commit 85e8d6e829e89ff58302f4f628c70ff4e8de2f8a Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Thu May 10 18:20:09 2018 -0400
Appendix to rend-spec.txt about how to generate revision counters --- rend-spec-v3.txt | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 78 insertions(+)
diff --git a/rend-spec-v3.txt b/rend-spec-v3.txt index 728f38f..8b3996b 100644 --- a/rend-spec-v3.txt +++ b/rend-spec-v3.txt @@ -2396,3 +2396,81 @@ Appendix E. Managing authorized client data [CLIENT-AUTH-MGMT] [XXX what happens when people use both the control port interface and the filesystem interface?]
+Appendix F. Two methods for managing revision counters. + + Implementations MAY generate revision counters in any way they please, + so long as they are monotonically increasing over the lifetime of each + blinded public key. But to avoid fingerprinting, implementors SHOULD + choose a strategy also used by other Tor implementations. Here we + describe two, and additionally list some strategies that implementors + should NOT use. + + F.1. Increment-on-generation + + This is the simplest strategy, and the one used by Tor through at + least version 0.3.4.0-alpha. + + Whenever using a new blinded key, the service records the + highest revision counter it has used with that key. When generating + a descriptor, the service uses the smallest non-negative number + higher than any number it has already used. + + In other words, the revision counters under this system start fresh + with each blinded key as 0, 1, 2, 3, and so on. + + F.2. Encrypted time in period + + This scheme is what we recommend for situations when multiple + service instances need to coordinate their revision counters, + without an actual coordination mechanism. + + Let T be the number of seconds that have elapsed since the descriptor + became valid, plus 1. (T must be at least 1.) Implementations can use the + number of seconds since the start time of the shared random protocol run + that corresponds to this descriptor. + + Let S be a secret that all the service providers share. For + example, it could be the private signing key corresponding to the + current blinded key. + + Let K be an AES-256 key, generated as + K = H("rev-counter-generation" | S) + + Use K, and AES in counter mode with IV=0, to generate a stream of T + * 2 bytes. Consider these bytes as a sequence of T 16-bit + little-endian words. Add these words. + + Let the sum of these words be the revision counter. + + + Cryptowiki attributes roughly this scheme to G. Bebek in: + + G. Bebek. Anti-tamper database research: Inference control + techniques. Technical Report EECS 433 Final Report, Case + Western Reserve University, November 2002. + + Although we believe it is suitable for use in this application, it + is not a perfect order-preserving encryption algorithm (and all + order-preserving encryption has weaknesses). Please think twice + before using it for anything else. + + (This scheme can be optimized pretty easily by caching the encryption of + X*1, X*2, X*3, etc for some well chosen X.) + + For a slow reference implementation, see src/test/ope_ref.py in the + Tor source repository. [XXXX for now, see the same file in Nick's + "ope_hax" branch -- it isn't merged yet.] + + This scheme is not currently implemented in Tor. + + F.X. Some revision-counter strategies to avoid + + Though it might be tempting, implementations SHOULD NOT use the + current time or the current time within the period directly as their + revision counter -- doing so leaks their view of the current time, + which can be used to link the onion service to other services run on + the same host. + + Similarly, implementations SHOULD NOT let the revision counter + increase forever without resetting it -- doing so links the service + across changes in the blinded public key.