commit 2bcd264a28e2d6bec1e806e779bf82435c9c7505 Merge: 3930ffdf6 cb92d47de Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Fri Feb 16 09:48:11 2018 -0500
Merge branch 'maint-0.2.9' into maint-0.3.1
changes/bug24952 | 5 + changes/bug25223 | 4 + changes/ticket24902 | 13 + changes/ticket25122 | 4 + changes/ticket25202 | 4 + doc/tor.1.txt | 95 ++++++ src/common/address.c | 27 +- src/common/address.h | 2 + src/common/address_set.c | 129 +++++++ src/common/address_set.h | 35 ++ src/common/include.am | 2 + src/common/log.c | 2 +- src/common/torlog.h | 4 +- src/or/channel.c | 9 +- src/or/channel.h | 3 +- src/or/channeltls.c | 2 +- src/or/command.c | 13 + src/or/config.c | 25 ++ src/or/connection.c | 16 + src/or/dos.c | 794 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/dos.h | 140 ++++++++ src/or/geoip.c | 205 ++++++++++-- src/or/geoip.h | 29 ++ src/or/include.am | 2 + src/or/main.c | 2 + src/or/networkstatus.c | 13 +- src/or/nodelist.c | 78 +++++ src/or/nodelist.h | 3 + src/or/or.h | 33 ++ src/or/relay.c | 14 +- src/or/rendmid.c | 12 + src/or/status.c | 2 + src/test/include.am | 2 + src/test/test.c | 20 ++ src/test/test.h | 2 + src/test/test_address_set.c | 174 ++++++++++ src/test/test_dos.c | 497 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 37 files changed, 2371 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
diff --cc doc/tor.1.txt index c4c569836,a7ee7d11c..a6b4f2fc4 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@@ -2405,9 -2438,104 +2405,104 @@@ The following options are used to confi non-anonymous HiddenServiceSingleHopMode. Enables direct connections in the server-side hidden service protocol. If you are using this option, you need to disable all client-side services on your Tor instance, - including setting SOCKSPort to "0". - (Default: 0) + including setting SOCKSPort to "0". Can not be changed while tor is + running. (Default: 0)
+ DENIAL OF SERVICE MITIGATION OPTIONS + ------------------------------------ + + The following options are useful only for a public relay. They control the + Denial of Service mitigation subsystem. + + [[DoSCircuitCreationEnabled]] **DoSCircuitCreationEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: + + Enable circuit creation DoS mitigation. If enabled, tor will cache client + IPs along with statistics in order to detect circuit DoS attacks. If an + address is positively identified, tor will activate defenses against the + address. See the DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType option for more details. + This is a client to relay detection only. "auto" means use the consensus + parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0. + (Default: auto) + + [[DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections]] **DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections** __NUM__:: + + Minimum threshold of concurrent connections before a client address can be + flagged as executing a circuit creation DoS. In other words, once a client + address reaches the circuit rate and has a minimum of NUM concurrent + connections, a detection is positive. "0" means use the consensus + parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 3. + (Default: 0) + + [[DoSCircuitCreationRate]] **DoSCircuitCreationRate** __NUM__:: + + The allowed circuit creation rate per second applied per client IP + address. If this option is 0, it obeys a consensus parameter. If not + defined in the consensus, the value is 3. + (Default: 0) + + [[DoSCircuitCreationBurst]] **DoSCircuitCreationBurst** __NUM__:: + + The allowed circuit creation burst per client IP address. If the circuit + rate and the burst are reached, a client is marked as executing a circuit + creation DoS. "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the + consensus, the value is 90. + (Default: 0) + + [[DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType]] **DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType** __NUM__:: + + This is the type of defense applied to a detected client address. The + possible values are: + + 1: No