line is given, Tor will use the default directory + servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor + network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be + distinguishable from other users, because you won’t believe the same + authorities they do. +</p> +</dd> +</dl></div> +<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>AlternateDirAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em><br /></p></div> +<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>AlternateHSAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em><br /></p></div> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AlternateBridgeAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em> fingerprint</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + As DirServer, but replaces less of the default directory authorities. Using + AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but + leaves the hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in place. + Similarly, Using AlternateHSAuthority replaces the default hidden service + authorities, but not the directory or bridge authorities. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>FetchDirInfoEarly</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other + directory caches, even if you don’t meet the normal criteria for fetching + early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>FetchHidServDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the + rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you’re using a Tor + controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>FetchServerDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server + descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if + you’re using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you. + (Default: 1) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>FetchUselessDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the + authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching useless + descriptors, for example for routers that are not running. This option is + useful if you’re using the contributed "exitlist" script to enumerate Tor + nodes that exit to certain addresses. (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>HTTPProxy</strong> <em>host</em>[:<em>port</em>] +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80 + if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory + servers. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>HTTPProxyAuthenticator</strong> <em>username:password</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy + authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP + proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you + want it to support others. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>HTTPSProxy</strong> <em>host</em>[:<em>port</em>] +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or + host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting + directly to servers. You may want to set <strong>FascistFirewall</strong> to restrict + the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only + allows connecting to certain ports. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>HTTPSProxyAuthenticator</strong> <em>username:password</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy + authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS + proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you + want it to support others. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>KeepalivePeriod</strong> <em>NUM</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell + every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection + has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of + idleness. (Default: 5 minutes) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>Log</strong> <em>minSeverity</em>[-<em>maxSeverity</em>] <strong>stderr</strong>|<strong>stdout</strong>|<strong>syslog</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Send all messages between <em>minSeverity</em> and <em>maxSeverity</em> to the standard + output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The + "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are + debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases, + since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an + attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all + messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>Log</strong> <em>minSeverity</em>[-<em>maxSeverity</em>] <strong>file</strong> <em>FILENAME</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The + "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file. + Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity + level. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>OutboundBindAddress</strong> <em>IP</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This + is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all + of Tor’s outgoing connections to use a single one. This setting will be + ignored for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>PidFile</strong> <em>FILE</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove + FILE. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ProtocolWarnings</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other parties not + following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity + 'info'. (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>RunAsDaemon</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect + on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option. + (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>SafeLogging</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g. + addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can + still be useful, but they don’t leave behind personally identifying + information about what sites a user might have visited.<br /> +<br /> + If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is + set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. (Default: 1) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>User</strong> <em>UID</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>HardwareAccel</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when + available. This is untested and probably buggy. (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AvoidDiskWrites</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise. + This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support + only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>TunnelDirConns</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will build + a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its ORPort. + (Default: 1) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>PreferTunneledDirConns</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don’t support tunneled + directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1) +</p> +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_client_options">CLIENT OPTIONS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if +<strong>SocksPort</strong> is non-zero):</p></div> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AllowInvalidNodes</strong> <strong>entry</strong>|<strong>exit</strong>|<strong>middle</strong>|<strong>introduction</strong>|<strong>rendezvous</strong>|<strong>…</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory + authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it’s not + recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You + can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is + "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ExcludeSingleHopRelays</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with + the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set + to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at + higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally + included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option, + so using these relays might make your client stand out. + (Default: 1) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>Bridge</strong> <em>IP</em>:<em>ORPort</em> [fingerprint] +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at + "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint" + is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that + the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use + fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if + it’s provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>CircuitBuildTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't + open in that time, give up on it. (Default: 1 minute.) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>CircuitIdleTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds, then + close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all + of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if we end up + making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests we’re + receiving, it won’t forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1 + hour.) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ClientOnly</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server or serve + directory requests. The default is to run as a client unless ORPort is + configured. (Usually, you don’t need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at + figuring out whether you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a + useful server.) (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ExcludeNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address + patterns of nodes to never use when building a circuit. (Example: + ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, {cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ExcludeExitNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address + patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any + node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this + list. