commit f0964628e6e6b4f5dda6df30fbb19f74c59eccfd Merge: de31c4757 7b4d9fabe Author: David Goulet dgoulet@torproject.org Date: Tue Feb 11 10:30:29 2020 -0500
Merge branch 'ticket33029_042_01' into ticket33029_043_03
Conflicts: doc/tor.1.txt src/app/config/config.c src/app/config/or_options_st.h src/core/mainloop/connection.h
Between 042 and 043, the dirauth options were modularized so this merge commit address this by moving the AuthDirRejectUncompressedRequests to the module along with a series of accessors.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet dgoulet@torproject.org
changes/ticket33029 | 5 + doc/tor.1.txt | 10 +- scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt | 2 +- src/core/mainloop/connection.c | 56 ++++---- src/core/mainloop/connection.h | 4 +- src/feature/dirauth/dirauth_config.c | 9 ++ src/feature/dirauth/dirauth_config.h | 4 + src/feature/dirauth/dirauth_options.inc | 7 + src/feature/dircache/dircache.c | 13 +- src/feature/nodelist/dirlist.c | 31 +++++ src/feature/nodelist/dirlist.h | 2 + src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c | 43 ++++-- src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.h | 2 + src/test/test_address_set.c | 15 ++- src/test/test_bwmgt.c | 217 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 15 files changed, 371 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
diff --cc scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt index 70e6a5519,7b15b37f8..d89b80c1b --- a/scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt +++ b/scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt @@@ -73,12 -68,12 +73,12 @@@ problem function-size /src/core/mainloo problem function-size /src/core/mainloop/connection.c:connection_buf_read_from_socket() 180 problem function-size /src/core/mainloop/connection.c:connection_handle_write_impl() 241 problem function-size /src/core/mainloop/connection.c:assert_connection_ok() 143 --problem dependency-violation /src/core/mainloop/connection.c 44 ++problem dependency-violation /src/core/mainloop/connection.c 47 problem dependency-violation /src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c 12 -problem include-count /src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c 63 +problem include-count /src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c 64 problem function-size /src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c:conn_close_if_marked() 108 problem function-size /src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c:run_connection_housekeeping() 123 -problem dependency-violation /src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c 49 +problem dependency-violation /src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c 50 problem dependency-violation /src/core/mainloop/mainloop_pubsub.c 1 problem dependency-violation /src/core/mainloop/mainloop_sys.c 1 problem dependency-violation /src/core/mainloop/netstatus.c 4 diff --cc src/core/mainloop/connection.c index 4a2dc21f1,50cd3810a..bfd850da8 --- a/src/core/mainloop/connection.c +++ b/src/core/mainloop/connection.c @@@ -91,6 -91,6 +91,7 @@@ #include "feature/control/control.h" #include "feature/control/control_events.h" #include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h" ++#include "feature/dirauth/dirauth_config.h" #include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h" #include "feature/dircommon/directory.h" #include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h" @@@ -3297,14 -3211,27 +3298,27 @@@ connection_dir_is_global_write_low(cons size_t smaller_bucket = MIN(token_bucket_rw_get_write(&global_bucket), token_bucket_rw_get_write(&global_relayed_bucket)); - if (authdir_mode(get_options()) && priority>1) - return 0; /* there's always room to answer v2 if we're an auth dir */ + + /* Special case for authorities (directory only). */ + if (authdir_mode_v3(get_options())) { + /* Are we configured to possibly reject requests under load? */ - if (!get_options()->AuthDirRejectRequestsUnderLoad) { ++ if (!dirauth_should_reject_requests_under_load()) { + /* Answer request no matter what. */ + return false; + } + /* Always answer requests from a known relay which includes the other + * authorities. The following looks up the addresses for relays that we + * have their descriptor _and_ any configured trusted directories. */ + if (nodelist_probably_contains_address(&conn->addr)) { + return false; + } + }
if (!connection_is_rate_limited(conn)) - return 0; /* local conns don't get limited */ + return false; /* local conns don't get limited */
if (smaller_bucket < attempt) - return 1; /* not enough space no matter the priority */ + return true; /* not enough space. */
