commit 3c2c6a61163cd6a42cc0eeee9fc43200b9f08503 Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Wed Sep 10 23:46:20 2014 -0400

In routerlist_assert_ok(), check r2 before taking &(r2->cache_info)

Technically, we're not allowed to take the address of a member can't exist relative to the null pointer. That makes me wonder how any sane compliant system implements the offsetof macro, but let's let sleeping balrogs lie.

Fixes 13096; patch on 0.1.1.9-alpha; patch from "teor", who was using clang -fsanitize=undefined-trap -fsanitize-undefined-trap-on-error -ftrapv --- changes/bug13096 | 4 ++++ src/or/routerlist.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/changes/bug13096 b/changes/bug13096 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..521faaf --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug13096 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (conformance): + - In routerlist_assert_ok(), don't take the address of a routerinfo's + cache_info member unless that routerinfo is non-NULL. Fixes bug + 13096; bugfix on 0.1.1.9-alpha. Patch by "teor". diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index b5e9245..32cbe19 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -4938,7 +4938,7 @@ routerlist_assert_ok(const routerlist_t *rl) } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(r); SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(rl->old_routers, signed_descriptor_t *, sd) { r2 = rimap_get(rl->identity_map, sd->identity_digest); - tor_assert(sd != &(r2->cache_info)); + tor_assert(!r2 || sd != &(r2->cache_info)); sd2 = sdmap_get(rl->desc_digest_map, sd->signed_descriptor_digest); tor_assert(sd == sd2); tor_assert(sd->routerlist_index == sd_sl_idx);