commit 7992eb43c5d9313ad66d9fea46121a47d0ca997c Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 3 13:01:59 2011 -0400 Log more loudly on a bad cert from an authority. Clock skew made this situation way too frequent so we demoted it to "protocol_warn", but when there's an authority, it should really just be warn. --- changes/bug4370 | 4 ++++ src/or/command.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug4370 b/changes/bug4370 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..168ec91 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug4370 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Log less loudly when we get an invalid certificate from a source other + than a directory authority: it's not unusual to see invalid certs + because of clock skew. Fixes bug 4370; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index a963d42..535c2ef 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -985,15 +985,24 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) } if (conn->handshake_state->started_here) { + int severity; if (! (id_cert && link_cert)) ERR("The certs we wanted were missing"); /* Okay. We should be able to check the certificates now. */ if (! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(conn->tls, link_cert)) { ERR("The link certificate didn't match the TLS public key"); } - if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, link_cert, id_cert, 0)) + /* Note that this warns more loudly about time and validity if we were + * _trying_ to connect to an authority, not necessarily if we _did_ connect + * to one. */ + if (router_digest_is_trusted_dir(conn->identity_digest)) + severity = LOG_WARN; + else + severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN; + + if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(severity, link_cert, id_cert, 0)) ERR("The link certificate was not valid"); - if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, id_cert, id_cert, 1)) + if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(severity, id_cert, id_cert, 1)) ERR("The ID certificate was not valid"); conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;