{ const time_t diff = approx_time() - write_buckets_last_empty_at; diff --cc src/core/mainloop/connection.h index 0ab601d86,668c74004..bcd3d590a --- a/src/core/mainloop/connection.h +++ b/src/core/mainloop/connection.h @@@ -219,26 -196,23 +219,26 @@@ void connection_mark_all_noncontrol_lis void connection_mark_all_noncontrol_connections(void);
ssize_t connection_bucket_write_limit(struct connection_t *conn, time_t now); - int global_write_bucket_low(struct connection_t *conn, - size_t attempt, int priority); + bool connection_dir_is_global_write_low(const struct connection_t *conn, + size_t attempt); void connection_bucket_init(void); -void connection_bucket_adjust(const or_options_t *options); +void connection_bucket_adjust(const struct or_options_t *options); void connection_bucket_refill_all(time_t now, uint32_t now_ts); -void connection_read_bw_exhausted(connection_t *conn, bool is_global_bw); -void connection_write_bw_exhausted(connection_t *conn, bool is_global_bw); -void connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(connection_t *conn); -void connection_consider_empty_write_buckets(connection_t *conn); - -int connection_handle_read(connection_t *conn); - -int connection_buf_get_bytes(char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn); -int connection_buf_get_line(connection_t *conn, char *data, - size_t *data_len); -int connection_fetch_from_buf_http(connection_t *conn, +void connection_read_bw_exhausted(struct connection_t *conn, + bool is_global_bw); +void connection_write_bw_exhausted(struct connection_t *conn, + bool is_global_bw); +void connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(struct connection_t *conn); +void connection_consider_empty_write_buckets(struct connection_t *conn); + +int connection_handle_read(struct connection_t *conn); + +int connection_buf_get_bytes(char *string, size_t len, + struct connection_t *conn); +int connection_buf_get_line(struct connection_t *conn, char *data, + size_t *data_len); +int connection_fetch_from_buf_http(struct connection_t *conn, char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen, char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen, int force_complete); diff --cc src/feature/dirauth/dirauth_config.c index 3aeeab3b3,000000000..ca16dc842 mode 100644,000000..100644 --- a/src/feature/dirauth/dirauth_config.c +++ b/src/feature/dirauth/dirauth_config.c @@@ -1,461 -1,0 +1,470 @@@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * @file dirauth_config.c + * @brief Code to interpret the user's configuration of Tor's directory + * authority module. + **/ + +#include "orconfig.h" +#include "feature/dirauth/dirauth_config.h" + +#include "lib/encoding/confline.h" +#include "lib/confmgt/confmgt.h" +#include "lib/conf/confdecl.h" + +/* Required for dirinfo_type_t in or_options_t */ +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "app/config/config.h" + +#include "feature/dircommon/voting_schedule.h" +#include "feature/stats/rephist.h" + +#include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h" +#include "feature/dirauth/bwauth.h" +#include "feature/dirauth/dirauth_periodic.h" ++#include "feature/dirauth/dirauth_sys.h" +#include "feature/dirauth/dirvote.h" +#include "feature/dirauth/guardfraction.h" +#include "feature/dirauth/dirauth_options_st.h" + +/* Copied from config.c, we will refactor later in 29211. */ +#define REJECT(arg) \ + STMT_BEGIN *msg = tor_strdup(arg); return -1; STMT_END +#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ <= 3 +#define COMPLAIN(args...) \ + STMT_BEGIN log_warn(LD_CONFIG, args); STMT_END +#else +#define COMPLAIN(args, ...) \ + STMT_BEGIN log_warn(LD_CONFIG, args, ##__VA_ARGS__); STMT_END +#endif /* defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ <= 3 */ + +#define YES_IF_CHANGED_INT(opt) \ + if (!CFG_EQ_INT(old_options, new_options, opt)) return 1; + ++/** Return true iff we are configured to reject request under load for non ++ * relay connections. */ ++bool ++dirauth_should_reject_requests_under_load(void) ++{ ++ return !!dirauth_get_options()->AuthDirRejectRequestsUnderLoad; ++} ++ +/** + * Legacy validation/normalization function for the dirauth mode options in + * options. Uses old_options as the previous options. + * + * Returns 0 on success, returns -1 and sets *msg to a newly allocated string + * on error. + */ +int +options_validate_dirauth_mode(const or_options_t *old_options, + or_options_t *options, + char **msg) +{ + if (BUG(!options)) + return -1; + + if (BUG(!msg)) + return -1; + + if (!authdir_mode(options)) + return 0; + + /* confirm that our address isn't broken, so we can complain now */ + uint32_t tmp; + if (resolve_my_address(LOG_WARN, options, &tmp, NULL, NULL) < 0) + REJECT("Failed to resolve/guess local address. See logs for details."); + + if (!options->ContactInfo && !options->TestingTorNetwork) + REJECT("Authoritative directory servers must set ContactInfo"); + + if (options->UseEntryGuards) { + log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Authoritative directory servers can't set " + "UseEntryGuards. Disabling."); + options->UseEntryGuards = 0; + } + if (!options->DownloadExtraInfo && authdir_mode_v3(options)) { + log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Authoritative directories always try to download " + "extra-info documents. Setting DownloadExtraInfo."); + options->DownloadExtraInfo = 1; + } + if (!