commit db7bde08be59398488624bc377d1d5318182ee45 Author: Yawning Angel yawning@schwanenlied.me Date: Wed May 20 17:33:59 2015 +0000
Add "HiddenServiceMaxStreams" as a per-HS tunable.
When set, this limits the maximum number of simultaneous streams per rendezvous circuit on the server side of a HS, with further RELAY_BEGIN cells being silently ignored.
This can be modified via "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit", which if set will cause offending rendezvous circuits to be torn down instead.
Addresses part of #16052. --- changes/feature16052 | 5 +++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 10 +++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++------- src/or/config.c | 2 ++ src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 ++ src/or/or.h | 3 +++ src/or/rendservice.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/feature16052 b/changes/feature16052 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cd09b58 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/feature16052 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features (hidden service): + - Add the new options "HiddenServiceMaxStreams" and + "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit" to allow hidden services to limit + the maximum number of simultaneous streams per circuit, and optionally + tear down the circuit when the limit is exceeded. Part of ticket 16052. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 2bb5f94..13f2bdd 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -2149,6 +2149,16 @@ The following options are used to configure a hidden service. not an authorization mechanism; it is instead meant to be a mild inconvenience to port-scanners.) (Default: 0)
+[[HiddenServiceMaxStreams]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** __N__:: + The maximum number of simultaneous streams (connections) per rendezvous + circuit. (Setting this to 0 will allow an unlimited number of simultanous + streams.) (Default: 0) + +[[HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit** **0**|**1**:: + If set to 1, then exceeding **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** will cause the + offending rendezvous circuit to be torn down, as opposed to stream creation + requests that exceed the limit being silently ignored. (Default: 0) + [[RendPostPeriod]] **RendPostPeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index b54a4d2..a429a7d 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1189,17 +1189,28 @@ circuit_detach_stream(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn)
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + int removed = 0; if (conn == origin_circ->p_streams) { origin_circ->p_streams = conn->next_stream; - return; + removed = 1; + } else { + for (prevconn = origin_circ->p_streams; + prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn; + prevconn = prevconn->next_stream) + ; + if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) { + prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream; + removed = 1; + } } - - for (prevconn = origin_circ->p_streams; - prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn; - prevconn = prevconn->next_stream) - ; - if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) { - prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream; + if (removed) { + /* If the stream was removed, and it was a rend stream, decrement the + * number of streams on the circuit associated with the rend service. + */ + if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) { + tor_assert(origin_circ->rend_data); + origin_circ->rend_data->nr_streams--; + } return; } } else { diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 1030448..1c04578 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -286,6 +286,8 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { VAR("HiddenServiceVersion",LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL), VAR("HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient",LINELIST_S,RendConfigLines, NULL), VAR("HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts",LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL), + VAR("HiddenServiceMaxStreams",LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL), + VAR("HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit",LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL), V(HiddenServiceStatistics, BOOL, "0"), V(HidServAuth, LINELIST, NULL), V(CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"), diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index cc6e3d7..c63c350 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -2860,6 +2860,8 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) origin_circ->p_streams = n_stream; assert_circuit_ok(circ);
+ origin_circ->rend_data->nr_streams++; + connection_exit_connect(n_stream);
/* For path bias: This circuit was used successfully */ diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 5bb080f..af34967 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -818,6 +818,9 @@ typedef struct rend_data_t { /** List of HSDir fingerprints on which this request has been sent to. * This contains binary identity digest of the directory. */ smartlist_t *hsdirs_fp; + + /** Number of streams associated with this rendezvous circuit. */ + int nr_streams; } rend_data_t;
/** Time interval for tracking replays of DH public keys received in diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index daca4cc..5d2225e 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -147,6 +147,13 @@ typedef struct rend_service_t { /** If true, we don't close circuits for making requests to unsupported * ports. */ int allow_unknown_ports; + /** The maximum number of simultanious streams-per-circuit that are allowed + * to be established, or 0 if no limit is set. + */ + int max_streams_per_circuit; + /** If true, we close circuits that exceed the max_streams_per_circuit + * limit. */ + int max_streams_close_circuit; } rend_service_t;
/** Returns a escaped string representation of the service, <b>s</b>. @@ -539,6 +546,33 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only) log_info(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable=%d for %s", service->dir_group_readable, service->directory); + } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceMaxStreams")) { + service->max_streams_per_circuit = (int)tor_parse_long(line->value, + 10, 0, 65535, &ok, NULL); + if (!ok) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, + "HiddenServiceMaxStreams should be between 0 and %d, not %s", + 65535, line->value); + rend_service_free(service); + return -1; + } + log_info(LD_CONFIG, + "HiddenServiceMaxStreams=%d for %s", + service->max_streams_per_circuit, service->directory); + } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit")) { + service->max_streams_close_circuit = (int)tor_parse_long(line->value, + 10, 0, 1, &ok, NULL); + if (!ok) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, + "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit should be 0 or 1, not %s", + line->value); + rend_service_free(service); + return -1; + } + log_info(LD_CONFIG, + "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit=%d for %s", + (int)service->max_streams_close_circuit, service->directory); + } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient")) { /* Parse auth type and comma-separated list of client names and add a * rend_authorized_client_t for each client to the service's list @@ -3795,6 +3829,25 @@ rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(edge_connection_t *conn, serviceid, (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id); return -2; } + if (service->max_streams_per_circuit > 0) { + /* Enforce the streams-per-circuit limit, and refuse to provide a + * mapping if this circuit will exceed the limit. */ +#define MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL 600 + static struct ratelim_t stream_ratelim = + RATELIM_INIT(MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL); + if (circ->rend_data->nr_streams >= service->max_streams_per_circuit) { + log_fn_ratelim(&stream_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_REND, + "Maximum streams per circuit limit reached on rendezvous " + "circuit %u; %s. Circuit has %d out of %d streams.", + (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id, + service->max_streams_close_circuit ? + "closing circuit" : + "ignoring open stream request", + circ->rend_data->nr_streams, + service->max_streams_per_circuit); + return service->max_streams_close_circuit ? -2 : -1; + } + } matching_ports = smartlist_new(); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->ports, rend_service_port_config_t *, p, {
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