commit 343f7aa05967df43c3f7e5b392b66e21c08b7cb1 Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Fri Feb 15 17:24:13 2013 -0500
Make the guard lifetime configurable and adjustable via the consensus
Fixes 8240.
(Don't actually increase the default guard lifetime. It seems likely to break too many things if done precipitiously.) --- changes/ticket8240 | 4 ++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 6 ++++++ src/common/util.h | 11 +++++++++++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- src/or/config.c | 1 + src/or/or.h | 3 +++ 6 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/ticket8240 b/changes/ticket8240 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..91e6f8c --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket8240 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Major security fixes: + - Make the default guard lifetime controllable via a new + GuardLifetime torrc option and a GuardLifetime consensus + parameter. Start of a fix for bug 8240; bugfix on 0.1.1.11-alpha. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 773fccf..5cf5a71 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -959,6 +959,12 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers as long-term entries for our circuits. (Default: 3)
+**HeartbeatPeriod** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**:: + If nonzero, and UseEntryGuards is set, minimum time to keep a guard before + picking a new one. If zero, we use the GuardLifetime parameter from the + consensus directory. No value here may be less than 2 months or greater + than 5 years; out-of-range values are clamped. (Default: 0) + **SafeSocks** **0**|**1**:: When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an IP diff --git a/src/common/util.h b/src/common/util.h index 8977d27..4642e40 100644 --- a/src/common/util.h +++ b/src/common/util.h @@ -173,6 +173,17 @@ int n_bits_set_u8(uint8_t v); * overflow. */ #define CEIL_DIV(a,b) (((a)+(b)-1)/(b))
+/* Return <b>v</b> if it's between <b>min</b> and <b>max</b>. Otherwise + * return <b>min</b> if <b>v</b> is smaller than <b>min</b>, or <b>max</b> if + * <b>b</b> is larger than <b>max</b>. + * + * Requires that <b>min</b> is no more than <b>max</b>. May evaluate any of + * its arguments more than once! */ +#define CLAMP(min,v,max) \ + ( ((v) < (min)) ? (min) : \ + ((v) > (max)) ? (max) : \ + (v) ) + /* String manipulation */
/** Allowable characters in a hexadecimal string. */ diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index f8521c5..f07d428 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4203,6 +4203,9 @@ control_event_guard_deferred(void) #endif }
+/** Largest amount that we'll backdate chosen_on_date */ +#define CHOSEN_ON_DATE_SLOP (30*86400) + /** Add a new (preferably stable and fast) router to our * entry_guards list. Return a pointer to the router if we succeed, * or NULL if we can't find any more suitable entries. @@ -4241,7 +4244,7 @@ add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status, int prepend) * don't all select them on the same day, and b) avoid leaving a * precise timestamp in the state file about when we first picked * this guard. For details, see the Jan 2010 or-dev thread. */ - entry->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(3600*24*30); + entry->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(CHOSEN_ON_DATE_SLOP); entry->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(VERSION); if (prepend) smartlist_insert(entry_guards, 0, entry); @@ -4285,15 +4288,40 @@ entry_guard_free(entry_guard_t *e) tor_free(e); }
+/** + * Return the minimum lifetime of working entry guard, in seconds, + * as given in the consensus networkstatus. + */ +static int32_t +guards_get_lifetime(void) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); +#define DFLT_GUARD_LIFETIME (86400 * 60) /* Two months. */ +#define MIN_GUARD_LIFETIME (86400 * 60) /* Two months. */ +#define MAX_GUARD_LIFETIME (86400 * 1826) /* Five years. */ + + if (options->GuardLifetime >= 1) { + return CLAMP(MIN_GUARD_LIFETIME, + options->GuardLifetime, + MAX_GUARD_LIFETIME) + CHOSEN_ON_DATE_SLOP; + } + + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "GuardLifetime", + DFLT_GUARD_LIFETIME, + MIN_GUARD_LIFETIME, + MAX_GUARD_LIFETIME) + CHOSEN_ON_DATE_SLOP; +} + /** Remove any entry guard which was selected by an unknown version of Tor, * or which was selected by a version of Tor that's known to select - * entry guards badly, or which was selected more 2 months ago. */ + * entry guards badly, or which was selected a long time ago */ /* XXXX The "obsolete guards" and "chosen long ago guards" things should * probably be different functions. */ static int remove_obsolete_entry_guards(time_t now) { int changed = 0, i; + int32_t guard_lifetime = guards_get_lifetime();
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(entry_guards); ++i) { entry_guard_t *entry = smartlist_get(entry_guards, i); @@ -4324,8 +4352,8 @@ remove_obsolete_entry_guards(time_t now) } tor_free(tor_ver); } - if (!version_is_bad && entry->chosen_on_date + 3600*24*60 < now) { - /* It's been 2 months since the date listed in our state file. */ + if (!version_is_bad && entry->chosen_on_date + guard_lifetime < now) { + /* It's been too long since the date listed in our state file. */ msg = "was selected several months ago"; date_is_bad = 1; } diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 90a5dfb..6ccd65a 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = { #endif OBSOLETE("GiveGuardFlagTo_CVE_2011_2768_VulnerableRelays"), OBSOLETE("Group"), + V(GuardLifetime, INTERVAL, "0 minutes"), V(HardwareAccel, BOOL, "0"), V(HeartbeatPeriod, INTERVAL, "6 hours"), V(AccelName, STRING, NULL), diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 51c23d3..b54834d 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3605,6 +3605,9 @@ typedef struct { int PathBiasScaleFactor; /** @} */
+ /** How long (seconds) do we keep a guard before picking a new one? */ + int GuardLifetime; + } or_options_t;
/** Persistent state for an onion router, as saved to disk. */