(options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir || + options->V3AuthoritativeDir)) + REJECT("AuthoritativeDir is set, but none of " + "(Bridge/V3)AuthoritativeDir is set."); + + /* If we have a v3bandwidthsfile and it's broken, complain on startup */ + if (options->V3BandwidthsFile && !old_options) { + dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths(options->V3BandwidthsFile, NULL, NULL, + NULL); + } + /* same for guardfraction file */ + if (options->GuardfractionFile && !old_options) { + dirserv_read_guardfraction_file(options->GuardfractionFile, NULL); + } + + if (!options->DirPort_set) + REJECT("Running as authoritative directory, but no DirPort set."); + + if (!options->ORPort_set) + REJECT("Running as authoritative directory, but no ORPort set."); + + if (options->ClientOnly) + REJECT("Running as authoritative directory, but ClientOnly also set."); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Legacy validation/normalization function for the dirauth schedule options + * in options. Uses old_options as the previous options. + * + * Returns 0 on success, returns -1 and sets *msg to a newly allocated string + * on error. + */ +int +options_validate_dirauth_schedule(const or_options_t *old_options, + or_options_t *options, + char **msg) +{ + (void)old_options; + + if (BUG(!options)) + return -1; + + if (BUG(!msg)) + return -1; + + if (!authdir_mode_v3(options)) + return 0; + + if (options->V3AuthVoteDelay + options->V3AuthDistDelay >= + options->V3AuthVotingInterval/2) { + REJECT("V3AuthVoteDelay plus V3AuthDistDelay must be less than half " + "V3AuthVotingInterval"); + } + + if (options->V3AuthVoteDelay < MIN_VOTE_SECONDS) { + if (options->TestingTorNetwork) { + if (options->V3AuthVoteDelay < MIN_VOTE_SECONDS_TESTING) { + REJECT("V3AuthVoteDelay is way too low."); + } else { + COMPLAIN("V3AuthVoteDelay is very low. " + "This may lead to failure to vote for a consensus."); + } + } else { + REJECT("V3AuthVoteDelay is way too low."); + } + } + + if (options->V3AuthDistDelay < MIN_DIST_SECONDS) { + if (options->TestingTorNetwork) { + if (options->V3AuthDistDelay < MIN_DIST_SECONDS_TESTING) { + REJECT("V3AuthDistDelay is way too low."); + } else { + COMPLAIN("V3AuthDistDelay is very low. " + "This may lead to missing votes in a consensus."); + } + } else { + REJECT("V3AuthDistDelay is way too low."); + } + } + + if (options->V3AuthNIntervalsValid < 2) + REJECT("V3AuthNIntervalsValid must be at least 2."); + + if (options->V3AuthVotingInterval < MIN_VOTE_INTERVAL) { + if (options->TestingTorNetwork) { + if (options->V3AuthVotingInterval < MIN_VOTE_INTERVAL_TESTING) { + /* Unreachable, covered by earlier checks */ + REJECT("V3AuthVotingInterval is insanely low."); /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */ + } else { + COMPLAIN("V3AuthVotingInterval is very low. " + "This may lead to failure to synchronise for a consensus."); + } + } else { + REJECT("V3AuthVotingInterval is insanely low."); + } + } else if (options->V3AuthVotingInterval > 24*60*60) { + REJECT("V3AuthVotingInterval is insanely high."); + } else if (((24*60*60) % options->V3AuthVotingInterval) != 0) { + COMPLAIN("V3AuthVotingInterval does not divide evenly into 24 hours."); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Legacy validation/normalization function for the dirauth testing options + * in options. Uses old_options as the previous options. + * + * Returns 0 on success, returns -1 and sets *msg to a newly allocated string + * on error. + */ +int +options_validate_dirauth_testing(const or_options_t *old_options, + or_options_t *options, + char **msg) +{ + (void)old_options; + + if (BUG(!options)) + return -1; + + if (BUG(!msg)) + return -1; + + if (!authdir_mode(options)) + return 0; + + if (!authdir_mode_v3(options)) + return 0; + + if (options->TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval + < MIN_VOTE_INTERVAL_TESTING_INITIAL) { + REJECT("TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval is insanely low."); + } else if (((30*60) % options->TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval) != 0) { + REJECT("TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval does not