commit f6f897c365044bcb293726b4579358826ceb038c Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Thu Jul 7 10:08:45 2016 -0400

Add the twstrike guard selection draft as a separate proposal

Taken from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/twstrike/torspec/review/proposals/259-guar...

See editorial note for comment on why I'm not just dropping this in over prop259. --- proposals/000-index.txt | 2 + proposals/268-guard-selection.txt | 507 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 509 insertions(+)

diff --git a/proposals/000-index.txt b/proposals/000-index.txt index 23fc3dc..180ba4e 100644 --- a/proposals/000-index.txt +++ b/proposals/000-index.txt @@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ Proposals by number: 265 Load Balancing with Overhead Parameters [ACCEPTED] 266 Removing current obsolete clients from the Tor network [DRAFT] 267 Tor Consensus Transparency [DRAFT] +268 New Guard Selection Behaviour [DRAFT]

Proposals by status: @@ -213,6 +214,7 @@ Proposals by status: 260 Rendezvous Single Onion Services 266 Removing current obsolete clients from the Tor network 267 Tor Consensus Transparency + 268 New Guard Selection Behaviour NEEDS-REVISION: 190 Bridge Client Authorization Based on a Shared Secret NEEDS-RESEARCH: diff --git a/proposals/268-guard-selection.txt b/proposals/268-guard-selection.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9277dd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/proposals/268-guard-selection.txt @@ -0,0 +1,507 @@ +Filename: 268-guard-selection.txt +Title: New Guard Selection Behaviour +Author: Isis Lovecruft, George Kadianakis, [Ola Bini] +Created: 2015-10-28 +Status: Draft + + (Editorial note: this was origianlly written as a revision of + proposal 259, but it diverges so substantially that it seemed + better to assign it a new number for reference, so that we + aren't always talking about "The old 259" and "the new 259". -NM) + +§1. Overview + + Tor uses entry guards to prevent an attacker who controls some + fraction of the network from observing a fraction of every user's + traffic. If users chose their entries and exits uniformly at + random from the list of servers every time they build a circuit, + then an adversary who had (k/N) of the network would deanonymize + F=(k/N)^2 of all circuits... and after a given user had built C + circuits, the attacker would see them at least once with + probability 1-(1-F)^C. With large C, the attacker would get a + sample of every user's traffic with probability 1. + + To prevent this from happening, Tor clients choose a small number of + guard nodes (currently 3). These guard nodes are the only nodes + that the client will connect to directly. If they are not + compromised, the user's paths are not compromised. + + But attacks remain. Consider an attacker who can run a firewall + between a target user and the Tor network, and make + many of the guards they don't control appear to be unreachable. + Or consider an attacker who can identify a user's guards, and mount + denial-of-service attacks on them until the user picks a guard + that the attacker controls. + + In the presence of these attacks, we can't continue to connect to + the Tor network unconditionally. Doing so would eventually result + in the user choosing a hostile node as their guard, and losing + anonymity. + + This proposal outlines a new entry guard selection algorithm, which + addresses the following concerns: + + - Heuristics and algorithms for determining how and which guard(s) + is(/are) chosen should be kept as simple and easy to understand + as possible. + + - Clients in censored regions or who are behind a fascist firewall + who connect to the Tor network should not experience any + significant disadvantage in terms of reachability or usability. + + - Tor should make a best attempt at discovering the most + appropriate behaviour, with as little user input and + configuration as possible. + + +§2. Design + + Alice, an OP attempting to connect to the Tor network, should + undertake the following steps to determine information about the + local network and to select (some) appropriate entry guards. In the + following scenario, it is assumed that Alice has already obtained a + recent, valid, and verifiable consensus document. + + The algorithm is divided into four components such that the full + algorithm is implemented by first invoking START, then repeatedly + calling NEXT while adviced it SHOULD_CONTINUE and finally