defense. + 2: Refuse circuit creation for the DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod period of time. + + + "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, + the value is 2. + (Default: 0) + + [[DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod]] **DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**:: + + The base time period in seconds that the DoS defense is activated for. The + actual value is selected randomly for each activation from N+1 to 3/2 * N. + "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, + the value is 3600 seconds (1 hour). (Default: 0) + + [[DoSConnectionEnabled]] **DoSConnectionEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: + + Enable the connection DoS mitigation. For client address only, this allows + tor to mitigate against large number of concurrent connections made by a + single IP address. "auto" means use the consensus parameter. If not + defined in the consensus, the value is 0. + (Default: auto) + + [[DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount]] **DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount** __NUM__:: + + The maximum threshold of concurrent connection from a client IP address. + Above this limit, a defense selected by DoSConnectionDefenseType is + applied. "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the + consensus, the value is 100. + (Default: 0) + + [[DoSConnectionDefenseType]] **DoSConnectionDefenseType** __NUM__:: + + This is the type of defense applied to a detected client address for the + connection mitigation. The possible values are: + + 1: No defense. + 2: Immediately close new connections. + + + "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, + the value is 2. + (Default: 0) + + [[DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous]] **DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: + + Refuse establishment of rendezvous points for single hop clients. In other + words, if a client directly connects to the relay and sends an + ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell, it is silently dropped. "auto" means use the + consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0. + (Default: auto) + TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS -----------------------
diff --cc src/common/log.c index 6a5819064,4db1c9f0d..87c260799 --- a/src/common/log.c +++ b/src/common/log.c @@@ -1177,7 -1177,7 +1177,7 @@@ static const char *domain_list[] = "GENERAL", "CRYPTO", "NET", "CONFIG", "FS", "PROTOCOL", "MM", "HTTP", "APP", "CONTROL", "CIRC", "REND", "BUG", "DIR", "DIRSERV", "OR", "EDGE", "ACCT", "HIST", "HANDSHAKE", "HEARTBEAT", "CHANNEL", - "SCHED", "GUARD", "CONSDIFF", NULL - "SCHED", "DOS", NULL ++ "SCHED", "GUARD", "CONSDIFF", "DOS", NULL };
/** Return a bitmask for the log domain for which <b>domain</b> is the name, diff --cc src/common/torlog.h index 6e374b1c1,20b7d938f..0149ce9a5 --- a/src/common/torlog.h +++ b/src/common/torlog.h @@@ -99,12 -99,10 +99,14 @@@ #define LD_CHANNEL (1u<<21) /** Scheduler */ #define LD_SCHED (1u<<22) +/** Guard nodes */ +#define LD_GUARD (1u<<23) +/** Generation and application of consensus diffs. */ +#define LD_CONSDIFF (1u<<24) + /** Denial of Service mitigation. */ -#define LD_DOS (1u<<23) ++#define LD_DOS (1u<<25) /** Number of logging domains in the code. */ - #define N_LOGGING_DOMAINS 25 -#define N_LOGGING_DOMAINS 24 ++#define N_LOGGING_DOMAINS 26
/** This log message is not safe to send to a callback-based logger * immediately. Used as a flag, not a log domain. */ diff --cc src/or/channel.c index 2970b9679,54e10666d..9f652b584 --- a/src/or/channel.c +++ b/src/or/channel.c @@@ -2696,9 -2570,20 +2696,10 @@@ channel_do_open_actions(channel_t *chan router_set_status(chan->identity_digest, 1); } else { /* only report it to the geoip module if it's not a known router */ - if (!router_get_by_id_digest(chan->identity_digest)) { + if (!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(chan->identity_digest)) { if (channel_get_addr_if_possible(chan, &remote_addr)) { char *transport_name = NULL; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); if (chan->get_transport_name(chan, &transport_name) < 0) transport_name = NULL;