divide evenly into " + "30 minutes."); + } + + if (options->TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay < MIN_VOTE_SECONDS_TESTING) { + REJECT("TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay is way too low."); + } + + if (options->TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay < MIN_DIST_SECONDS_TESTING) { + REJECT("TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay is way too low."); + } + + if (options->TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay + + options->TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay >= + options->TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval) { + REJECT("TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay plus TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay " + "must be less than TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval"); + } + + if (options->TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset > + MIN(options->TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval, + options->V3AuthVotingInterval)) { + REJECT("TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset is higher than the voting " + "interval."); + } else if (options->TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset < 0) { + REJECT("TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset must be non-negative."); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Return true if changing the configuration from <b>old</b> to <b>new</b> + * affects the timing of the voting subsystem + */ +static int +options_transition_affects_dirauth_timing(const or_options_t *old_options, + const or_options_t *new_options) +{ + tor_assert(old_options); + tor_assert(new_options); + + if (authdir_mode_v3(old_options) != authdir_mode_v3(new_options)) + return 1; + if (! authdir_mode_v3(new_options)) + return 0; + + YES_IF_CHANGED_INT(V3AuthVotingInterval); + YES_IF_CHANGED_INT(V3AuthVoteDelay); + YES_IF_CHANGED_INT(V3AuthDistDelay); + YES_IF_CHANGED_INT(TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval); + YES_IF_CHANGED_INT(TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay); + YES_IF_CHANGED_INT(TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay); + YES_IF_CHANGED_INT(TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset); + + return 0; +} + +/** Fetch the active option list, and take dirauth actions based on it. All of + * the things we do should survive being done repeatedly. If present, + * <b>old_options</b> contains the previous value of the options. + * + * Return 0 if all goes well, return -1 if it's time to die. + * + * Note: We haven't moved all the "act on new configuration" logic + * into the options_act* functions yet. Some is still in do_hup() and other + * places. + */ +int +options_act_dirauth(const or_options_t *old_options) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + /* We may need to reschedule some dirauth stuff if our status changed. */ + if (old_options) { + if (options_transition_affects_dirauth_timing(old_options, options)) { + voting_schedule_recalculate_timing(options, time(NULL)); + reschedule_dirvote(options); + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/** Fetch the active option list, and take dirauth mtbf actions based on it. + * All of the things we do should survive being done repeatedly. If present, + * <b>old_options</b> contains the previous value of the options. + * + * Must be called immediately after a successful or_state_load(). + * + * Return 0 if all goes well, return -1 if it's time to die. + * + * Note: We haven't moved all the "act on new configuration" logic + * into the options_act* functions yet. Some is still in do_hup() and other + * places. + */ +int +options_act_dirauth_mtbf(const or_options_t *old_options) +{ + (void)old_options; + + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + int running_tor = options->command == CMD_RUN_TOR; + + if (!authdir_mode(options)) + return 0; + + /* Load dirauth state */ + if (running_tor) { + rep_hist_load_mtbf_data(time(NULL)); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** Fetch the active option list, and take dirauth statistics actions based + * on it. All of the things we do should survive being done repeatedly. If + * present, <b>old_options</b> contains the previous value of the options. + * + * Sets <b>*print_notice_out</b> if we enabled stats, and need to print + * a stats log using options_act_relay_stats_msg(). + * + * Return 0 if all goes well, return -1 if it's time to die. + * + * Note: We haven't moved all the "act on new configuration" logic + * into the options_act* functions yet. Some is still in do_hup() and other + * places. + */ +int +options_act_dirauth_stats(const or_options_t *old_options, + bool *print_notice_out) +{ + if (BUG(!print_notice_out)) + return -1; + + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + if (authdir_mode_bridge(options)) { + time_t now = time(NULL); + int print_notice = 0; + + if (!old_options || !authdir_mode_bridge(old_options)) { + rep_hist_desc_stats_init(now); + print_notice = 1; + } + if (print_notice) + *print_notice_out = 1; + } + + /* If we used to have statistics enabled but we just disabled them, + stop gathering them. */ + if (old_options && authdir_mode_bridge(old_options) && + !authdir_mode_bridge(options)) + rep_hist_desc_stats_term(); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Make any necessary modifications to a dirauth_options_t that occur + * before validation. On success return 0; on failure return -1 and + * set *<b>msg_out</b> to a newly allocated error string. + **/ +static int +dirauth_options_pre_normalize(void *arg, char **msg_out) +{ + dirauth_options_t *options = arg; + (void)msg_out; + + if (!options->RecommendedClientVersions) + options->RecommendedClientVersions = + config_lines_dup(options->RecommendedVersions); + if (!options->RecommendedServerVersions) + options->RecommendedServerVersions = + config_lines_dup(options->RecommendedVersions); + + if (config_ensure_bandwidth_cap(&options->AuthDirFastGuarantee, + "AuthDirFastGuarantee", msg_out) < 0) + return -1; + if (config_ensure_bandwidth_cap(&options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee, + "AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee", msg_out) < 0) + return -1; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Check whether a dirauth_options_t is correct. + * + * On success return 0; on failure return -1 and set *<b>msg_out</b> to a + * newly allocated error string. + **/ +static int +dirauth_options_validate(const void *arg, char **msg) +{ + const dirauth_options_t *options = arg; + + if (options->VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory && + (!options->RecommendedClientVersions || + !options->RecommendedServerVersions)) { + REJECT("Versioning authoritative dir servers must set " + "Recommended*Versions."); + } + + char *t; + /* Call these functions to produce warnings only. */ + t = format_recommended_version_list(options->RecommendedClientVersions, 1); + tor_free(t); + t = format_recommended_version_list(options->RecommendedServerVersions, 1); + tor_free(t); + + if (options->TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability > 2*60*60) { + COMPLAIN("TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability is insanely high."); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Declare the options field table for dirauth_options */ +#define CONF_CONTEXT TABLE +#include "feature/dirauth/dirauth_options.inc" +#undef CONF_CONTEXT + +/** Magic number for dirauth_options_t. */ +#define DIRAUTH_OPTIONS_MAGIC 0x41757448 + +/** + * Declare the configuration options for the dirauth module. + **/ +const config_format_t dirauth_options_fmt = { + .size = sizeof(dirauth_options_t), + .magic = { "dirauth_options_t", + DIRAUTH_OPTIONS_MAGIC, + offsetof(dirauth_options_t, magic) }, + .vars = dirauth_options_t_vars, + + .pre_normalize_fn = dirauth_options_pre_normalize, + .validate_fn = dirauth_options_validate +}; diff --cc src/feature/dirauth/dirauth_config.h index 2ebafd917,000000000..1ec599717 mode 100644,000000..100644 --- a/src/feature/dirauth/dirauth_config.h +++ b/src/feature/dirauth/dirauth_config.h @@@ -1,83 -1,0 +1,87 @@@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * @file dirauth_config.h + * @brief Header for feature/dirauth/dirauth_config.c + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_FEATURE_DIRAUTH_DIRAUTH_CONFIG_H +#define TOR_FEATURE_DIRAUTH_DIRAUTH_CONFIG_H + +struct or_options_t; + +#ifdef HAVE_MODULE_DIRAUTH + +#include "lib/cc/torint.h" + +int options_validate_dirauth_mode(const struct or_options_t *old_options, + struct or_options_t *options, + char **msg); + +int options_validate_dirauth_schedule(const struct or_options_t *old_options, + struct or_options_t *options, + char **msg); + +int options_validate_dirauth_testing(const struct or_options_t *old_options, + struct or_options_t *options, + char **msg); + +int options_act_dirauth(const struct or_options_t *old_options); +int options_act_dirauth_mtbf(const struct or_options_t *old_options); +int options_act_dirauth_stats(const struct or_options_t *old_options, + bool *print_notice_out); + ++bool dirauth_should_reject_requests_under_load(void); ++ +extern const struct config_format_t dirauth_options_fmt; + +#else /* !defined(HAVE_MODULE_DIRAUTH) */ + +/** When tor is compiled with the dirauth module disabled, it can't be + * configured as a directory authority. + * + * Returns -1 and sets msg to a newly allocated string, if