calling + END. For an example usage see §A. Appendix. + + Several components of NEXT can be invoked asynchronously. SHOULD_CONTINUE + is used for the algorithm to be able to tell the caller whether we + consider the work done or not - this can be used to retry primary + guards when we finally are able to connect to a guard after a long + network outage, for example. + + This algorithm keeps track of the unreachability status for guards + in state global to the system, so that repeated runs will not have + to rediscover unreachability over and over again. However, this + state does not need to be persisted permanently - it is purely an + optimization. + + The algorithm expects several arguments to guide its behavior. These + will be defined in §2.1. + + The goal of this algorithm is to strongly prefer connecting to the + same guards we have connected to before, while also trying to detect + conditions such as a network outage. The way it does this is by keeping + track of how many guards we have exposed ourselves to, and if we have + connected to too many we will fall back to only retrying the ones we have + already tried. The algorithm also decides on sample set that should + be persisted - in order to minimize the risk of an attacker forcing + enumeration of the whole network by triggering rebuilding of + circuits. + + +§2.1. Definitions + + Bad guard: a guard is considered bad if it conforms with the function IS_BAD + (see §G. Appendix for details). + + Dead guard: a guard is considered dead if it conforms with the function + IS_DEAD (see §H. Appendix for details). + + Obsolete guard: a guard is considered obsolete if it conforms with the + function IS_OBSOLETE (see §I. Appendix for details). + + Live entry guard: a guard is considered live if it conforms with the function + IS_LIVE (see §D. Appendix for details). + +§2.1. The START algorithm + + In order to start choosing an entry guard, use the START + algorithm. This takes four arguments that can be used to fine tune + the workings: + + USED_GUARDS + This is a list that contains all the guards that have been used + before by this client. We will prioritize using guards from this + list in order to minimize our exposure. The list is expected to + be sorted based on priority, where the first entry will have the + highest priority. + + SAMPLED_GUARDS + This is a set that contains all guards that should be considered + for connection. This set should be persisted between runs. It + should be filled by using NEXT_BY_BANDWIDTH with GUARDS as an + argument if it's empty, or if it contains less than SAMPLE_SET_THRESHOLD + guards after winnowing out older guards. + + N_PRIMARY_GUARDS + The number of guards we should consider our primary + guards. These guards will be retried more frequently and will + take precedence in most situations. By default the primary + guards will be the first N_PRIMARY_GUARDS guards from USED_GUARDS. + When the algorith is used in constrained mode (have bridges or entry + nodes in the configuration file), this value should be 1 otherwise the + proposed value is 3. + + DIR + If this argument is set, we should only consider guards that can + be directory guards. If not set, we will consider all guards. + + The primary work of START is to initialize the state machine depicted + in §2.2. The initial state of the machine is defined by: + + GUARDS + This is a set of all guards from the consensus. It will primarily be used + to fill in SAMPLED_GUARDS + + FILTERED_SAMPLED + This is a set that contains all guards that we are willing to connect to. + It will be obtained from calling FILTER_SET with SAMPLED_GUARDS as + argument. + + REMAINING_GUARDS + This is a running set of the guards we have not yet tried to connect to. + It should be initialized to be FILTERED_SAMPLED without USED_GUARDS. + + STATE + A variable that keeps track of which state in the state + machine we are currently in. It should be initialized to + STATE_PRIMARY_GUARDS. + + PRIMARY_GUARDS + This list keeps track of our primary guards. These are guards + that we will prioritize when trying to connect, and will also + retry more often in case of failure with other guards. + It should be initialized by calling algorithm + NEXT_PRIMARY_GUARD repeatedly until PRIMARY_GUARDS contains + N_PRIMARY_GUARDS elements. + + +§2.2. The NEXT algorithm + + The NEXT algorithm is composed of several different possibly flows. The + first one is a simple state machine that can transfer between two + different