commit 971f0f8e18c0f3ea9f2aa74a54951235269a1cd1 Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Tue May 19 16:14:20 2015 -0400
Remove code to support OpenSSL 0.9.8 --- changes/ticket16034 | 6 +++ src/common/crypto.c | 36 +++------------ src/common/tortls.c | 128 ++++----------------------------------------------- src/test/bench.c | 3 +- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 149 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/ticket16034 b/changes/ticket16034 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b909946 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket16034 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Removed features: + + - Tor no longer supports versions of OpenSSL before 1.0. (If you + are on an operating system that has not upgraded to OpenSSL 1.0 + or later, and you compile Tor from source, you will need to + install a more recent OpenSSL to link Tor against.) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index a68294a..0feed1c 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ #include "compat.h" #include "sandbox.h"
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,8) -#error "We require OpenSSL >= 0.9.8" +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0) +#error "We require OpenSSL >= 1.0.0" #endif
#ifdef ANDROID @@ -300,13 +300,6 @@ crypto_early_init(void) SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)); }
- if (SSLeay() < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)) { - log_notice(LD_CRYPTO, - "Your OpenSSL version seems to be %s. We recommend 1.0.0 " - "or later.", - crypto_openssl_get_version_str()); - } - crypto_force_rand_ssleay();
if (crypto_seed_rng(1) < 0) @@ -2423,15 +2416,6 @@ crypto_dh_free(crypto_dh_t *dh) * work for us too. */ #define ADD_ENTROPY 32
-/** True iff it's safe to use RAND_poll after setup. - * - * Versions of OpenSSL prior to 0.9.7k and 0.9.8c had a bug where RAND_poll - * would allocate an fd_set on the stack, open a new file, and try to FD_SET - * that fd without checking whether it fit in the fd_set. Thus, if the - * system has not just been started up, it is unsafe to call */ -#define RAND_POLL_IS_SAFE \ - (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'c')) - /** Set the seed of the weak RNG to a random value. */ void crypto_seed_weak_rng(tor_weak_rng_t *rng) @@ -2506,14 +2490,14 @@ crypto_seed_rng(int startup) int rand_poll_ok = 0, load_entropy_ok = 0; uint8_t buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
+ (void) startup; + /* OpenSSL has a RAND_poll function that knows about more kinds of * entropy than we do. We'll try calling that, *and* calling our own entropy * functions. If one succeeds, we'll accept the RNG as seeded. */ - if (startup || RAND_POLL_IS_SAFE) { - rand_poll_ok = RAND_poll(); - if (rand_poll_ok == 0) - log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "RAND_poll() failed."); - } + rand_poll_ok = RAND_poll(); + if (rand_poll_ok == 0) + log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "RAND_poll() failed.");
load_entropy_ok = !crypto_strongest_rand(buf, sizeof(buf)); if (load_entropy_ok) { @@ -3123,13 +3107,11 @@ openssl_dynlock_destroy_cb_(struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *v, tor_free(v); }
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0) static void tor_set_openssl_thread_id(CRYPTO_THREADID *threadid) { CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(threadid, tor_get_thread_id()); } -#endif
/** @{ */ /** Helper: Construct mutexes, and set callbacks to help OpenSSL handle being @@ -3144,11 +3126,7 @@ setup_openssl_threading(void) for (i=0; i < n; ++i) openssl_mutexes_[i] = tor_mutex_new(); CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(openssl_locking_cb_); -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0) - CRYPTO_set_id_callback(tor_get_thread_id); -#else CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback(tor_set_openssl_thread_id); -#endif CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_callback(openssl_dynlock_create_cb_); CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_callback(openssl_dynlock_lock_cb_); CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_callback(openssl_dynlock_destroy_cb_); diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index e0265b4..cc76537 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -75,8 +75,8 @@ #include "container.h" #include <string.h>
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,8) -#error "We require OpenSSL >= 0.9.8" +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0) +#error "We require OpenSSL >= 1.0.0" #endif
/* Enable the "v2" TLS handshake. @@ -93,10 +93,8 @@
#define ADDR(tls) (((tls) && (tls)->address) ? tls->address : "peer")
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'s') || \ - (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,9) && \ - OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f'))) -/* This is a version of OpenSSL before 0.9.8s/1.0.0f. It does not have +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f') +/* This is a version of OpenSSL before 1.0.0f. It does not have * the CVE-2011-4576 fix, and as such it can't use RELEASE_BUFFERS and * SSL3 safely at the same time. */ @@ -114,20 +112,6 @@ #define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x0010 #endif
-/** Does the run-time openssl version look like we need - * SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION? */ -static int use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 0; -/** Does the run-time openssl version look like we need - * SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION? */ -static int use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag = 0; -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) -/* If we have openssl 1.1, we just trust that the "mode" will work, and don't - * use the "flag" at all. Nobody would forward-port that weird little glitch - * from 0.9.8l to 1.1, would they? - */ -#define SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG -#endif - /** Structure that we use for a single certificate. */ struct tor_cert_t { X509 *cert; @@ -492,56 +476,6 @@ tor_tls_init(void)
version = SSLeay();