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>EntryNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames and address + patterns of nodes to use for the first hop in normal circuits. These are + treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ExitNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address + patterns of nodes to use for the last hop in normal exit circuits. These + are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>StrictEntryNodes</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "EntryNodes" for + the first hop of a circuit. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>StrictExitNodes</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "ExitNodes" for + the last hop of a circuit. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>FascistFirewall</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports + that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see <strong>FirewallPorts</strong>). + This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with + restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such + a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use + ReachableAddresses instead. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>FirewallPorts</strong> <em>PORTS</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when + <strong>FascistFirewall</strong> is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses + instead. (Default: 80, 443) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>HidServAuth</strong> <em>onion-address</em> <em>auth-cookie</em> [<em>service-name</em>] +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16 + characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22 + characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal + purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times + for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and + this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden + services can be configured to require authorization using the + <strong>HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient</strong> option. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]… +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows + you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except + that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For + example, 'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept + *:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net + 99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port + 80 otherwise. (Default: 'accept *:*'.) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ReachableDirAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]… +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Like <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong>, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey + these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP + GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of + <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> is used. If <strong>HTTPProxy</strong> is set then these + connections will go through that proxy. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ReachableORAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]… +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Like <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong>, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey + these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not + set explicitly then the value of <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> is used. If + <strong>HTTPSProxy</strong> is set then these connections will go through that proxy.<br /> +<br /> + The separation between <strong>ReachableORAddresses</strong> and + <strong>ReachableDirAddresses</strong> is only interesting when you are connecting + through proxies (see <strong>HTTPProxy</strong> and <strong>HTTPSProxy</strong>). Most proxies limit + TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443, + and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory + information) to port 80. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>LongLivedPorts</strong> <em>PORTS</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections + (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these + ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node + will go down before the stream is finished. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, + 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>MapAddress</strong> <em>address</em> <em>newaddress</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to newaddress + before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to + www.indymedia.org to exit via <em>torserver</em> (where <em>torserver</em> is the + nickname of the server), use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org + www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit". +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>NewCircuitPeriod</strong> <em>NUM</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30 + seconds) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>MaxCircuitDirtiness</strong> <em>NUM</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago, + but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. (Default: 10 + minutes) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>NodeFamily</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames, + constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use + any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed + when a server doesn’t list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option + can be used multiple times. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>EnforceDistinctSubnets</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on + the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in + the same /16 range. (Default: 1) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>SocksPort</strong> <em>PORT</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking + applications. Set this to 0 if you don’t want to allow application + connections. (Default: 9050) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>SocksListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>] +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking + applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g. + 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind + to multiple addresses/ports. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>SocksPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the + SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit + policies below. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>SocksTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds + unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default: + 2 minutes.) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>TrackHostExits</strong> <em>host</em>,<em>.domain</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent + connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same + exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is treated as + matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it means + match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites + that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if + your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage + of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single + user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it + through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>TrackHostExitsExpire</strong> <em>NUM</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the + association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is + 1800 seconds (30 minutes). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>UpdateBridgesFromAuthority</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors + from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to + a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>UseBridges</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge" + config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory + guards. (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>UseEntryGuards</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try + to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers + increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a + fraction of your paths. (Defaults to 1.) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>NumEntryGuards</strong> <em>NUM</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers + as long-term entries for our circuits. (Defaults to 3.) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>SafeSocks</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that + use unsafe variants of the socks protocol — ones that only provide an IP + address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first. + Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS. + (Defaults to 0.) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>TestSocks</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for + each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a + safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This + helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking + DNS requests. (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>VirtualAddrNetwork</strong> <em>Address</em>/<em>bits</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS + command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor + picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default: + 127.192.0.0/10)<br /> +<br /> + When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool + like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or + "172.16.0.0/12". The default <strong>VirtualAddrNetwork</strong> address range on a + properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For + local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AllowNonRFC953Hostnames</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal + characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be + resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on. + (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>FastFirstHopPK</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first + hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have + already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure + keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower.<br /> +<br /> + Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it’s + operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it + doesn’t yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: 1) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>TransPort</strong> <em>PORT</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on <em>PORT</em> (by convention, + 9040). Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or + Linux’s IPTables. If you’re planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for + a network, you’ll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the + default setting. You’ll also want to set the TransListenAddress option for + the network you’d like to proxy. (Default: 0). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>TransListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>] +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections. (Default: + 127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server to an + entire network. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>NATDPort</strong> <em>PORT</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc.) + to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol. This option is + only for people who cannot use TransPort. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>NATDListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>] +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AutomapHostsOnResolve</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address + that ends with one of the suffixes in <strong>AutomapHostsSuffixes</strong>, we map an + unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address. + This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that + resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AutomapHostsSuffixes</strong> <em>SUFFIX</em>,<em>SUFFIX</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with <strong>AutomapHostsOnResolve</strong>. + The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>DNSPort</strong> <em>PORT</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves + them anonymously. (Default: 0). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>DNSListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>] +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that + tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or + 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don’t + turn it off unless you know what you’re doing. (Default: 1). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>DownloadExtraInfo</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents + contain information about servers other than the information in their + regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything + itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>FallbackNetworkstatusFile</strong> <em>FILENAME</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If Tor doesn’t have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this + one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to + learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn’t need to put load on the + authorities. (Default: None). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>WarnPlaintextPorts</strong> <em>port</em>,<em>port</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous + connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users + to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default: + 23,109,110,143). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>RejectPlaintextPorts</strong> <em>port</em>,<em>port</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor + will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None). +</p> +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_server_options">SERVER OPTIONS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort +is non-zero):</p></div> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>Address</strong> <em>address</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + The IP address or fully qualified domain name of this server (e.g. + moria.mit.edu). You can leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP + address. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AllowSingleHopExits</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop + proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is + the only hop in the circuit. Note that most clients will refuse to use + servers that set this option, since most clients have + ExcludeSingleHopRelays set. (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AssumeReachable</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1, + don’t do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor + immediately. If <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> is also set, this option + instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list + all connected servers as running. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>BridgeRelay</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections + from bridge users to the Tor network. It mainly causes Tor to publish a + server descriptor to the bridge database, rather than publishing a relay + descriptor to the public directory authorities. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ContactInfo</strong> <em>email_address</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Administrative contact information for server. This line might get picked + up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact that it’s an + email address. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ExitPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form + "<strong>accept</strong>|<strong>reject</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]". If /<em>MASK</em> is + omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving + a host or network you can also use "*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0). + <em>PORT</em> can be a single port number, an interval of ports + "<em>FROM_PORT</em>-<em>TO_PORT</em>", or "*". If <em>PORT</em> is omitted, that means + "*".<br /> +<br /> + For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*" would + reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept + anything else.<br /> +<br /> + To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8, + 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and + 172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address. + These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit + policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the + ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you’ve done + that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to + internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*", though that + may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its + public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details + about internal and reserved IP address space.<br /> +<br /> + This directive can be specified multiple times so you don’t have to put it + all on one line.<br /> +<br /> + Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you + want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with + either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you’re _augmenting_ + (prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is:<br /> +</p> +<div class="literalblock"> +<div class="content"> +<pre><tt>reject *:25^M +reject *:119^M +reject *:135-139^M +reject *:445^M +reject *:563^M +reject *:1214^M +reject *:4661-4666^M +reject *:6346-6429^M +reject *:6699^M +reject *:6881-6999^M +accept *:*</tt></pre> +</div></div> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ExitPolicyRejectPrivate</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP address, + at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy. + (Default: 1) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>MaxOnionsPending</strong> <em>NUM</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject + new ones. (Default: 100) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>MyFamily</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or + organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by + their identity fingerprints or nicknames. When two servers both declare + that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients will not use them in the + same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other servers in its + family; it doesn’t need to list itself, but it won’t hurt.) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>Nickname</strong> <em>name</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Set the server’s nickname to 'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 + characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9]. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>NumCPUs</strong> <em>num</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ORPort</strong> <em>PORT</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ORListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>] +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and + servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one + specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified + multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>PublishServerDescriptor</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>|<strong>v1</strong>|<strong>v2</strong>|<strong>v3</strong>|<strong>bridge</strong>,<strong>…</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as + a relay. You can + choose multiple arguments, separated by commas. +<br /> + If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its + descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you’re testing + out your server, or if you’re using a Tor controller that handles directory + publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptors of all + type(s) specified. The default is "1", + which means "if running as a server, publish the + appropriate descriptors to the authorities". +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ShutdownWaitLength</strong> <em>NUM</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When we get a SIGINT and we’re a server, we begin shutting down: + we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After <strong>NUM</strong> + seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immedi- + ately. (Default: 30 seconds) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AccountingMax</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>|<strong>TB</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting + period, or receive more than that number in the period. For example, with + AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB and receive 800 MB + and continue running. It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 + GB. When the number of bytes gets low, Tor will stop accepting new + connections and circuits. When the number of bytes + is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some + time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from waking at + the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in each period + before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation + is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a + collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more + useful than a set of slow servers that are always "available". +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AccountingStart</strong> <strong>day</strong>|<strong>week</strong>|<strong>month</strong> [<em>day</em>] <em>HH:MM</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Specify how long accounting periods last. If <strong>month</strong> is given, each + accounting period runs from the time <em>HH:MM</em> on the <em>dayth</em> day of one + month to the same day and time of the next. (The day must be between 1 and + 28.) If <strong>week</strong> is given, each accounting period runs from the time <em>HH:MM</em> + of the <em>dayth</em> day of one week to the same day and time of the next week, + with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If <strong>day</strong> is given, each + accounting period runs from the time <em>HH:MM</em> each day to the same time on + the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to + "month 1 0:00".) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ServerDNSResolvConfFile</strong> <em>filename</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in + <em>filename</em>. The file format is the same as the standard Unix + "<strong>resolv.conf</strong>" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options, + only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. + (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems + parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers. + Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until + it eventually succeeds. (Defaults to "1".) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ServerDNSSearchDomains</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain. + For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in + "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be + connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that + your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "0".) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ServerDNSDetectHijacking</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine + whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS + requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to + correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does + on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "1".) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ServerDNSTestAddresses</strong> <em>address</em>,<em>address</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When we’re detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these <em>valid</em> addresses + aren’t getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless, + and we’ll reset our exit policy to "reject <strong>:</strong>". This option only affects + name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to + "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org".) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames + containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an + exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve + URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does + on behalf of clients. (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>BridgeRecordUsageByCountry</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have + GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how many client + addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess + which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>ServerDNSRandomizeCase</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in + outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies. + This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack. + For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through + 0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server + does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>GeoIPFile</strong> <em>filename</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry. +</p> +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_directory_server_options">DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is, +if DirPort is non-zero):</p></div> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory + server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of + good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients + already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want + to set this option. Please coordinate with the other admins at + <a href="mailto:tor-ops@torproject.org">tor-ops@torproject.org</a> if you think you should be a directory. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>DirPortFrontPage</strong> <em>FILENAME</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on + the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing + to set up a separate webserver. There’s a sample disclaimer in + contrib/tor-exit-notice.html. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>V1AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor + generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy + Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>V2AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor + generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as + described in doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers running + 0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>V3AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor + generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as + described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers running at + least 0.2.0.x). +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of + Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each + version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2 + authorities provide this service optionally. See <strong>RecommendedVersions</strong>, + <strong>RecommendedClientVersions</strong>, and <strong>RecommendedServerVersions</strong>. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>NamingAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has + opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these + opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with + the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and fingerprint + has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers will refuse to + accept or publish descriptors that contradict a registered binding. See + <strong>approved-routers</strong> in the <strong>FILES</strong> section below. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>HSAuthoritativeDir</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is set in addition to + <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor also accepts and serves hidden + service descriptors. (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>HSAuthorityRecordStats</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is set in addition to <strong>HSAuthoritativeDir</strong>, + Tor periodically (every 15 minutes) writes statistics about hidden service + usage to a file <strong>hsusage</strong> in its data directory. (Default: + 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>HidServDirectoryV2</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service + descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients + connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>BridgeAuthoritativeDir</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor + accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main + networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>seconds</strong>|<strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>|<strong>days</strong>|<strong>weeks</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by + authoritative directories. (Default: 24 hours) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>DirPort</strong> <em>PORT</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Advertise the directory service on this port. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>DirListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>] +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind to + this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) + This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple + addresses/ports. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>DirPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the + directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above. +</p> +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_directory_authority_server_options">DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>RecommendedVersions</strong> <em>STRING</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be + safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the + directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear + multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When + this is set then <strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> should be set too. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>RecommendedClientVersions</strong> <em>STRING</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be + safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2 + directories. If this is not set then the value of <strong>RecommendedVersions</strong> + is used. When this is set then <strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> should + be set too. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>RecommendedServerVersions</strong> <em>STRING</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be + safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2 + directories. If this is not set then the value of <strong>RecommendedVersions</strong> + is used. When this is set then <strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> should + be set too. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>DirAllowPrivateAddresses</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address" + elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP + address, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AuthDirBadDir</strong> <em>AddressPattern…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that + will be listed as bad directories in any network status document this + authority publishes, if <strong>AuthDirListBadDirs</strong> is set. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AuthDirBadExit</strong> <em>AddressPattern…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that + will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority + publishes, if <strong>AuthDirListBadExits</strong> is set. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AuthDirInvalid</strong> <em>AddressPattern…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that + will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this + authority publishes. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AuthDirReject</strong> <em>AddressPattern</em>… +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that + will never be listed at all in any network status document that this + authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor + submitted for publication by this authority. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AuthDirListBadDirs</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some + opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory caches. (Do not set + this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning directories as bad; + otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared + directory.) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AuthDirListBadExits</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some + opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to + 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are + effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AuthDirRejectUnlisted</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server rejects + all uploaded server descriptors that aren’t explicitly listed in the + fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get hit with a Sybil + attack. (Default: 0) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr</strong> <em>NUM</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will + list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit". + (Default: 2) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr</strong> <em>NUM</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies + to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>V3AuthVotingInterval</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred voting + interval. Note that voting will <em>actually</em> happen at an interval chosen + by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time + SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>V3AuthVoteDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred delay + between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the + other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server’s + preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes.) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>V3AuthDistDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred delay + between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it has all the + signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used + is not the server’s preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. + (Default: 5 minutes.) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>V3AuthNIntervalsValid</strong> <em>NUM</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals + for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers + increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases + directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the + server’s preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at + least 2. (Default: 3.) +</p> +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_hidden_service_options">HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are used to configure a hidden service.</p></div> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>HiddenServiceDir</strong> <em>DIRECTORY</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service + must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple times to + specify multiple services. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>HiddenServicePort</strong> <em>VIRTPORT</em> [<em>TARGET</em>] +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this + option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most + recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to + the same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or + both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have + multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that + VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>PublishHidServDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won’t + advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if + you’re using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you. + (Default: 1) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>HiddenServiceVersion</strong> <em>version</em>,<em>version</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden + service. Currently, only version 2 is supported. (Default: 2) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient</strong> <em>auth-type</em> <em>client-name</em>,<em>client-name</em>,<em>…</em> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients + only. The auth-type can either be 'basic' for a general-purpose + authorization protocol or 'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also + hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are + listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names + are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no + spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for + clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be + found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in + their configuration file using <strong>HidServAuth</strong>. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>RendPostPeriod</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>seconds</strong>|<strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>|<strong>days</strong>|<strong>weeks</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous + service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also + uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 1 hour) +</p> +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_testing_network_options">TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.</p></div> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below, + so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if + non-default set of DirServers is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is running. + (Default: 0)<br /> +</p> +<div class="literalblock"> +<div class="content"> +<pre><tt>ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1^M +DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1^M +EnforceDistinctSubnets 0^M +AssumeReachable 1^M +AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0^M +AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0^M +ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0^M +ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0^M +V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes^M +V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds^M +V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds^M +TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes^M +TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds^M +TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds^M +TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes^M +TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes</tt></pre> +</div></div> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first + consensus has been created. Changing this requires that + <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 30 minutes) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Like TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before + the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that + <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 5 minutes) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Like TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before + the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that + <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 5 minutes) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers + are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires + that <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 30 minutes) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches after this + time. Changing this requires that <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: + 10 minutes) +</p> +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_signals">SIGNALS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph"><p>Tor catches the following signals:</p></div> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>SIGTERM</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>SIGINT</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled + slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting. + (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.) +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>SIGHUP</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing and + reopening logs), and kill and restart its helper processes if applicable. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>SIGUSR1</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and throughput. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>SIGUSR2</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels by + sending a SIGHUP. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>SIGCHLD</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited, so it + can clean up. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>SIGPIPE</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Tor catches this signal and ignores it. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>SIGXFSZ</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it. +</p> +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_files">FILES</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>@CONFDIR@/torrc</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<strong>@LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + The tor process stores keys and other data here. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/cached-status/</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority. + Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal + identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/cached-descriptors</strong> and <strong>cached-descriptors.new</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more + than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines + beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about + a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets + too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/cached-routers</strong> and <strong>cached-routers.new</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When + Tor can’t find the newer files, it looks here instead. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/state</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in + the file. These include: +</p> +<div class="ulist"><ul> +<li> +<p> +The current entry guards and their status. +</p> +</li> +<li> +<p> +The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see + below). +</p> +</li> +<li> +<p> +When the file was last written +</p> +</li> +<li> +<p> +What version of Tor generated the state file +</p> +</li> +<li> +<p> +A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router + descriptors. +</p> +</li> +</ul></div> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/bw_accounting</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts + and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file + is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the 'state' file as well. Only + used when bandwidth accounting is enabled. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/control_auth_cookie</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be + overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup. See + control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie authentication is + enabled. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/keys/</strong>* +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/fingerprint</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server’s identity key. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/approved-routers</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see + <strong>NamingAuthoritativeDirectory</strong>). This file lists nickname to identity + bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by + whitespace. See your <strong>fingerprint</strong> file in the <em>DataDirectory</em> for an + example line. If the nickname is <strong>!reject</strong> then descriptors from the + given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is + <strong>!invalid</strong> then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as + not valid, that is, not recommended. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/router-stability</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for + router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of + how to set their Stable flags. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<em>HiddenServiceDirectory</em><strong>/hostname</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service. + If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file + also contains authorization data for all clients. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<em>HiddenServiceDirectory</em><strong>/private_key</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + The private key for this hidden service. +</p> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +<em>HiddenServiceDirectory</em><strong>/client_keys</strong> +</dt> +<dd> +<p> + Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by + authorized clients. +</p> +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_see_also">SEE ALSO</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>privoxy</strong>(1), <strong>tsocks</strong>(1), <strong>torify</strong>(1)<br /></p></div> +<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>https://www.torproject.org/</strong></p></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_bugs">BUGS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph"><p>Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.</p></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_authors">AUTHORS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph"><p>Roger Dingledine [arma at mit.edu], Nick Mathewson [nickm at alum.mit.edu].</p></div> +</div> +</div> <!-- END MAINCOL --> - <div id = "sidecol"> +<div id = "sidecol"> #include "side.wmi" #include "info.wmi" - </div> - <!-- END SIDECOL --> </div> +<!-- END SIDECOL --> +</div> <!-- END CONTENT --> -#include <foot.wmi> +#include <foot.wmi>
Modified: website/trunk/docs/fr/sidenav.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/fr/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) +++ website/trunk/docs/fr/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435) @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ {'url' => 'docs/running-a-mirror', 'txt' => 'Configuring a Mirror', }, -# {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', -# 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', -# }, + {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', + 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', + }, {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual-dev', 'txt' => 'Tor -alpha Manual', },
Modified: website/trunk/docs/my/sidenav.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/my/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) +++ website/trunk/docs/my/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435) @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ {'url' => 'docs/running-a-mirror', 'txt' => 'Configuring a Mirror', }, -# {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', -# 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', -# }, + {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', + 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', + }, {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual-dev', 'txt' => 'Tor -alpha Manual', },
Modified: website/trunk/docs/pl/sidenav.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/pl/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) +++ website/trunk/docs/pl/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435) @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ {'url' => 'docs/running-a-mirror', 'txt' => 'Configuring a Mirror', }, -# {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', -# 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', -# }, + {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', + 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', + }, {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual-dev', 'txt' => 'Tor -alpha Manual', },
Modified: website/trunk/docs/ru/sidenav.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/ru/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) +++ website/trunk/docs/ru/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435) @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ {'url' => 'docs/running-a-mirror', 'txt' => 'Configuring a Mirror', }, -# {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', -# 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', -# }, + {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', + 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', + }, {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual-dev', 'txt' => 'Tor -alpha Manual', },
tor-commits@lists.torproject.org
-
Runa Sandvik