states. Every time NEXT is invoked, it will resume at the + state where it left off previously. In the course of selecting an + entry guard, a new consensus can arrive. When that happens we need + to update the data structures used, but nothing else should change. + + Before jumping in to the state machine, we should first check if it + was at least PRIMARY_GUARDS_RETRY_INTERVAL minutes since we tried + any of the PRIMARY_GUARDS. If this is the case, and we are not in + STATE_PRIMARY_GUARDS, we should save the previous state and set the + state to STATE_PRIMARY_GUARDS. + + +§2.2.1. The STATE_PRIMARY_GUARDS state + + Return each entry in PRIMARY_GUARDS in turn. For each entry, if the + guard should be retried and considered suitable use it. A guard is + considered to eligible to retry if is marked for retry or is live + and id not bad. Also, a guard is considered to be suitable if is + live and, if is a directory it should not be a cache. + + If all entries have been tried transition to STATE_TRY_REMAINING. + +§2.2.2. The STATE_TRY_REMAINING state + + Return each entry in USED_GUARDS that is not in PRIMARY_GUARDS in + turn.For each entry, if a guard is found return it. + + Return each entry from REMAINING_GUARDS in turn. + For each entry, if the guard should be retried and considered + suitable use it and mark it as unreachable. A guard is + considered to eligible to retry if is marked for retry or is live + and id not bad. Also, a guard is considered to be suitable if is + live and, if is a directory it should not be a cache. + + If no entries remain in REMAINING_GUARDS, transition to + STATE_PRIMARY_GUARDS. + + +§2.2.3. ON_NEW_CONSENSUS + + First, ensure that all guard profiles are updated with information + about whether they were in the newest consensus or not. + + Update the bad status for all guards in USED_GUARDS and SAMPLED_GUARDS. + Remove all dead guards from USED_GUARDS and SAMPLED_GUARDS. + Remove all obsolete guards from USED_GUARDS and SAMPLED_GUARDS. + +§2.3. The SHOULD_CONTINUE algorithm + + This algorithm takes as an argument a boolean indicating whether the + circuit was successfully built or not. + + After the caller have tried to build a circuit with a returned + guard, they should invoke SHOULD_CONTINUE to understand if the + algorithm is finished or not. SHOULD_CONTINUE will always return + true if the circuit failed. If the circuit succeeded, + SHOULD_CONTINUE will always return false, unless the guard that + succeeded was the first guard to succeed after + INTERNET_LIKELY_DOWN_INTERVAL minutes - in that case it will set the + state to STATE_PRIMARY_GUARDS and return true. + + +§2.4. The END algorithm + + The goal of this algorithm is simply to make sure that we keep track + of successful connections made. This algorithm should be invoked + with the guard that was used to correctly set up a circuit. + + Once invoked, this algorithm will mark the guard as used, and make + sure it is in USED_GUARDS, by adding it at the end if it was not there. + + +§2.5. Helper algorithms + + These algorithms are used in the above algorithms, but have been + separated out here in order to make the flow clearer. + + NEXT_PRIMARY_GUARD + - Return the first entry from USED_GUARDS that is not in + PRIMARY_GUARDS and that is in the most recent consensus. + - If USED_GUARDS is empty, use NEXT_BY_BANDWIDTH with + REMAINING_GUARDS as the argument. + + NEXT_BY_BANDWIDTH + - Takes G as an argument, which should be a set of guards to + choose from. + - Return a randomly select element from G, weighted by bandwidth. + + FILTER_SET + - Takes G as an argument, which should be a set of guards to filter. + - Filter out guards in G that don't comply with IS_LIVE (see + §D. Appendix for details). + - If the filtered set is smaller than MINIMUM_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE and G + is smaller than MAXIMUM_SAMPLE_SIZE_THRESHOLD, expand G and try to + filter out again. G is expanded by adding one new guard at a time using + NEXT_BY_BANDWIDTH with GUARDS as an argument. + - If G is not smaller than MAXIMUM_SAMPLE_SIZE_THRESHOLD, G should not be + expanded. Abort execution of this function by returning null and report + an error to the user. + + +§3. Consensus Parameters, & Configurable Variables + + This proposal introduces several new parameters that ideally should + be set in the consensus but that should also be possible to + set or override in the client configuration file. Some of these have + proposed values, but