diff --cc src/or/config.c index f11c183b8,3b4027433..96cbbc7c7 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@@ -301,8 -240,21 +302,21 @@@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = OBSOLETE("DisableIOCP"), OBSOLETE("DisableV2DirectoryInfo_"), OBSOLETE("DynamicDHGroups"), - VPORT(DNSPort, LINELIST, NULL), - V(DNSListenAddress, LINELIST, NULL), + VPORT(DNSPort), + OBSOLETE("DNSListenAddress"), + /* DoS circuit creation options. */ + V(DoSCircuitCreationEnabled, AUTOBOOL, "auto"), + V(DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections, UINT, "0"), + V(DoSCircuitCreationRate, UINT, "0"), + V(DoSCircuitCreationBurst, UINT, "0"), + V(DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType, INT, "0"), + V(DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod, INTERVAL, "0"), + /* DoS connection options. */ + V(DoSConnectionEnabled, AUTOBOOL, "auto"), + V(DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount, UINT, "0"), + V(DoSConnectionDefenseType, INT, "0"), + /* DoS single hop client options. */ + V(DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous, AUTOBOOL, "auto"), V(DownloadExtraInfo, BOOL, "0"), V(TestingEnableConnBwEvent, BOOL, "0"), V(TestingEnableCellStatsEvent, BOOL, "0"), diff --cc src/or/include.am index 1ef5afa01,5108a08e5..5d5ff5c41 --- a/src/or/include.am +++ b/src/or/include.am @@@ -48,12 -43,9 +48,13 @@@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = src/or/dirvote.c \ src/or/dns.c \ src/or/dnsserv.c \ + src/or/dos.c \ src/or/fp_pair.c \ src/or/geoip.c \ + src/or/hs_intropoint.c \ + src/or/hs_circuitmap.c \ + src/or/hs_ntor.c \ + src/or/hs_service.c \ src/or/entrynodes.c \ src/or/ext_orport.c \ src/or/hibernate.c \ diff --cc src/or/main.c index 0d91803d4,fcd8dc902..197dfd430 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@@ -3239,8 -2990,7 +3240,9 @@@ tor_free_all(int postfork control_free_all(); sandbox_free_getaddrinfo_cache(); protover_free_all(); + bridges_free_all(); + consdiffmgr_free_all(); + dos_free_all(); if (!postfork) { config_free_all(); or_state_free_all(); diff --cc src/or/or.h index 95281e701,024a9cff0..9e7833386 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@@ -4562,22 -4515,34 +4566,51 @@@ typedef struct /** If 1, we skip all OOS checks. */ int DisableOOSCheck;
+ /** Autobool: Should we include Ed25519 identities in extend2 cells? + * If -1, we should do whatever the consensus parameter says. */ + int ExtendByEd25519ID; + + /** Bool (default: 1): When testing routerinfos as a directory authority, + * do we enforce Ed25519 identity match? */ + /* NOTE: remove this option someday. */ + int AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys; + + /** Bool (default: 0): Tells if a %include was used on torrc */ + int IncludeUsed; + + /** The seconds after expiration which we as a relay should keep old + * consensuses around so that we can generate diffs from them. If 0, + * use the default. */ + int MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs; ++ + /** Autobool: Is the circuit creation DoS mitigation subsystem enabled? */ + int DoSCircuitCreationEnabled; + /** Minimum concurrent connection needed from one single address before any + * defense is used. */ + int DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections; + /** Circuit rate used to refill the token bucket. */ + int DoSCircuitCreationRate; + /** Maximum allowed burst of circuits. Reaching that value, the address is + * detected as malicious and a defense might be used. */ + int DoSCircuitCreationBurst; + /** When an address is marked as malicous, what defense should be used + * against it. See the dos_cc_defense_type_t enum. */ + int DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType; + /** For how much time (in seconds) the defense is applicable for a malicious + * address. A random time delta is added to the defense time of an address + * which will be between 1 second and half of