AuthoritativeDir + * is set in options. Otherwise returns 0. */ +static inline int +options_validate_dirauth_mode(const struct or_options_t *old_options, + struct or_options_t *options, + char **msg) +{ + (void)old_options; + + /* Only check the primary option for now, #29211 will disable more + * options. */ + if (options->AuthoritativeDir) { + /* REJECT() this configuration */ + *msg = tor_strdup("This tor was built with dirauth mode disabled. " + "It can not be configured with AuthoritativeDir 1."); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +#define options_validate_dirauth_schedule(old_options, options, msg) \ + (((void)(old_options)),((void)(options)),((void)(msg)),0) +#define options_validate_dirauth_testing(old_options, options, msg) \ + (((void)(old_options)),((void)(options)),((void)(msg)),0) +#define options_validate_dirauth_testing(old_options, options, msg) \ + (((void)(old_options)),((void)(options)),((void)(msg)),0) + +#define options_act_dirauth(old_options) \ + (((void)(old_options)),0) +#define options_act_dirauth_mtbf(old_options) \ + (((void)(old_options)),0) + +#define options_act_dirauth_stats(old_options, print_notice_out) \ + (((void)(old_options)),((void)(print_notice_out)),0) + ++#define dirauth_should_reject_requests_under_load() (false) ++ +#endif /* defined(HAVE_MODULE_DIRAUTH) */ + +#endif /* !defined(TOR_FEATURE_DIRAUTH_DIRAUTH_CONFIG_H) */ diff --cc src/feature/dirauth/dirauth_options.inc index 5939010fe,000000000..21f4996c3 mode 100644,000000..100644 --- a/src/feature/dirauth/dirauth_options.inc +++ b/src/feature/dirauth/dirauth_options.inc @@@ -1,98 -1,0 +1,105 @@@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * @file dirauth_options.inc + * @brief Declare configuration options for the crypto_ops module. + **/ + +/** Holds configuration about our directory authority options. */ +BEGIN_CONF_STRUCT(dirauth_options_t) + +/** If non-zero, always vote the Fast flag for any relay advertising + * this amount of capacity or more. */ +CONF_VAR(AuthDirFastGuarantee, MEMUNIT, 0, "100 KB") + +/** If non-zero, this advertised capacity or more is always sufficient + * to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for the Guard flag. */ +CONF_VAR(AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee, MEMUNIT, 0, "2 MB") + +/** Boolean: are we on IPv6? */ +CONF_VAR(AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity, BOOL, 0, "0") + +/** True iff we should list bad exits, and vote for all other exits as + * good. */ +CONF_VAR(AuthDirListBadExits, BOOL, 0, "0") + +/** Do not permit more than this number of servers per IP address. */ +CONF_VAR(AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, POSINT, 0, "2") + +/** Boolean: Do we enforce key-pinning? */ +CONF_VAR(AuthDirPinKeys, BOOL, 0, "1") + +/** Bool (default: 1): Switch for the shared random protocol. Only + * relevant to a directory authority. If off, the authority won't + * participate in the protocol. If on (default), a flag is added to the + * vote indicating participation. */ +CONF_VAR(AuthDirSharedRandomness, BOOL, 0, "1") + +/** Bool (default: 1): When testing routerinfos as a directory authority, + * do we enforce Ed25519 identity match? */ +/* NOTE: remove this option someday. */ +CONF_VAR(AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys, BOOL, 0, "1") + +/** Authority only: key=value pairs that we add to our networkstatus + * consensus vote on the 'params' line. */ +CONF_VAR(ConsensusParams, STRING, 0, NULL) + +/** Authority only: minimum number of measured bandwidths we must see + * before we only believe measured bandwidths to assign flags. */ +CONF_VAR(MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised, INT, 0, "500") + +/** As directory authority, accept hidden service directories after what + * time? */ +CONF_VAR(MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2, INTERVAL, 0, "96 hours") + +/** Which versions of tor should we tell users to run? */ +CONF_VAR(RecommendedVersions, LINELIST, 0, NULL) + +/** Which versions of tor should we tell users to run on clients? */ +CONF_VAR(RecommendedClientVersions, LINELIST, 0, NULL) + +/** Which versions of tor should we tell users to run on relays? */ +CONF_VAR(RecommendedServerVersions, LINELIST, 0, NULL) + +/** If an authority has been around for less than this amount of time, it + * does not believe its reachability information is accurate. Only + * altered on testing networks. */ +CONF_VAR(TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability, INTERVAL, 0, "30 minutes") + + /** Relays in a testing network which should be voted Exit + * regardless of exit policy. */ +CONF_VAR(TestingDirAuthVoteExit, ROUTERSET, 0, NULL) +CONF_VAR(TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict, BOOL, 