for others more simulation and trial needs to + happen. + + PRIMARY_GUARDS_RETRY_INTERVAL + In order to make it more likely we connect to a primary guard, + we would like to retry the primary guards more often than other + types of guards. This parameter controls how many minutes should + pass before we consider retrying primary guards again. The + proposed value is 3. + + SAMPLE_SET_THRESHOLD + In order to allow us to recognize completely unreachable network, + we would like to avoid connecting to too many guards before switching + modes. We also want to avoid exposing ourselves to too many nodes in a + potentially hostile situation. This parameter, expressed as a + fraction, determines the number of guards we should keep as the + sampled set of the only guards we will consider connecting + to. It will be used as a fraction for the sampled set. + If we assume there are 1900 guards, a setting of 0.02 + means we will have a sample set of 38 guards. + This limits our total exposure. Proposed value is 0.02. + + MINIMUM_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE + The minimum size of the sampled set after filtering out nodes based on + client configuration (FILTERED_SAMPLED). Proposed value is ???. + + MAXIMUM_SAMPLE_SIZE_THRESHOLD + In order to guarantee a minimum size of guards after filtering, + we expand SAMPLED_GUARDS until a limit. This fraction of GUARDS will be + used as an upper bound when expanding SAMPLED_GUARDS. + Proposed value is 0.03. + + INTERNET_LIKELY_DOWN_INTERVAL + The number of minutes since we started trying to find an entry + guard before we should consider the network down and consider + retrying primary guards before using a functioning guard + found. Proposed value 5. + +§4. Security properties and behavior under various conditions + + Under normal conditions, this algorithm will allow us to quickly + connect and use guards we have used before with high likelihood of + working. Assuming the first primary guard is reachable and in the + consensus, this algorithm will deterministically always return that + guard. + + Under dystopic conditions (when a firewall is in place that blocks + all ports except for potentially port 80 and 443), this algorithm + will try to connect to 2% of all guards before switching modes to try + dystopic guards. Currently, that means trying to connect to circa 40 + guards before getting a successful connection. If we assume a + connection try will take maximum 10 seconds, that means it will take + up to 6 minutes to get a working connection. + + When the network is completely down, we will try to connect to 2% of + all guards plus 2% of all dystopic guards before realizing we are + down. This means circa 50 guards tried assuming there are 1900 guards + in the network. + + In terms of exposure, we will connect to a maximum of 2% of all + guards plus 2% of all dystopic guards, or 3% of all guards, + whichever is lower. If N is the number of guards, and k is the + number of guards an attacker controls, that means an attacker would + have a probability of 1-(1-(k/N)^2)^(N * 0.03) to have one of their + guards selected before we fall back. In real terms, this means an + attacker would need to control over 10% of all guards in order to + have a larger than 50% chance of controlling a guard for any given client. + + In addition, since the sampled set changes slowly (the suggestion + here is that guards in it expire every month) it is not possible for + an attacker to force a connection to an entry guard that isn't + already in the users sampled set. + + +§A. Appendix: An example usage + + In order to clarify how this algorithm is supposed to be used, this + pseudo code illustrates the building of a circuit: + + ESTABLISH_CIRCUIT: + + if chosen_entry_node = NULL + if context = NULL + context = ALGO_CHOOSE_ENTRY_GUARD_START(used_guards, + sampled_guards=[], + options, + n_primary_guards=3, + dir=false, + guards_in_consensus) + + chosen_entry_node = ALGO_CHOOSE_ENTRY_GUARD_NEXT(context) + if not IS_SUITABLE(chosen_entry_node) + try another entry guard + + circuit = composeCircuit(chosen_entry_node) + return circuit + + ON_FIRST_HOP_CALLBACK(channel): + + if !SHOULD_CONTINUE: + ALGO_CHOOSE_ENTRY_GUARD_END(entryGuard) + else + chosen_entry_node = NULL + + +§B. Appendix: Entry Points in Tor + + In order to clarify how this algorithm is supposed to be integrated with + Tor, here are some entry points to trigger actions mentioned in spec: + + When establish_circuit: + + If *chosen_entry_node* doesn't exist + If *context* exist, populate the first one as *context* + Otherwise, use ALGO_CHOOSE_ENTRY_GUARD_START to initalize a new *context*. + + After this when we want to choose_good_entry_server, we will use + ALGO_CHOOSE_ENTRY_GUARD_NEXT to get a candidate. + + Use chosen_entry_node to build_circuit and handle_first_hop, + return this circuit + + When entry_guard_register_connect_status(should_continue): + + if !should_continue: + Call ALGO_CHOOSE_ENTRY_GUARD_END(chosen_entry_node) + else: + Set chosen_entry_node to NULL + + When new directory_info_has_arrived: + + Do ON_NEW_CONSENSUS + + +§C. Appendix: IS_SUITABLE helper function + + A guard is suitable if it satisfies all of the folowing conditions: + - It's considered to be live, according to IS_LIVE. + - It's a directory cache if a directory guard is requested. + - It's not the chosen exit node. + - It's not in the family of the chosen exit node. + + This conforms to the existing conditions in "populate_live_entry_guards()". + + +§D. Appendix: IS_LIVE helper function + + A guard is considered live if it satisfies all of the folowing conditions: + - It's not disabled because of path bias issues (path_bias_disabled). + - It was not observed to become unusable according to the directory or + the user configuration (bad_since). + - It's marked for retry (can_retry) or it's been unreachable for some + time (unreachable_since) but enough time has passed since we last tried + to connect to it (entry_is_time_to_retry). + - It's in our node list, meaninig it's present in the latest consensus. + - It has a usable descriptor (either a routerdescriptor or a + microdescriptor) unless a directory guard is requested. + - It's a general-purpose router unless UseBridges is configured. + - It's reachable by the configuration (fascist_firewall_allows_node). + + This conforms to the existing conditions in "entry_is_live()". + + A guard is observed to become unusable according to the directory or the + user configuration if it satisfies any of the following conditions: + - It's not in our node list, meaninig it's present in the latest consensus. + - It's not currently running (is_running). + - It's not a bridge and not a configured bridge + (node_is_a_configured_bridge) and UseBridges is True. + - It's not a possible guard and is not in EntryNodes and UseBridges is + False. + - It's in ExcludeNodes. Nevertheless this is ignored when + loading from config. + - It's not reachable by the configuration (fascist_firewall_allows_node). + - It's disabled because of path bias issues (path_bias_disabled). + + This conforms to the existing conditions in "entry_guards_compute_status()". + +§E. Appendix: UseBridges and Bridges configurations + + This is mutually exclusive with EntryNodes. + + If options->UseBridges OR options->EntryNodes: + - guards = populate_live_entry_guards() - this is the "bridge flavour" of + IS_SUITABLE as mentioned before. + - return node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(guards, WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD) + This is "choose a guard from S by bandwidth weight". + + UseBridges and Bridges must be set together. Bridges go to bridge_list (via + bridge_add_from_config()), but how is it used? + learned_bridge_descriptor() adds the bridge to the global entry_guards if + UseBridges = True. + + We either keep the existing global entry_guards OR incorporate bridges in the + proposal (remove non bridges from USED_GUARDS, and REMAINING_GUARDS = bridges?) + + If UseBridges is set as true, we need to fill the SAMPLED_GUARDS + with bridges specified and learned from consensus. + +§F. Appendix: EntryNodes configuration + + This is mutually exclusive with Bridges. + + The global entry_guards will be updated with entries in EntryNodes + (see entry_guards_set_from_config()). + + If EntryNodes is set, we need to fill the SAMPLED_GUARDS with + EntryNodes specified in options. + +§G. Appendix: IS_BAD helper function + + A guard is considered bad if is not included in the newest + consensus. + +§H. Appendix: IS_DEAD helper function + + A guard is considered dead if it's marked as bad for + ENTRY_GUARD_REMOVE_AFTER period (30 days) unless they have been disabled + because of path bias issues (path_bias_disabled). + +§I. Appendix: IS_OBSOLETE helper function + + A guard is considered obsolete if it was chosen by an Tor + version we can't recognize or it was chosen more than GUARD_LIFETIME ago. + +-*- coding: utf-8 -*-