this value. */ + int DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod; + + /** Autobool: Is the DoS connection mitigation subsystem enabled? */ + int DoSConnectionEnabled; + /** Maximum concurrent connection allowed per address. */ + int DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount; + /** When an address is reaches the maximum count, what defense should be + * used against it. See the dos_conn_defense_type_t enum. */ + int DoSConnectionDefenseType; + + /** Autobool: Do we refuse single hop client rendezvous? */ + int DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous; } or_options_t;
/** Persistent state for an onion router, as saved to disk. */ diff --cc src/or/relay.c index a86ae9bc4,22ce76752..7a074d63d --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@@ -2618,11 -2469,15 +2618,15 @@@ static time_t last_time_under_memory_pr STATIC int cell_queues_check_size(void) { + time_t now = time(NULL); size_t alloc = cell_queues_get_total_allocation(); alloc += buf_get_total_allocation(); - alloc += tor_zlib_get_total_allocation(); + alloc += tor_compress_get_total_allocation(); const size_t rend_cache_total = rend_cache_get_total_allocation(); alloc += rend_cache_total; + const size_t geoip_client_cache_total = + geoip_client_cache_total_allocation(); + alloc += geoip_client_cache_total; if (alloc >= get_options()->MaxMemInQueues_low_threshold) { last_time_under_memory_pressure = approx_time(); if (alloc >= get_options()->MaxMemInQueues) { @@@ -2632,8 -2487,16 +2636,14 @@@ if (rend_cache_total > get_options()->MaxMemInQueues / 5) { const size_t bytes_to_remove = rend_cache_total - (size_t)(get_options()->MaxMemInQueues / 10); - rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(now, bytes_to_remove); - alloc -= rend_cache_total; - alloc += rend_cache_get_total_allocation(); + alloc -= hs_cache_handle_oom(time(NULL), bytes_to_remove); } + if (geoip_client_cache_total > get_options()->MaxMemInQueues / 5) { + const size_t bytes_to_remove = + geoip_client_cache_total - + (size_t)(get_options()->MaxMemInQueues / 10); + alloc -= geoip_client_cache_handle_oom(now, bytes_to_remove); + } circuits_handle_oom(alloc); return 1; } diff --cc src/or/rendmid.c index 23c3dedda,441d5043c..89739e129 --- a/src/or/rendmid.c +++ b/src/or/rendmid.c @@@ -11,7 -12,7 +12,8 @@@ #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuituse.h" #include "config.h" +#include "crypto.h" + #include "dos.h" #include "relay.h" #include "rendmid.h" #include "rephist.h" diff --cc src/test/include.am index d5ae0bec1,0ee3d1169..723b4964e --- a/src/test/include.am +++ b/src/test/include.am @@@ -104,7 -88,7 +105,8 @@@ src_test_test_SOURCES = src/test/test_controller.c \ src/test/test_controller_events.c \ src/test/test_crypto.c \ + src/test/test_crypto_openssl.c \ + src/test/test_dos.c \ src/test/test_data.c \ src/test/test_dir.c \ src/test/test_dir_common.c \ diff --cc src/test/test.c index 68f5f90fd,0fef69790..911ef0c24 --- a/src/test/test.c +++ b/src/test/test.c @@@ -1203,7 -1216,7 +1222,8 @@@ struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = { "control/", controller_tests }, { "control/event/", controller_event_tests }, { "crypto/", crypto_tests }, + { "crypto/openssl/", crypto_openssl_tests }, + { "dos/", dos_tests }, { "dir/", dir_tests }, { "dir_handle_get/", dir_handle_get_tests }, { "dir/md/", microdesc_tests }, diff --cc src/test/test.h index 6abaf39e6,028082386..ea1b16ade --- a/src/test/test.h +++ b/src/test/test.h @@@ -198,7 -191,7 +199,8 @@@ extern struct testcase_t container_test extern struct testcase_t controller_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t controller_event_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t crypto_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t crypto_openssl_tests[]; + extern struct testcase_t dos_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t dir_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t dir_handle_get_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t entryconn_tests[];
tor-commits@lists.torproject.org