- /* OpenSSL 0.9.8l introduced SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION - * here, but without thinking too hard about it: it turns out that the - * flag in question needed to be set at the last minute, and that it - * conflicted with an existing flag number that had already been added - * in the OpenSSL 1.0.0 betas. OpenSSL 0.9.8m thoughtfully replaced - * the flag with an option and (it seems) broke anything that used - * SSL3_FLAGS_* for the purpose. So we need to know how to do both, - * and we mustn't use the SSL3_FLAGS option with anything besides - * OpenSSL 0.9.8l. - * - * No, we can't just set flag 0x0010 everywhere. It breaks Tor with - * OpenSSL 1.0.0beta3 and later. On the other hand, we might be able to - * set option 0x00040000L everywhere. - * - * No, we can't simply detect whether the flag or the option is present - * in the headers at build-time: some vendors (notably Apple) like to - * leave their headers out of sync with their libraries. - * - * Yes, it _is_ almost as if the OpenSSL developers decided that no - * program should be allowed to use renegotiation unless it first passed - * a test of intelligence and determination. - */ - if (version > OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'k') && version <= OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'l')) { - log_info(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s looks like version 0.9.8l, but " - "some vendors have backported renegotiation code from " - "0.9.8m without updating the version number. " - "I will try SSL3_FLAGS and SSL_OP to enable renegotation.", - SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)); - use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag = 1; - use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1; - } else if (version > OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'l')) { - log_info(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s looks like version 0.9.8m or later; " - "I will try SSL_OP to enable renegotiation", - SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)); - use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1; - } else if (version <= OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'k')) { - log_info(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s [%lx] looks like it's older than " - "0.9.8l, but some vendors have backported 0.9.8l's " - "renegotiation code to earlier versions, and some have " - "backported the code from 0.9.8m or 0.9.8n. I'll set both " - "SSL3_FLAGS and SSL_OP just to be safe.", - SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION), version); - use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag = 1; - use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1; - } else { - /* this is dead code, yes? */ - log_info(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s has version %lx", - SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION), version); - } - #if (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && \ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && \ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1)) @@ -1333,24 +1267,6 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, } #endif
- /* XXX This block is now obsolete. */ - if ( -#ifdef DISABLE_SSL3_HANDSHAKE - 1 || -#endif - SSLeay() < OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'s') || - (SSLeay() >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,9) && - SSLeay() < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f'))) { - /* And not SSL3 if it's subject to CVE-2011-4576. */ - log_info(LD_NET, "Disabling SSLv3 because this OpenSSL version " - "might otherwise be vulnerable to CVE-2011-4576 " - "(compile-time version %08lx (%s); " - "runtime version %08lx (%s))", - (unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT, - (unsigned long)SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)); - SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3); - } - SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
@@ -1361,7 +1277,7 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, /* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation * as authenticating any earlier-received data. */ - if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) { + { SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION); } @@ -1410,8 +1326,7 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, crypto_dh_get_dh_(dh)); crypto_dh_free(dh); } -#if (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && \ - OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)) +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) if (! is_client) { int nid; EC_KEY *ec_key; @@ -1769,10 +1684,6 @@ tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
if (tls) { tls->wasV2Handshake = 1; -#if (defined(USE_BUFFEREVENTS) && defined(SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTATION_FLAG)) - if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag) - tls->ssl->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; -#endif } else { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!"); } @@ -1780,7 +1691,6 @@ tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) } #endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0) /** Callback to get invoked on a server after we've read the list of ciphers * the client supports, but before we pick our own ciphersuite. * @@ -1818,9 +1728,6 @@ tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tor_tls_t *tls) { SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL); } -#else -#define tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tls) STMT_NIL -#endif
/** Explain which ciphers we're missing. */ static void @@ -2098,15 +2005,8 @@ tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls) { /* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation * as authenticating any earlier-received data. */ -#ifdef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG - if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag) { - tls->ssl->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; - } -#endif - if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) { - SSL_set_options(tls->ssl, - SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION); - } + SSL_set_options(tls->ssl, + SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION); }
/** If this version of openssl supports it, turn off renegotiation on @@ -2127,16 +2027,8 @@ tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls) void tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls) { -#ifdef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG - if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag) { - tor_assert(0 != (tls->ssl->s3->flags & - SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)); - } -#endif - if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) { - long options = SSL_get_options(tls->ssl); - tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)); - } + long options = SSL_get_options(tls->ssl); + tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)); }
/** Return whether this tls initiated the connect (client) or diff --git a/src/test/bench.c b/src/test/bench.c index 5cbc072..6909e73 100644 --- a/src/test/bench.c +++ b/src/test/bench.c @@ -502,8 +502,7 @@ bench_dh(void) " %f millisec each.\n", NANOCOUNT(start, end, iters)/1e6); }
-#if (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) \ - && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)) +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) #define HAVE_EC_BENCHMARKS static void bench_ecdh_impl(int nid, const char *name)