0, "0") + +/** Relays in a testing network which should be voted Guard + * regardless of uptime and bandwidth. */ +CONF_VAR(TestingDirAuthVoteGuard, ROUTERSET, 0, NULL) +CONF_VAR(TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict, BOOL, 0, "0") + +/** Relays in a testing network which should be voted HSDir + * regardless of uptime and DirPort. */ +CONF_VAR(TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir, ROUTERSET, 0, NULL) +CONF_VAR(TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict, BOOL, 0, "0") + +/** Minimum value for the Exit flag threshold on testing networks. */ +CONF_VAR(TestingMinExitFlagThreshold, MEMUNIT, 0, "0") + +/** Minimum value for the Fast flag threshold on testing networks. */ +CONF_VAR(TestingMinFastFlagThreshold, MEMUNIT, 0, "0") + +/** Boolean: is this an authoritative directory that's willing to recommend + * versions? */ +CONF_VAR(VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory, BOOL, 0, "0") + ++/** Boolean: Under bandwidth pressure, if set to 1, the authority will always ++ * answer directory requests from relays but will start sending 503 error code ++ * for the other connections. If set to 0, all connections are considered the ++ * same and the authority will try to answer them all regardless of bandwidth ++ * pressure or not. */ ++CONF_VAR(AuthDirRejectRequestsUnderLoad, BOOL, 0, "1") ++ +END_CONF_STRUCT(dirauth_options_t) diff --cc src/test/test_bwmgt.c index 1da379698,e6f028ed7..117783caf --- a/src/test/test_bwmgt.c +++ b/src/test/test_bwmgt.c @@@ -6,12 -6,30 +6,33 @@@ * \brief tests for bandwidth management / token bucket functions */
+ #define CONFIG_PRIVATE + #define CONNECTION_PRIVATE ++#define DIRAUTH_SYS_PRIVATE #define TOKEN_BUCKET_PRIVATE
#include "core/or/or.h" - #include "test/test.h"
+ #include "app/config/config.h" + #include "core/mainloop/connection.h" ++#include "feature/dirauth/dirauth_sys.h" + #include "feature/dircommon/directory.h" + #include "feature/nodelist/microdesc.h" + #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" + #include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h" + #include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h" + #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/evloop/token_bucket.h" + #include "test/test.h" + #include "test/test_helpers.h" + + #include "app/config/or_options_st.h" + #include "core/or/connection_st.h" ++#include "feature/dirauth/dirauth_options_st.h" + #include "feature/nodelist/microdesc_st.h" + #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h" + #include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h" + #include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h"
// an imaginary time, in timestamp units. Chosen so it will roll over. static const uint32_t START_TS = UINT32_MAX-10; @@@ -220,8 -269,162 +272,167 @@@ test_bwmgt_token_buf_helpers(void *arg ; }
+ static void + test_bwmgt_dir_conn_global_write_low(void *arg) + { + bool ret; + int addr_family; + connection_t *conn = NULL; + routerstatus_t *rs = NULL; microdesc_t *md = NULL; routerinfo_t *ri = NULL; + tor_addr_t relay_addr; ++ dirauth_options_t *dirauth_opts = NULL; + + (void) arg; + + memset(&mock_options, 0, sizeof(or_options_t)); + MOCK(networkstatus_get_latest_consensus, + mock_networkstatus_get_latest_consensus); + MOCK(networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor, + mock_networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor); + MOCK(get_estimated_address_per_node, + mock_get_estimated_address_per_node); + + /* + * The following is rather complex but that is what it takes to add a dummy + * consensus with a valid routerlist which will populate our node address + * set that we need to lookup to test the known relay code path. + * + * We MUST do that before we MOCK(get_options) else it is another world of + * complexity. + */ + + /* This will be the address of our relay. */ + tor_addr_parse(&relay_addr, "1.2.3.4"); + + /* We'll now add a relay into our routerlist and see if we let it. */ + dummy_ns = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*dummy_ns)); + dummy_ns->flavor = FLAV_MICRODESC; + dummy_ns->routerstatus_list = smartlist_new(); + + md = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*md)); + ri = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ri)); + rs = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*rs)); + crypto_rand(rs->identity_digest, sizeof(rs->identity_digest)); + crypto_rand(md->digest, sizeof(md->digest)); + memcpy(rs->descriptor_digest, md->digest, DIGEST256_LEN); + + /* Set IP address. */ + rs->addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&relay_addr); + ri->addr = rs->addr; + /* Add the rs to the consensus becoming a node_t. */ + smartlist_add(dummy_ns->routerstatus_list, rs); + + /* Add all configured authorities (hardcoded) before we set the consensus so + * the address set exists. */ + ret = consider_adding_dir_servers(&mock_options, &mock_options); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + /* This will make the nodelist bloom filter very large + * (the_nodelist->node_addrs) so we will fail the contain test rarely. */ + addr_per_node = 1024; + + nodelist_set_consensus(dummy_ns); + ++ dirauth_opts = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(dirauth_options_t)); ++ dirauth_opts->AuthDirRejectRequestsUnderLoad = 0; ++ dirauth_set_options(dirauth_opts); ++ + /* Ok, now time to control which options we use. */ + MOCK(get_options, mock_get_options); + + /* Set ourselves as an authoritative dir. */ + mock_options.AuthoritativeDir = 1; + mock_options.V3AuthoritativeDir = 1; + mock_options.UseDefaultFallbackDirs = 0; + + /* This will set our global bucket to 1 byte and thus we will hit the + * banwdith limit in our test. */ + mock_options.BandwidthRate = 1; + mock_options.BandwidthBurst = 1; + + /* Else an IPv4 address screams. */ + mock_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 1; + mock_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 1; + + /* Initialize the global buckets. */ + connection_bucket_init(); + + /* The address "127.0.0.1" is set with this helper. */ + conn = test_conn_get_connection(DIR_CONN_STATE_MIN_, CONN_TYPE_DIR, + DIR_PURPOSE_MIN_); + tt_assert(conn); + + /* First try a non authority non relay IP thus a client but we are not + * configured to reject requests under load so we should get a false value + * that our limit is _not_ low. */ + addr_family = tor_addr_parse(&conn->addr, "1.1.1.1"); + tt_int_op(addr_family, OP_EQ, AF_INET); + ret = connection_dir_is_global_write_low(conn, INT_MAX); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + /* Now, we will reject requests under load so try again a non authority non + * relay IP thus a client. We should get a warning that our limit is too + * low. */ - mock_options.AuthDirRejectRequestsUnderLoad = 1; ++ dirauth_opts->AuthDirRejectRequestsUnderLoad = 1; + + addr_family = tor_addr_parse(&conn->addr, "1.1.1.1"); + tt_int_op(addr_family, OP_EQ, AF_INET); + ret = connection_dir_is_global_write_low(conn, INT_MAX); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + /* Now, lets try with a connection address from moria1. It should always + * pass even though our limit is too low. */ + addr_family = tor_addr_parse(&conn->addr, "128.31.0.39"); + tt_int_op(addr_family, OP_EQ, AF_INET); + ret = connection_dir_is_global_write_low(conn, INT_MAX); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + /* IPv6 testing of gabelmoo. */ + addr_family = tor_addr_parse(&conn->addr, "[2001:638:a000:4140::ffff:189]"); + tt_int_op(addr_family, OP_EQ, AF_INET6); + ret = connection_dir_is_global_write_low(conn, INT_MAX); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + /* Lets retry with a known relay address. It should pass. Possible due to + * our consensus setting above. */ + memcpy(&conn->addr, &relay_addr, sizeof(tor_addr_t)); + ret = connection_dir_is_global_write_low(conn, INT_MAX); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + /* Lets retry with a random IP that is not an authority nor a relay. */ + addr_family = tor_addr_parse(&conn->addr, "1.2.3.4"); + tt_int_op(addr_family, OP_EQ, AF_INET); + ret = connection_dir_is_global_write_low(conn, INT_MAX); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + /* Finally, just make sure it still denies an IP if we are _not_ a v3 + * directory authority. */ + mock_options.V3AuthoritativeDir = 0; + addr_family = tor_addr_parse(&conn->addr, "1.2.3.4"); + tt_int_op(addr_family, OP_EQ, AF_INET); + ret = connection_dir_is_global_write_low(conn, INT_MAX); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + /* Random IPv6 should not be allowed. */ + addr_family = tor_addr_parse(&conn->addr, "[CAFE::ACAB]"); + tt_int_op(addr_family, OP_EQ, AF_INET6); + ret = connection_dir_is_global_write_low(conn, INT_MAX); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + done: + connection_free_minimal(conn); + routerstatus_free(rs); routerinfo_free(ri); microdesc_free(md); + smartlist_clear(dummy_ns->routerstatus_list); + networkstatus_vote_free(dummy_ns); + + UNMOCK(get_estimated_address_per_node); + UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_latest_consensus); + UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor); + UNMOCK(get_options); + } + #define BWMGT(name) \ - { #name, test_bwmgt_ ## name , 0, NULL, NULL } + { #name, test_bwmgt_ ## name , TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }
struct testcase_t bwmgt_tests[] = { BWMGT(token_buf_init),