commit cd678ae790b3bd7d5b278405e7690ea0f6f27346 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> Date: Thu Oct 9 15:12:36 2014 -0400 Remove is_router_version_good_for_possible_guard() The versions which this function would keep from getting the guard flag are already blocked by the minimum version check. Closes 13152. --- changes/bug13152 | 5 ++++ src/or/dirserv.c | 72 +----------------------------------------------------- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug13152 b/changes/bug13152 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6f3d61 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug13152 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Removed features (directory authority): + - Remove code that prevented authorities from listing Tor servers + affected by CVE-2011-2769 as guards. These servers are already + rejected altogether due to the minimum version requirement of + 0.2.3.16-alpha. Closes ticket 13152. diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index c8f47e6..9bc016f 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -2028,75 +2028,6 @@ get_possible_sybil_list(const smartlist_t *routers) return omit_as_sybil; } -/** Return non-zero iff a relay running the Tor version specified in - * <b>platform</b> is suitable for use as a potential entry guard. */ -static int -is_router_version_good_for_possible_guard(const char *platform) -{ - static int parsed_versions_initialized = 0; - static tor_version_t first_good_0_2_1_guard_version; - static tor_version_t first_good_0_2_2_guard_version; - static tor_version_t first_good_later_guard_version; - - tor_version_t router_version; - - /* XXX024 This block should be extracted into its own function. */ - /* XXXX Begin code copied from tor_version_as_new_as (in routerparse.c) */ - { - char *s, *s2, *start; - char tmp[128]; - - tor_assert(platform); - - /* nonstandard Tor; be safe and say yes */ - if (strcmpstart(platform,"Tor ")) - return 1; - - start = (char *)eat_whitespace(platform+3); - if (!*start) return 0; - s = (char *)find_whitespace(start); /* also finds '\0', which is fine */ - s2 = (char*)eat_whitespace(s); - if (!strcmpstart(s2, "(r") || !strcmpstart(s2, "(git-")) - s = (char*)find_whitespace(s2); - - if ((size_t)(s-start+1) >= sizeof(tmp)) /* too big, no */ - return 0; - strlcpy(tmp, start, s-start+1); - - if (tor_version_parse(tmp, &router_version)<0) { - log_info(LD_DIR,"Router version '%s' unparseable.",tmp); - return 1; /* be safe and say yes */ - } - } - /* XXXX End code copied from tor_version_as_new_as (in routerparse.c) */ - - if (!parsed_versions_initialized) { - /* CVE-2011-2769 was fixed on the relay side in Tor versions - * 0.2.1.31, 0.2.2.34, and 0.2.3.6-alpha. */ - tor_assert(tor_version_parse("0.2.1.31", - &first_good_0_2_1_guard_version)>=0); - tor_assert(tor_version_parse("0.2.2.34", - &first_good_0_2_2_guard_version)>=0); - tor_assert(tor_version_parse("0.2.3.6-alpha", - &first_good_later_guard_version)>=0); - - /* Don't parse these constant version strings once for every relay - * for every vote. */ - parsed_versions_initialized = 1; - } - - return ((tor_version_same_series(&first_good_0_2_1_guard_version, - &router_version) && - tor_version_compare(&first_good_0_2_1_guard_version, - &router_version) <= 0) || - (tor_version_same_series(&first_good_0_2_2_guard_version, - &router_version) && - tor_version_compare(&first_good_0_2_2_guard_version, - &router_version) <= 0) || - (tor_version_compare(&first_good_later_guard_version, - &router_version) <= 0)); -} - /** Extract status information from <b>ri</b> and from other authority * functions and store it in <b>rs</b>>. * @@ -2135,8 +2066,7 @@ set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(routerstatus_t *rs, ((options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee && routerbw_kb >= options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee/1000) || routerbw_kb >= MIN(guard_bandwidth_including_exits_kb, - guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits_kb)) && - is_router_version_good_for_possible_guard(ri->platform)) { + guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits_kb))) { long tk = rep_hist_get_weighted_time_known( node->identity, now); double wfu = rep_hist_get_weighted_fractional_uptime(